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Abstract

A decade of political unrest over the question of parliamentary taxation resulted in the
development of an alternate political structure of committees and congresses in the province
of New York. By 1776, a revolutionary government led by the Provincial Congress controlled the
province. Upon learning of the Declaration of Independence, the New York Provincial Congress
declared independence from the British. Within months of this declaration, southern New York
was occupied by British troops, and remained under British control for the duration of the
Revolutionary War. The area was under martial law for the duration. Britain’s loss of the
Saratoga Campaign brought French entry into the war, and a major strategic reassessment as
the American colonies became to the British but one front—and not even the most
important—in a world war with France (and later others). A peace commission led by the Earl
of Carlisle was sent to America, spending time in Philadelphia and New York, but its proposals
were met with contempt. Partially as a result of the failed mission, a new strategy was
developed for fighting the war by the British. A major part of this new strategy was the
restoration of civilian government to the province of New York. It was hoped that, among other
things, this would showcase Britain’s desire to, rather than impose a tyranny, restore free
government to the colonies. General James Robertson was chosen to be the new governor,
arriving in 1780, but was unable to implement the strategy because of opposition by Sir Henry
Clinton, the commander of Britain’s forces in America.

The dissertation examines the developing break with Britain, the occupation, and the
failure of the attempt to restore civilian government it. The dissertation examines the effect
that various appalling, violent or questionable acts by British troops or officers had on the
people of New York, and discusses briefly how British military actions and the occupation
affected the developing independent New York government. It contrasts events in Georgia,
where civilian government, complete with an assembly was created, with events in New York.
Lastly, the dissertation examines the question of whether the restoration of civilian government
was just too late in 1780 to have been an effective strategy to win back the loyalties of New
Yorkers and Americans, even if civilian government had been restored.
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Introduction

I. Basic Statement of Question

A decade-long constitutional dispute between Britain and her colonies in the Western
hemisphere culminated with thirteen of her mainland colonies declaring independence in July
of 1776. The triggering cause was the question of the right of Parliament to tax the colonies.
The colonies were represented in London by agents, the functional equivalent of lobbyists, but
they had no members in Parliament. The colonies rejected the assertions of some members of
Parliament that they were “virtually represented” in Parliament; they did not see how the
interests of, for example, New York could be represented or even understood by a Member of
Parliament from Cornwall or Newcastle. The colonists believed that they were thus
unrepresented in Parliament and that there could be no taxation without some form of
representation. Taxes were supposed to be free gifts from the commons, the ordinary people,
through their members of Parliament in the House of Commons to the king, and the colonists
had no representatives in Parliament.1

1

William Pitt the Elder during the Stamp Act Crisis argued that Americans were “the sons, not the bastards, of
England. Taxation is no part of the governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the
Commons alone…When therefore, in this House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own. But in an
American tax, what do we do?...we give and grant to your Majesty, the property of your Majesty’s commons of
America. It is an absurdity in terms.” He continued by attacking the idea that the colonies were virtually
represented in the Commons. Parliamentary History, XVI, 97-108. See Edmund S. Morgan, ed. Prologue to
Revolution, Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764-1766, (University of North Carolina Press :
Chapel Hill), 1959, 136. See also Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in
England and America, (W. W. Norton: New York) 1988, 239. Perhaps the most famous of the colonial agents was
Benjamin Franklin, who served as the Pennsylvania Assembly’s agent from 1757 to 1762.

2

Put in these terms, this seems like a fairly easy problem to solve. The colonies, after all,
all accepted George III as their rightful ruler. Their governments were modeled in most respects
on Britain’s, with a governor representing and usually cchosen
hosen by the King, a Council acting as an
upper house, high court, and body of advisors for the governor, and an assembly representing
the people (or at least free white males who owned property). The colonists respected
Parliament, just rejected its rightt to impose certain taxes on them
them—that
that was a task for their
own assemblies. A few representatives in Parliament for the colonies, or some kind of
continental assembly with a delaying power or veto over Parliamentary actions concerning the
colonies, would probably
robably have satisfied the vast majority of Americans, and maintained British
rule over the Americans.2
But for various reasons, the problem, the “Imperial Question”, proved unsolvable. A
structure of committees designed for a protest movement morphed in each colony into a
second government, and eventually the legal government was replaced by a new revolutionary
structure. Fighting broke out in Massachusetts, and throughout the thirteen colonies,
preparations were made for war. Yet the colonists still clu
clung
ng to their loyalty to the king, even
though they were fighting bloody battles with His Majesty’s troops. The decision to become
independent, to become independent republics, was not taken lightly. It occurred only when it
became clear that there was no co
compromise,
mpromise, no choice but war or surrender, and that the king
was not on their side. This realization was a devastating psychological blow to many. Patriots

2

The latter was proposed by Joseph Galloway in his 1774 Plan of Union. 28 Sept. 1774 Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1:49—51; The Founders' Constitution
Constitution,
Volume 1, Chapter 7, Document 3 http://press
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch7s3.html
chicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch7s3.html
The University of Chicago Press.
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and Loyalists3 were in the beginning both loyal to the king; indeed, one British officer opined
that “So far were [the Americans] in 1767 from thinking of a Form of Gouvernent without a
king, that the People believed the King would take their Part if he was rightly informed.”4 The
King was considered the protector of their liberties. His name was inscribed on flags placed on
liberty poles, and there was no intentional irony in the playing of “God Save the King” when
these poles were raised.
But the decision to declare independence was finally made, and New York—rather
reluctantly—accepted the Declaration of Independence. New York and the other colonies
began the process of becoming independent states, while simultaneously joining with other
states to fight a war of independence. The ad hoc structure of committees and provincial
congresses that had brought the states to independence began to be replaced by more
permanent constitutions and institutions. In New York, this process was disrupted several times
by British military action. The most important of these actions was the occupation of southern,
“downstate” New York by the British. This was completed by November, 1776. Behind British
lines for the duration of the war was the colonial capital of New York City (then consisting of
about one square-mile at the southern tip of Manhattan), the rest of the island of Manhattan,
Staten Island, Long Island, the modern Bronx, and portions of southern Westchester. The last
British troops did not leave until November 25, 1783. This long occupation, in addition to its
effects on the people “behind the lines”, may have had a significant effect on the government
3

This work will generally refer to the faction which opposed British policies (and eventually supported
independence) as “Patriots”, not “Whigs”, since most of the political actors of the time were Whigs of one form or
another. In New York, many Loyalists had been members of the Patriot movement, before leaving it when it began
to head in a direction that could, and did, end in armed conflict between Britain and America. A Whig may defined
as a believer in the complex of ideas that would become liberalism, in constitutionalism, and generally the ideals of
the 1688-9 Glorious Revolution.
4
Apollo Morris to Germain, November 1775, Sackville-Germain Papers, Vol. IV, Clement Library
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of independent New York in the Revolution and early years of the Republic, as will be discussed
below.
The occupation presented an opportunity to the British. The area had a sizable number
of Loyalists, and more arrived each day as Loyalist refugees entered the region. While subject to
raids from across the Long Island Sound or from New Jersey, the area was relatively secure, and
the Patriot presence within the area was for the most part cowed. The occupation presented
the British with a golden opportunity to contrast British-ruled America with the America ruled
by “the Usurpers”. An attempt to do this was made, but it would not be implemented for
various reasons detailed in text. The failure to restore civilian government meant that the area
was under seven years of martial law.
Instead of a glittering example of British rule, southern New York was faced with raids,
pillage, plunder and corruption. Sacred places were desecrated, at times seemingly maliciously.
Loyalists and their property were often treated no better than Patriots. Women were raped,
and people kidnapped. The British were often unable to protect the residents from these
actions; sometimes, they were the perpetrators. Because under martial law the courts did not
operate, there was little recourse for property damage, theft, or conversion. Many Loyalists
became disaffected, and a few even became active spies for the Americans. What was
seemingly a golden opportunity for the British seems to have been wasted. It is this occupation
of southern New York by the British, and the abortive attempt to restore civilian government to
the occupied region, that is the main subject of this dissertation.

5

This work will first study the Revolution in New York, and then the occupation
that followed. It examines the development of the idea of establishing civilian
government in New York as a means of winning back the “hearts and minds”, the love
and loyalty, of New Yorkers and other Americans. It studies the attempt to establish
civilian government, its failure, the reasons for the failure, the substitutes for civilian
government that were tried, and the final abortive attempt to restore civilian
government. The work also compares events in New York with events in another colony
(Georgia) where civilian government was restored. It will seek to determine if the
restoration of civilian government in New York was truly a glittering opportunity that
should have been tried by the British, or if it was not such an opportunity. The British
hoped to showcase through restoring civilian government that they aimed at freedom
within empire, not tyranny for their colonies. They hoped this would win back the
loyalties, within New York and without, of many individuals, if not whole counties,
colonies, or regions. The ultimate question of this work may be stated thusly:

Would the restoration by the British of full civilian government have had the
beneficial effects the British desired from it? Would it have returned large
numbers of individuals, counties, colonies, or regions back to British allegiance, or
was the attempt too late to have any such effect? If the latter, at what point was
reconciliation not possible, and what factors made this failure to achieve
reconciliation more likely?

By 1780, when the attempt to restore civilian government was made, was it too late?
Would an earlier successful attempt to restore civilian government have succeeded in the
purpose of showcasing British intentions to restore liberty within the empire and thus bring

6

many back to their former allegiance? How much earlier? Did the specific persons and
personalities involved negatively impact the result? If the British occupation had been not as
harsh as it actually was, with greater respect and protection for the rights, persons, and
property of the occupied, would that have helped win back—and retain—the loyalties of the
occupied? These and other questions must be asked if we are to determine whether the
restoring of civilian government would have had the beneficial results for the British they
hoped it would have.
The British occupation in many ways seems like a wasted opportunity. A golden
opportunity to win back hearts and minds was arguably thrown away by poor administration,
numerous unpleasant incidents, and the failure to restore civilian government, which arguably
could have drawn disillusioned individual Americans—and perhaps entire regions or
provinces—back into the British fold. At the very least, it seems apparent that an opportunity
was wasted to make the occupation more tolerable for the people of southern New York, and it
also seems apparent that there was a wasted propaganda opportunity. The reasons for the
British failure to take full advantage of this opportunity are discussed in the main section of the
work. But even if the occupation was a mild one,, with far greater security for life and
property, with the rights of the occupied population properly respected, would it have
mattered? If, in 1780, southern New York had been declared at the King’s Peace and full civilian
government restored, would it have really mattered? Was willing reconciliation with Britain
possible by this time, or had the time when the hearts and minds, the love and loyalty, of the
population could be regained passed? In short, could a gentler occupation have helped the
British cause by winning back hearts and minds—or was the time when that could have

7

happened passed? And if so, when was the last time that New Yorkers and Americans could
have reconciled?
As will be argued in the text, reconciliation was possible, but the attempt in New York was
made too late. Options that would have satisfied both Britain and America, and kept the
colonies willingly in the British Empire, existed. But the time for that soon disappeared. A
crushing military victory might have brought the colonies back into the fold, albeit reluctantly,
but that option became less and less likely. The rather harsh occupation did not help the
British cause as well. The idea of restoring civilian government was not a bad idea, but it was
made too late in the day to have any benefits for the British.

II. Subsidiary questions

The Imperial Crisis which culminated in American independence was a decade-long
affair. While there were many areas of dispute and tension between the colonies and the
mother country, the main issue, the trigger for the crisis, was a constitutional question. The
colonists wanted a say in the taxes and laws that would govern them, justifying this belief on
various grounds. They objected, often violently as in the case of the Stamp Act, to the
imposition of taxes by the British without their consent. The slogan of “No taxation without
representation!” was a call, at least in the beginning, for a reworking of the British Empire’s
constitution so that the colonists would have a say in the taxes they paid the empire. But in
addition, Americans in the 18th century believed that unjust taxes threatened property rights
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which in turn threatened liberty. Property allowed one a kind of independence---liberty. The
evidence is that the great majority wanted to remain in the empire, but wanted a greater say in
how they were governed. They wanted both liberty and empire. If Britain could have found a
way to give the Americans a place at the table, they could have retained America in the empire.
But Britain never found a method that retained a suitable amount of British control while giving
America a satisfactory say. Indeed, they seemed to ignore what the Americans saw as
reasonable and rightful concerns. When Britain backed down on the Stamp Act, Britain coupled
this with the Declaratory Act, declaring that Parliament had the right to issue the taxes the
colonists believed they did not. Some Britons even argued that the Americans were virtually
represented already, so that the colonists’ arguments as to “no taxation without
representation” had no merit.
The failure of Britain to reach a satisfactory arrangement with America resulted in new
factions and a developing structure of protest organizations. Britain in the years following the
end of the Stamp Act Crisis could perhaps have come to some solution that would have
satisfied all but the most radical American. But they did not. In the early 1770s, there was a
continuing series of incidents, such as the Battle of Golden Hill in New York and the Boston
Massacre. The 1773 Boston Tea Party brought the crisis to a head. Organizations formed
originally to manage a protest movement began to take on governmental powers and supplant
and eventually replace the official governments. But even at this stage, even after blood was
shed at Lexington-Concord, there is much evidence the Americans desired reconciliation. This
was particularly true of New York, which had many economic and other ties to Britain. A
gesture of reconciliation, a proposal which gave even a minimal say to the Americans, could

9

perhaps have helped defuse the crisis and left America within the Empire. But no such gesture
came; instead the king declared the Americans to be in rebellion.
The Americans finally declared independence. For the Americans, independence seems
to have changed everything. After independence, the Americans rejected proposals that
possibly would have defused the crisis in an earlier time. In 1766, Britain had many
opportunities to retain the hearts and minds of the colonists. Even after the events of 1770, of
1773, even after Lexington-Concord and the clear state of war between the colonies and
Britain, reconciliation still seemed possible. But by 1778, as will be described in more detail in
Chapter IV, proposals that would have been greeted with joy in 1775 or even early 1776 were
treated with contempt. The attempt in 1780 to restore civilian government in southern New
York may also have been too late. The passage of time closed off many opportunities for the
British—what would have been acceptable then was no longer acceptable now. This question of
timing will be examined to help answer the basic question.
Personality is also an important factor that should be examined. The war was waged by
distinct persons with distinct abilities, flaws, and personality quirks. It is conceivable that
different personnel could have handled things better, and changed the course of history. If the
king had been more flexible in his reaction to the demands of the colonists, then America may
have reconciled itself with Britain. Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the American Colonies,
and de facto minister of war during the “American War”, had been suspected of cowardice
during the Battle of Minden during the Seven Years War, and had been publicly disgraced for
his actions there by King George II. He may not have been the best person to give orders to
battle-tested generals. In Georgia, by contrast, there was much cooperation between the
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military and civilian policies, and British civilian government was restored for a brief time. In
New York, General Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief, refused to grant his needed consent to
civilian government. A major factor in this refusal—perhaps the main factor—was his difficulty
in working with and sharing authority with others. Another general without this flaw may have
granted his consent. The interplay of the different personalities and how their various flaws,
quirks, and virtues affected events will be among the questions examined.
Another important question is the question of the power relations between the various
groups of Whigs. One cannot truly understand the events of the time without understanding
the various factions and their inter-relationships during the Revolution. This has been an area
of much historical discussion over the years. Carl Becker, in 1909’s The History of Political
Parties in the Province of New York, 1760-17765, argued that there were three levels of society
in colonial New York: an aristocracy of great landlord and merchant families, the independent
freeholders and freemen, and the unenfranchised mechanics and tenant farmers. The
aristocracy alternately aligned itself with the assembly or governor to guard its privileges. In
their struggles, they used the language of natural rights and general welfare, which the
unenfranchised began to use in their demands for political power. After 1760, fearing for their
own power, they tried to “shut the open-door” to power of the “extra-legal mass activities” of
ordinary New Yorkers. In a memorable phase that has enormously influenced much
Revolutionary historiography, the Revolution became not only a struggle for home rule, but
“also about—who was to rule at home.”

5

Madison, WI 1909, 1960
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Becker’s analysis dominated discussions for decades, but by the early 1960s, there
began to be disagreement with his picture of a struggle between the privileged and
unprivileged. Rather than a rather monolithic monopoly of the privileged in a struggle with the
unprivileged, the historian Roger Champagne in 1963 argued that the struggle over who ruled
New York in 1765 was actually between two aristocratic factions, the Livingstons and
Delanceys, who exploited “popular agitation” over the “imperial question” for local political
purposes, with little concern for the constitutional principles raised.6
In 1971, the historian Patricia Bonomi tried to make sense of the factional alliances of
New York’s colonial history by setting out an economic base underlying the factions. According
to Bonomi, commerce and agriculture were of nearly equal importance to the prosperity of the
colony, and there had developed a merchant interest and a landed or country interest. These
two were often at odds with each other over political or economic advantage. Thus, both
Champagne and Bonomi challenged Becker’s view of a privileged monolithic aristocracy in a
struggle with the under-privileged. 7
However, in 1981, Edward Countryman in his history of Revolutionary New York argued
that the factions were mainly based on narrow groups, based at least in part on kinship, rather
than class, region, or other interest. The main concern of the factions was not ideology or
economic interest, but holding power for themselves, or controlling those who held it. He thus

6

Roger Champagne “Family Politics versus Constitutional Principles: The New York Assembly Elections of 1768 and
1769,” WMQ, 3d Ser., XX (Jan, 1963), 57-79, 58-9.
7
Patricia Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (Columbia University:New York)
1971, 2-5, 56, 60, 69, 81.
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disagrees with Bonomi’s argument that there was a real economic basis underlying the
factions.8
Marc Egnall in 1988 basically agreed with Bonomi as to the existence of the factions, but
rather than calling them merchant or landed, he emphasized their attitudes towards expansion
and military action against France and the Indians. His expansionist faction roughly coincides
with the landed faction, while his non-expansionist faction coincides with the merchant
faction.9
This work in general will use Bonomi’s analysis and designation of the factions, as it
seems the most accurate and useful analysis. New York’s factions would align themselves with
other interests, such as lesser merchants or those “mechanicks” who had the vote—basically,
the working class—as they jockeyed for power. Both of the landed and the merchant factions
may be considered Whig factions, in general agreement with the complex of ideas that would
become liberalism, in constitutionalism, and generally the ideals of the 1688-9 Glorious
Revolution. This is not surprising; by the time of the American Revolution, most political figures
in the Empire were Whigs of one sort or another, and even those who called themselves Tories
had adopted many Whig ideas.
The merchant faction, known as the Delanceys in the 1760s and 70s, had many ties with
Britain. They engaged in much trade with Britain, and feared the economic harm that boycotts
or a rupture with Britain would cause. While they shared the concerns of the other groups
concerning the actions of the British government, they thus tended to moderation in their
8

Edward Countryman, A People in Revolution: The American Revolution and Political Society in New York, 17601790, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.) 1981, 77-78.
9
Marc Egnal, A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 1988,
51-54.
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response. Many became Loyalists as the rupture approached. The landed, or Livingston faction,
had less direct ties with Britain. Many of them also seem to have belonged to a more radical
branch of the Whigs, the “Real Whigs”. Real Whigs thought that those in authority would
constantly try to expand their power beyond its lawful limits, and that therefore there must be
constant vigilance against any action that seemed an abuse of power.10 This ideological
predilection to seeing incipient tyranny in the actions of the government, combined with the
fact that they would suffer much less direct economic harm from boycotts or more radical
measures than the merchants would, made the Livingstons far more likely to support boycotts
and eventually independence than the great merchants. Many Livingstons would become
Patriots and be numbered among the leaders of the new state. Hence, the landed interest,
which in many societies is often the most conservative of interests (in the sense of trying to
keep things unchanged as much as possible), in New York were among the those who led the
state to independence.
But a third Whig grouping arose during the Revolution, complicating what had once
been a rather straight-forward two-faction system.11 The Sons of Liberty emerged during the
Stamp Act Crisis. They formed over the question of Britain’s ability to tax the colonists, and
were the most strident and radical of the factions. They were the faction most likely to engage
in violence or property damage in their protests. All three factions opposed Britain’s actions;
they mainly differed in stridency and preferred tactics. The Sons of Liberty differed in a
fundamental way from the other factions. The Delanceys and Livingstons both represented
10

Pauline Maier, From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to
Britain, 1765-1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 1972, 43.
11
While the factions are sometimes referred to as “parties”, this work will generally use the term “faction.” The
term “party” implies a much greater amount of formal political organization than existed at the time.

14

New York’s elites: its great merchants and great landowners. The Sons of Liberty were led by
men who a few years earlier been part of the working class; their leaders tended to be newlyrich merchants who had made a fortune (often by privateering) during the French and Indian
War. They maintained close contact with New York’s workers, and many of these filled out the
rank and file of the “Liberty Boys”. The Sons of Liberty were interested in a more meritocratic
society and represented a more democratic point of view than the other factions. They were
among the “new men” that the historian Richard Ryerson and other historians, such as Gary
Nash, have noted began to be raised to positions of power by the Revolution.12 The shifting
alliances and maneuvering between these groups, and the development of a new factional
divide, that between Patriots and Loyalists, will be examined.
One very important question to be examined is the effect of mistaken British
assumptions as to the loyalty of the Americans in general and local populations in particular.
The British had very erroneous assumptions on these, and decision-makers at all levels were
fed a constant stream of questionable data from spies, Loyalists, and “experts” as to the
number of Loyalists in America as a whole, as well as in particular regions. The British were
convinced that they were faced with a small group of usurpers who had seized power. They
were convinced that the majority of the population supported them. There actually were fewer
Loyalists and more Patriots than the British thought there were. From the very beginning of the
war, the British strategies were based on a very skewed and inaccurate picture of the loyalties
of the Americans. Even the new strategy of the later war was based on a misreading of the
12

See Ryerson, Richard Alan, The Revolution is Now Begun: The Radical Committees of Philadelphia, 1765-1776
(University of Pennsylvania) 1978, and Nash, Gary B., The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness
and the Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1979, as well as The
Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy (New York: Viking) 2005.
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amount of Loyalists in the country. This constant misunderstanding by the British of the
loyalties of the population, indeed of the very nature of the enemy, needs to be understood if
one is to answer the ultimate question of this work.
An entire chapter will be devoted to the fifth question: the regrettable and at times
appalling actions of the British. These ranged from rape to petty pilferage, from kidnapping to
not paying for seized goods. There was vandalism, corruption, and insensitivity to the
sensibilities of Loyalists and others. Churches were damaged, and the churches and burying
grounds of some denominations seem to have been deliberately targeted for mistreatment (if
not desecration). Towns were even destroyed. In addition, there were few opportunities to get
satisfaction for claims against the British. And the British were unable to give Long Islanders and
others protection against raids. These actions made reconciliation far more difficult.

III. Specific Contributions

The story of America’s revolution and break from Britain is an oft-told tale; the tale of
New York’s break with Britain is a tale less told, but still an area that has received much
attention, especially in recent years. These recent works have tended to concentrate on the
events in New York City and ignore for the most part the surrounding counties. Other works
have concentrated on individual areas. This work will make a close examination of events in
New York City but also integrate events on Long Island, Westchester, and Staten Island into this
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story. Thus, a fuller picture of the processes and events of the Revolution in southern New York
will be produced.
The process of revolution will be rather closely examined. The formation of various
committees at town, city, and eventually provincial level, will be examined, as will the
production of documents and declarations both Patriot and Loyalist. While many of the
significant events of the Revolution occurred in New York City, many significant events occurred
in the surrounding counties, and this work will integrate the “suburban” and urban stories. This
will hopefully provide a fuller picture of the revolutionary process than a New York City-centric
history would. Most importantly, the process by which loyal subjects of the Crown became
revolutionaries will be examined, because if one is to understand the failure of an effort to
restore loyalty, then it is helpful to understand how that loyalty was lost in the first place. The
discussion of the process of revolution and loss of loyalty is vital to the main topic of the work,
the failed attempt to restore civilian government in the colony. In this, the work goes beyond
and differs from many of the recent histories, which emphasized the process of breaking with
Britain, but not the occupation period or the restoration attempt. Those that discuss the
occupation have ignored for the most part the attempt at restoration of civilian government, or
failed to emphasize it. However, a few articles have discussed the loss of loyalty or other effects
of occupation at the local level (most notably Joseph Tiedemann’s “Patriots by Default”, which
discussed Queens County, and Sung Bok Kim’s discussion of Westchester.)13 The main focus of

13

Joseph S. Tiedemann, “Patriots by Default: Queens County, New York, and the British Army, 1776-1783,” William
and Mary Quarterly 43 (January 1986): 35-63 ; Sung Bok Kim, “The Limits of Politicization in the American
Revolution: The Experience of Westchester County, New York,” The Journal of American History, Vol 80, No. 3
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this work is not the ever-fascinating tale of revolution, but the occupation of southern New
York by the British for seven long years, and the attempt to restore civilian government
Arguably, this occupation was a glittering opportunity for the British to convince southern New
Yorkers and others of the benevolence of their intentions and win back hearts and minds.
Whether it actually was such an opportunity is a question that the work will examine, but by
the late 1770s, the possibilities the occupation might offer began to be recognized by the
highest authorities in Britain. An attempt to restore civilian government was attempted, but
failed.
This work will closely examine the genesis of the attempt to restore civilian government,
its failure, and the substitutes for civilian government that were attempted after the failure.
The evolving views of Lord Germain, the de facto Minister of War for the “American War”, as
the British call the Revolutionary War, and other important actors such as the members of the
Carlisle Commission will be examined as they begin to lean to a new strategy. An important part
of this strategy would involve the restoration of civilian government in the occupied part of
New York.
The work will take a close look at the life and career of General James Robertson, the
civilian governor chosen to implement the strategy, only to be stymied by the opposition of
General Sir Henry Clinton. Robertson is a much-neglected figure in the American Revolution.
For many years, he had a very poor historical reputation. He was rehabilitated somewhat when
his letterbook was discovered and published in 1983. However, despite this important new
source, very little has been written about him in the intervening years, and this work will
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hopefully at least begin the process of repairing the neglect. This work will also examine the
failure of the attempt to achieve civilian government in New York by comparing New York with
Georgia, where a similar attempt was tried, and where civilian government was restored.
This work will look at the various regrettable and appalling acts by the occupiers and
breakdowns of law and order that made life in the occupied area miserable, if not intolerable.
From petty theft to corruption, rape, and an inability to protect against raiders, these all made a
mockery of the promise of good government. These actions harmed the British effort to regain
the loyalties of Patriots and the non-aligned, and helped them lose the loyalty of the Loyalists.
Many escaped into an apolitical privatism, and some Loyalists even became Patriot spies. Lastly,
this work will look at whether or not a restoration of civilian government would have had for
the British any of the beneficial effects that were desired. Was it too late to restore love and
loyalty? Had the rejection of loyalty to Britain and the King ended all possibility of
reconciliation? Was independence a psychological “Rubicon” which once crossed could not be
uncrossed? In a round-about way, by examining this question, light is thus shed on what is
perhaps the most basic question of any student of the American Revolution: Why did the
Americans abandon their loyalty to the British and declare independence? By studying an
attempt to restore loyalty, light can be shed on the abandonment of loyalty.
While the work’s focus is on the occupation, it also deals to some extent with the events
and the process of the Revolution in New York. Some very important things occurred because
of the peculiar circumstances New York was under. New York, city and state, was a prime
target of the British military in 1776, and this, it is argued, had a long-lasting effect on the
development of New York State. One of these circumstances was what I have called the
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“Evaporation of New York”. As the British threatened New York City, much of the city’s
population “evaporated”, fleeing to safety, and the revolutionary government fled as well to a
series of small towns on the Hudson. By the time the British entered, only a few hundred New
Yorkers remained. It will be argued that the occupation of New York City had a very important
effect on the development of New York State’s government. The exile of the Convention and
the disappearance of much of the Patriot population from New York City removed the pressure
that democratically-inclined elements of the population such as the “mechanics” had been
exerting and would most likely have continued to exert on the leadership of New York to
produce a democratic constitution. Relieved of this pressure, the Constitution that was
produced was much less democratic than the mechanics would have preferred, and it was not
submitted to the people for ratification, as the mechanics had desired.

To summarize, the specific contributions made by the dissertation are:

1. A greater integration of the revolutionary incidents of Long Island, Staten
Island, and Westchester into the usually New York City-centric narrative of the
American Revolution in New York.
2. An analysis of the question as to whether restoring civilian government to
occupied New York would have had any beneficial effects from the British point
of view.
3. A close examination of the British occupation of southern New York,
concentrating on the attempt to restore civilian government to New York and its
failure.
4. A highlighting of the career of General James Robertson, the man selected to
implement the restoration strategy, and whose career has been largely
neglected.
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5. The effects of the “Evaporation of New York” on the development of government in
Revolutionary and Early Republic New York.

IV. Outline of the Work

The dissertation will consist of seven chapters, plus this introduction and conclusion,
and a few appendices and bibliography. The first chapter will be “A Brief History of Colonial
New York, 1609-1774”. The chapter will briefly describe the colonial background of New York
so as to “set the stage” for the story of the Revolution and the occupation that followed, then
look at the early days of the American Revolution. After a brief look at the American Indian
presence in New York, it will turn to the near simultaneous settlement by Dutch and Puritans,
the early days of English rule, and the factional disputes that arose in the wake of the Glorious
Revolution. There will be a long look at the factional system that developed in the eighteenth
century, and at the economic, ethnic, and religious system, as well as the governing system.
The early phases of the American Revolution, from the end of the French and Indian
War to 1774, will be examined, in order to understand why the colonists in general and New
Yorkers in particular revolted against the British, and in order to understand the difficulties and
possibilities faced by the British in restoring hearts and minds, as well as the question of timing
alluded to above. Among the items stressed by the chapter will be the broad consensus among
most New Yorkers that British policy was wrong and needed to be changed, and the emergence
of a structure of extra-constitutional committees and congresses that by the end of 1774 had
begun to assume governmental power.
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The next chapter, “The American Revolution in New York” will follow the events in New
York City in 1775. It will continue the story of how the protest against British policy continued
to move in the direction of armed confrontation with Britain, and how an increasingly elaborate
and powerful revolutionary structure of committees and congresses was formed to coordinate
the resistance. These structures took on an increasing quasi-governmental function. By the end
of 1775, much of the actual government in the province was in the hands of these revolutionary
organizations, and the official governor of the colony was attempting to govern from a ship in
the harbor. The colonies would also be engaged in warfare with Britain, although still professing
loyalty to the king. In addition to the events in New York City in 1775, this chapter will also
examine the progress of the Revolution from 1773 to 1775 in the small rural counties that
surrounded the capital.
Chapter III, “The Final Break with Great Britain and the Capture of New York”, will first
look at the final break by the colonies in general and New York in particular. By examining how
and why the colonists revolted, the difficulties and opportunities the British faced when they
occupied New York can be better understood. Late 1775 and early 1776 was a period of dual
government, with the new governments in the ascendency. Nonetheless, it will be argued, the
colonies were still possibly amenable to reconciliation. However, no offer of reconciliation was
offered by the British. Instead, the British made no attempt at compromise and proclaimed the
colonists in rebellion. The colonists finally declared independence. In New York, many had
strong ties to Britain, and many had become Loyalists. New York was quite reluctant to declare
independence, but eventually it did so. It was then attacked by the British. The population of
New York City virtually “evaporated” under the threat of invasion. This may have had an
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influence on the state constitution that was eventually written. The chapter then describes the
conquest of southern New York.
The fourth and fifth chapters are in many ways the heart of the work, as the fourth
examines the origins of the attempt to restore civilian government in occupied New York, and
the fifth the failure of this attempt. The fourth chapter, “The New Strategy”, will first examine
the disastrous (for the British) 1777 campaign, which led to French intervention and the need
for a strategic reassessment. The role of George Germain, de facto Minister of War, will be
examined. The Carlisle Commission, its mission and instructions, and its failure will be
discussed. The private observations of Lord Carlisle as to the sentiments of the “common
people” will be noted. The new strategy that was at least in part developed by the committee
will be discussed. This strategy included as one of its elements the restoration of civilian
government in New York.
The fifth chapter, “The Failure to Restore Civilian Government”, will discuss the attempt
to restore civilian government and the failure of the attempt. The career of General James
Robertson and his selection to be governor will be discussed. The role of General Sir Henry
Clinton in this failure will be examined, and the reasons why Clinton, whose consent was
required to restore civilian government, did not give his consent will be discussed. The attempt
to restore a semblance of civilian government by instituting “Police Courts” will finish the
chapter.
The sixth chapter, “The Military Occupation of Southern New York”, unlike the rest, will
be mainly topical, examining British rule in southern New York mainly from “the ground level”.
Its main focus will be the various hardships, indignities, and dangers that the people of
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occupied New York faced. The purpose of this will be to show that the situation in southern
New York was not conducive to winning back or retaining the hearts and minds, the love and
loyalty of the people. Indeed, it had for many the opposite result, driving many towards
Patriotism and even espionage. This will help show some of the difficulties that the attempt to
restore civilian government and achieve reconciliation faced. The chapter will end with an
incident from late 1782, the building of Fort Golgotha in the burying ground at Huntington,
Long Island. In many ways, this incident symbolizes and summarizes the mistakes and lost
opportunity that the long occupation of southern New York by the British represented.
The seventh chapter, “The Fading of British Rule”, continues the chronological
discussion of Robertson’s governorship, and the final attempt to restore civilian government to
New York. Several important events, such as Robertson’s involvement in the aftermath of
Benedict Arnold’s defection and the events surrounding Yorktown, are discussed. After
describing the final failed attempt, the entire question of restoring civilian government and its
failure is examined. In order to contrast the situation in New York with a region where civilian
government was restored, the situation in Georgia, where full civilian government was
restored, is examined as well. The last days of British rule are then discussed. Lastly, the postwar fate of many of the participants and institutions discussed in the work will be briefly looked
at, as will the role the Loyalists played in the British Empire (especially Canada).
In “Conclusions”, the final thoughts and conclusions of the work will be presented.
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V. Some Notes on Historiography and Sources

Prior to the 1970s, much military history had concentrated on strategy and tactics, on
the operations and movements of armies and fleets. In the 1970s, there was a shift in the focus
of much scholarly military history from “battlefields to military institutions, society, and
thought, and how they fit in the currents of their times, together with the willingness to use
social scientific techniques”. This, it is argued, gave not only “a more balanced image of the
military, but also, in some instances, new perspectives in the civilian areas.” One of the areas
which saw much scholarship was the Revolutionary War.14 An early precursor of this “New
Military History” was the work of the British historian Piers Mackesy, who in The War for
America, 1775-1783 (1964), described the Revolutionary War from the British perspective. He
stressed the importance of British administration in the prosecution of the war, and how, from
the British perspective, the war became after 1778 merely a theatre in a world war.
The Bicentennial and its approach resulted in much writing about the Revolutionary
War. The Vietnam War, whose final act was in the spring of 1975, shed a long shadow over
these histories, as many historians saw parallels between the two wars. The parallels were in
many ways apt, as both wars featured a long revolutionary struggle in which a militarily
superior power, arguably the most militarily powerful country in the world, was defeated by a
much weaker power. The need to win “hearts and minds” was often spoken of during Vietnam,
and the phrase, used by John Adams in an early nineteenth century discussion of the American
14

Edward M. Coffman, “The New American Military History,” Military Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Jan, 1984), pp. 1-5, 1.
The other period which saw much interest was the 1880 to 1914 period.

25

Revolution, found its way into many of the histories written during the Bicentennial era.15 Don
Higginbotham in The War for American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice,
1763-1789 (1971) argued that the military was a projection of society. To study the military, he
argued, was to learn about the society that “projected” it. The historian John Shy in his writings,
while he discussed questions of strategy, also discussed such subjects as the importance and
use of the militia, loyalists and other Revolutionary War subjects, as well as the important
questions of why people fight, and who actually does the fighting. Shy considered the
Revolutionary War to be a “’social process’ of political education for the majority of Americans,
or a struggle for hearts and minds.”16 He believed that as the war continued, many apathetic
Americans became patriotic citizens of the United States, having been politicized and
nationalized by British military actions and by experience in the militia. The historian Sung Bok
Kim, drawing partially on his personal experience of the Korean War, respectfully disagreed (at
least in regards to Westchester).17 All of these discussions took military history far away from
the discussion of strategies and tactics that had dominated the field, and reintegrated it into
the mainstreams of academic history.
Local studies of the effect of the war may also be considered part of the New Military
History. Thus, Robert A. Gross can be considered a New Military historian, as his book the
Minutemen and Their World (1976) describes the impact of war on the people of Concord, and
how such a war meant change for them. Discussions of the effect of war and its aftermath on
15
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occupied territories and frontline regions may also be considered part of this new movement.
The present work draws in part on some of this scholarship, and examines the effect of war on
an occupied region, and its aftermath. This dissertation, it is submitted, is at least in part an
heir or part of the New Military History.18

Here is a quick note on spelling before discussing the sources. Historians working in eras
before English spelling was standardized, such as the Revolutionary era, are faced with the
question of how to handle this: should spelling in quotes from the sources be modernized for
clarity, or should it be left alone? In this work, spelling has been left as I found it in my sources.
This, it is believed, helps give a feel for the time and the speakers, and hopefully rarely detracts
from understanding.

Perhaps the two most important sources for the American Revolution in New York and
the occupation of southern New York are the History of New York during the Revolutionary War
by Thomas Jones, and the Historical Memoirs of William Smith, Jr. Smith is an invaluable source;
as a member of the Governor’s Council and Chief Justice of New York, he had the ear of many
of the main actors of New York, including General Clinton and Governor Robertson, and in
many ways was a major actor himself. Jones, however, has to be read with great care; he had
very strong opinions, and was bitter about the turn of events. He tended to ascribe the basest
motives to people’s actions. He hated Scots and Presbyterians, and was predisposed to despise
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the Scottish-born Robertson. Nonetheless, his history is full of many important incidents and
events. While it may have to be read with care, the author’s biases are at least readily
apparent. Jones overall is still an extremely useful and important source.
Less commonly used by historians but absolutely vital for this work was The New York
Letter Book of General James Robertson, 1780-83. The letters, reports, and proclamations
contained within give a rather complete picture of the governorship of Robertson, and
Robertson’s conflicts with Clinton. They are well-edited by historians Milton M. Klein and
Ronald W. Howard, and the book contains an invaluable biographical essay on Robertson.
The American Journal of Ambrose Serle, while only referenced in this work a few times,
gives a very good picture of British views toward America in the early days of the American
Revolution, and how they began to alter by 1778. The book is rewarding reading for anyone
interested in the British view of the Revolution. The various papers of Lord Carlisle were
invaluable in understanding the Carlisle Commission. The papers of Lord Germain, found at the
Clements Library at the University of Michigan, were invaluable in understanding the actions
and plans of the British government, and the views of many Loyalists and Britons. The same
may be said for the papers of King George III. The David Library in Washington Crossing,
Pennsylvania contains many microfilmed records from Britain, such as the Colonial Office
records, as well as many books and other items relating to the Revolutionary era, and its
resources were invaluable in the research for this work. Governor Tryon’s report may be found
amongst the Colonial Office records found at the David Library.
The three most important sources for Long Island were the Huntington Town Records,
and Henry Onderdonck’s two mid-nineteenth century collections of newspaper articles and
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other documents from the Revolution: The Revolutionary Incidents of Queens, and the
Revolutionary Incidents of Kings and Suffolk. Generations of local and academic historians have
drawn upon these collections when they discussed the American Revolution on Long Island,
and the present author has as well. Journeys on Old Long Island, edited by Natalie A. Naylor,
contains several valuable sources relating to the Revolution, including the memoirs of
Femmetie Leggerts, who gives an invaluable glimpse into life during the occupation.
Lastly, perhaps the ultimate primary source is the ground and places where events have
occurred. While not always possible, if a historian can visit the places of which he speaks, that
can only help his or her understanding of the events. I have endeavored to do this. I have
walked in Raynham Hall in Oyster Bay, where British officers and American spies both dwelled. I
have seen the Union Jack still flying as part of a weather vane over Caroline Church in Setauket,
and virtually every day of my college career at Columbia I passed the plaque commemorating
the Battle of Harlem Heights which had been fought on the site of the campus. And I have also
climbed to the top of the Old Burial Ground in Huntington, where once stood Fort Golgotha.

Frank P. Mann
Farmingdale, NY
Feb 28, 2013

29

Chapter I

A Brief History of Colonial New York, 1609-1774
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Colonial New York had a rather unique history that marked it out as quite different from
its neighbors in New England. In some features, such as its ethnic diversity, it did resemble its
Middle Atlantic neighbor Pennsylvania. While New England was nearly purely English and
Puritan in its origins, New York had multiple origins: Dutch, New England Puritan, and Anglican
English. While New England was dominated by small, independent farmers, New York became
the home of great land-owners and tenants, and of great merchants and “mechanicks”. It
would develop a factional, “fractious” political system. This chapter will examine New York
society and politics at the dawn of the Revolution, and then the first stages of the Revolution in
New York. But before doing that, it will briefly look at the early days of colonial New York and
its rather diverse origins.

I

Colonial New York had a dual or triple founding, being founded by Dutch settlers, by
English Puritans and by Anglicans. Southern New York was occupied by Algonquin tribes at the
time of Henry Hudson’s exploration in 1609. The names of many of these tribes are preserved
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in place names such as Massapequa and Montauk. The Dutch rather rapidly followed up
Hudson’s explorations by, in the period 1614-1623, establishing trading posts in the Albany
area, and a trading post on what is now Governor’s Island near Manhattan in 1624. The famous
Manhattan Purchase occurred in 1626. A small Dutch community was established on
Manhattan to help facilitate the trade with the Indians, and there was also a major population
center in the Albany area known as Beverwyck. This upriver community was mainly Dutchspeaking. In contrast to Beverwyck, at a very early date, New Amsterdam (later known as New
York City) was already a very cosmopolitan city. In the early 1640s, according to a Jesuit priest
who visited the town, it was a city of about four or five hundred persons speaking about 18
different languages.1 It also was the home of many different faith communities. In 1686, about
40 years after Father Jogues’s visit (and about twenty after the English conquest), Governor
Thomas Dongan noted that the city contained “Dutch Calvinists, Anglicans, French Calvinists,
Dutch Lutherans, and ordinary Quakers, the city also contained ‘Singing Quakers, Ranting
Quakers; Sabbatarians; Antisabbatarians; Some Anabaptists some Independents; some Jews.”2
The Dutch also settled Long Island, mainly in present day Brooklyn and Queens, and Staten
Island.
In 1640, Puritans from Lynn, Massachusetts founded Southampton on the South Fork of
eastern Long Island, in what is now Suffolk County. This settlement was soon followed by the
founding of Southold on the North Fork. For many years, the two communities argued over
which had been founded first. While geographically separated from New England by the Long

1
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Patricia U. Bonomi, A Factious People: Politics and Society in Colonial New York (New York: Columbia University
Press) 1971, 25.
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Island Sound, colonial Suffolk County was in many ways culturally part of New England. There
was much cross-Sound trade and travel, and the ministers of most Suffolk County churches
were trained in New England. This relationship was not only cultural, but for a long-time
political as well. Before the English conquered neighboring New Netherlands, much of eastern
Long Island was politically connected with Connecticut. After the English conquered New
Netherlands in 1664, the region was politically attached to New York, as the English renamed
New Netherlands. This New England character remained for a long time; as in New England,
many residents of Suffolk County were Patriots at the time of the Revolution. Even today,
traces of a New England accent can be heard on the North Fork of Long Island.3
Puritans also founded Hempstead on Long Island in 1644, and lived there under Dutch
rule for several decades. On Long Island, the international boundary between the Dutch and
English settlements was approximately the present border between Nassau and Suffolk
counties, though Oyster Bay (in the east of Nassau County) was mainly outside New
Netherlands. North of Manhattan, both before and after the English conquest in 1664, New
Englanders began to move into the Hudson River region. After the conquest, officials and others
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from England began arriving. In addition, Huguenots and, at a later date, Germans from the
Palatine began to settle the Hudson River Valley. 4
As the above indicates, New York State had a dual, if not triple founding. It was founded
by the Dutch, by New England Puritans, and by officials and other emigrants from England. Its
main city, New York City, was very cosmopolitan. There was a large Puritan (and later, postPuritan) element in New York, and one county was virtually an outpost of New England. The
Dutch remained an important feature of New York life for many years, and Dutch was still
spoken in parts of New York well into the nineteenth century. They left a legacy of words, place
names, and culture. For example, the words “stoop” and “boss” are of Dutch origin, as are
place names such as Catskill, Arthur van Kill, Flushing and Brooklyn (“kill” is Dutch for stream).
And of course, Santa Claus has his origins in the Dutch Sinterklaas.
In 1664, the English conquered New Netherlands. The area was renamed New York,
after its new proprietor, James, the Duke of York. The most distinctive feature of the
government of early New York was the lack of a colonial assembly; the colony was governed
without a legislature until the 1680s. In 1683, not only was a seventeen member assembly
formed, but the twelve original counties of New York were formed. These included Queens
(which then included present-day Nassau County), Suffolk, Kings, and Albany, among others.
Albany County, now a small region about the state capitol, then included much of northern and
western New York. A “Charter of Liberties” was proclaimed by the new legislature, which
among other items proclaimed that the consent of those taxed was needed for taxation. 5

4
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In 1685, New York became a royal colony when its proprietor became King James II.
James was overthrown in the Glorious Revolution in 1688. When news reached New York in the
spring of 1689, it created a power vacuum, and a wealthy merchant and soldier named Jacob
Leisler seized power. His support came mainly from radical Calvinists. After a stormy seventeen
month rule, he was removed from office and he and several associates were hanged. For
several decades after that, New York politics were divided between pro and anti-Leislerite
factions. In 1710 Governor Robert Hunter defused the tension between the two factions by
judiciously distributing offices to both Leislerites and anti-Leislerites. This did not end the
existence of faction in New York; they remained a feature of New York political life. Shortly
after Hunter defused the Leislerite/anti-Leislerite dispute, a new political faction system arose,
based mainly on economic interests and attitudes toward settlement and defense. While the
factions over the years were known by different names (the names were based on the leading
families of the factions), the system would continue intact into the Revolutionary era.6

As the historian Richard R. Beeman notes, “the cultural geography of the colony as a
whole tended to fracture any sense of a single, organic society.”7 Perhaps as a result of the
diversity of ethnic, economic, regional, religious, and other interests in New York, New York’s
colonial politics were driven by fierce factionalism and the “aggressive pursuit and defense of

Assembly.” This pre-Glorious Revolution document thus firmly grounded rights in a grant from the King, not in
natural rights. The belief of the American colonists that they could not be taxed without their consent was a major
factor in the revolutionary crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.
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interests, which frequently cut across lines of court and country or aristocracy and
commoners.” 8
New York’s society was hierarchical and deferential, dominated by an “aristocracy” of
great landed lords and great merchants. This aristocracy was not monolithic, but divided into
factions that originally formed around economic issues. One faction represented the great
landed interests, and the other the great merchants. They were usually in direct political
competition, with taxation a major issue. The merchants favored a land tax, and the landed
interest preferred a tax on commerce. Eventually, other issues began to overshadow the
economic debate, and many merchants became great landowners.9 However, the economic
split was still at the core of the factional split in the 1760s. The factions were usually known by
family names. In the 1760s, the landed faction was known as the Livingstons, and the merchant
faction was known as the Delanceys. The factions would align with various interests as they
jockeyed for power. The infighting and shifting alliances of the Assembly are called by Beeman
very English, reminiscent of the Whig-dominated eighteenth-century English Parliament. 10

8
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Edward Countryman, a historian of revolutionary New York, stresses the fact that the
factions were known by family names.

He argues that the faction members identified with

narrow groups, based on consideration of kinship “as much as anything”, rather than “groups
based on class or region or policy”. Indeed, Countryman says that the factions in New York
were not like later policy-based parties, such as the Anti-Federalists. He argues that the
“Parties, in other words, were small groups of men whose main concern was to hold office
themselves or control the men holding it.” The factions of colonial New York, he argues, lacked
mass organization or even cohesive principles. In this he differs with historian Patricia Bonomi,
who argues that the factions were organized around economic interests.11
Whichever interpretation of the faction structure one prefers,12 the Revolutionary era
would see the addition of a third faction, the Sons of Liberty, as discussed below. It would also
see the replacement s of the landed/merchant (or expansionist/non-expansionist) faction
system by the Patriot/Tory system.

II

In 1763, New York consisted of the counties of Suffolk, Queens, Kings, Richmond,
Orange, Ulster, Dutchess, and Albany, New York City, and Westchester Borough. Tryon County,
west of Albany, was organized out of Albany County in 1772, and about the same time
11
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Charlotte, Gloucester, and Cumberland counties were organized in what is now mainly
Vermont. Not counting the frontier, the main settled area of New York was roughly L-shaped,
running east along Long Island and north along the Hudson, and consisted of two main regions:
the southern, “downstate” region of New York City, Long Island, and Staten Island, and the
Hudson Valley region, or “upstate” region, for short. The government of New York was similar
to the governments of the other colonies which would soon declare independence. It was led
by a governor chosen by the King. He was usually a well-connected Englishman, often
experienced in governing other colonies. The governor was advised by a seven to twelve
member Governor’s Council. The Governor’s Council was appointed by the Crown, and had
multiple roles, acting as a privy council, the upper house of the legislature, and as a high court
of appeal. The lower house of the legislature, the General Assembly, was popularly elected. The
suffrage was limited to propertied males. This limited suffrage was in accordance with classical
republican notions that citizens should have a stake in society. It was believed that property, in
addition to giving one a stake, also gave independence. Since unpropertied people, or people
without much wealth, were considered to have no stake in society and no independence (and
were thus susceptible to having their vote controlled by employers or others), as a corollary the
lower classes were often disenfranchised. In New York, those adult males with an
unencumbered freehold worth 40 pounds and tenants with lifetime leases could vote. In the
cities of Albany and New York City, those who could pay a modest fee became “freemen” and
also became eligible to vote. Thus, the franchise was a little larger and wider than it appeared
at first glance. Voting was “open”, by voice or show of hands. The Assembly was quite small,
reaching the number of 27 shortly before independence, and elections were rarely held.
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Elections were only held about once every 5 years after 1743. Before that, they were held only
upon the death of the king. By contrast, the average for the other colonies was every two years,
and in neighboring Pennsylvania annually. The representatives were fairly evenly distributed,
though the Hudson River Valley was slightly overrepresented. 13
While its government was somewhat similar to that of the other colonies, New York was
in many ways unique. It was a very diverse colony with many competing ethnic, economic,
religious, and other interests. Only Pennsylvania approached its diversity. Perhaps the most
notable component of its diversity was its large Dutch population. A century after the English
conquest, a sizable number of New York’s population was still Dutch in religion, culture, and
language. New York City was the most diverse city in the colonies (with the possible exception
of Philadelphia). Its ethnic groups included English, Dutch, French, Germans, Scots, Swedes,
Irish, Scots-Irish, Jews and Africans (the latter, about fifteen percent of the population, were for
the most part slaves). A 1776 map of New York City shows thirteen places of worship, ranging
from Anglican and Dutch churches to a Moravian meeting and a synagogue.14
Economically, as one historian relates, “New York presented a greater mixture of
agrarian and mercantile interests than any of the other colonies.”15 Writing in 1774, Governor
William Tryon stated that the province carried on “a considerable Trade with the British
Settlements on the Continent of North America, supplying some of them with the produce of
the Colony, others with British Manufactures and West India Goods.” Trade with the British
13
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West Indies was extensive, since they had “a Constant demand for provisions and Lumber of all
kinds, which Articles are the Natural Produce of this province.”16
New York City was the main port, commercial center, and capital of the colony, and
the second largest city in the colonies, after Philadelphia. In 1771, its population was about
22,000. As late as 1790, as the historian Linda DePauw notes, the entire population would have
fit easily into Yankee Stadium, with room left over for the populations of Philadelphia and
Boston. The city was cosmopolitan and sophisticated (at least in comparison with “upstate”),
with access to many books, newspapers, and coffeehouses. The population ranged from
wealthy merchants to slaves, with many laborers. New York City in 1776 consisted of about
4000 wood and brick buildings covering less than a square mile at the southern tip of the island
of Manhattan. The city ended just north of Chambers Street (the current location of an
important courthouse) in marshes and farms. To the east of the marsh, the city extended north
a few blocks along Bowery Lane, then became farms. A few blocks to the southeast of the end
of Broadway (which was just beyond Chambers Street) were located the Common, the jail, a
soldier’s barracks and a powder magazine. According to a map prepared in 1776 by Major
Holland, British Surveyor General, there were about a dozen major buildings, such as the Fort
on the Battery, the military hospital, the Governor’s House (in the fort), the Custom House, the
Exchange, several markets, City Hall (then on Wall Street) and the Dutch Free School. Most of
16

Report of His Excellency William Tryon Esquire, Captain General and Governor in Chief in and over the Province of
New York and the Territories depending thereon in America, Chancellor and Vice Admiral of the Same—On certain
th
Heads of Enquery relative to the present State and Condition of His Majesty’s said Province, London, 12 June 1774.
CO 5/1105, 266 and following, Question No. 7. The report in its style (a set of questions followed by an answer) is
reminiscent of Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia. Sag Harbor on the East End of Long Island, the main port for the East
End region, had an extensive trade with the West Indies. This is evidence for Suffolk, which had many religious and
other ties to New England, having a trading system similar to New England’s—helping perhaps to explain why
Suffolk would be a Patriot-leaning county at the time of the Revolution. Frederic Mather, The Refugees of 1776
from Long Island to Connecticut (Albany: J.B. Lyon) 1913, 166.

40

these were clustered within a third of a mile from the tip of Manhattan. In addition to these
governmental and commercial buildings, and several wharfs, Holland’s map listed thirteen
churches of various denominations, plus a synagogue (and it probably did not include all the
city’s congregations). In addition, the map also noted the location near the Common of the
“Engine which suplies the City with Fresh Water”.17
The province’s population in 1771 was approximately 168 thousand, with about twenty
thousand of that number African American (the 1774 population was estimated by Tryon as
being 182,251). The city was heavily engaged in trade, much of it with Britain or the Old World
(as well as trade with the West Indies, not all of it legal). According to Tryon, more than eleventwelfths of the province’s population was clothed in British manufactures, and the homes were
filled to a similar proportion with British manufactures, except for a few locally-manufactured
products such as cabinets. Many goods such as gunpowder, lead, tin, and East India goods such
as spices were also imported into the colony. 18
The southern region, or “downstate” (New York, Richmond, Kings, Queens, and Suffolk),
was the wealthiest part of the state, representing about three-fifths of the total wealth of the
province. Richmond and Kings were mainly Dutch and mainly agricultural. Queens County, in
the center of Long Island, had been settled by both Dutch and English, and had many Anglicans,
as well as a sizable Quaker minority. Suffolk, settled by New England Puritans in the 1640s, was
mainly Presbyterian in religion. Suffolk’s ties with New England remained strong in the 1760s
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and 1770s, and there was much cross-Sound traffic, with most of Suffolk’s ministers trained in
New England.19
The largest upstate city was Albany, located two to five days journey north of the City. It
was located near the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson. Founded by the Dutch and
renamed by the English, much of its wealth had come from the fur trade and trade with the
Indians. The city was mainly Dutch, and the population was about a tenth of New York’s. To the
west of Albany could be found the Iroquois (Haudenosaunee), an extremely powerful group of
Indian tribes. Fort Stanwix, located in present-day Rome, New York, represented the limit of
European settlement. To the northeast was the disputed Green Mountain region (disputed
between New York, New Hampshire, and for a while Massachusetts). Though awarded by the
British to New York in 1764, the residents resisted becoming part of New York (mainly because
they feared becoming tenants), and the region eventually became the state of Vermont.20
The most distinctive feature of the Hudson Valley was the great manors, some of which
were comparable in size to a small downstate county. Some of these were the result of the
great patroonships granted by the Dutch during their control of the province, others of grants
by early English or British governors to favorites. Among the major manors were those of the
Livingstons, the Schuylers, and the Van Rensellaers. The manor lords modeled their lifestyles
and control of the tenants after the English gentry. Many but not all of their tenants were Dutch
or German. Some historians believe that the manor system kept New York’s population down,
as potential settlers went to colonies where they could have freeholds and not be tenants.
19
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Resentment against the conditions of tenancy resulted in a series of revolts. There was much
unrest in the manors during the 1750s and 1760s, possibly caused by an influx of New
Englanders who were used to land-ownership, not being tenants on the land.21
New York’s politics was marked by factionalism between factions broadly representing
economic interests. While both factions were Whig factions, there were some notable
differences between the two. The Delanceys22, the merchant faction, according to the historian
Joseph Tiedemann thought of themselves as Anglo-Americans and had built fortunes trading
with the British Empire. They saw the Empire as a vast trading and commercial network, and
their interests and livelihoods were threatened by a break with Britain. They rejected
characterization of the Empire as a tyranny. Many would eventually become Loyalists. The
Delanceys, while believing in the rule of the elite, would mix with the non-elite and even
frequent their taverns. They were thus less “elitist” than the landed Livingston faction, many of
whom sought to duplicate as much as possible the lifestyle of an English gentleman. Yet their
direct connections with Britain were slight, far slighter than that of the merchants, whose
wealth was tied to the British connection. Many Livingstons would become Patriots. 23
The Livingstons, the landed faction, like the Delanceys were Whigs, committed to
defending constitutional liberty and the peoples’ right to resist tyranny. Many were what the
historian Pauline Maier calls “Real Whigs,” and it is in this that we can see a real difference
between the two factions (indeed, here is a real ideological divide within the Whig movement).
Real Whigs saw politics as an unrelenting struggle of liberty against power. They believed that
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any man entrusted with authority would seek to expand his power beyond its lawful limits.
Constant vigilance against this was required, and resistance was necessary against the “first
abuses of power”. Corruption, which in its broadest sense meant pursing private interest “at
public cost,” was the “most important indication of danger”. In addition to this belief in
vigilance against overreaching government power, the Livingstons’ vision of America’s future
also differed from that of the DeLanceys. The Livingstons envisioned America’s future not so
much in terms of trade and empire, but of peopling the North American continent. In other
words, they were in Egnal’s terms “Expansionist.”24
Both of the main parties represented the interests of different parts of the elite. Both
wanted to protect their position and property. The Delanceys, as great merchants, however,
had many ties to Britain, and saw themselves as Anglo-Americans. They wanted the imperial
dispute over taxation resolved in a way that kept the great commercial empire of Britain intact
and operating. Independence threatened their self-identification as members of a vast transAtlantic trading empire, and the disruption, alteration, and possible destruction of the British
commercial network directly threatened their positions and fortunes. While the Livingstons
modeled themselves on the English gentry, their ties to Britain were weaker. It was easier for
them to see Britain as a tyranny trying to steal their property without their consent, through
taxation without representation. In such a case, they could preserve their positions and wealth
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by leaving the Empire, and many became Patriots. It was actually a way to preserve the status
quo—as long as America achieved independence.25
A third group would soon emerge in the wake of the Stamp Act, which will be discussed
in the next chapter. These were the Sons of Liberty. Led by lesser merchants who had done well
in the Seven Years War, they craved a society based on merit, not rank. They called for selfdetermination in the empire and equal treatment at home. Tiedemann argues that they
coveted elite status (which they were disqualified from because of their modest birth). Having
risen from the lower classes, they were often popular leaders, becoming crowd leaders during
the Stamp Act crisis. In the 1770s, they would support independence, republicanism, and the
“removal of all artificial restraints based on rank, estate or privilege.” They were the most
radical, and most democratic, of the three groups. Countryman describes them as the
“successful children of oyster catchers, milkmen, and indentured servants,” and as having more
“affinity” with the concerns of the people than “did the gentlemen, the merchants, and the
lawyers who dominated established politics.” He asserts that their emergence helped begin an
internal revolution. At the very least, these nouveau-riche lesser merchants represented some
of the “new men” that the Revolution was beginning to bring to the forefront of politics. 26
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Two important politicians in late colonial New York were outside these factions and
represented the interests and outlook of British imperialists. Perhaps the most important was
Cadwallader Colden. Colden had been born in Scotland and moved to New York in 1718, where
he gained a series of important positions, culminating in being the lieutenant-governor. Since
the governor was frequently absent from the province, Colden would often act as governor. He
was a strong supporter of British rule, and of expansion under British control. In the Stamp Act
and later crises, he constantly upheld the desires and rule of Britain.27
Sir William Johnson, born in Ireland, had come to New York in 1738, and eventually
settled on the frontier west of Albany. He became a prominent landowner and by 1756
Superintendant for Indian Affairs (and a baronet). He was also a strong supporter of British
policies after 1763, especially the policy of keeping colonists from settling beyond the
Appalachians.28 He died in 1774 , and Colden in September, 1776, thus denying the Loyalist
community of New York two people who might have become important Loyalist leaders.
Religious tensions also became enmeshed with the political faction system. The British
had granted the Dutch the freedom to worship as they pleased, and religious toleration was a
feature of British rule over New York. However, while there was religious toleration, the
Anglican Church was the preferred church, and it was also the church of many of the elite.
While only ten percent of New York’s population were Anglicans, many of the political elite,
such as the great merchants and landowners, the Governor and lieutenant governor, and much
of the Council and Assembly were Anglicans. In the 1740s, many non-Anglican groups, such as
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Scottish immigrants or Dutch Reformed, supported Presbyterian efforts to limit Anglican power.
Many of those involved in these efforts would soon become important figures in the
Revolutionary crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.
A Presbyterian “triumvirate”, led by William Livingston, William Smith Jr., and John
Morin Scott, opposed the attempts of the Anglican Church to expand its power. The landedmerchant battle became enmeshed in the struggle between the Anglicans and Presbyterians.
Much of the battle in the 1750s revolved around Presbyterian opposition to the Anglican
attempt to appoint a bishop for the colonies, and for the control of King’s College (now known
as Columbia University). While no bishop was appointed, the struggle over the college would
eventually end in Presbyterian defeat, as the Anglicans managed to gain control of the school’s
leadership and religious services. The “triumvirate” launched the Independent Reflector, which
attacked corruption and enunciated an early version of the ideas and values that would
dominate the Revolutionary era. It folded under political pressure from its opponents. A feud
developed between Smith, then still in his teens and a graduate of Yale, and Cadwallader
Colden. Colden wanted a reference to a land claim that he had an interest in left out of a
compendium of New York’s law, and he threatened Smith’s pay if he did not. The enmity that
arose from this incident would be life-long. Smith, it should be noted, was the son of William
Smith Senior, who had helped defend John Peter Zenger in the historic libel case of 1735.29
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While politics were rather contentious in New York City, politics were much less
contentious on Long Island in the pre-Revolutionary era than in New York City. However, the
island also had tensions which would come to the forefront during the Revolution. On Long
Island, town government resembled New England town government, with annual town
meetings, usually in April. Here, among other things, town officials would be selected. Several
families would virtually monopolize town office and would often possess a disproportionate
amount of the wealth of the towns. The same family names appear, year-after-year, in the
town records of many towns as holding important office. In the aptly-named Smithtown, for
example, most major positions went to a member of the Smith family. In Huntington, to the
west of Smithtown, between 1690 and 1770, government was “of the many by the privileged
few.” Here six families monopolized town office and amassed a disproportionate share of town
wealth. Between 1688 and 1770, the town clerk was either a Platt or a Ketcham. There tended
to be electoral deference to descendants of founding families, much plural office holding, and
long tenure in governmental service. An increase in population, with its concurrent
geographical spread of population, resulted in an increase in offices, with minor ones stepping
stones to more important ones. These minor offices would often go to people outside the
oligarchy. One of the effects of the Revolution was a break in the hold of the old families and
the end to plural office holding, as well as a more equal distribution of wealth, at least in
Huntington.30
New York’s governmental structure allowed some popular participation, probably more
than traditionally thought. But New York was a colony of both great landed estates and great
30
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commercial fortunes, and it must be concluded that maintaining and enhancing the position of
the great landowners and merchants was a dominant feature and aim of the political system.
The prevailing classical republican political philosophy, while it nobly encouraged public service
by the elite, also limited the franchise, and the tiny Assembly undoubtedly reduced the number
of voices that could be heard. Tenants were dominated by their landlords, and many of the
urban workers had no vote at all. The manor lords consciously tried to emulate English country
gentlemen. As in England, wealth in late-colonial New York did not always bring status. The
various elements of the elite aligned with other interests in an attempt to improve or maintain
their position. In many respects, the social and governmental system resembled the English
system. It emulated some of its worst features, including “pocket boroughs.”31
New York was an ethnically, religiously, and economically diverse colony. It was ruled by
great landlords and great merchants; it was also inhabited by tenants and mechanics and
freeholders, among others. Its great merchants had strong trans-Atlantic ties and an AngloAmerican identity. Its landlords modeled themselves on the English gentry, but had fewer
connections to Britain than the merchants. The political and social structure was inherently
conservative (in the sense of trying to maintain the status quo). There were cracks and tensions
in the structure. Nouveau-riche merchants craved a meritocracy, tenants would on occasion
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revolt, and mechanics would soon form violent mobs during the Stamp Act Crisis. 32 But, in
general, the system was conservative and stable, designed to maintain the elites in power.
It is not surprising that such a conservative system would be reluctant to revolt.
Landlords and wealthy merchants would be reluctant to encourage revolution, fearing that a
revolution against Britain could become a revolution against them. New York would not be in
the forefront of the Patriot movement in the 1770s, and the leaders of New York’s revolution
have been called “reluctant revolutionaries.”33 It is not surprising that New York had to be
“dragged” into revolution, or that much of the Revolution’s leadership would come from “new
men” outside the traditional elite, such as the lesser merchants or freeholders. It is therefore
not surprising that New York had many Loyalists. What is surprising is that New York was briefly
in the forefront of the Patriot movement, during the Stamp Act Crisis. The Stamp Act Crisis, and
the development of the Revolution in New York, will be discussed below.

III

In 1764, Parliament’s attempt to tax the American colonies sparked a decade-long
dispute which eventually resulted in American independence. The “imperial question” would
add itself to the mainly local or provincial questions that animated the colonial politics of New
York. The Delanceys and Livingstons would be faced with a new faction, the Sons of Liberty
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(often called the “Liberty Boys”), that represented both a more democratic viewpoint and a
rising economic interest. In New York and other colonies, the dispute with Britain over
Parliament’s right to tax the colonies led to the formation of various committees at local levels.
These committees formed to coordinate and lead the protests against British policies.
Eventually, these committees would lead to the formation of congresses at the provincial and
continental level. This committee system would eventually begin to take on quasigovernmental and then governmental powers. It would supersede the traditional colonial
structure described above and lead New York out of the British Empire. It would also lead to the
collapse of New York’s political system and the rise of a more open system, although much of
the old elite still retained much power in the new republic.
The American Revolution, at least in part, arose out of the aftermath of the Seven Years
War—most particularly, the post-war attempt of Britain to tax the colonists. The Seven Years
War in New York benefited the local economy, ending a depression that had lasted from 1750
to 1755. New York City was a major supply center for British forces, and many New Yorkers
made their fortunes (or increased already existing fortunes) with war contracts or with
privateering. Many artisans gained work from war contracts. Provincial forces were mustered
to fight in the war. Upstate New York was a major front in the war. But New York was again
faced with economic difficulties as peace-time returned. In fact, the post-war downturn began
in 1760, as the war shifted to the West Indies.34
The war had been very expensive. In order to raise revenue (and, it has been argued by
many, to increase control over the colonies), Britain passed several acts shortly after the war
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ended. The acts included the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act. While many Americans were
troubled by aspects of the Sugar Act, particularly its court provisions35, it was the Stamp Act
that caused the most concern. The Stamp Act was the first direct tax Parliament had imposed
on the colonies, taxing most printed materials, from newspapers to playing cards and legal
documents. Many in the colonies questioned the constitutionality of the Act, fearing that they
were being taxed without representation.36 The Stamp Act, as most New Yorkers saw it, not
only represented a political threat to the liberties of New Yorkers, but an economic threat, as it
threatened to increase the costs of nearly all business. This was especially grievous during an
economic downturn. All constituencies in New York City united against it. Concerned with
rumors of new revenue measures, as early as January 27, 1764, New York merchants had met
at Burns’ Tavern to frame a protest to Parliament and establish a permanent committee on
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and others would eventually propose a continent-wide assembly with a veto, or at least a delay, on British laws
affecting the colonies. Another proposed solution was for each of the colonies to voluntarily vote the King a
“revenue.” The assembly of Georgia, where British civilian government was briefly restored in the 1780s, voted the
King an annual revenue. See Chapter VII.
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trade. 37 The Assembly sent petitions in October 1764 to Parliament protesting the Sugar and
Stamp Acts, respectfully arguing that Parliament had no right to tax the colony. The petitions
were never delivered, since the colony’s agent in London considered them too inflammatory to
be presented to Parliament. New Yorkers were uncertain as to what steps to take next. A Stamp
Act Congress, proposed by Massachusetts during the summer of 1765, was scheduled to meet
in early October of 1765. The Assembly, however, was not in session to formally pick
candidates, and would not be in session until about a week after the Stamp Act Congress was
due to start. Showing the pragmatism (or disregard for obeying the legal niceties) that
characterized many New York actions during the Revolution, the House’s Committee of
Correspondence informally selected its own members as delegates. The Stamp Act Congress
met on October 19th in New York City and formally condemned taxation without
representation. 38
Before the Stamp Act Congress met, the first and only issue of The Constitutional
Courant appeared in New York. In it, “Philoleutherus” (friend of freedom) argued that while the
British Parliament should be treated with respect, if they transgressed constitutionally set
boundaries, infringed American liberties, and pursued “such measures as will infallibly end in a
Turkish despotism”, then this usurped jurisdiction should be denied, as “we owe them no more
subjection, in this respect, than the Divan of Constantinople.” “Philo Patriae” (friend of the
country—literally, “friend of the fatherland”) argued that if the British could impose the Stamp
Tax on the colonists, it could take all of the colonist’s property from them, sell them into
slavery, or even put them to death, and that it would be better for the colonists to die in
37
38

Wilbur C. Abbott, New York in the American Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons) 1929, 36.
Tiedemann, 62-3, 69-70.

53

defense of their rights. The paper also reproduced the famous “Join or Die” cartoon first
produced in 1754 by Benjamin Franklin, which featured a divided snake representing the
various colonies. The radical nature of these views shocked many, and Colden attempted to
discover the authorship. To this day, that is disputed, but it is clear that the paper was printed
in New Jersey, and then carried to New York. The most likely responsible party was the Sons of
Liberty, though they may not have yet taken on that name or considered themselves a formal
organization at that point.39
The Sons of Liberty formed in New York and several other colonies in response to the
Stamp Act, though the actual date of formation of the New York group is unknown. The New
York group is generally considered to have most likely formed in October of 1765, though a
September or even earlier date is also possible (and the biographer of one of their leaders,
Isaac Sears, believes they did not formalize the association until January, 1766). The name
referred to a debate in Parliament between Isaac Barré and Charles Townshend. Townshend
argued that the colonists, in their opposition to taxes, were biting the hand that had planted
and nurtured them in the New World. Barré countered that England’s “Oppressions planted
‘em in America”, and called the Americans “Sons of Liberty.” The group was originally
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secretive, and this secrecy is one of the reasons why historians are unclear about when the
group formed. Among the leaders of the New York “Liberty Boys”, as they were also known,
were Isaac Sears, Alexander McDougall, John Lamb, and Marinus Willett. Their supporters were
not just middle class artisans, but those poorer white males who were denied the vote. Many of
these would soon show their dislike of British policy through violent street action.40 The
Stamp Act was to become effective on November 1, 1765. In the days before that, broadsides
signed Vox Populi (the voice of the people) were put up all over New York City threatening
property damage (and death) to anyone who attempted to use the stamps. A more moderate
response was made by the merchants on October 31. Meeting at Burns Tavern, the former
home of James De Lancey, Sr., the merchants agreed to boycott all British imports until the
Stamp Act was repealed. Captain James De Lancey emerged here as “a first-class political
leader and organizer of men.” The De Lancey family excelled in bold, dramatic, flamboyant
actions, and a boycott was such an action. However, bolder and far more dramatic action was
about to be executed in New York City.41
In November of 1765, violent riots against the Stamp Act broke out in New York City.
The actions of the mob horrified the elite. Contemporaries called November 1 through 4 the
“General Terror of November 1-4”. However, their attacks were confined mainly to symbolic
government targets. A movable gallows was erected on which was hung an effigy of
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Lieutenant–Governor Cadwalladar Colden.42 The Governor’s coach house was broken open,
Colden’s carriage dragged out, and another effigy of Colden was driven in it. The mob marched
to Fort George. Placards announced that “the sons of Neptune”, that is, mariners, would lead a
new demonstration. The crowd approached the wall, throwing rocks and stones over the walls.
Some seemed ready to enter the fort, which would probably have provoked fire from the
soldiers. Fortunately, they pulled back and regrouped at the Bowling Green, where they burned
the effigy of Colden, the gallows—and Colden’s carriage. All of these were for the most part
symbolic targets. But then a group destroyed the mansion of Major Thomas James, who had
bragged about forcing the colonials to use the stamps. This was similar to what had happened
in August to Massachusetts Lt. Gov. Thomas Hutchinson’s house in August, which had been
destroyed by a Boston mob. About the same time, there had been similar riots in Newport.
Arguably, the destruction of James’ house was also the destruction of a symbolic target, but still
the actions frightened the elites. However, despite the property damage, no one had been
killed, and a Boston “Massacre” (or even a Bastille) was avoided. Still, it was clear that the
more “respectable” members of the Sons of Liberty had at least temporaily lost control over
the artisans and sailors, and whether they could retain control over them was questionable.
Sears and others, mainly in the Sons of Liberty, did seem to exert a steadying influence on the
“mob.” The Sons of Liberty’s leaders had started at the bottom or near the bottom of the
economic ladder, and had improved their economic position during the recent war. They were
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not members of the elite; at best, they could be characterized as nouveau-riche. They were
closer in mindset and attitude to the lower economic ranks than the elite were, and had
influence with and respect from the “lower” classes. Sears had been a privateer during the
French and Indian War and his actions had won him a small fortune and a reputation for
bravery. Well-liked by sailors and artisans, he could mobilize the common people, and the
“aristocrats” dubbed him “King Sears.”43
Following the riots, the city was still in an uproar, and leading members of all three
factions patrolled the streets, trying to restore order. One of these leaders was William Smith
Jr., formally of the “Triumvirate.” Smith had become a successful lawyer during the 1750s and
1760s, clashing occasionally with Colden as Smith defended the province’s landowners clients
against suits for rents the Crown claimed it was owed under the terms of land grants. By 1763,
he was the highest paid lawyer in the province and lived in a mansion on Broadway that had
once belonged to the earlier acting governor James Delancey (who had been acting governor in
the 1750s). Despite the long-standing enmity between Colden and Smith , Smith now helped
local leaders negotiate with Colden. The lieutenant governor, in an effort to defuse tensions,
transferred the stamps to a waiting ship of war. Full-scale revolt was averted, and the crisis
would end when the Stamp Act was repealed.44
The next decade saw continued attempts by Britain to tax the colonies (and assert their
right to do so), and continued resistance. In January of 1766, during the Stamp Act Crisis, the
Sons of Liberty formed a “committee of correspondence” to communicate with other Sons of
43
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Liberty groups in other colonies. The Sons of Liberty borrowed this technique from the
Presbyterians and Congregationalists, who had used it in their struggle against the appointment
of an Anglican bishop for America. The creation of the committee of correspondence was the
beginning of a system of committees that would eventually rise to assume governmental
power. After the Coercive or Intolerable Acts were passed in 1774, in New York City and its
environs various committees were formed to organize and coordinate the various resistance
efforts (such as boycotts). The committees in the City were known by names such as the
Committee of Fifty-one or the Committee of One Hundred. Much of the membership of these
committees came from “new men”, such as the lesser merchants or the freeholders, though
members of both of the traditional factions jockeyed for positions on these committees. The
committees existed at all levels of government, and most were formed by or with the
cooperation of preexisting local governments, such as town meetings. However, in areas with
many Loyalists, such as parts of Queens, committees were sometimes formed by extra-legal
meetings. But, as one historian notes (speaking of the City committees) the “committee system
in itself was revolutionary because it was extra-legal, since no provision was made for it in the
city charter.”45
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IV

On Long Island, the last decades of the British era were a time of stability and growth.
The population of Huntington rose from about 500 in the 1690s to between 1500 and 1800 in
1775, and spread out from present-day Huntington “village” on the North Shore south through
central Long Island to Babylon on the Atlantic. 46 The Anglican Church made inroads in
Presbyterian Suffolk. The first Anglican church in the county was Caroline Church in Setauket
(approximately modern Stony Brook), founded in 1730. Huntington organized an Anglican
Church in 1745 under the Reverend Samuel Seabury, later an important Loyalist and, after the
Revolution, the first bishop of the Episcopalian Church. Brookhaven Presbyterians would
reportedly listen to Anglican prayers if a Presbyterian minister was unavailable.47 The New Light
controversy that disturbed religious congregations in New England also troubled Long Island
churchgoers, as Mary Cooper of Oyster Bay reported in her diary.48
The town records of Long Island from the period are generally concerned with the
delineation and demarcation of property rights and recording town meetings and rulings,
though other items (such as choosing delegates to committees and congresses, emancipations
from slavery and entries into indentured servitude ) would occasionally find their way into
them—especially as the dispute with Britain deepened. While the limits of landed property
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were often set out in the records, movable property was also recorded. “Ear marks”—generally
small distinguishing cuts in the ears of animals—would be recorded so that all would know who
owned an animal. 49
Connections with Connecticut were kept up by such things as the establishment of a
ferry service to Norwalk by Huntington in 1765. On a 1757 trip to New London, Connecticut,
George Washington stopped at Greenport (in Southold on the North Fork of Long Island). Horse
racing was a common amusement. Mary Cooper of Oyster Bay went to races in the late 1760s
at a place called “Seder Swamp”, and races were also held in New Hyde Park and Jamaica.50
Town meetings were generally held in April, though it was not uncommon for town
meetings to be held in May. There are few echoes of the great dispute over taxation in the
records until 1774. At the 1773 Huntington Town meeting, besides the election of officers, the
most important thing discussed was the sale of land to help build a new parsonage house for
the Presbyterian Church. It was also voted that the trustees should have the power to prohibit
“any stranger or furrener from hunting in the Township of Huntington the ensuing year.” By
1774, however, Long Island was heavily involved in the great events of the day. And by 1775, a
low-level civil war occurred in parts of Long Island.51
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Westchester’s population in 1771 was approximately 18,315 whites, and 3430 slaves.
The population was diverse, coming from Dutch, English, German, Scandinavian, Jewish,
American Indian and Huguenot backgrounds. The most notable feature of Westchester in the
1760 and 1770s was the great manors discussed earlier. These manors had been the scene of
several landlord-tenant clashes in the 1750s and 1760s. The Imperial Question sharpened
factional disputes, and a Delanceyite (John Delancey) defeated Lewis Morris of the Livingston
faction by only 3 votes in a 1768 Assembly election. The leading families of the county were
involved in both New York City and provincial affairs, and the Morris families and Van Cortlandt
families in the 1760s and later generally opposed the Delancey and Philipse families. 52
Religiously, as with the Presbyterians of Brookhaven, the Huguenots of New Rochelle,
while preferring ministers of the French Reformed Church, would accept an Anglican minister
when a minister of their faith was not available. Tarrytown was a Dutch Reformed town, while
Yonkers, Rye, and the Borough of West Chester were Anglican. Itinerant ministers could also be
found. The Anglican ministers were strong proponents of the King and Parliament, and at least
one Anglican minister was pleased to report that he had prevented his flock from opposing the
Stamp Act. The Anglican ministers support for the British was from both personal conviction
(the King was, it should be noted, the ultimate leader of the Church of England) and at least in
part because much of their income relied on a continued attachment to Britain. 53
The county before 1775 was “notably indifferent to continental and imperial politics.”
The essayist J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur lived on a large farm in Orange County, across the
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Hudson from Westchester. He reported that the constitutional controversy with Britain that so
exercised the urban population interested neither him nor his neighbors. Sung Bok Kim, a
historian of revolutionary Westchester, argues that the population was mainly apolitical before
the war. Indeed, interest in local politics was minimal, and Kim says that elections were mainly
social occasions, and that the people of Westchester gave much deference in political matters
to the great families of the county (which included great families such as the Van Cortlandts,
Morrises, Philipses, and De Lanceys.) Despite this, because of its strategic position,
Westchester would become greatly involved in the great events of the day by the spring of
1775. Much of Westchester would be a borderland between the American and British forces,
and White Plains would be the scene of a major battle during Washington’s retreat from New
York in 1776, as well as the place where New York’s independence was proclaimed. The county
would soon be faced with what can only be called civil war.54
“That ever loyal island,” Staten Island (Richmond County), was then, as now, the least
populated of the counties that would eventually constitute modern New York City, with a
population of about 3000 at the time of the Revolution. Ethnically, the island was about one
quarter African, one half Dutch or French (with Dutch predominating), with the rest British in
ethnicity, though determining these divisions is difficult and the best study is for 1706. Slavery
was common; the average farm had at the most three slaves, though some had as many as ten.
The island was populated mainly by middle-class farmers, who grew wheat, corn, and other
crops, as well as fruit orchards and woodlots and salt meadows. Many engaged in the oyster
trade and fishing. The island traded its products with both New York and New Jersey (which it is
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actually geographically closer to). A natural spring called “The Watering Place” provided fresh
water for ships sailing from New York, so they would often stop at the island.55
In the late colonial period Anglicans dominated the island politically, and most free
Staten Islanders would become Loyalists. Four leading families—the Billopps, Dongans,
Micheaus, and Seamans—dominated the government of the island through intermarriage and
deference. Religion, as in other parts of New York, had a clear influence on Richmond’s political
opinions. Historian Phillip Papas argues that Presbyterians and members of the Dutch
Reformed Church often became Patriots at least in part as a way to break the Anglican political
hold and disestablish the Church of England. Conversely, there had been tensions between the
Moravians and the Reformed congregations, so many Moravians became Loyalists, fearing the
new Presbyterian-Dutch Reformed political and social order that would arise from a Patriot
victory. 56
In 1774-76, Staten Island would oppose the Continental Association and many other
measures supported by the Patriots. The island was mostly Loyalist, and would welcome the
British troops that arrived in the summer of 1776 with open arms. 57 The island was used as the
staging area for the invasion of Long Island and Manhattan in August and September of that
year. During the war, it would guard New York harbor from attack. During the long occupation
it would be the scene of attacks and raids into New Jersey—and of raids from New Jersey.
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V

The end of the Stamp Act crisis was not the end of tensions in New York; ironically, the
celebrations surrounding the repeal of the Stamp Act led to a series of violent clashes. News of
the Parliament’s repeal of the Stamp Act reached New York on May 20, 1766. The Assembly
voted to have statues of the king and William Pitt, who had argued for the act’s repeal, erected.
The Sons of Liberty erected a “liberty pole” on the Common, using an old ship mast. The liberty
pole was an ancient Roman symbol, and it has been argued that the liberty pole was fused with
the maypole in the popular mind. The pole was inscribed “George III, Pitt and Liberty.”58
In June of 1766, two British regiments were quartered near the Common. The soldiers of
the regiments began to supplement their incomes by moonlighting, thus arguably taking jobs
away from New Yorkers. To those who resented paying taxes to support the soldiers, this was
adding insult to injury. The soldiers, annoyed at what they saw as ingratitude and disrespect,
responded by cutting down the Liberty Pole on August 10, 1766. Rioting broke out the next day
between New Yorkers and British regulars. Fortunately, no one was killed, but this was the first
time American colonists had clashed openly with British regulars. Several more liberty poles
would be erected (and torn down) in the next few years, and more violence would surround
some of these poles, as discussed below.59
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While Parliament had defused a crisis by ending an unpopular tax, it did not give up its
belief that it had a right to tax the colonies. Concurrent with repeal of the Stamp Act, it passed
a Declaratory Act, declaring its right to tax the colonies “in all cases whatsoever”, and in the
summer of 1767, it passed the Townshend duties. These included duties on lead, glass, tea, and
other items shipped to America. In New York, the Assembly protested these duties, and was
soon dissolved by the governor. A new election was called for 1768. In this election, believing
that the Livingstons had been too moderate in their protests, the Sons of Liberty supported the
Delanceys. Over the years, James Delancey had cultivated a radical image for his faction. This
radical image helped his party to do well in the election, as did the Livingston-controlled
Assembly passing an unpopular bill in 1767 to quarter British troops. The Delanceys also
exploited popular distaste for the legal profession (many Livingstons were lawyers.) When the
votes were finally counted, the Delanceys gained seats in the Assembly but remained a
minority. In the meantime, Massachusetts had instituted nonimportation as a tactic, and sent a
circular letter urging all the colonies to join. Further agitation by the Delanceys for the Assembly
to formally join the boycott led to a new election in 1769, where they gained the votes of many
working class and middle-class New Yorkers and won a majority in the Assembly.60
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basically differed on tactics and the stridency of their protests. As Patriot tactics began to turn
towards armed resistance and eventually independence, many who opposed British policies
would find themselves unable to follow along, and despite their opposition to many British
policies would find themselves on the Loyalist side.
Once in office, the Delanceyites made an alliance with Colden (who was acting governor
after Governor Moore’s unexpected death in 1769). In exchange for offices and the issuance of
more paper money by the province61, the Delanceyites agreed in November, 1769 to pay for
the quartering of British troops in the province. An earlier failure by New York and other
colonies to do this had resulted in the “Mutiny” Act, which required the veto of legislation until
funds had been appropriated. 62 Many New Yorkers felt betrayed by the agreement with
Colden, and an anonymous broadside attacked the Delanceys and said that the troops were
sent to “enslave” New Yorkers. Former Triumvirate member William Smith Jr. (henceforth
Smith), a Livingstonite who had been appointed to the Council in 1767, denounced the
Assembly’s actions loudly and attempted to realign the Liberty Boys with his faction. The Sons
of Liberty held large rallies in January, 1770 in front of the Liberty Pole against what they
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considered a corrupt bargain by the Delancey faction. In response, British soldiers in the dead
of the night destroyed the pole.63
Another broadside complained of having to pay for quartering the soldiers and
supporting the poor whose jobs, it alleged, they stole, and of the need to pay a poor tax to
maintain the soldiers’ “whores and bastards.” Not surprisingly, many soldiers were incensed,
and printed up their own broadside calling the Americans ingrates, and making fun of the Sons
of Liberty, who, the broadside claimed, defended the Liberty Pole as if “their freedom
depended on a piece of wood.” On January 19, 1770, Isaac Sears, a leader of the Liberty Boys,
forcibly prevented some soldiers from posting the broadside, which he considered libelous. This
led to an armed clash between a New York mob and the redcoats, known as the “Battle of
Golden Hill” after the wheat field where it occurred. The British reportedly used bayonets
against the mob, while the mob responded with halberds (long poles with ax blades and a steel
spike at the end). There were some serious wounds, and many cuts and bruises. Fortunately, no
one was killed, but the incident has been called the “first blood-shed of the Revolution.” Six
weeks later, Golden Hill was eclipsed by the incident commonly called the “Boston Massacre”,
where a clash between Bostonians and soldiers sent to ensure compliance with British policy
resulted in four deaths.64
The Liberty Pole had become an important symbol of the struggle against the British,
and a fifth pole was erected on a plot (owned by Sears) near the Common in February, 1770.
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Standing forty-six feet above the ground, it bore a weather-vane that spelled out the word
“Liberty”, and would last six years. “God Save the King” was played as it was installed.65 At this
point in the Revolution, despite their opposition to British policy, the Patriots were also
Loyalists.
In 1770, the British dropped all duties except that on tea. The Delanceys, who
represented merchant interests, wanted to end the economic boycott on all items except tea.
The other two factions wanted the boycott to continue. On July 7, 1770, the Liberty Boys and
their new allies the Livingstons clashed with representatives of the Delanceys in what became
known as the Battle of Wall Street.66 The breach between the factions on the trade and tax
issue had been made clear in March, when competing annual banquets were held
commemorating the Stamp Act’s repeal. A group calling itself the “Friends of Liberty and Trade”
reserved Montaigne’s Tavern for March 18, the date of the annual banquet. This tavern had
been the unofficial meeting place and headquarters of the Liberty Boys.67 Undeterred, several
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leaders of the Sons of Liberty (such as Isaac Sears, Alexander McDougall, and John Morin Scott),
bought a building near the Liberty Pole, named it Hampden Hall, and held their banquet. The
Friends of Liberty and Trade toasted “Trade and navigation and a speedy removal of their
embarrassments” and appeared to be members of the Delancey faction. 68
Shortly after the “Battle of Wall Street”, the nonimportation agreement collapsed in
New York. For the next few years after the collapse of the agreement, political disputes in New
York would be mainly about patronage, not matters of high principle. The crisis was had been
defused. Symbolic of the seeming return to normality, in August of 1770, an equestrian statue
of King George, ordered after the repeal of the Stamp Act, was unveiled in New York City. This
and the statue of William Pitt were the first statues ever erected in Manhattan. 69 But the
“Imperial Crisis” was merely defused, not over. The fundamental questions remained. In less
than six years, the statue of King George would be destroyed by crowds celebrating
independence.

also probable that some of the more violent actions of the Revolution in New York were fueled at least in part by
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VI

After Moore and Colden’s acting governorship, Lord Dunmore was briefly the governor
of New York. In July, 1771, he was succeeded by William Tryon, who remained the official
British governor of the province until 1780. Tryon was well-connected, with titled relatives and
a marriage to the daughter of a wealthy merchant of the East India Company. The Earl of
Hillsborough, who was president of the Board of Trade and Plantations from 1763 to 1769 and
from 1768 to 1772 Secretary of State for the colonies, was a family friend. Tryon joined the
army and was nearly killed during the Seven Years War, but survived. In 1764, he used his
connections with Hillsborough to become lieutenant-governor of North Carolina, and became
governor the next year. In many ways, his governorship was moderate. He supported the
colonial demands for paper money, and was sympathetic to colonial demands in the Stamp Act
crisis.70
However, Tryon’s term as North Carolina governor is remembered for two things. The
first was the erection of a new governor’s mansion at New Bern. The Assembly appropriated
£15,000 for the mansion. Many considered this excessive, and dubbed the mansion “Tryon’s
Palace”. Far more importantly was his treatment of the Regulators. For years, the people of
western North Carolina had tried to get greater representation in the colonial assembly. They
also had other grievances, such as the economic depression, with the debts and foreclosures it
caused (and what they believed was corruption by lawyers and the politically-connected). They
70
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also had had little desire to pay for the “Palace”. Tryon had attempted to alleviate their
demands, but the eastern “establishment” of North Carolina (mainly wealthy commercial
farmers) had resisted increasing representation. The westerners eventually revolted in what
became known as the “Regulator Revolt”. About 80 percent of the white males of the North
Carolina backcountry were involved in the Regulator movement. Tryon put together a small
militia and routed the Regulators at the Battle of Alamance in May, 1771, killing at least 25 and
wounding 160 more. Loyalty oaths were imposed by Tryon and his forces on the people of
west North Carolina, with 6000 former Regulators repudiating their actions. Seven Regulator
leaders were hung shortly before Tryon left for New York.71
As New York governor, Tryon tried to be neutral, and above politics. Sometimes, he
leaned towards the Delanceys, sometimes to the Livingstons. He tried to counter democratic
tendencies in the province by commissioning only well-born gentlemen as officers in the militia,
and by granting huge tracts of land to not only colonial aristocrats but to himself as well. This
practice raised a few eyebrows in London.72
The Imperial Crisis was merely in hiatus during the early years of Tryon’s administration,
and a convoluted chain of events would end the seeming normality of the time. War in India,
famine in Bengal, and a financial crash in 1772 nearly ruined the British East India Company.
The company, while it received bail-out loans from the government, needed to increase tea
sales to improve its balance sheet. To help out the company, an act was passed by Parliament
71
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giving the company a monopoly on the tea trade with America. While the prior heavy tariff on
tea was eliminated, the Townshend duty remained at the insistence of the Prime Minister, Lord
North. The end result of these changes was that the price of legal tea was less than that for
smuggled Dutch tea. It seems that the Ministry was mainly interested in raising revenue and
helping out the Company by increasing the sales of legal (as opposed to smuggled) tea.
However, whether intentional or not, a trap had been laid: should the colonials buy the
suddenly cheap tea, then, as Schecter argues, “they would have effectively agreed to
parliamentary taxation.” Sears and McDougall began a broadside and pamphlet campaign to
unite all New Yorkers, regardless of class or political affiliation, against the Tea Act. In some of
these, not only Parliament’s power to tax, but its claim to pass any law or have any sovereignty
over the colonies began to be questioned. 73
On December 16, 1773, the Boston Tea Party occurred, as men disguised as Mohawks
(some or most were probably members of the local Sons of Liberty) boarded a ship full of tea in
Boston Harbor and dumped the tea into the Harbor. News of the tea party was sent to New
York by an express rider, a Boston silversmith named Paul Revere. About 16 months later,
Revere would make a more famous ride, but now his report helped inspire the radical faction in
New York. On April 22, 1774, a group of men on the New York wharves boarded a ship called
the London and threw eighteen chests full of tea into New York harbor. This was the New York
Tea Party. A second ship, the Nancy, also laden with tea, was at Sandy Hook on the approaches
to the harbor. On learning of the Tea Party, it pulled up anchor and headed back to England.74

73

Schecter, 37; Tiedemann, 176-7.
Schecter, 38-39. Sandy Hook is a six mile long, one-mile wide barrier beach jutting out from Monmouth County,
New Jersey into lower New York Bay, and has often been used as an anchorage.

74

72

The British Parliament, on learning of the Boston Tea Party, was shocked at the
destruction of property, the lawlessness, and the implicit attack on what it saw as its rights and
powers, and passed a series of acts it called the Coercive Acts but the colonists called the
Intolerable Acts. The Acts shut down Boston harbor, made many Massachusetts offices
appointed by the king or governor (thus making major changes to Massachusetts government
without the consent of the Massachusetts population), and limited Massachusetts town
meetings to once a year, among other provisions. News of these acts reached New York two
weeks after the New York Tea Party.75 Since New York had done the same as Boston, many
must have worried that these acts could be extended to New York. This undoubtedly gave an
incentive to join with other colonies in opposition, and to respond favorably to the Boston
Committee of Correspondence’s appeal for help, unity, and resistance.
Sears and McDougall urged that the colonies agree not to export to, or import from,
Britain. However, they urged that such an agreement be formed under regulations agreed upon
by “Committees from the Principal towns on the Continent, to meet in a general Congress to be
held here for that Purpose.” This was in many ways the genesis of the Continental Congress.76
A meeting was held at the Exchange on May 16 to discuss New York’s response to the
Intolerable Acts. Regardless of faction, most New Yorkers, including the Delanceys, were
shocked at the strong British response. While the meeting was advertised to be for merchants
only, many of the Sons of Liberty also attended. So many showed up at the Queen’s Head
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Tavern, the advertised site, that the meeting had to be moved to the Exchange. About 300
people attended the meeting.77
While shocked by the British actions, the merchants did not want a disruption of trade if
possible, and the Delancey leaders argued that Boston should just pay for the tea, thereby
ending the crisis. They urged that nonimportation not be adopted until there had been
consultation with other colonies. A committee of correspondence was formed; the Delanceys
insisted on a large committee of 50, (which soon became 51) and carried the day. They also
achieved a majority on the Committee; only about 14 members of the Livingston-Sons of
Liberty alliance were on the committee. 78
Judge Thomas Jones, an important if biased Loyalist historian of Revolutionary New
York, noted in his history that the majority of the Committee of 51, as it became known, were
“real friends of Government.” 79 The committee was dominated by merchants, by respectable
citizens, and was in character moderate, if not conservative (in the sense of wishing to maintain
as much as possible the status quo). It was dominated by people with strong ties to Britain and
its trade, who would seek to repair the breach with Britain. The majority of the committee
members, while no doubt concerned with British actions, wanted trade. Thus, a little more than
two years before independence, the most important Revolutionary committee in New York was
quite conservative. To borrow an oft-used phrase, if they were revolutionaries, they were
“reluctant” revolutionaries.
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Jones’ language is interesting. Many Loyalists or Britons would often use “friend of
government” for Loyalists or “enemy of government” for the rebels.80 In calling their foes
“enemies of government”, rather than “enemies of the government”, it seems they were calling
them anarchists81; that in opposing the King and Parliament’s rule, they were opposed to any
government at all. This fits in well with the characterization of the Patriots as usurpers82, mob
rulers, and tyrants—though perhaps too much is being made here of a missing definitive article.
Despite its conservative nature, the Committee did contain a sizable number of radicals,
and meetings were often quite fractious. It began to act “as a legal body, legally chosen, and
fined, imprisoned, robbed, and banished his Majesty’s loyal subjects with a vengeance.” 83 In
short, even this most-moderate body began to act as a revolutionary committee, taking on
quasi-governmental functions. Similar events have occurred in other revolutions, as
committees, elected or self-chosen, begin to act as a government. Perhaps the most famous
instance of this was the soviets in revolutionary Russia, and the historian Edward Countryman,
rather provocatively, noted this similarity between the two revolutions in the 1980s. Similar
activities occurred in other colonies; for example, developments in Philadelphia and
Pennsylvania are detailed in Richard Ryerson’s The Revolution Has Now Begun.84
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The proposed Continental Congress met in Philadelphia in September and October,
1774 (though unlike Sears and McDougall’s suggestion, the delegates represented colonies, not
towns). It was here that Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania presented his Plan of Union. Under
this plan, a continental parliament called the General Council would be formed, and a
President-General would represent the Crown’s interests. The Council could veto British
decisions relating to the colonies, and the British Parliament could veto American decisions.
This would have given the colonies a greater say and retained British control. Many moderates
at the Congress found the plan quite attractive. It is possible the British might have found it, or
something like it, an acceptable compromise. Had Galloway’s plan, or something like it, been
adopted, war and independence would probably have been avoided, as it would have satisfied
all but the most radical Americans in 1774. How the British would have reacted to such a plan is
an open question; having adopted a hard-line policy, they may have rejected any plan that
reduced what they saw as their power over America. After the Suffolk Resolves arrived in
Philadelphia, discussion swung in a more radical direction, and Galloway’s plan was narrowly
defeated. Galloway would later become a leading Loyalist.85
The Congress passed the Continental Association. This was an agreement for
nonimportation, and set up means to enforce this agreement. In New York, there was much
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consternation among the Delanceyites, who had hoped for resolution of the crisis, not its
intensification and continuation. Jones reports that the Loyalists in New York had hoped for a
“redress of grievances, and a firm union between Great Britain and America upon constitutional
principles.” Now, totally disappointed, at a public meeting they resolved to oppose sending
delegates to a future Congress.86
Many members of the Committee of 51, being merchants, were reluctant to enforce the
Association. After much maneuvering, Isaac Low, the Committee’s chairman (and a leading
merchant of New York), reached an agreement with Daniel Dunscomb, the head of the
Mechanics Committee, to form a new Committee of 60 to enforce the Association. This new
committee formed on November 17, 1774, and included more Sons of Liberty and
Livingstonites than before. 87
The Committee of 60 set up a subcommittee known as the Committee of Inspection to
inspect ships and send them back before they could unload their cargo.88 One of the powers of
a government is to control and regulate trade. This will sometimes entail embargoing some or
all cargoes. What the Committee of Inspection was doing was more than a boycott, where
private citizens voluntarily choose to not purchase “offensive” items. The Committee was
preventing these items from reaching the stores. Perhaps without quite realizing what they
were doing, the Committee of Inspection had taken on a governmental function. Thus began a
period of “dual government”, which, as discussed above, often occurs in revolutions. The
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committees of New York would soon form a Provincial Congress which would compete with and
supersede the old Assembly.
Of course, governments need police to enforce their rules and ruling. In a revolutionary
situation, the police role is frequently played by informal actors, who will often draw their
legitimacy from a sense of accordance with the will of the people or from the ideals of the
revolution. In New York, the Committee of Inspection used mobs to enforce their decisions. On
February 9, 1775, at the same wharf where the New York Tea Party had been held, the mob
jeered the captain of the James, a British trading vessel. The James did not land its cargo. The
owner of the wharf, Robert Murray, more from economic motives than any political motive,
tried several times to land cargo either at his wharf or elsewhere. Alexander McDougall and
the other inspectors wanted to exile him from the city, but his wife’s ardent appeals prevented
that. However, the British could not land cargo in New York. The embargo held. 89

New York at the dawn of the Revolution was a colony with a varied past and present.
The long domination by two factions representing the interests of major economic interests
was disrupted by the crisis, as a new faction, representing both a more strident outlook on the
issues of the day and a rising economic interest arose. The dispute with Britain was fought by
formal protests, petitions, pamphlets, and on occasion riots. The Boston Tea Party and the
British response to it raised tensions between Britain and America to an all- time high. By 1775,
open warfare would break out between America and Britain. News of the Battle of Lexington-
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Concord would galvanize not just the people of New York City but those of the rural counties
surrounding the city. The rural communities would begin to put their views on record, and
begin seizing weapons or otherwise putting under suspicion their neighbors. Control of the
province would increasingly pass from the organs of the official government and more and
more into the hands of various committees. By the end of 1775, Governor Tryon would have
fled New York City for the safety of British ships in the harbor.
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Chapter II
The American Revolution in New York
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1775 was a year in which the Imperial Crisis deepened in New York and the thirteen
colonies in general. Resistance to British policy and the “Intolerable Acts” would lead to open
warfare at Lexington and Concord near Boston. This escalation of the conflict would galvanize
the anti-British movement. The structure of committees and congresses that had been slowly
developing began to take over the province of New York. The governor would flee by year’s
end to a ship protected in New York harbor by the British navy. From here, he would attempt
to govern. The old political divisions of New York were being replaced by a new division of
Loyalists and Patriots.
Outside of the city, the towns and counties were faced with the question of whether to
participate in the Provincial Congress. Those who opposed the Patriot position would
memorialize their opposition in various statements. But peaceful opposition was being seen as
impermissible, and this would lead to confiscations of weapons and a low-level but very real
civil war, which in some regions was in full-swing before 1776 began. Hopes for reconciliation
with Britain were dimming. While the next logical step may have been independence, many as
the year ended were reluctant to take that step.

I

In 1775, the first of a series of Provincial Congresses was elected in New York to
coordinate the anti-British movement and the actions of the local committees. The Second
Continental Congress was scheduled for May. The Patriot leaders believed that to give New
York’s delegation more legitimacy, it should represent the whole state, not just New York City.
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A provincial congress or convention should be selected to make what had mainly been an urban
movement into one that encompassed the other parts of the province—and perhaps supplant
the Assembly, controlled by the Delanceys. The Delancey faction had been moving more and
more into a position that was beginning to be called Loyalist. This was not surprising. As one
scholar argues, “the De Lancey party’s long-term commitment to the empire, Anglicanism,
elitism, and commercial growth had by now made it impossible for many of its members to
accept…the path that patriots were taking.”1 Many of the great merchants who eventually
became Loyalists did not have deep roots in New York (Isaac Low was a notable exception.)
Many were immigrants from Britain or her possessions. They had family, partners and trading
connections in Britain. In one way of putting it, they had East-West connections. The
connections of the Sons of Liberty and other traders who chose independence were more
North-South—they traded with the other colonies, or with the West Indies (including the
French and Spanish possessions.) 2
Merchants, which many of the Delanceys were, could only support short stoppages of
trade with their main trading partner. Long stoppages would be economically harmful, if not
ruinous. Merchants whose trade was less-dependent on Britain, such as many of the nouveauriche Liberty Boys, were far less economically vulnerable to a trade stoppage.3 Since much of
their wealth did not come from trade, the great landlords (many of whom were Livingstons),
also were fairly immune to the direct effects of an embargo.4 It must also be noted that the
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creation of a rival center of power to challenge the Delancey-dominated assembly may also
have been partially a maneuver in the old factional strife.
As an example of their conservatism on the Imperial Question, the Delancey-dominated
Assembly in March passed several resolutions which affirmed loyalty to the crown, and stated
that all laws that were not “inconsistent with the essential rights and liberties” of Englishmen
were binding on the colonies. However, to these rather unobjectionable statements they also
argued that taxation by parliament was unconstitutional, and petitioned the King and
Parliament for a redress of grievances. It is again apparent that, while all three factions were in
general agreement in their opposition to British policy, and even on the reasons the policies
were wrong, they differed on method. The Delanceyites saw the parliament’s actions as
unconstitutional, but their strategy was to petition through the legal assembly for a redress of
grievances; the Livingston-Liberty Boy alliance wanted to boycott and enforce the boycott
through the committees. 5
In many ways, within a few weeks, the De Lancey/Livingston divide, indeed, the entire
faction system that had governed New York for decades would be an anachronism. The
question of American-British relations would dominate all questions and supplant all prior
alignments. The new factional divide would be that between the Tories or Loyalists (mainly
composed of members of the Delancey faction, though some Livingstons would become
Loyalists) and the Whigs or Patriots (mainly Livingstons and Sons of Liberty).
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As the crisis deepened, the committees had begun to move from coordination and
organization to enforcement of boycotts and other quasi-governmental activity. This process
was similar to events occurring in many other colonies. With rare exceptions, such as
Cadwallader Colden, the majority of New Yorkers wanted to resist what they saw as a British
attempt to extinguish their liberties, but they also wanted to remain in the Empire. As the
historian JosephTiedemann phrased it, they wanted “both empire and liberty.” A solution to
the Imperial Crisis that kept New York (and the other colonies) solidly within the Empire (with
all its commercial benefits), yet respected—and solved—Patriot concerns regarding taxation
without representation was desired. Judge Jones reported in his history that what many
desired was both a redress of grievances, and a firm union. Galloway’s Plan, which might have
led to such a solution, had been rejected, and a series of resolutions which clearly pointed at
armed resistance had been adopted instead by the Continental Congress. While many,
probably most, New Yorkers desired to remain within the Empire, many truly feared that the
British sought a tyranny over the colonies. To prevent this, Patriots in New York and the other
colonies began taking actions that leaned not towards reconciliation, but towards active
resistance and independence.6
As the above occurred, or before, some members of the elite (many of them Delanceys)
began to leave the Patriot movement, fearing the direction they saw it moving in. Wishing for
some kind of reconciliation with Britain that also addressed the legitimate grievances of the
colonies, they saw—some sooner than later—that the colonies were instead moving towards
independence. James Delancey left for Britain in May, 1775, and never returned. Isaac Low left
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the Patriot cause in November, 1775, after he was named by the Provincial Congress to a
committee to purchase gunpowder. John Alsop, a prominent merchant, remained in the
Provincial Congress until July 16, 1776, resigning only after the Declaration of Independence
“closed the door of reconciliation,” as he put it in his letter of resignation. A few, like
Cadwallader Colden, actively opposed the Patriots. Perhaps 15 percent of New Yorkers
became—or remained—Loyalists.7
William Smith Jr.’s journey from youthful radicalism to Loyalism is intriguing. 8 His
father, William Smith Sr., had represented John Peter Zenger in the famous 1735 trial, and
incurred the enmity of the Delancey family during this trial. Young William Smith Jr., born in
1725, hence naturally moved politically into the Livingston orbit, and with William Livingston
and John Morin Scott, formed part of the “Triumvirate” discussed above. Smith was probably
the author of nine of the articles in the Independent Reflector. The Reflector supported “truth
and liberty”, and opposed the control of the proposed King’s College (the modern Columbia
University) by Anglicans. This was a cause dear to many Presbyterians, such as Smith,
Livingston, and Morin. Smith wrote a history of New York, became a prominent lawyer, and
helped keep the calm after the Stamp Act riots. Eventually, in 1767, he became a member of
the Governor’s Council, where he would often clash with the Delanceys, and would attempt to
align the Sons of Liberty with the Livingston faction. In 1774, Alexander McDougall introduced
John Adams to Smith. Adams described Smith as having “the character of a great lawyer, a
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sensible and learned man, and yet a consistent, unshaken friend to his country, and her
liberties.” In short, Adams considered Smith in 1774 to be a Patriot.9
As a member of the Council, in late 1775 and early 1776, Smith would attend meetings
on board the Dutchess of Gordon, a British vessel Governor Tryon had taken refuge on (see
below), and strive to achieve compromise on his return. Communication between the ship and
the city was stopped by April 1776, so Smith left the city with his family, and went to his
country home at Haverstraw on the Hudson, where his brothers Thomas and Joshua also lived.
Two trunks of documents were left in his New York City home, and he never recovered them.
His home was used by George Washington as a headquarters for a while, and was destroyed in
the great fire of September 1776. Hence, Smith, a member of the governing Council of British
New York, lived for several years in the unoccupied portion of independent New York. Smith
was placed on a list of suspect people in June 1776, and summoned to appear before a
committee. He had several friends on the committee, and they allowed him to avoid an
appearance and move to Livingston Manor. In June 1777, the Committee of Safety asked him if
he considered himself a citizen of the independent state of New York. He “declined to answer”,
and was put on parole in Livingston Manor. This was basically house arrest. Livingston Manor
was quite large, covering about 200,000 acres, so it was not an unpleasant house arrest, but it
was still house arrest. The Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies in July 1778
banished Smith to British-held New York, but did not strip him of his estates. This and other
actions, such as continued correspondence with leading rebels, aroused suspicions by Thomas
Jones and the British secret service as to his loyalties. However, the more likely explanation was
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that he was a fence-sitter; that while he agreed with many of the Patriot arguments, he could
not shake his loyalties to Britain. Anyone who has read even a portion of his Memoirs will
consider him a Loyalist, though perhaps one with some sympathy for the American cause.
When he finally had to make a choice, he chose Britain. The youthful crusader against privilege
and Anglican domination chose in his middle age to stay with Great Britain. Like many New
Yorkers, he wanted liberty, but he also wanted empire. He was awarded by the Crown with,
among other distinctions, being made Chief Justice of New York in 1780.10
Why did people become Loyalists? As several have pointed out, the question is
somewhat backwards. Arguably, loyalty was the “default state”; a better question is to ask why
people became rebels. However, in the northern colonies at least, it seems that the default
state was only achieved by much effort. The colonists may have been, as Pitt proclaimed, the
“sons of England”, but they were often the disliked sons of England, at least in the North. New
England was settled by Pilgrims and Puritans, as was much of Long Island. The Puritans wished
to purify the Church of England of what they saw as Catholic remnants, and feared what they
saw as Catholic leanings by the kings. The Pilgrims had actually separated from the Church.
The seventeenth-century Puritan New Englanders and Long Islanders may have respected the
king as lawful authority, but most probably did not have great fondness or devotion to him.
Indeed, their co-religionists in England actually killed a king of England, and until 1828 would be
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a suspect group (the “Dissenters”) in Britain, prohibited from many offices. Even after 1828,
they were for a long time social outsiders in Britain.
But, at least the Puritans and Pilgrims were English. New York was a conquered Dutch
province, and was run without an assembly for about twenty years after the conquest, at least
in part for this reason. Pennsylvania, founded in 1681, and much of New Jersey would be
populated largely by another group of religious dissidents, the Society of Friends—generally
referred to as Quakers. The Stuart kings after the Restoration began a process to anglicize—
that is, make more like English norms—the laws, governments, and customs of America as
much as possible. Governor Edmund Andros of the Dominion of New England in the 1670s
introduced oaths to legal procedures, which many Puritans saw as a form of idolatry. The King’s
arms were placed in town courthouses. Imperial holidays such as the King’s birthday were
celebrated—and some of these fell on the Sabbath. Flags flew St. George’s cross—another idol
in Puritan eyes. Before the Restoration, ties with England had been tenuous, and some of the
Puritan colonies could be said to be virtually self-governing. The Stuarts’ effort to assert their
authority and rule over the Americas even prompted one historian of seventeenth century
America to call 1676 (the year of Bacon’s Rebellion and King Philip’s War) the “End of American
Independence.”11
After the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, the later Stuarts and then the Hanovers
continued this process of rationalization and royalization, but with more success in New
England and the Middle Colonies than the earlier Stuarts. The kings were now Protestants,
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often at war with Catholic powers, and far more acceptable to American Calvinists. The
Glorious Revolution, the overthrow of a Catholic monarch and the establishment of a
Protestant monarchy, was seen as an important event in God’s plan for history in the almanacs
of the day. The day of the defeat of the Catholic dissident Guy Fawkes’ plot to destroy
Parliament, November the 5th, became a holiday as early as 1665 in Massachusetts. Royal
birthdays were celebrated as early as 1710 in New York. As many New Yorkers were Anglicans,
and the King was the ultimate leader of the Church of England, it is not surprising that many
New Yorkers felt strongly for the king. There are many reports of cheers of “God save the King,”
drinking the King’s health, and the like from eighteenth-century colonial America. By the
eighteenth century, historian Brendan McConville argues, “The evidence points to deep and
real affections for the British monarchy among provincials.”12 But this affection did not include
the Parliament. The king ruled them, and this was accepted, but the right of the Parliament to
rule them was not so accepted and by the 1770s was being explicitly rejected.
Not only was the king by the late colonial era loved or at least deeply respected, but he
was seen as the guarantor of the people’s liberties. Liberty poles would be raised to the tune of
God Save the King. Flags would be placed on these poles with both the words “Liberty” and
“George III” on them, symbolically equating the king with liberty (see below). And, as one
British officer wrote the Colonial Secretary, George Germain:

So far were they in 1767 from thinking of a Form of Gouvernent without a king,
that the People believed the King would take their Part if he was rightly
informed. If any convulsion at home had made it necesasary for em to think of
12
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Gouverning emselves I am convinced that most of the provinces would have
asked for a Prince of the House of Hanover. I am not saying there was no
Republican amongst em. But no man professed it, or would have been popular
for it.13

By the mid-eighteenth century, if not earlier, the King was respected, perhaps loved,
and seen as the guarantor of the people’s liberties. What shook this faith in the King and the
British Constitution among so many Americans? The Intolerable Acts and the Quebec Act, it has
been suggested, may have been the tipping point for many. The Intolerable Acts seemed an
overreaction to an act of political vandalism and reduced the freedoms and liberties of the
people of Massachusetts. The Quebec Act, which established the Catholic Church in Quebec
and extended that province’s boundaries, seemed to many to be the act of a tyrant; Catholicism
had long been associated with not just a heretical religion but with tyranny in Protestant
minds. The hiring in 1775 of Hessian mercenaries—foreigners14— whose likely use would be to
attack British subjects, was also seen as tyrannical. The influence of Opposition theory, of a
classical republicanism which saw tyranny as an eternal temptation for those in power which
had to be zealously guarded against, was also an important factor. And it became more and
more clear that the King was as much the colonists’ enemy as the Parliament. The King, the
protector of their liberties, had become in the eyes of many freedom’s enemy. And, as so often
happens, love can turn to hate when the object of one’s love seems to betray one. By January
1776, when Tom Paine’s Common Sense denounced and ridiculed the very notion of monarchy,
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many Americans were ready to accept the arguments.15 Still, not all had their faith shaken. For
example, while the settlers of the Caribbean and Bermuda shared many of the same concerns,
and had close economic ties with the colonies, they remained loyal. Fear of the French was
probably a major factor; the British fleet was their protection against foreign conquest. Revolt
would have been senseless; a few ships could overawe any possible resistance an island could
mount. Even a large island with some “strategic depth”, like Jamaica, would probably have
been defeated by a few regiments backed by the British Navy. And fighting on these islands was
something to be avoided for financial reasons. Fighting would cause great damage to the sugar
cane fields, the main source of the island’s wealth. This would take some years to repair, and
was therefore to be avoided. The islands had huge slave populations, and fear of a servile revolt
probably was another factor. Many of the ruling class of the West Indies had very strong ties
with London, and were often absentees, spending much time not on the island. Their ties to
the islands, their sense of being Jamaican or Barbadian, were not strong. As one commentator
told the Secretary of State for America:

The Subjects of those islands must at all times depend upon the Parent State for
protection, & and for every Essential resourse. The mart of their Produce will
ever be at home; & the Public credit is security for their acquired Wealth if
established in our Bank or Funds. Their aim is only to get Fortunes & return to
their native Land.
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Thus, while Bermuda actually sent a delegation to the Second Continental Congress, neither
Bermuda nor any of the islands of the Caribbean left the empire.16
People became (or remained) Loyalists for many reasons. Loyalists came from every
economic class and background. While many were wealthy and learned, others were poor and
illiterate. For example, tenants of the great estates of the Hudson had many grievances against
their mainly Patriot landlords, and would have preferred to have been freeholders. The British
were told in 1777 that a promise to make the tenants freeholders would bring thousands of
Loyalist farmers to their side. Once war began, tenants of Patriot landlords in Albany County,
were “actively Tory or at best indifferent to the patriot cause.” Many New York Loyalists
believed that prosperity and unity were brought to the colonies by the British tie; that it was
good to be part of a trans-Atlantic empire. Britain was associated with liberty and prosperity;
maybe some adjustments in its relations with the colonies needed to be made, but not in the
manner the Patriots were seeking it (and certainly not through severing the tie by declaring
independence.) The diverse nature of New York province may have made some fear the
changes that could occur once the steadying hand of Britain was removed.17
Religious and ethnic minorities could also link the British connection with liberty. Since
Britain desired peace and unity, it could act as a neutral party and protector of minorities.
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Baptists in Massachusetts, for example, were often at odds with their Congregationalist
neighbors. The British connection was the “final line of defense” against the majority, and many
Baptists in Massachusetts became Loyalists.18 Similarly, the Dutch in New York no doubt saw
the British as a protection against being overwhelmed by their English-speaking neighbors.
Moravians on Staten Island, as discussed above, became Loyalist to protect themselves from a
feared alliance of the Dutch Reformed Church and the Presbyterians’ against them.19
Like the West Indians, those who lived near the borders also enjoyed British protection.
The British not only protected upstate New Yorkers from the Iroquois, but the British Empire
was allied with the Iroquois. The British could and did protect the Iroquois from land-hungry
Americans. The Proclamation of 1763 was an attempt to protect Indian territories from settlers.
While a few tribes supported the Americans, most of the Iroquois continued in their alliance
when the Revolution occurred. The restriction on expansion onto Indian lands, as well as
British moves in the 1760s to challenge some of the titles acquired by the landlords, could have
helped swing some landlords (and settlers) into the Patriot camp: remove the British, remove
the check on westward expansion. 20 After the Revolution, the British government in Canada
would keep a tighter rein on and control westward expansion much more than the American
government did.
A final point should be noted. Loyalists considered the committees and congresses to be
illegal bodies that were imposing their will on others. They were imposing a “democratic
tyranny” on the colonies. Loyalists in Jamaica Queens, for example, responded to the
18
19
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December, 1774 meeting which produced the Jamaica Resolves by calling the meeting
“unlawful”. (See below). Soon, the committees would seize arms and prevent merchants from
trading. The Revolution was believed by some Loyalists to be the work of a small cabal. Thomas
Jones, for example, had thought that the Triumvirate wished to overthrow Anglicanism and the
king with Presbyterianism and a republic, or throw the entire province into anarchy. Loyalists
believed that the losers in many of the factional disputes of each colony were attempting to
overthrow the winners by stirring up the people; the Patriots were really motivated by
ambition, envy, and spite. The impassioned discussions of natural rights and constitutional
principles were merely means of stirring up the populace in service of those who would usurp
power in each colony. The British, as detailed below, would often refer to the rebel leaders as
the “Usurpers”.21 All of these beliefs were reported by many Loyalists to the British, with the
result that the British tended to underestimate the size and depth of feeling of the Patriots.
Patriots in Queens County and elsewhere in America would soon begin forcibly
disarming those who refused to sign documents stating their loyalty to the Patriot cause. (See
below). Loyalists were subject to mob action such as being run out of town on a rail or tar and
feathering. In other words, at least arguably they were being persecuted for holding a political
opinion differing from the majority—and the “majority” was probably not even a majority.
Revolutionary committees, not the official governments, would call men to militia service. It is
unsurprising that many Loyalists thought that there was a real danger of tyranny in America—
but the danger came from the Patriots, not the British.
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Turning from individual motives for Loyalism, let us now look at the counties of New
York to see which could be considered Patriot, Loyalist, or mixed or neutral. The prevailing
attitude of the inhabitants of the various counties as the crisis deepened was divided. Views
differed from county to county, from locality to locality, from house to house (and many houses
and families were divided). Neither upstate nor downstate could be considered a Patriot,
Loyalist, or undecided region. In downstate New York, Suffolk, with its strong New England ties,
was mainly Patriot, while Kings and Richmond were mainly Loyalist. Queens was split between
the political tendencies, as was Manhattan. In upstate New York, Ulster and Orange were
Patriot, while Westchester, Dutchess, Albany, and Tryon were split. The frontier and Green
Mountain regions were mainly Patriot. Albany County had a sizable Loyalist minority. Thus,
after the occupation of downstate New York began, one overwhelmingly Patriot county
(Suffolk) was “behind” the lines, while independent New York had sizable Loyalist minorities.
Indeed, Albany, New York’s second largest city—and the largest population center in
unoccupied New York—was located in a county with a large Loyalist minority. 22
Why counties leaned one way or another depended much on local circumstances. For
example, Suffolk on Long Island had a New England character, and was heavily influenced by
Patriot-leaning ministers with New England roots. Countryman notes that all of the Patriot
counties were growing at a higher rate than the Loyalist counties.New York City had many
citizens who were tied strongly to Britain, through economic trading ties, or recent
immigration, and counties near the City were tied to the City economically and by other
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matters. The Dutch in Kings tended towards Loyalism. Dutch areas may have felt more
culturally and ethnically secure under British than independent rule. Many of the Dutch in Kings
owned slaves, who were vital to the agricultural economy of the county. This has been
suggested as a reason for not desiring to upset “the status quo, least of all in the cause of
liberty.” 23 It is possible that this explanation could explain other examples of Loyalism among
non-Dutch slave owners.

II

On Sunday morning, April 23, 1775, a messenger from Boston (not, this time, Paul
Revere) arrived in New York City. Riding on horseback, he loudly blew on a trumpet, urging
New Yorkers to gather at the Liberty Pole. Here he announced the Battle of Lexington-Concord,
which had occurred a few days earlier, and that American blood had been shed by the British.
There was great animation and consternation at the news. What occurred next was called by
one Patriot leader “a general insurrection of the populace.” Isaac Sears and other Liberty Boys
formed a parade with drums beating and flags flying, urging that arms be taken up in defense of

23

Burrows, 21-42, 22-3; Countryman, 105. Quote is from Burrows, 23. It is intriguing to note that despite the
correlation noted between growth and Patriotism above, many of the upstate “gentry” from fairly economically
stable areas became Patriots, while many merchants from relatively dynamic New York City became Loyalists. The
question of the relative economic dynamism of the Patriot counties Countryman notes is intriguing. Why would
they want to shake a favorable status quo? Countryman suggests that Patriot counties such as Suffolk, Orange, and
Ulster did not have the close ties to the transatlantic world that Tory counties such as Kings, Richmond and Queens
had (he considers Queens a mainly Loyalist county—it seems to have been more mixed). These counties were
prosperous; the Patriot counties, while growing , could better be described as places of modest comfort, with
lower land values than the counties that bordered New York City. Hence, they had less to lose from a breach with
Britain, and would be more amenable to Patriot and independence arguments. Countryman, 105-7.

96

the rights of America. According to Judge Jones, the “posts were stopped, the mails opened,
and the letters read.” A ship loaded with supplies for the British in Boston were seized by mobs
and the cargo removed. The Arsenal at City Hall (then at Wall and Nassau Streets) was broken
into and 600 muskets were seized, as well as ammunition and bayonets. More gunpowder was
seized at the Fresh Water Pond. The large brick house of Isaac Sears on Queen Street became
the de facto seat of government and headquarters of the militia. 24
Attempts to control the situation by the official government were ineffective. As
Governor Tryon was then in England, it fell to the hapless Lieutenant-Governor Cadwalladar
Colden to deal with the situation. He called an emergency meeting of the Council and city
officials. Thomas Jones urged that the militia be called out; “the Loyal Whig”, William Smith,
opposed the plan, stating that the insurrection was a result of Britain’s attempt to enslave the
colonies. If the people’s grievances were redressed, the ferment would subside. He urged no
action. Smith’s biographer L.F.S. Upton notes that Jones’ suggestion was absurd. Most of the
militia were members of the Liberty Boys; they were with the rioters—some of them may have
been rioters. Jones records that no one replied to Smith’s suggestion, and that the Council
meeting ended with no decision made. Colden soon left New York City for the relative safety of
his home on Long Island. 25
New York City was in an effective state of anarchy, with armed citizens parading around
the city, and with British troops huddling in their barracks. To restore order, a meeting was held
24
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at the Merchant’s Coffee House on April 29. Here a “General Association” was signed.
Signatories agreed to obey the Continental Congress, New York’s Provincial Congress, and the
Committee of Sixty. Many on the old committee, such as Isaac Low and Philip Livingston, did
not want additional powers such as raising militias. Enforcing a boycott was one thing, and was
what they had been elected to do, but now they were being asked to run a city in revolt. In such
a case, it was not unreasonable to ask for a new election. This election occurred on May 1.
There was much maneuvering over the membership of the Committee of One Hundred, with
Sears objecting that the original list of candidates included too many Loyalists. Some of the
more objectionable names were removed, and the Committee of One Hundred began to
govern New York. This new committee, while a revolutionary body, included many who wanted
a rapprochement between America and Britain.26
A few days later, New York hosted enthusiastically the Massachusetts and Connecticut
delegations to the Second Continental Congress. New Yorkers also began actively seeking out
Loyalists. Alexander Hamilton helped Miles Cooper, president of King’s College, escape from a
mob intent on doing him harm. And worries turned to the large Loyalist population of Queens.
The citizens of New York began to drill intently. On May 23, the British man-of war Asia,
equipped with sixty-four guns and loaded with guns and ammunition, arrived in the harbor and
anchored off the Battery. The Committee of One Hundred and the Provincial Congress now had
to operate under the possible threat of bombardment. To appease the British, local merchants

26

Schechter, 52-3; Tiedemann, 222-5. The Provincial Convention had adjourned on April 22, having fulfilled its
main purpose of selecting delegates. The news of Lexington-Concord arrived the next day, and the New York
Committee set out to form a new Provincial Congress, the one referred to in the General Association. Flint, 353.

98

were authorized by the Congress to supply the Asia with food and other necessary items. Many
still hoped for reconciliation.27
The new Provincial Congress convened on May 22, and assumed control of the antiBritish opposition, and more and more the colony. Its members had to sign a General
Association pledging allegiance to the Congress, and the Provincial Congress decreed that all
New Yorkers needed to do this as well. There was no official punishment for failing to do this,
but obviously those who failed to do so were under suspicion by their Patriot neighbors. There
was becoming little room for opinions that dissented too far from the Patriot viewpoint.
Nonetheless, while it prepared fortifications and organized militia and Continental Army units,
the Congress’s members held out hope for a settlement. The Assembly still existed; New York
City had an official mayor in addition to the Committee of One Hundred. New York was in a
period of dual government.28
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One of the more amusing incidents of the early Revolution in New York occurred on
June 25, 1775, and it shows the strange nature of dual government and of professing loyalty to
a government that you were engaged in hostilities with. New York still had a royal governor,
William Tryon, but he had been away in England for an extended period. On June 25, George
Washington, newly appointed to his position as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army,
arrived in Northern New Jersey on his way to Boston. He was also accompanied by Generals Lee
and Schuyler. The Provincial Congress sent a delegation to escort the visitors into New York
City. Washington entered the city “towards evening” and received a lavish reception.
Governor Tryon that same day arrived at Sandy Hook. Tryon landed at the Exchange about 9
PM, and also received a lavish reception—by many of the same people who a few hours earlier
had been feting Washington. Jones commented:

I must again say, strange to relate! these very men, who had been not five hours
before pouring out their adulation and flattery, or more probably the real
sentiments of their souls, to the three rebel Generals, now one and all joined in
the Governor’s train…wished him joy of his safe arrival, hoped he might remain
long in his Government, enjoy peace and quietness, and be a blessing to the
inhabitants under his control. What a farce! What cursed hypocrisy!29

The needs of resisting the British and preparing for possible full-scale war were many.
While many American families had some kind of firearm, the Americans were deficient in
artillery. This had been one of the needs that drove Ethan Allen’s attack on Fort Ticonderoga in
May of 1775, and the cannon seized there would help force the British evacuation of Boston in
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March, 1776. The Provincial Congress planned a fort in the Highlands (see Chapter IV for a
discussion of the military importance of the Highlands). Forts need cannons, and the Congress
authorized the removal of some cannon from the Battery. The operation took place at midnight
of August 22, 1775, under the command of Isaac Sears and John Lamb, but the Asia shelled the
American troops. Several Americans were killed, but twenty-one cannons were removed by
Sears’ forces.30
This shelling had two contrasting effects; increased defiance among some, while others
(some Loyalists, some just afraid of war) chose to leave the city. This evacuation by many New
Yorkers reached the highest levels of government and society. In October 1775, Governor Tryon
of New York received information that he was to be apprehended as “an enemy to America,”
made a prisoner, and transported to Connecticut and confined for the duration of the war.
Tryon informed Mayor Whitehead Hicks of his fear that he would be captured, citing
“undoubted authority from the City of Philadelphia.” According to Thomas Jones, the source
was a member of the Provincial Congress, and Tryon told Dartmouth that a Continental
Congress resolve that he and other Crown officers should be arrested had agitated the town.
Hicks began discussions with the City Committee, which he described as “a very numerous body
consisting of reputable inhabitants elected at a convention of the whole Town” regarding
Tryon’s fears. The New York Committee, chaired by Isaac Low, informed Mayor Hicks in a
written answer on Oct. 17, 1775 that Tryon could “rest assured of all that Protection from us
and our fellow citizens, which will be consistent with the great principle of our safety and
preservation…” (italics mine). Hicks sent the Committee’s written answer to Tryon. Not
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surprisingly, Tryon’s next communication with Mayor Hicks was addressed from “On Board the
Halifax Packet”, and stated that he found Hicks’ “letter of yesterday insufficient for that
security I requested from the corporation & Citizens…my duty directed me for the present
instant to remove on board this ship….”31
Tryon would spend the next few months on board the HMS Dutchess of Gordon. From
here he acted as governor, and met with his Council. Council members such as William Smith
would be rowed to and from the ship for the meetings. The Assembly had held its last meeting
in January, and was continuously prorogued. The Provincial Congress slowly took over the
management of the Province, while the official government was literally “at sea”.32

III

Long Island had been little touched by “the excitement of the capital.” The factional
strife seemed far away.33 Government on the island was stable, each town being run by a small
group of families generally recognized as the natural leadership. Long Island was not isolated,
31
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however. Undoubtedly, in the homes and taverns of Long Island, the great issues of the day
were discussed, and opinions, however tentative, were formed. Most of the ministers in the
Presbyterian churches that dominated Suffolk County had been trained in New England, and
like the ministers of New England, used their influence to shape opinion in a Patriot direction.34
Long Island had a long tradition of resistance to arbitrary government. Hempstead, for example,
had been settled in 1643 by Stamford, Connecticut men who complained they had no vote, no
liberties and no justice because New Haven men made their laws and laid down the tax rate.
Suffolk County had peacefully resisted incorporation into New York in the 1660s, and its
inhabitants resented having to pay for title to land they had possessed before 1664. In 1689, in
response to news of the Glorious Revolution, the town meeting of Huntington gave “full power
to ackt as sivell and milletery head officer” to its militia captain, Epenetus Platt (in effect, it
declared martial law), and with Southold sent some men to join Jacob Leisler in his taking of the
fort in New York. Relations began to turn rocky with the rather high-handed Leisler, and the
eastern towns favored annexation with Connecticut, but eventually supported the new
governor, Henry Sloughter, who replaced Leisler.35
It was the Boston Tea Party, or more accurately, the British response to it, that finally
forced Long Island into the controversies of the time. News of the Intolerable Acts reached
New York City on about May 12, 1774 (see above) and soon spread to Long Island. By this time,
the towns of Long Island had already held their annual meetings.36 Beginning in June many
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Long Island towns, sometimes at special town meetings, began to condemn the Intolerable
Acts.37
Huntington in Suffolk was one of the first to respond. At a special town meeting held on
or about June 21, the town adopted the “Declaration of Rights.” Here, they argued that “every
freemans property is absolutely his own, and no man has a right to take it from him without his
consent, expressed either by himself or his representatives” and that therefore “all taxes and
duties imposed on His Majesties subjects in the American colonies by the authority of Parliment
are wholly unconstitutional and a plain violation of the most essential rights of British subjects.”
The Declaration condemned the Parliament’s closing of the port of Boston as subversive of “just
and constitutional liberty”, and urged a breaking off of “all commercial intercourse with Great
Britain, Ireland, and the English West India colonies.” They considered that the people of
Boston were suffering in the “common cause of British America.” They expressed their
willingness to enter into such measures as a general congress of the colonies might agree to,
and formed a three-man committee to join with the other committees of the other towns of
Suffolk as a general committee for the county to correspond with the New York committee. 38
Huntington had joined the great debate with a brief but elegant statement of the issues
involved, and identified the cause of Boston as their own, as would many communities and
colonies from New Hampshire to Georgia. Lastly, though operating through the ordinary
methods of government, they had formed a committee that would soon become part of the
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dual, revolutionary government that would form as the official government of the province
collapsed and lost its power.
A few days earlier, East Hampton had also voted to form a committee, and Huntington’s
eastern neighbor Smithtown adopted the Declaration of Rights and formed a committee. The
Committees of Correspondence for the County of Suffolk met on November 14 and
recommended a subscription for the Boston poor and a ship to collect and deliver them. 39
The towns of Queens took a little longer to join in, but here, even some of those areas
that would later show reluctance and even hostility to the Patriot cause joined in the general
disapproval of the Intolerable Acts and support for non-intercourse with Britain. The
Continental Congress had urged every town and county to form an association to enforce the
boycott. At least partially in response to this call, many towns on Long Island met.
The town of Jamaica was located in the southern part of western Queens. On December
6th, 1774, many of Jamaica’s freeholders gathered at the Court House. After some discussion,
they produced what became known as the Jamaica Resolutions. After asserting their
allegiance to the king and “their intention to maintain the dependency of the Colonies upon the
Crown of Great Britain,” they resolved that it was their “undoubted right to be taxed only by
our own consent” and that the taxes imposed by the Parliament were “unjust and
unconstitutional”. They argued that they were one people with the “Mother Country,
connected by the strongest ties of duty, interest, and religion.” They expressed sympathy with
Boston and approved the measures taken by the First Continental Congress, and appointed an
eight man Committee of Correspondence. Not all approved, and 136 Jamaicans signed a
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statement stating that they had never given their consent to choosing that committee, “as we
disapprove of all unlawful meetings, and all tyrannical proceeding whatsoever.”40
A meeting of a large number of freeholders in the town of Newtown in northwest
Queens41 met on December 10, listened to the Jamaica Resolutions, and formed a committee.
This committee issued a set of resolutions, known as the Newtown Resolves, on December 29,
1774. The first resolution expressed allegiance to the king, and stated that “we consider it our
greatest happiness and glory to be governed by the illustrious House of Hanover.” The
resolution stated that they considered the British and American people one people, under the
same Constitution, and regretted anything which had a tendency to “destroy the mutual
confidence which the mother countries and her colonies should repose in each other.” The
second stated that it was a “fundamental part of the British constitution that a man shall have
the disposal of his own property, either by himself or representatives.” It reiterated the
argument that as they were not represented in Parliament, Parliamentary taxation was
“subversive” of the English constitution, and that it had “a direct tendency to alienate the
affections of the colonists from their parent state.” Lastly, the resolutions approved of “the
wise, prudent, and constitutional mode of opposition, adopted by our worthy delegates in
general congresses, to the several late tyrannical and oppressive acts of the British Parliament.”
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After thanking the delegates for their “patriotic spirit”, they hoped that their liberties and
privileges would be restored, as well as “harmony and confidence” throughout the Empire.42
Despite the protestations, no doubt sincere, of loyalty, the resolutions were strongly
worded, calling Parliament’s actions not only unconstitutional but tyrannical. Not all in
Newtown were in agreement with the committee or the resolves, which were published a few
days later. On January 12, 1775, a little less than sixty Newtown inhabitants signed a letter,
published in Rivington’s Gazette, stating that they were not involved in any way with the
resolves and that they did not acknowledge any other representatives but the “general
assembly of the province.”43 Such letters and statements, such as the earlier one from
Jamaica, would become rather common in New York, as Loyalists (and probably some neutral
parties) tried to dissociate themselves from the actions of the Patriots. It is apparent they
feared that the protest movement was spiraling towards armed rebellion, and feared possible
retribution by the British. By formally stating their opposition, they hoped to put their loyalty
and opposition to the Patriots on record. Three of the signatories of the Newtown letter were
justices of the peace, and reflecting the ethnic composition of the town and the general
conservatism of the Dutch population as to the imperial dispute, at least thirty names were of
Dutch derivation.44
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The day after the Newtown Resolutions (December 30, 1774), ninety freeholders of the
town of Oyster Bay (in eastern Queens, wedged between Hempstead and Huntington in
Suffolk) met. However, so many of those who attended seemed, according to one
correspondent, to be “friends to our happy, regular and established government” that the
meeting was deemed illegal, and that no business could be properly done.45 So Oyster Bay did
not go on record on the great questions of the day, as apparently those who opposed the
congresses and committees were in the majority at the meeting. Thomas Jones does not
mention this meeting in his history, but as a resident of the Town of Oyster Bay, he may very
well have been one of those decrying the meeting as illegal.
In Kings County, a countywide meeting was called to elect delegates to the first
Continental Congress in the summer of 1774, but only two people showed up. No response
was made to the Congress’s call to form an association. However, in April 1775, five of Kings
County’s six towns sent delegates to the County Hall in Flatbush to choose delegates to the
second Continental Congress. Flatlands failed to send delegates. After the news arrived of
Lexington-Concord, the British action was denounced by the “magistrates and freeholders” of
the village of Brooklyn, and Kings sent eight delegates to the First Provincial Congress. However,
the general trend of the county was Loyalist and this Loyalist tendency was increased by an
influx of refugees from Manhattan in the summer and fall of 1775. Many Loyalists found refuge
in Kings County from the turmoil in Manhattan, including Governor Tryon and Chief Justice
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Daniel Horsmanden. However, in Flatbush, the church pulpit was shared by the outspoken
Loyalist Johannes Rubel and the outspoken Patriot Ulpianus van Sinderen.46

As discussed above, the news of Lexington-Concord had led to a “general insurrection of
the people” in New York City, and the ascendency of such extra-constitutional bodies as the
Committee of One Hundred and the Provincial Congress. The first congress would soon give
way to a second in November. Long Island and other southern New York communities had to
decide whether to send delegates to the congresses.
The towns and county of Suffolk responded with sending delegates to both congresses.
Kings did as well. Queens also sent delegates to both congresses, but the large number of
Loyalists and “neutrals” made this an altogether different proposition. One study, based on
active declarations of Loyalty or Whiggism, concludes that only 12 percent of the county was
Whig. However, only 26.8 percent of the population were Loyalist. The majority, 60.3 per cent,
were neutral. 47 On March 31, 1775, the motion to send delegates from Queens County to the
convention (to choose delegates to the Continental Congress) failed 94 to 82. In Hempstead the
freeholders met on April 4 and issued what is known as the “Confession of Faith”, or the
“Hempstead Resolves”. These declared for the King and unity with Britain, that choosing
delegates to a provincial congress was “highly disrespectful” to their legal representatives, that
in other provinces it had resulted in “destroying the authority of constitutional assemblies”, and
concluded that
46
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We are utterly averse to all mobs, riots and illegal proceeding by which the lives, peace,
and property of our fellow subjects are endangered, and that we, to the utmost of our
power, will support our legal magistrates in suppressing all riots and preserving the
peace of our liege sovereign. 48

Hempstead thus rejected the institutions of the embryonic revolutionary government.
The authors of the document recognized that a rival government was in the process of forming,
and announced their preference for the old government. The legitimacy of these new
institutions was not accepted by Hempstead. Expressions of Loyalism such as the above, and
the rejection of congresses and committees—the arising revolutionary government—would
soon result in Patriots from outside Queens feeling compelled to attempt to subdue the county
through the use of force.49
Patriots in Hempstead were concentrated in the northern “necks” of the town, while
the southern parts were far more Loyalist. The people of the north had long resented the
political domination of the southern parts of the town. It was difficult for the northerners to go
to town meetings in the South. The north was more prosperous, sending much of its
agricultural produce to New York City. In September of 1775, following the Provincial
Congresses direction that militia companies be formed, residents of the north met and declared
that they could not support “the common cause” as long as they were part of Hempstead. They
resolved that for the duration they would considers themselves a separate entity, and
established their own committee and militia company. This division was not simply the result
of a difference of opinions, but a result of long-standing differences between the parts of the
48
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town. In 1784, the town was permanently divided into the Towns of Hempstead and North
Hempstead.50
In Oyster Bay’s town meeting on the first Tuesday of April, 1775, “it was Objected by
many Against haveing anything to do with Deputies or Congresses.” The vote was 205 to 42
against choosing deputies. Announcements began to be posted in Oyster Bay after LexingtonConcord and the “insurrection” in the capital for a meeting at Jamaica to elect deputies to the
Convention. On May 19, 1775, the three justices of the peace of Oyster Bay stated in a
document entered into the town records that they paid “NO Regard to Anonimous
Advertisemnts Nor to Any other matter, Contrary to the Sacred Oath we have taken to Keep the
peace of the Country as far as we are able.” The history of this protest is rather interesting. The
town clerk, Samuel Townsend, entered the document in the Town Records, with the note that
if there was no approval at the next Town Meeting, it was to be erased. At the April 2, 1776
town meeting, the majority of voters ordered that the protest be erased. The protest was
crossed out. At the next town meeting, in April, 1777, things had changed. The British were
firmly in control of Long Island in general and Oyster Bay in particular. Thomas Smith, one of
the protestors, was elected Moderator of the meeting. The protest was re-entered into the
Town Records, which continued:

When the Freedom of Election was destroyed the Congressional Party Came into
this Township of Oysterbay With an Armed Force and took Great Numbers of the
Loyal Freeholders & Inhabitants Prisoners Sum few they Carryed of[f] Prisoner
the others they Disarmed and Carried of [f] there Arms and Obliged them to Sine
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there Paper Not to Oppose there Measures, this ye Congressional Party Did
Some Months Before the Anuel Town Meeting April 1776.51

The Loyalists stated at the 1778 Town Meeting that they had wanted the protest back in
so that “Disstant Ages” would know the large number of Loyalists that Oyster Bay contained,
and that they had not changed their mind in 1776—but had that year been unable to vote or
afraid of the “Congressional” party.52 This was probably not “trimming”; the 5 to 1 “antiCongressional” vote, and the failure of the December 30, 1774 meeting to make any statement
protesting British actions, all indicated that the rather tiny town was Loyalist.53 The locals
wanted the British (as well as distant “Ages”) to know that the town was Loyal, and should be
treated so.
The five-to-one defeat of the motion to select delegates was not the end of the matter
in Oyster Bay, nor in Queens. Having been defeated at the Town Meeting, the Patriots of the
town held their own meeting, appointing one Zebulon Williams as their delegate. Forty three
delegates signed the statement of appointment—one with a mark.54
The members of the First Provincial Congress were mainly chosen by town meetings, or
by committees chosen by town meetings. In other words, despite its extra-constitutional (if not
revolutionary) character, the Congress drew its legitimacy, its claim to represent the people of
51
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New York, from within the pre-existing system as much as possible. Its membership consisted
of representatives chosen by the towns and counties of New York, and therefore arguably had
as much claim to legitimately represent the people of New York as the Assembly—arguably
more, as the Congress had been chosen far more recently than the Assembly, and in direct
response to a set of circumstances that had not existed when the Assembly had been elected in
1769. Zebulon Williams, however, presented a problem to the Congress. Williams had not been
elected by a town meeting, but by a self-selected group of Patriots. He could not be said to
represent the entire town; he represented at best a faction. Unlike those chosen by town
meetings or committees selected by such meetings, he lacked democratic legitimacy. In fact,
the town he purported to represent had overwhelmingly voted to have “nothing to do with
Congresses.” He represented, if anything, the opposite of the town’s opinion.
Oyster Bay was not the only Queens town to send a questionable delegate. The
Congress was faced with 4 delegates from Queens (Zebulon Williams, Joseph Talman, Joseph
Robinson, and Col. Jacob Blackwell) with questionable credentials. The decision was made to
give these delegates from Queens “observer status”. That is, the questionable Queens
delegates could be present at the deliberations, make their opinions known, could speak, but
could not vote. The delegates were satisfied with this, and even expressed the opinion that
“they do not think themselves entitled to vote.”55 Apparently, they too were conscious of their
questionable status and unrepresentative nature. And it was also apparent that a major
downstate county, or at least a large portion of it, seemed remarkably unenthusiastic towards
the Patriot movement. This was noted both at the Provincial Congress and soon by the
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Continental Congress. In any event, after Lexington-Concord, five delegates were selected from
Queens for the Provincial Congress, but two were dissuaded by Loyalists from serving.56
One sign of Loyalist feelings was an anonymous poem (attributed to “NO YANKEE”) that
circulated in their circles in Queens about this time:

O Tempora! O Mores!...
…True Sons of Catiline! Like his your cause—
Insult the Government! despise its laws!...
Thy venal priests inflame the peoples’ breasts
These holy cheats! A nuisance and a pest!...
P.S. I fret, I storm, I spit, I spew
At sound of YANKEE DOODLE DOO!57

The Suffolk towns began to prepare for the possibility of armed resistance to the
“Ministerial” troops. The May 2d, 1775 Town Meeting in Huntington voted that 80 men should
be chosen to exercise and to be ready to march. In the summer, Brookhaven formed a
Committee of Observation and began keeping a close eye on several Loyalists, who had
declared that they would furnish British ships with provisions. Brookhaven apologized on June
27 for being rather slow to respond to “Congressional measures”. The town had perhaps the
largest concentration of Loyalists in the county. Several large landholders were Loyalists, and
held important offices. James Lyon, the Anglican preacher for the town, had organized, spoke,
written, and used his influence to become the “Mainspring” of the Loyalists of the region.58
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During the summer, American troops continued besieging Boston, and a major battle
was fought near Bunker Hill. The colonies were at war with Britain, and while most still hoped
for reconciliation, they continued preparing for possible warfare in New York. The western
towns of Suffolk County met at Smithtown in early September to nominate officers for a
regiment. The preparation for war soon involved more than building forts, drilling militia and
forming regiments. It also involved keeping an active eye on suspected Loyalists. And soon, it
involved more than just keeping an eye on them. In August, Parson Lyon was arrested by the
committees of Brookhaven and Smithtown and transported to Connecticut. On September 16,
1775, the Provincial Congress, alarmed at reports it had heard of Loyalists in Queens and
elsewhere, ordered that every New Yorker who had not signed the Continental Association be
disarmed. The Third Regiment of New York, stationed in Suffolk, was ordered into Queens to
disarm Loyalists. Three weeks later, on October 6, the Continental Congress recommended
that the provincial assemblies and Committees of Safety of the provinces arrest and secure
every person who “in their opinion endanger the safety of the Colonies or the liberties of the
people.”59
As discussed above, opposition to British policy was widespread; the main difference
seemed to be over tactics, whether to use boycotts supported and enforced through a new
structure of committees and congresses, or to protest through more traditional methods such
as petitions by the colonial assemblies. But as the Patriots moved in the direction of armed
conflict, some began to drop away from the movement and oppose the Patriots. Though many
59
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of these still opposed British policies, they believed that the movement was moving from
opposition to British policies to opposition to Britain and the British connection; that was a
bridge too far for them to take. By the fall of 1775, the colonies, while still professing loyalty to
the king, were at war with the King’s troops (while still clinging to the fiction that their enemy
was the Parliament, not the King.) There were credible reports that Loyalists were being
supplied with weapons from the Asia. And, as many colonial homes possessed firearms, it was
likely that many of the Loyalists were armed, even without British supplies.60
Now the Congresses were ordering or urging arrests, and seizing weapons from
Loyalists. Another way of describing this is that they were disarming those who disagreed with
the Patriot movement. The arrest and disarming of political opponents is something we
associate more with the French or Russian Revolutions than with the American. The Patriots
tried to make clear that the arrests were not for having the wrong opinion, but were for those
they believed to be dangerous to the “safety of the Colonies.” Still, though they even promised
to pay for the seized arms (which would be used to arm the Patriot troops), it certainly did
seem that any who opposed the Patriots were having their property seized. To the Loyalists,
they were being arrested by illegal bodies “unknown to the British Constitution”. Their Patriot
neighbors, who wished to protect American property from being taxed without consent, had
engaged in property damage in Boston and New York, and were now seizing the weapons of
Loyalists. Hence, many Loyalists believed that their liberties were under assault by the Patriots,
and that the Patriots were hypocrites. The situation had now reached the level of armed
conflict; the ordinary give and take of the political system could not function; the profession of
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certain opinions now was beyond the pale, and could result in being placed under suspicion or
worse.
The effort in the fall of 1775 to disarm the Loyalists in Queens failed. Loyalists began
concealing their weapons and refused to obey the orders of an extralegal congress. Some of
them were drilling in military formations (in short, forming or preparing to form Loyalist
militias). Cadwallader Colden was urging resistance. In Hempstead, a militia officer, Captain
Richard Hewlett, was boasting that he was prepared to do battle with the Patriots. Troops
would be needed to disarm the Loyalists, and the Provincial Congress did not have them to
spare.61
Loyalist strength was again shown in November when an election to choose delegates
to Congress was held. The polls were open from Tuesday to Saturday in Jamaica. Over a
thousand ballots were cast, but the results were 778 to 221 against representation. Queens
Loyalists issued a declaration on December 6 that they only wished to live in peace, yet were
being treated as enemies of the country. Therefore, they were arming themselves (with
weapons provided by the Asia) and were prepared to resist any “Acts of Violence.” The
Congress soon reacted by ordering over 700 people to appear before it, and declaring that all
those who had voted against deputies in November were guilty of a breach of the General
Association. Punishing people for voting “incorrectly” is a clear breach of democratic norms, but
New York—or Queens at least—was in a state of civil war or incipient civil war at this point.
Differences of opinion were still being debated with words, but those who held differing
opinions were arming themselves and threatening to use them—or were using them to disarm
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their opponents. Under such circumstances, many governments have turned to much harsher
measures than were adopted in Queens. The Provincial Congress next requested help from the
Continental Congress, which would send troops in the New Year to arrest Loyalists. 1775 ended
on Long Island with incipient civil war.62

In Westchester, there was a center of Patriot activity at Rye on the Sound. A group
calling itself the “Freeholders and Inhabitants of Rye” urged the other towns to send
representatives to White Plains (near the center of the southern part of the county) to select
delegates to the first Continental Congress. The meeting was held on August 22, 1774. The
Borough of West Chester, where the Morris family dominated, sent representatives to the
meeting and also adopted a set of resolutions, arguing that the imposition of taxes without
consent was arbitrary and oppressive. The meeting chose to accept the delegates already
elected by New York City (John Alsop, James Duane, John Jay, Philip Livingston, and Isaac
Low.)63 The White Plains meeting was probably not well attended, as it was held during “the
busiest season of the agricultural year”. 64 The White Plains meeting was “the first time the
county linked itself to the mainstream of the revolutionary movement.” It also was met with a
concurrent mass rally at White Plains, attended by about 400 people, organized by Loyalists to
denounce the Continental Congress and the actions of the Patriots of New York. They resolved
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to form a Loyalist Association to oppose the Whigs.65 The White Plains Patriot meeting, as had
similar meetings on Long Island, resulted about a month later in a statement by 83 “Inhabitants
and Freeholders” of Rye stating that they had nothing to do with these resolutions and
measures. Fourteen more Rye residents objected to the objections.66
A general meeting held in White Plains on April 11, 1775 to elect delegates to the
Second Continental Congress was well-attended by Loyalists, but they did not participate in
discussions, nor did they vote. After a delegate (Lewis Morris) had been selected, a Loyalist
spokesman, Isaac Wilkins, rose to declare his “abhorrence of all unlawful congresses and
committees.” This explained his group’s non-participation in the meeting; they did not wish to
participate or vote in a meeting to elect delegates to an illegal congress. The group then retired
to a nearby tavern, where a protest was signed by over 300 county residents, most prominently
Assemblyman Frederick Phillipse, the great landowner and merchant. Lewis Morris rejected the
protest, alleging that 170 of the signatories were not voters and other signatories were too
young to vote.67
The response to the Battle of Lexington-Concord had swung the pendulum towards the
Patriots in Westchester. A Committee of 90 for the county was formed by the Patriots of
Westchester on May 8, and eleven deputies were selected for the Provincial Congress. The
county committee was set up three weeks before the Provincial Congress recommended doing
so. County militia organizations were established from June to September. Some militia
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officers had not signed the Continental Association until their selection. In August of 1775, the
Westchester Committee of Safety (which met when the full committee could not) declared that
tea buyers or sellers would be considered “inimical” to the liberties to the country.68
In the fall of 1775, Loyalists began organizing themselves into military units and arming
themselves for self-defense. Activity was particularly intense in Philipsburg and in Cortland
Manor (near Peekskill in the northwest part of the county). The Loyalists hoped to acquire
arms and ammunition from the British. Their plans were discovered, and in November there
was a clash between armed opponents that lasted three days. The Loyalists numbered about
250, and the county committee sent to Connecticut for troops. However, the Whigs managed
to disperse the Loyalists and arrest their leaders before the Connecticut forces arrived. 1775
had ended in New York City with the Patriots in control, and the governor a refugee on a
warship. On Long Island it had ended with the beginnings of civil war. In Westchester, civil war
had already begun. 69
The three thousand residents of Staten Island, like those of Westchester, had been fairly
apolitical, deferring to a few respected leaders. The most prominent of these were Christopher
Billopp, a member of the 1769 Assembly (the Thirty First and last-sitting of the colony of New
York)70 and a member of a family with many ties to the governments of both New York and
New Jersey. His father- in-law Benjamin Seaman was a justice of the county surrogate court and
had been in the Assembly since 1756. Both were Anglicans, and tended to vote in the Assembly
68
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against the measures of the “Congressional” party. The people of Richmond County opposed
the Continental Association and the committee system that sought to enforce it, fearing the
harm it threatened to transatlantic trade; there was a rather lucrative export trade from Staten
Island. Staten Island evaded the Association through smuggling, of which there was a long
history on the island.71
Staten Island is quite close to New Jersey, and had an extensive trade with the Garden
State. It was hence susceptible to economic coercion from New Jersey. In February, 1775, two
local New Jersey committees from towns where Staten Island sold its goods (Elizabeth and
Woodbridge) banned or threatened to ban all trade with the island until the people of
Richmond signed the Association. By July of 1775, most had signed the Association. 72
On April 11, a meeting was held on Staten Island to select delegates for the upcoming
Provincial Convention. The meeting was convinced by Billopp that they should repudiate the
Congress, as it made reconciliation more difficult to achieve. Staten Island sent no delegates to
the Convention and thus played no part in choosing New York’s delegation to the Second
Continental Congress (the main purpose of the Provincial Convention). When news reached
Staten Island of Lexington-Concord, the islanders were stunned—both by the actions of Britain
and the mob violence which occurred in New York City. The majority wanted reconciliation.
Billop and Seaman joined twelve other Assemblymen in sending a message to Britain’s
commander in Massachusetts, Thomas Gage, asking for a ceasefire and negotiated
settlement. 73
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A few weeks after rejecting sending delegates to a Provincial Congress, Staten Island
sent delegates to the Congress after news of Lexington-Concord. A moderate to conservative
delegation was sent. The desire to achieve a peaceful reconciliation had probably not been
altered by the news of bloodshed. One contemporary wrote in a letter that the people of the
island had wanted little to do with the Congress, but the threat of armed force had compelled
them to send delegates. At the Congress, the Staten Island delegation voted for Benjamin
Kissam’s resolution calling for reconciliation on Constitutional principles. 74
Staten Island was one of five counties which failed to hold elections for delegates to the
Provincial Congress which convened on November 14, 1775, after the Provincial Congress
ordered the counties to hold elections for these delegates. The other four counties were the
northeast counties of Charlotte, Cumberland, and Gloucester (later to become the core of
Vermont), and Queens. The three northern counties eventually sent delegates
(communications had been a problem for the distant counties) while in Queens, the Loyalists
defeated the Whigs electorally. In Richmond, the Richmond County Committee stated that they
did not have a quorum, so they did not think they were empowered to act. This infuriated the
members of the Congress—this, plus the trade that Staten Islanders was continuing with British
warships in the harbor (in violation of Congressional regulations). The Congress ordered Staten
Island to hold an election immediately, and hinted that failure to do so would result in military
intervention. Two weeks later, Staten Island voted overwhelmingly against sending delegates
to the Congress. The Provincial Congress announced on December 21 that Staten Island was
“guilty of a breach of the General Association” and in contempt of the Congress’ authority.
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Congress ordered a list of the “delinquents to the common cause” be sent under threat of
interdicting all commerce. When the new year opened, no such list was sent. Staten Island’s
majority did not want to participate in what had become an armed conflict with the mother
country. However, they succumbed to the commercial pressure in early January and elected
delegates on January 19, 1776.75
Thus, by the end of 1775, the governor of the state was a refugee on a ship in the
harbor, protected by British warships. Staten Island was under commercial and military
pressure to participate in Patriot-controlled activities, such as sending delegates to the
Provincial Congress. Open warfare between Patriots and Loyalists had broken out in several
places.. To the northeast, Boston was besieged by colonial troops, and there had been pitched
battles between colonial troops and British regulars. Despite all this, many, in New York and
elsewhere, still yearned for reconciliation and compromise. New York and America were on a
precipice, the precipice of independence, but many were reluctant to take that final,
irrevocable step. In the next few months, decisions were made in New York and elsewhere that
led to war and the occupation of southern New York.
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Chapter III
The Final Break with Britain and the Capture of Southern New York
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I

In 1763, Britain had won a resounding victory over the French, and New Yorkers and
Americans had rejoiced and toasted the King. By the end of 1775, British troops in the city of
Boston were besieged by an army of colonists, and the governor of New York, fearing for his
safety, was conducting his government from on board a British warship. Britain was preparing
for a major military campaign to suppress what they saw as rebellion.1 While still professing
loyalty to the king, the colonists were besieging Boston and Quebec, and an American assault
was made on Quebec on December 31. It failed. Most of the colonies were no longer being run
by their royal governors, though some, like Tryon and Virginia’s Lord Dunmore, were doing
whatever governing could be done from British warships. The colonies were instead run by
extra-legal congresses, province-wide outgrowths of the committee movements. The official
assemblies, while still existing, were being superseded by the provincial congresses. A new
election would even be held for the New York Assembly in January, but it would never meet (as
it was overwhelmingly Whig in composition, Governor Tryon prorogued it).2 And the possibility
of independence was being discussed, at least by its enemies. As early as August, 1775, Tryon
was writing confidential letters to Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary of State for the Colonies,
stating that “Independency is shooting from the root of the present Contest,” and that if no
new plan of accommodation was presented by Great Britain, then the colonies would sever
1
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themselves from their tie to Britain. Tryon did add that the bulk of the inhabitants, particularly
in New York, did not wish an independency, but the “great affliction is, the American friends of
Government in general consider themselves between Scylla and Carybdis, that is the dread of
Parliamentary Taxation, and the Tyranny of their present Masters”, and that if some
compromise could be made (“the first principal moved out of the way”), then many would be
drawn to the British.3
This was a period of dual government, but the upper hand was not with the old
government, but with the new. At the town and county levels, the old governments still
functioned for the most part; here the committees were chosen by the town meetings. In areas
like Queens, however, where Loyalism reigned in many towns, the committees were becoming
separate from the official governments of the towns. As for the courts in New York, for the
most part they continued to function, and many a royalist judge and sheriff continued to serve
until independence was proclaimed. The Provincial Congress spent much time preparing
military and militia units, providing for supplies, funds, and other items, but did not assume
responsibility for the normal administration of justice. 4
What had started as a protest movement against what was considered unconstitutional
taxation was now open rebellion. However, it was not yet a full-blown revolution. The hour
was getting late, but it is not inconceivable that a compromise could have been worked out.
The revolutionary congresses and committees in New York and several other colonies had many
moderates and conservatives who longed for reconciliation; Lowe, the Chairman of New York
City’s committee, was so conservative that he would eventually become a Loyalist. Even the
3
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fact of bloodshed did not make the situation irretrievable. British and colonial history were full
of instances of armed rebellion where the rebels did not seek independence or to overthrow
the king, but merely to get the lawful authorities to do what good sense (as the rebels saw it) or
the Constitution demanded. The resort to arms was only made when normal procedures had
proved inadequate or fruitless—often because the rebels were not properly (in their eyes at
least) represented. For example, in Bacon’s Rebellion, frontier Virginians had rebelled in part
because the Virginia government would not attack the Indians they believed threatened them.
The Regulators wanted adequate representation, and resented their taxes being spent on
projects like Tryon’s Palace, rather than on defense against the Indians. The Paxton Boys had
had a similar complaint against Pennsylvania, with tragic results for some peaceful Indians. And
similarly, the colonists had no representation in Parliament, only a few lobbyists, and what the
Americans saw as reasonable arguments had been ignored—and the British had begun acting,
in American eyes at least, in a tyrannical manner. But, because they were rebelling, not
revolting, had the British made some gesture of compromise, some reconciliation between
America and Britain could have occurred, despite the ongoing war. America in December, 1775,
was in a state of rebellion, not revolution.5
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Rather than compromise, the British did the exact opposite. They dug their heels in. In
July, Congress had sent the King the so-called “Olive Branch Petition”, which professed loyalty
to the king and requested his aid in solving the conflict. It was rejected, and the King proclaimed
that the colonists were in rebellion in “The Proclamation of Rebellion”, dated August 23, 1775.
In his King’s Speech on October 26, the King asserted that the American rebellion was
“manifestly carried on for the purpose of establishing an independent Empire.” The King
rejected the professions of loyalty to him as a smoke-screen, meant only to “amuse”, while the
“conspiracy” prepared for a general revolt. The raising of troops and naval forces, the
assumption of legislative, executive, and judicial powers, and the seizure of control of the public
revenue were all proofs of their hostility. The time had come to “put a speedy end to these
disorders.” The King even announced that he was seeking friendly offers of foreign assistance.
There were protests against this by some members of Parliament. Members of Parliament
noted that the Congress had explicitly denied a desire for independence, and in the House of
Lords, the Earl of Shelburne asked if the government was trying to force the Americans to
declare independence. Nonetheless, British government policy was clear: crush the rebellion.6
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News of this reached the Continental Congress in early January, along with news that
yet another American town, Norfolk, had been burned by the British. 7 The King’s Speech was a
crushing blow to hopes for reconciliation. The King, on whom so many had pinned their hopes
for peace and reconciliation, was instead manifestly opposed to the Americans. He was even
seeking to send foreign troops to attack his own subjects, to aid in the crushing of their liberty.
No doubt, many felt betrayed by the king they had toasted, by the king whose name they had
put on liberty poles. Certainly, that for many their love had turned to hate was evidenced a few
months later, when George III was burned in effigy and his statue destroyed. The fiction that
the Americans were fighting “Ministerial” troops was just that: a fiction. They were in rebellion
against their king, and the King had rejected their reasonable demands. The question arose:
Now what?
On January 9, 1776, the day after Congress received news of the King’s Speech and the
burning of Norfolk, a small pamphlet called Common Sense appeared on the streets of
Philadelphia.8 Reaction to it was so immense that the pamphlet was constantly reprinted and
read throughout the colonies. While published anonymously, its author was later learned to be
Thomas Paine, a recent immigrant from England (among suspected authors were both Samuel
and John Adams9). In this pamphlet, he had two main points. The first was an attack on the
very idea of monarchy and hereditary rule. Paine argued that it was condemned by the Bible
7
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itself; “it is the pride of kings which throws mankind into confusion.” Monarchy was “ranked in
scripture as one of the sins of the Jews;” Samuel had told the Israelites when they demanded a
king that he would seize their sons for his armies, their daughters to be his cooks, and much of
their wealth.10 Monarchy was condemned by nature; the descendants of strong kings were
often unworthy or rogues. Their claims to rule lacked honor: “A French Bastard [William the
Conqueror] landing with an armed Banditti and establishing himself king of England against the
consent of the natives, is in plain terms a very rascally original. It certainly hath no divinity in
it.”11 And hereditary succession did not preserve a nation from civil wars, as many argued it
did; just look at the Wars of the Roses.12 Monarchy, Paine concluded, had laid “the World in
Blood or Ashes,”13 and that “Of more worth is one honest man to society and in the sight of
God, than all the crowned ruffians that ever lived.”14
By attacking the very idea of monarchy, and by the fact that so many read his pamphlet
and evidently accepted much of his argument15, Paine made it possible to contemplate what
was becoming the logical next step for the Americans: independence. Many Americans had
deep emotional attachments to the British Empire and its symbolic and constitutional head:
10
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the King. No matter what he did, how could they stand against him, how could they rebel
against their lawful monarch, chosen at least in part by divine assent and the consent of their
ancestors? Paine answered this question by arguing, that rather than the king being chosen
with divine assent, God is actually opposed to monarchy. Certainly, Paine argued, your
ancestors chose his ancestor to be their king; but they had no power to bind their posterity.16
And the King’s claim to rule traces back to an usurper, a rascal. Why should this crowned ruffian
rule you? These were powerful arguments to many. And they set the stage for Paine’s next
argument: the colonies should declare independence.
Paine argued that while America may have benefited in the past from her British
connection, that to argue that it would in the future was like arguing that “because a child hath
thrived upon milk, that it is never to have meat.”17 Britain had protected the colonies, but her
motive was “interest not attachment,” that she protected the colonies from Britain’s enemies,
not the enemies of the colonies; indeed, except for the British connection, some of these would
not be her enemies at all.18 If Britain was the parent country, “then the more shame upon her
conduct. Even brutes do not devour their young.”19 Many of us are not even of English descent,
Paine argued, and even if we were, what of it? With Britain an open enemy, every other claim is
extinguished. America was strong, with sufficient men and materials to resist Britain, with great
unity, our plan was commerce, our desire was peace, and it was “repugnant to reason, to the

16

Jensen, 413.
Ibid., 420.
18
Ibid. 420-21. Quote from 420.
19
Ibid., 421.
17

131

universal order of things…to suppose, that this Continent can long remain subject to any
external power.” 20
As for reconciliation, Britain had shown little inclination toward it, and ever since
Lexington-Concord, Paine said he had rejected the “hardened, sullen tempered Pharaoh of
England forever.” Paine argued that reconciliation would actually be bad for America. The King
would have a “negative” over American legislation. The King was English, and he would only
permit legislation that benefited England. Such a government would be temporary at best; the
colonies would mature some more, and there would be commotions and disturbances. Paine
then proposed a continental federation (or confederation) with unicameral legislatures in each
of the new states and a Congress of 390 delegates as the best form of government for the new
America.21
As seen by some of the above quotes, Paine spoke in plain language, understandable to
the meanest worker or subsistence farmer. He addressed many of the fears and misgivings that
many had towards independency. He used arguments from both religion and from the natural
law theories of the Enlightenment, couched in simple but forceful language, to make his points.
Most of his points had been stated before in the press or in Congress, or even from the pulpits.
Paine gathered these arguments together and “used them not to persuade Congress, which
was already moving apace toward Independence, but the people whose support Congress
needed.”22 One hundred and fifty thousand copies were printed up in a few months. Since
pamphlets were often shared, or available for reading in coffeehouses or taverns, its readership
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was possibly in the millions. Its timing was also fortuitous; the news of the King’s Speech, the
burning of Norfolk, and soon the Prohibitory Act (see below) all seemed to foreclose
alternatives. For the colonies, it was submission or independence. Paine made the argument
against rule by monarchs and for independence well, and the once dangerous word
“independence” was now openly discussed in many places.23
A few weeks after the King’s Speech, the Parliament passed the “Prohibitory Act”. This
act prohibited all commerce with the colonies while the rebellion continued. American ships
and their cargoes were forfeited to the Crown as if they belonged to the Crown’s enemies, and
their crews were subject to impressment. George III signed the Act on December 22, 1775, and
news reached Philadelphia and the Continental Congress in February. John Hancock noted that
the Act “doesn’t look like a Reconciliation”. John Adams considered it a declaration of
independence made by the British, completely dismembering the Empire, and throwing the
colonies out of royal protection. In Philadelphia, and in coffee shops and taverns and around
kitchen tables throughout much of America, independence was looking like the only option.
And those who could not stomach that option began to swell the ranks of those who had
already decided that the Patriot movement, with its extralegal conventions and committees,
and the path it had taken towards armed conflict, was something they could not be
part of.24
New York rather reluctantly at this time began to turn towards revolution. The catalytic
event was, according to one historian, the British decision to make New York City their main
base and the province as a major military theatre. This decision was not surprising.
23
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Cadwallader Colden had espoused such a plan as early as 1774, and the noted Loyalist Jonathan
Boucher wrote Lord Germain in August 1775 urging such a course. New York’s harbor was
unparalleled, and armies could be sent north along the Hudson (the armies supported for much
of its length by naval ships) to divide New England from the rest of the colonies (the strategic
importance of New York will be discussed further in a following chapter.) Long Island,
Westchester, and New Jersey could provide much of the foodstuff, wood, and forage the
armies required. One did not have to have much military experience or knowledge to see that
this was the logical place for the main British base. And there also seemed to be many Loyalists,
so Boucher argued that it could return to the King’s allegiance fairly easily.25
The news that New York would soon be a battlefield, while it seemed to further doom
reconciliation, also seemed to dampen Patriotism. Taking the next step of advocating
independence was a difficult step even for those who stayed Patriots. The many moderates in
the revolutionary councils hesitated at this step, and some became (or remained) Loyalists.
Nerves were frayed, and the Provincial Congress, perhaps fearful of the guns of the Asia, rarely
met. The Continental Congress began pushing New York to take more radical action, and began
keeping a close eye on New York. A failed motion in the Continental Congress to arrest Tryon
led to Tryon fleeing to the safety of a British ship under the protection of the Asia. (See Chapter
II). Loyalists from lower New York would come to the ship to provide him with information, and
Tryon would run a spy network from his quarters on the Dutchess of Gordon. New York’s new
mayor, David Matthews (inaugurated in February, 1776) recruited David King, an AfricanAmerican slave and shoemaker, to carry messages to Tryon. Tryon also recruited the Loyalist
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Minister Charles Inglis to write a pamphlet in reply to Common Sense. Most ominously, in
December 1775, convinced of Loyalist strength, Tryon requested several thousand arms from
General William Howe, the new commander of British forces in America, but Howe demurred.26
William Smith, as he slipped more and more into a Loyalist frame of mind, seems to
have lost his grasp on public opinion. He proposed a complicated plan to restore British rule,
involving votes by the Continental Congress and General Assembly to accept Lord North’s
Conciliation Plan of February, 1775. This plan would have recognized the Continental Congress,
acknowledged the supremacy of Parliament, and the Continental Congress would have voted a
revenue to Parliament. The Continental Congress had rejected this plan, but Smith hoped that
Assembly approval would divide the colonies. The Provincial Congress27 decisively rejected
Smith’s plan. Undeterred, Smith called for new elections. The Assembly, the legal government
of the colony, had been elected in 1769, and its term was constitutionally due to expire.
New elections needed to be called. Hopeful that those who wanted reconciliation
would be elected, Smith convinced Tryon to dissolve the Assembly on January 2, 1776. Smith’s
hopes were unfounded, for of the twenty-nine members elected, twenty-four were Whigs
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(Patriots) and only four were Loyalists. Thirteen were also members of the new Provincial
Congress (the third). The new Thirty-Second Assembly, elected after the dissolution of the 1769
Assembly, was due to meet on February 14; Tryon prorogued it twice. On April 17, the
Assembly was dissolved, having never met. On that day, all contact with the warships in the
harbor was cut off (see below). With the exceptions of a few courts still going about their
procedures, the last vestige of royal government was ended. With this dissolution, the period
of dual government was over. The Patriot forces controlled the province.28

In the meantime, the situation on Long Island was becoming particularly distressful to
both New York Patriots and the Continental Congress. Cadwallader Colden and his son David
led the effort to block election of Queens’s delegates to the Provincial Congress. Tryon was
attempting to arm the Loyalists. By early 1776, the Continental Congress would send troops to
Long Island.29
On December 21, 1775, the Provincial Congress had resolved that conduct “inimical to
the Common Cause of the United Colonies” could not be suffered, and that measures needed
to be taken “to put a stop to it.” Seven hundred and forty names from Queens were placed on a
list of those in contempt of and out of the protection of the Congress.30 Isaac Sears, fresh from
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the burning of Rivington’s Printing Office in November, 31 traveled to Massachusetts to impress
on Washington and the army the danger of the “Tories” of Long Island to New York. On January
3, 1776, the Congress in Philadelphia passed “The Tory Act”. Under this act, all those in Queens
who had voted against sending deputies to New York’s Provincial Congress, or had been named
in the aforementioned list, were put “out of the protection of the United Colonies”, and they
could not travel or live in any of the colonies without a certificate vouching for them by the
New York Congress (referred to inaccurately as the “Convention”). Should they seek legal
redress, any attorney who aided them was to be considered an enemy of the cause. Lastly,
officers from New Jersey and Connecticut, each with five or six hundred men, were ordered to
enter Queens from east and west and disarm Loyalists, and arrest those who were opposed. 32
About five hundred men, half of whom were on the list of those who had voted against
electing delegates, on January 19 submitted a declaration to Congress promising to obey from
now on the orders of the Provincial and Continental Congresses. For various reasons, the
Connecticut-based attack was not mounted, but the Jersey-based attack, led by Colonel
Nathaniel Heard of Woodbridge, New Jersey went forth as scheduled. About one thousand
weapons were brought in by Queens residents, and those who had signed the above
declaration swore an oath that the arms that they had just turned in were all the arms that they
possessed. Heard’s men entered New York on the 27th, and arrived at Newtown and Jamaica on
the 30th. The Jersey men acted vigorously, and to be frank, rather poorly. Homes were broken
into and looted, cattle wantonly slaughtered, farm yards looted, and the soldiers billeted
31
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among the inhabitants. At Hempstead, where the militant Loyalist captain Richard Hewlett
lived, resistance was expected, but none occurred. Nineteen men were arrested, sent to the
Continental Congress in Philadelphia, which sent them back to New York, which finally released
them. An examination of the guns which had been provided by the Queens residents was
rather disturbing from the Patriot perspective. They were mostly obsolete arms, hunting pieces
and the like, not the military arms that the Asia had been supplying. The attempt to disarm the
Loyalists had failed. The Loyalists were still armed.33
Heard’s troops joined New Jersey militia who were patrolling Staten Island in midFebruary. They were insulted and threatened by the Loyalist-leaning Richmondites. Heard
finally arrested four Staten Islanders, and rather than hand them over to the island’s
Committee of Safety, he sent them to Elizabethtown, New Jersey, to be tried for treasonous
activities (including drinking damnation to independence and providing arms and men to the
British), thinking conviction was more likely. Attempting to smooth things over, the New York
Congress ordered the trial be in Staten Island. It was, and all were acquitted.34
About the same time as Heard’s raid into Queens, Suffolk County’s Committee sent a
letter to the Congress in Philadelphia, noting that the militia of the county was approximately
two thousand men. The extended nature of the East End, and its exposure to sea-based attack,
made the committee request that Congress send some Continental troops to help with the
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defense. They also requested guns to arm those who were lacking, and hinted that financial
help would be welcome.35
There were undoubtedly a large number of Loyalists in Queens, while Staten Island was
mainly Loyalist. There were also a large number that could be called non-aligned, such as many
of the Quakers. But the movement of the province’s people in the winter of 1776 was clearly
towards independence among those capable of being convinced.36 The colonies, however
reluctantly, were at war with Britain, and all attempts at reconciliation by their side had been
rejected. The King himself had proclaimed them rebels, and Paine and other pamphleteers
argued strongly for independence. But the next step was truly momentous. The colonies were
drawing towards rejecting the king and the British connection, and towards declaring
independence. Once they had crossed that “Rubicon”, there would be no turning back. But
many were steeling themselves to cross the Rubicon, and many had crossed it in their minds
already. The formal crossing of the Rubicon was now needed. In early March, guns from
Ticonderoga, having been hauled all winter from upstate New York to the outskirts of Boston,
were emplaced on Dorchester Heights, overlooking Boston. This gave the Americans the upper
hand—they could fire on the British Army and destroy Boston if they so chose. The British,
faced with an untenable position, evacuated on March 17. In April, Washington’s army began to
transfer itself to New York. General Charles Lee (and later, General Nathaniel Greene) were in
charge of preparing the defenses. On April 17, New York finally ceased supplying the Asia and
other British ships with food and other necessities. British government in the province was
virtually extinguished by this ending of contact between the Governor on his ship and New
35
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York. Tryon dissolved the Assembly which had been elected in January but had never met. This
was the quiet end of New York province’s royal assembly; it would never meet again.37 A new
provincial congress was to meet on May 14. Should it form itself into a de jure government,
rather than the de facto government it was? The Assembly was no more, the governor had fled,
and the ordinary operations of government such as courts and the validity of contracts were in
limbo. If the Provincial Congress took on full-fledged government responsibilities, that could be
construed as declaring independence. This situation existed in many of the colonies; they were
being governed by revolutionary congresses with no basis in the old system, and no
constitutional authority to exercise the ordinary functions of government. On May 10, the
Continental Congress resolved that the colonies should form new state governments. The
Provincial Congress at first did nothing towards this. Finally, as some states began to declare
independence and the Continental Congress moved towards independence, the Third Provincial
Congress “passed” on the issue. Their passing was couched in fine democratic (or republican)
language. In two “resolves” they argued that they had not been authorized by the people to
take such a vote. A new Congress should be held, and via instructions or other means the
people should tell their deputies how they wanted them to vote on such a question. But,
perhaps as a compromise with conservative factions, the people were not to be informed of
these resolves until after the election. In other words, a new Congress was to be elected to
vote on the question of independency—but the voters would not be told that this was the
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reason for the formation of the new Congress. The new Congress would also take up the
question of framing a new constitution.38
The Third Congress had a brief life. It adjourned on June 30, when British sails began to
appear off Sandy Hook. They reconvened at White Plains on July 2, but no quorum could be
mustered. The Congress quietly gave way to its successor, the Fourth Provincial Congress, on
July 9.

II

New York’s leadership, Livingston or Delancey, Loyalist or Patriot, were concerned about
the devastation the war could bring, which helped in the reluctance to take the final step. The
Patriots feared the possible confiscation of property—or worse—if they lost. Their fortunes
were at risk—and their very lives—if they were on the losing side. The Livingstons and
Delanceys also feared the possibility that such a revolutionary struggle could result in
attempts, forceful or otherwise, at reducing the power of the elite leadership. 39 The great
merchants and landlords were in many ways an oligarchy, and their domination of the province
was threatened, both by the nouveau-riche merchants of the Sons of Liberty and the mechanics
and artisans that supported them. New men were rising to power through the revolutionary
movement, and they were making it clear that they did not want to be ruled by what they saw
as a corrupt oligarchy.
38
39

Tiedemann, 247-249; Mason, 182.
Tiedemann, 250. Mason, 172-5.

141

The “mechanics” of New York City, roughly the equivalent of the working class, had
been a driving force throughout the decade-long revolutionary movement. They had often
acted as the “shock troops” of the Revolution (as would their counterparts in the French and
other revolutions). They had composed the bulk of the mobs that had pushed the
Revolutionary movement and threatened British and Loyalist interests. While the mechanics
supported the Revolutionary movement, they had their own concerns and had achieved a
distinct group identity. The mechanics had accepted the leadership of the Sons of Liberty. These
mainly nouveau-riche merchants had for the most part “blue-collar” roots. They were mainly
mechanics and artisans who had “made good,” and spoke the same “language” as the
mechanics. Out of discussions in taverns with Sears, McDougall, and other Sons of Liberty, the
mechanics had formed the Body of Mechanics (or Committee of Mechanics) and even
purchased a meeting place called Mechanics Hall in 1773 or 1774. The political actions of
mechanics were coordinated from here. The mechanics wanted, among other things, a larger
say in the political life of the city and the province. The revolutionary committee structure,
which had many carpenters, pewterers, and other mechanics on its committees, provided a
means for them to gain this. 40
The Mechanics Committee argued forcibly in early June that the people of New York
must be allowed to ratify a new constitution—that it was their “inalienable right.” While they
recognized that not everyone had the needed skills and background to draft a constitution,
everyone possessed enough common sense to determine whether any proposed constitution
40
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would be in his best interests. To allow someone else to ratify it, such as the Provincial
Congress, would both cast the people into “absolute slavery” and destroy the Congress’s power
over them. This was an argument for responsible democracy. Some things, such as
constitution-writing, should be left to the experts—but non-experts were capable of
intelligently evaluating the product the experts produced. While recognizing the importance of
expertise, this clearly challenged elite rule, and deference to the “natural leaders” of the
community. Not only did the mechanics wish the ordinary people to have a seat at the table,
they wanted them to have a say in what the table would look like. In another letter, they also
urged the delegates in Philadelphia to work for independence. It is clear that they did not wish
the seemingly inevitable independent New York to be a carbon copy of the old province, but a
more democratic state. Here again, the question of who ruled at home was as important as the
question of home rule. In the event, as will be discussed below, the New York Constitution was
ratified by the New York Convention in April, 1777, and was not submitted to the people for
ratification.41
In Philadelphia, discussion turned towards independence. The New York delegation,
lacking instructions, were unable to participate, and on June 8 requested that the Provincial
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Congress tell them how to vote.42 It was now that the Third Provincial Congress resolved to
leave the question to a new congress—without publishing the resolutions it made which
indicated that the electors should inform the deputies of how they should vote on the
independence question. The Third Provincial Congress was unable to do much more on the
question. The appearance of British sails near New York forced the adjournment to White Plains
on July 2—too late to instruct New York’s delegates in Philadelphia.
On July 2, in Philadelphia, Congress voted in favor of a resolution of independence, and
on July 4, the Declaration of Independence was signed. On July 3 and July 4, nine thousand
British and Hessian troops landed on Staten Island. On July 9, the Fourth Provincial Congress
met in White Plains in Westchester County, about 20 miles north of New York City. By this time,
they were well-aware of both the events in Philadelphia and the events on Staten Island. The
question could no longer be avoided. A committee was appointed at the morning session to
consider the letter from New York’s delegation to the Continental Congress, and the
Declaration of Independence which had been enclosed with it. In the afternoon, the committee
reported to the Congress. The committee’s report

Resolved, unanimously, That the reasons assigned by the Continental Congress
for declaring the United Colonies free and independent States are cogent and
conclusive; and that while we lament the cruel necessity which has rendered
that measure unavoidable, we approve the same, and will, at the risk of our lives
and fortunes, join with the other colonies in supporting it.43
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The report was adopted, and copies of the Declaration were ordered to be printed up
and distributed throughout Westchester and the other counties of the state. The delegates to
the Continental Congress were also given authorization in the Resolutions that adopted
independence to vote for all measures “as they may deem conducive to the happiness and
welfare of the United States of America.”44
The reluctance to vote for independence and the unhappiness is palpable. The New York
Independence Resolution was a product of reluctant revolutionaries, driven by circumstances
to voting for a resolution and an independence they did not want. They lamented “the cruel
necessity” that had driven them to this, but they felt that they had no choice. They had
legitimate grievances, and the British had failed to come to a reasonable compromise. Instead,
rather than compromise, the British had gone to war with their colonists. The British had gone
to war with America and New York. As the Fourth Provincial Congress sat in White Plains,
Staten Island was occupied, and the province’s—no, the state’s—great city was soon to be
attacked by the British. Even the state constitution, much of which was written shortly after
independence was finally declared, seems to hope for, yearn for, reconciliation:

Whereas the present government of this colony, by congress and committees,
was instituted while the former government, under the Crown of Great Britain,
existed in full force, and was established for the sole purpose of opposing the
usurpation of the British Parliament, and was intended to expire on a
reconciliation with Great Britain, which it was then apprehended would soon
take place, but is now considered as remote and uncertain;….45

44

Journal of the Provincial Congress, July 9, 1776; Mason, 182.
Preamble to 1777 New York State Constitution, http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ny-1777.htm, accessed July 11,
2011.
45

145

Reluctant they may have been, but, as George III had said, the die was now cast. They
would risk their lives and fortunes to achieve independence. They had crossed the Rubicon.

Let us review the factors and events that led to the final break. New York was an
oligarchic province, ruled by competing oligarchies. The factional, interest-driven politics of the
province had tried to absorb the movement we have called Patriot, but was overtaken by it.
Delancey versus Livingston, Presbyterian versus Anglican, north Hempstead versus south
Hempstead, all of these disputes may have influenced one’s initial side, but these controversies
were all subsumed by the Imperial Question. Committees and then congresses had formed to
work within the British system to achieve a solution to the tax and underlying constitutional
problems that afflicted the empire, but had been unable to make headway. Their very
existence, the existence of political organizations and committees outside the official
governmental structure, was seen as extra-constitutional, as possibly subversive.46 Many
Loyalists ascribed their names to letters and statements to register their disgust and
abhorrence with these committees, a “thing unknown to the British Constitution”, as Jones
described one. The Patriots had tried to work with the Assembly, but as had occurred in
Pennsylvania and other colonies, it was not the best instrument for revolutionary action, and
would be succeeded by province-wide Congresses.
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In general, in the 1760s and early 1770s, virtually every New Yorker who took an
interest in politics could be considered a Whig, a Patriot. Virtually everyone objected to British
taxation by Parliament. But some wanted to work through Assembly petitions, through the
slow processes of the British Constitution. Others wanted more direct action, through
resolutions by committees and congresses, through boycotts, and even through property
damage and riot. The unity of the anti-Parliamentary taxation movement began to break up
after the Intolerable Acts, as some Patriots began to take actions leading to rebellion—and
possibly independence. In general, those with strong British ties stayed Loyalist, while those
whom the British connection seemed to harm more than help were more likely to become
Patriot. British intransigence forced the Patriots into armed revolt. Even after LexingtonConcord and Bunker Hill, reconciliation was still possible, but the British dug their heels in and
turned a rebellion into revolution. Independence seemed the only possible solution short of
surrender. The love and loyalty the Americans felt for the King was crushed, and soon turned to
hatred for the king and those who supported him. Having the “wrong opinion” now made one a
traitor.
New York was left with no options; save perhaps total surrender to what they believed
was tyranny. Reluctantly, but probably resolutely, their delegates in White Plains pledged their
lives and fortunes to the “Glorious Cause.” As of July 10, the Fourth Provincial Congress became
the Convention of Representatives of the State of New York, charged with running the state
and a war while writing a permanent constitution. Twenty miles south of White Plains, the
British were waiting to end the state’s independence—and perhaps the lives of its leaders.
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III

Having adopted the Declaration of Independence, on July 9, 1776, the Fourth Provincial
Congress informed John Hancock and the Continental Congress by letter, and the Declaration
and New York’s acceptance were printed up and distributed. The acceptance was at the
afternoon session of the Congress (which the next day changed its name to the Convention of
the Representatives of the State of New York). At six o’clock in the evening, the Declaration was
read to Washington’s troops. It was also read on the Common in New York City, where it was
greeted by cheers. A mixed group of soldiers and civilians then marched to Bowling Green,
where stood the statue of George III on horseback. This statue had recently been erected,
having been commissioned in the wake of the end of the Stamp Act Crisis. The statue was about
4000 pounds of lead, topped with about 10 ounces of gold leaf. The king was depicted as the
Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. The excited mob tore down the statue. Its nose was torn off,
and the golden crown of laurels was removed. The statue was decapitated. It has been
suggested that this was in emulation of the killing of Charles I. The head was stuck on a pike
outside a tavern. Most of the statue was melted down into 42,088 bullets. The head of the King
was eventually rescued by a British engineer, John Montresor, who sent it to England so that
the ministry could see the rage of the rebels first-hand. Exiled Massachusetts governor Thomas
Hutchinson saw the head in London, and noted that, even without a nose, it bore a striking
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resemblance to the king. The horse’s tail survived, and is on display at the New York Historical
Society. Washington mildly reproved the troops for joining in the mob.47
This is probably the most famous of the destructions of royal symbols in America, but it
was not the only one. The historian Brendan McConville describes this as a period of
iconoclasm, complete with symbolic regicides. The king was burned in effigy in Baltimore after
the Declaration was read there. The king’s coat and arms were removed from statehouses and
courtrooms in Pennsylvania. In Dover, the king’s portrait was burned by a member of the local
Committee of Safety.48
On July 22, the Declaration and the Resolutions of the Provincial Congress were “with
beat of drum” proclaimed in Huntington on Long Island. According to Holt’s New York Journal,
they were approved and applauded by “animated shouts”. The flag which waved on the local
Liberty Pole had the words “Liberty” on one side and “George III” on the other. The King’s name
was ripped off, and used in a hastily-constructed effigy of the king, which was wrapped in a
Union Jack lined with gunpowder, with a wooden crown. The effigy was then hung on a gallows
and was then exploded and burnt to ashes. The Committee and many of the “principal
inhabitants” of the Town spent the evening toasting the Congress, the commanders of
American forces, and the fallen. Thirteen toasts, one for each colony, were made.49
It was apparent that many Americans, in New York City, in the rural countries that
surrounded the metropolis, and throughout America, had rejected the king. Indeed, they
committed acts of symbolic regicide, showing both that they not only rejected the king who
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they believed had betrayed them, attacking rather than supporting their liberties, but they
hated him. They now hated a king that they had once loved. This was a king who the people
had symbolically equated with liberty, as the people of Huntington showed by stitching his
name onto a flag that also bore the word “Liberty”. At the raising of one of the New York City
liberty poles God Save the King had been played, and the king’s name and the word “Liberty”
had also been placed on it, showing that the erectors of the Liberty Pole (the local Sons of
Liberty) did not see a conflict between the king and liberty (see Chapter II). Now, they felt
betrayed by the King’s actions, and rejected the King. The intensity of the post-Independence
actions, these burnings, these hangings in effigy, (and the extreme thoroughness of the
destruction of the King’s effigy at Huntington, where it was both hung and exploded)
demonstrated “the power the monarch had once held over provincial imagination.” The
intensity also symbolized the betrayal the Americans felt. And this hatred would not be
confined to effigies. The Loyalists, living symbols of the King and Empire, would be the objects
of particular hatred. The hatred the Patriots held for the Loyalists was most obviously shown in
South Carolina a few years later ( as will be discussed in a following chapter), but it could be
seen in many places, including the New York region, as will be discussed below.50
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IV.

The arrival of the British fleet at Sandy Hook was an awe-inspiring sight. More than 130
British warships had entered New York Bay by June 30. One onlooker thought that “all of
London was afloat”. On board his ship General William Howe, commander of British forces in
America, was advised by Governor Tryon of New York and several Loyalists, who gave him
intelligence about fortifications in Brooklyn Heights and Gravesend. They advised a quick strike.
Washington, in the meantime, was in a strategic quandary. If the British occupied Brooklyn
Heights, overlooking New York City, they could shell New York City and force a retreat or
surrender (the situation was similar to Britain’s in Boston a few months earlier, where
Washington’s occupation of Dorchester Heights with cannon had forced a British evacuation).
The British could also, if they could navigate the tricky passages around Manhattan, use their
naval superiority to surround Manhattan and trap Washington on the island, or cut off any
forces on Long Island from Manhattan. Despite this, Washington made the perhaps unwise
decision to reinforce Brooklyn. This was dividing one’s army in the face of a superior army,
which is generally considered unwise.51
Howe’s forces were mainly those who had evacuated Boston, then had been refitted,
rested, and resupplied in Halifax. Many reinforcements were coming, but Howe thought he had
enough troops to begin offensive operations. His original aim was to land his men at Gravesend,
in the south of Kings County, but he was dissuaded by a trusted staff officer, General James
51
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Robertson. Robertson urged Howe to wait for the reinforcements before beginning his assault.
Robertson, among other positions, had served as deputy quartermaster under General Jeffrey
Amherst, and was familiar with Staten Island. During the Seven Years War, Robertson had
established a staging area near “the Watering Place”, a fresh-water stream on Staten Island
where ships often stopped for water. The location of the island near New Jersey, Manhattan,
and Long Island made it an excellent base for attacks on any of those places. It possessed much
fresh-water, good farmland, and all indications were that it was a very Loyalist area. In addition,
the island was also poorly defended. As a result, the occupation of the island was virtually
unopposed.52
Howe accepted Robertson’s advice and the troops were landed on July 2 at Staten
Island. The embarkation was completed on July 4. Howe waited for the reinforcements, and
the main assault on Long Island and Manhattan did not commence until late August. Thus,
much of the summer, ideal campaigning weather, was spent with the British troops waiting on
Staten Island. Howe has been roundly criticized for this, but striking with the whole of one’s
force is usually not a bad idea. Certainly, while much of the prime campaign season was lost, he
used the troops quite well once the assault was finally launched—up until the end of the
campaign. Indeed, he was knighted for the Battle of Long Island.53 If not for the Battles of
Trenton and Princeton, Howe’s campaign would quite possibly be remembered as a masterful
one—despite all the lost opportunities (see Chapter IV).
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William Howe had in 1759 at Quebec led the advance guard that scaled the Heights of
Abraham, and was the younger brother of Richard Lord Howe, known as “Black Dick” because
of the dark cast of his skin and his bravery during the Seven Years War. Richard Howe was the
naval commander of British forces in America. During the French and Indian War, the oldest
brother, George, had led British and American troops at Ticonderoga, and been slain there.
Massachusetts had allocated funds for a monument to George at Westminster Abbey. The
remaining Howe brothers ever-after possessed a fondness for America. Richard had spoken
against the Stamp Act. William was the Member of Parliament for Nottingham, and he had told
his constituents that he condemned the government’s American policy and that he would not
accept a commission there. The Howe brothers were particular favorites of the King, and most
likely close relatives. Their mother was probably an illegitimate daughter of George I. Despite
their conciliatory stance towards the colonies, they were given—or pushed for—the
appointments. William Howe wrote one constituent that he was ordered to America and could
not refuse; Burgoyne said that Howe had diligently sought the command, partially because of
his low opinion of his predecessor, Gage. One biographer, Troyer Steel Anderson, believes
William’s statement that he would not accept a command was a lie. In any event, since the
brothers were also to be made Peace Commissioners, their sympathy and affection for America
and Americans could possibly turn out to be an asset. 54
The British were warmly greeted by the Staten Islanders. The few Continental troops on
the island had fled to New Jersey, bringing some of the prominent Patriots. Many Loyalists
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climbed the heights of the eastern shore of the island to see the flotilla and the landing of the
troops. Governor Tryon reported that the islanders came down to the shore to greet the
soldiers as deliverers. The Continental Congress was publicly cursed, and its paper money was
burned. Later in July, effigies of George Washington, General Lee and General Isaac Putnam, as
well as John Witherspoon were burned. Witherspoon, a New Light Presbyterian, was a leading
Whig in New Jersey, President of Princeton College, and a signatory of the Declaration of
Independence. In addition to these symbolic actions, more concrete actions were taken by the
joyous Staten Islanders. On July 6, more than 500 men, mostly from Staten Island (with a few
from New Jersey), gathered at Richmond village. At a ceremony provided over by Howe and
Governor Tryon of New York, more than five hundred men took an oath of allegiance to George
III, and were formed into “Billopp’s Corps of Staten Island Militia” under the command of
Christopher Billopp. 55
Patriot leaders deplored the reaction of the Staten Islanders, Washington even calling
them “our inveterate Enemies.” One British officer noted the joy of the Islanders, and ascribed
it to “seeing well the difference between anarchy and a regular mild government.” Again, the
low opinion many of the British officers had for America and its new governments is shown.
What many of the Americans saw as the people choosing their own governments, in
accordance with principles laid down by Locke and others (indeed, in accordance basically with
the principles of the Glorious Revolution, which were the principles which ultimately legitimized
George III’s rule), the British saw as anarchy. The Patriots were not just enemies of the
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government, they were seen as enemies of government; the Loyalists were friends of
government. As one Marine captain described the joyous Richmondites, they had long been
oppressed “for their attachment to Government.”56
As would soon occur on Long Island and Manhattan, the homes of prominent
inhabitants—especially those of a Patriot persuasion—became the homes of British officers.
General Howe settled at the home of former provincial congressman Adrian Bancker. Bancker
had not left Staten Island, and was detained upon a naval vessel by the British. The troops and
refugees were quartered in private homes, barns, and other buildings. However, the island did
not have enough buildings to satisfy the need for housing, so many of the soldiers had to live in
tents.57
For most of the summer, troops poured into the island. Some came from Europe. Three
thousand arrived on August 1 with Generals Clinton and Cornwallis, after being withdrawn from
a failed campaign to take Charleston. From Virginia, Lord Dunmore and the Ethiopian Regiment
arrived. Dunmore in November, 1775, had promised freedom to any slave who left his master
to fight for the British. Many slaves responded to the call, and were formed into the regiment.
Unfortunately, only 150 remained of the regiment, thanks to smallpox. The existence of the
regiment caused some concern among Staten Islanders, especially those who owned slaves, but
it was soon apparent that Lord Dunmore’s Proclamation was not the forerunner of a general
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policy of emancipation, but the product of military exigencies. The uniforms of the Ethiopian
Regiment, however, bore sashes on which the words “LIBERTY TO SLAVES” were written.58
Thousands of troops were cooped up on the island for nearly two months with little to
do. It is not surprising that there was some trouble on “that ever loyal island.” Discipline was
not as strong as it should have been. Lord Rawdon, with inappropriately poetical language,
cavalierly described a problem that the presence of so many bored men and insufficient
discipline caused:

The fair Nymphs of this Isle are in wonderful tribulation, as the fresh meat our
men have got here has made them as riotous as Satyrs. A Girl cannot step into
the Bushes to pluck a Rose without running the most imminent risque of being
ravished; and they are so little accustomed to these vigourous methods, that
they don’t bear them with the proper resignation, and of consequence we have
most entertaining Courts-Martial every day.59

In plain language, women on the island were being raped by soldiers. Since, except for a
few exceptions, the majority of Staten Islanders were Loyalists, this means the women being
raped were Loyalists or the daughters of Loyalists. These violent acts against women were
virtually guaranteed to undercut and even destroy American support for the occupation army,
transforming the British military’s image from liberators and defenders to oppressors, and
transforming Loyalists to passive neutrals or even into Patriots. Criminal actions by soldiers,
ranging from minor crimes such as petty thefts and vandalism, to far worse, such as home
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invasions, kidnapping, and rape, would plague the populations in contact with the British and
Hessian soldiers throughout the war.
The British attempted to negotiate with the Americans during the long summer. In midJuly, Lieutenant Philip Brown was sent with a flag of truce to Washington. He was turned back
by boat-borne sentries, because the letter he bore was addressed not to General Washington,
but to George Washington Esq. A second letter was turned back for a similar reason a few days
later. Ambrose Serle, secretary to Lord Howe, commented that, while the British had tried “as
far as Decency and Honor could permit” to prevent bloodshed, that it seemed “to be beneath a
little paltry Colonel of Militia at the Head of a Banditti or Rebels to treat with the
Representative of His lawful Sovereign, because ‘tis impossible for him to give all the Titles
which the poor Creature requires.” 60 Pace Serle, this insistence by the Americans on proper
titles was actually quite vital; the colonies had declared independence, and demanded
recognition of their generals as generals, given this title by the states or the Congress. For the
British to give them these titles would be in many ways a partial recognition of independence;
hence their reluctance to do so. A few years later, when peace was desperately desired by
Britain, the instructions to the Carlisle Commission told them to use any titles the Americans
wanted (see Chapter IV).
All through the summer, Washington kept working on the fortifications and gained more
reinforcements. Peaceful envoys were not the only thing the British sent to Washington during
this lull. The British tested the defenses of the Americans by sending two warships, the Phoenix
and the Rose, up the Hudson. The Americans were unable to stop them. Only about half the
60
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men who should have been on duty on the cannons were there; some were allegedly drinking,
or visiting “the Holy Ground”—the local red light district. Some Americans were killed by
cannonades by the ships. Panicked New Yorkers continued to flee the city.61
The population of New York City virtually evaporated during 1776. Loyalists, Patriots,
and the unaffiliated fled the war-zone. Many members of the Sons of Liberty and “mechanics”
became members of military units, or otherwise left the city. The revolutionary government of
the province shortly before independence was declared had left New York City for the safer
confines of White Plains in Westchester, where it now styled itself the Convention of
Representatives of the State of New York. The exigencies of war would force the Convention—
and later the legislature—to move several times. White Plains would soon be under British
control.
The “evaporation” of New York City’s population and the relocation of the government
to a series of small towns in the Hudson Valley probably had a major effect on the government
of New York State for the first few decades of independence. The Committee of Mechanics—
representing roughly what we would call the working class—had urged that the new
constitution, once written, be submitted to the people of New York for approval. (See above).
It is probable that, had New York City remained in American hands and the state capital
remained there, that the Committee and the mechanics it represented would have put
pressure on the Convention to make the Constitution a democratic one, or at least more
democratic than the oligarchs who had long dominated the province would have wanted. But,
the Convention was not in New York City, and many of the mechanics were not as well. By
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contrast, in Philadelphia the population remained, and a very democratic constitution was
written for Pennsylvania in the fall of 1776. Similarly, a few years later, the sans-culottes
(roughly the equivalent of the mechanics) pushed the French revolutionary assemblies in more
radical directions—some perhaps more radical than many of the mainly middle-class
revolutionaries wanted. But in New York, the impact of invasion and the internal “exile” of the
Convention isolated the classical republican constitution writers from the democratic pressure
the mechanics of New York City might have exerted. John Jay and his fellow authors produced a
republican constitution, with a bicameral legislature and checks and balances such as a Council
of Revision, which would govern the state until 1821. Arguably, with its bicameral legislature
and its Council of Revision, the 1777 Constitution was one more in tune with the interests of
the oligarchs of New York than a more democratic constitution would have been. It was
adopted by the Convention in April, 1777, in “the name and by the authority of the good people
of this State” and was not submitted to the voters as the Committee of Mechanics had
wished.62
As discussed in more detail in the following chapter, Howe’s strategy was to gain control
of Manhattan, and pin Washington’s force in southern New York and New Jersey while an army
from Canada would march down the Hudson. Washington, faced with two superior armies,
would either have to retreat (thus abandoning New England to isolation from the middle
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colonies) or offer battle, where his poorly trained and poorly armed troops would no doubt be
crushed. General Clinton urged that Howe send ships to land a sizable corps at Spuyten Duyvil,
at the northern tip of Manhattan, to block the retreat of Washington’s forces. Howe was
interested in the idea, but eventually did not use it in his campaign. 63
Instead, Howe intended to use his 24 thousand men in a large enveloping movement,
taking first Long Island, then taking Manhattan from a point northeast of the City (which was in
1776 a one square-mile town at the southern tip of the island). This plan has been criticized as
allowing Washington’s troops ample room to escape, and as not fully exploiting the British
naval advantage. In the meantime, Washington fortified northern Manhattan. Nathaniel
Greene, “the fighting Quaker”, was in charge of fortifying Brooklyn Heights. Greene had
renounced his sect’s pacifist teachings, and had gained much of his military knowledge from
reading campaign histories. Greene, it is reported, “had made himself acquainted with every
pass and defile leading to the city”, but he came down with a serious fever a few days before
the British struck. Israel Putnam took over the Long Island troops on Aug 23, 1776. General
Sullivan commanded within the fortifications, and “Lord” Stirling the troops outside the
fortifications. Sullivan is often reported to have been in command during the Battle of Long
Island, and he took great pains to correct that impression.64
“Tory hunting” also continued on Long Island. An investigation into a plot to rearm
Loyalists resulted in warrants being issued for the arrest of many on Long Island. Military force
was sent to capture the 38 people named, and there was a skirmish in a swamp in Queens on
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June 22 or 23. While there were fortunately no fatalities, this “Battle of Hempstead Swamp”
was probably the first bloodshed on Long Island. The danger of armed Loyalists was a problem
to the American military planners. The bulk of the Continental troops were stationed in Kings, a
Loyalist region, as was much of Queens. Hempstead’s armed Loyalists were headed by a
former Indian fighter from the French and Indian War, Hewitt. Probably to counter them,
Nathaniel Woodhull, former head of the Provincial Congress and now a militia officer, was
stationed to the east of Jamaica Queens at the time of the Battle of Long Island. In Brookhaven,
in the months leading up to the battle, several people were brought before the Committee of
Safety, and several arrested.65

On August 22, 1776, British troops landed on Long Island. While many have
criticized the British for wasting much of the summer, the operation when finally launched was
masterful. The British had built enough flat-bottomed boats to disembark six thousand men in
one wave. The boats, according to a major in the Quartermaster’s department, each had a
hinged front that could be let down to serve as a gangplank, by which the men and guns could
go ashore. In short, they were eighteenth century versions of the landing craft used at
Normandy and other amphibious invasions of the Second World War. Over 400 vessels were
involved in the movement. The ships disembarked at Gravesend, in southern King’s County.
They were met with little resistance; they also were not met by many cheering Loyalists as had
occurred on Staten Island. The American troops burned some “corn”, though a recent rain
65

George D.A. Combs, “The First Revolutionary Battle on Long Island: Battle of Hempstead Swamp”, NCHSJ 19
(1958) 19-25, reprinted NCHSJ 29 (1969) 38-43; Orville Ackerly, “Ebenezer Dayton: A Revolutionary Character”,
paper read at annual meeting of Suffolk County, Historical Society, July 14, 1903, at Riverhead (and in their
collections) 3-4, 6.

161

hindered that, and drove off some cattle. The British soldiers and sailors treated themselves to
the fine apples that grew in abundance. Skirmishing soon began between British and American
forces.66
The Hessians crossed over on Sunday, the 25th; Serle noted in his journal his fear that
their use would “tend to irritate and inflame the Americans infinitely more than two or three
British Armies.” In Brookhaven, on the North Shore of Long Island, British troops were landed
and began shooting cattle on the 26th. Some American troops were diverted there; this action
was a feint by the British to hold the militia of Suffolk County at home, rather in Kings.67
As historian Troyer Steele Anderson puts it, “the battle of Long Island, on August 27, was
a very brief, simple, and decisive affair.”68 Sullivan had been temporarily in command on Long
Island until Israel Putnam had taken over. As mentioned earlier, Nathaniel Greene, who had
been in charge of preparing the defenses of Long Island and would probably have led the troops
in battle, had become very ill and had been relieved of duty. Washington adopted Sullivan’s
modification to the defensive plan that had been prepared by the sick Greene and earlier by
Lee: Putnam was ordered to put his best troops into the passes in the Gowanus Heights and the
other hills of northern Kings. The intent was to not allow the British to reach the fortifications at
Brooklyn Heights, overlooking New York City. These heights were Britain’s strategic objective in
the battle. Unfortunately, the Jamaica Pass on the far left of the American lines was left
unguarded. It is possible that Greene, with his intimate knowledge of the area, would have not
made this error. In any event, Howe discovered this weakness, and “turned the left flank” of
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the American lines. With British and Hessian forces behind the passes they were guarding, the
Americans had no choice but to retreat. Heavy losses were sustained by the American troops,
and several high-ranking American officers, such as Lord Stirling, were captured. By nightfall,
the remnants of the American army stationed on Long Island were within the Brooklyn Heights
fortifications. Howe did not attempt to capture the fortifications, as he was not sure of the
strength of the fort, and did not want to “risk the loss that might have been sustained in the
assault,” believing that “the lines must have been ours at a very cheap rate by regular
approaches”. He began to besiege the position, unaware that the force holding the fort was
quite small. Some clever planning and some fortuitous weather permitted the 9500 American
soldiers, their equipment, and General Washington (who had crossed over to Long Island on the
morning of the battle, once he was satisfied that the attack was the main British effort and not
a feint) to return to Manhattan on the 29th unmolested . On the morning of the 30th, the British
occupied the forts on Brooklyn Heights. Long Island was now theirs. They would not leave until
1783.69

69

Schecter, 131, 133, 152-3, 158-9, 161-4; Anderson 132, 136-141; William Howe to Lord Germaine, Camp at
Newtown, LI, Sept 3, 1776, OKS # 805, pp. 134-5. “Lord Stirling” was William Alexander of New Jersey, who
claimed the disputed earldom of Stirling in Britain. Despite his claim to a British title, he became an important
American general. Concerning the battle, one British officer observed that “The American fought bravely, and (to
do them justice) could not be broken till they were greatly outnumbered and taken in flank, front and rear.” This
officer was also shocked at what he described as a “massacre” made by the Hessians and Highlanders who gave no
quarter. It was also at this battle that General Putnam is said to have rode along the lines and ordered his men not
to fire “till they could see the whites of the enemies’ eyes.” OKS # 805, p. 138.

163

V

General Nathaniel Woodhull, a former delegate to several Provincial Congresses,
commanded the Suffolk County militia. They had been charged on the 24th of August with
driving the cattle of Queens east of the Hempstead Plains to keep it out of British hands. Of a
total force of 500, only two hundred met him in Jamaica, and half soon deserted. Despite this,
Woodhull was successful in his task. His troops remained in Jamaica on the 27th, but began to
scatter on the 28th as rumors of the defeat began to spread. Woodhull was taken prisoner by
dragoons. According to accounts from fifty years later, after he surrendered his sword, he was
ordered to say “God save the King.” He refused, saying “God save us all.” At this, the accounts
continue, the commanding major, identified as the Loyalist Major Oliver Delancey (of the
famous Delancey clan), struck him in the arm with his sword. The arm became infected, and
was amputated, but he soon died. Ballads and tragedies of his life would be written many
decades later.70
Two representatives of the Convention, Judge Hobart and James Townshend, learned
of Woodhull’s capture on August 30, 1776 while in Queens. The militia of Queens had
dispersed. The two reported their “unspeakable mortifaction” to the Convention at the twin
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bad news. The two headed to Huntington, “as the only place where we could have any prospect
of making an effectual stand”. They then ordered the militia of Suffolk to rendezvous there. In
the meantime, the British had spread troops out from Kings. By the 30th, they were “in full
possession” of western Queens, as far as Jamaica, and Loyalists were joining them. By August
31, the British reached Newtown in Queens. Virtually everyone there who had taken up arms
against the British, according to one report, surrendered.71
While a great victory, the Battle of Long Island (or Brooklyn, as it is sometimes called)
was not quite the decisive battle Howe wanted, as a sizable portion of the “rebel” army still
existed. However, as far as Long Island was concerned, it was quite decisive. In the face of
overwhelming military superiority, the troops disbanded and Patriots fled—or submitted to the
British. On August 30, several militia companies from Brookhaven and Smithtown, as well as
various militiamen (some complaining that their officers had left them), gathered in
Huntington. Major Jeffrey Smith called the officers into a room, and told them that their forces
were insufficient to oppose the enemy and that he “very much gave up the Island”. He said it
would not be good policy to “incense a cruel enemy by being taken in arms”. They would fare
better if they stayed at home. One captain ordered his troops to return home, and the militia of
Suffolk disbanded.72
Brigadier General William Erskine was appointed commanding officer for the eastern
part of Long Island. From his base in Queens, he issued a proclamation for Suffolk County
ordering committeemen and others to cease their activities, and that all men in arms lay them
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down. He then ordered that they assist British forces by bringing in their cattle, and wagons and
horses, promising that they would be fully paid, as “His Majesty having sent his army, not for
the oppression but for the protection of the inhabitants.” If, however, they did not submit (and
especially if the cattle and wagons orders were not immediately complied with), he would
without delay enter the county and “lay waste the property of the disobedient, as persons
unworthy His Majesty’s clemency.” 73
From Jamaica, Oliver Delancey, Major General of the [Loyalist] Militia in the Southern
District of the Colony of NY, issued a proclamation on September 1 for the people of Suffolk to
lay down their arms, take an oath of allegiance, disclaim and reject “the orders of Congress and
Committees”, and to pray for the king and the royal family in all places of worship. That day,
dragoons arrived in Huntington. The next day, Delancey arrived in Huntington and ordered the
militia of Suffolk to lay down their arms and take an oath of allegiance. On Sept 5, Delancey
issued an order to raise a “Brigade of Provincials solely for the defence of this Island to reestablish order and govt within the same.” Three regiments were eventually raised; as will be
discussed below, there was much criticism when some were sent to fight in the South when
they were needed to protect Long Island against raiders. In addition to these orders, several
orders were issued concerning the gathering of cattle and sheep and wood for the use of the
King’s troops. While a distinction was to be made between rebel and Loyalist livestock (the
Loyalists were promised pay), in practice, few were paid.74
After the disastrous Battle of Long Island, many Long Islanders who fought with
Washington elected to stay with his army. But perhaps as many as five thousand men, women
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and children, particularly those who had been very active in Patriot activities, escaped to
Connecticut, leaving their homes and much of their property behind. The flight was referred to
as “Over to the Main” by the refugees. Sag Harbor on the northern shore of the South Fork was
a major port of departure; before the war and into the next century, Sag Harbor was the second
greatest port in New York. As late as September 15, and possibly later, the wharves of Sag
Harbor were crowded with emigrants. The Convention recommended on August 29 that Long
Island’s inhabitants “remove as many of their women, children and slaves, and as much of their
live stock and grain, to the main, as they can,” and stated that it would pay the expense. Some
effort was made to prevent the exodus by the British, but it went forward. Various committees
in Connecticut helped provide for the needs of the refugees.75
But many remained behind on Long Island, and not all were Loyalists or neutrals or
“trimmers”. Many of those who stayed were Patriots. Many feared to leave their property
behind, were unable to secure transport, or feared the uncertainties of exile far from their
homes. For myriads of reasons, many who had no love for the British remained behind on Long
Island. Having chosen or been compelled by circumstance to stay behind, they did what was
necessary. They feared that failure to pledge allegiance to the King would result in being exiled
in winter.76 They began to take oaths of loyalty to the king—several were demanded during the
course of the occupation—and those who had been highly-placed in the revolutionary
movement began to recant their involvement.
After the Battle of Long Island, each town on the island held town meetings which
formally surrendered their towns to the British. The island was now under martial law. The
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Revolutionary committees began to recant their involvement. On or about Oct 21, 1776,
Huntington, Smithtown, Southold, South Hampton and East Hampton’s committees, as well as
the Committee of the County of Suffolk, all recanted. The statements of Huntington and Suffolk
were printed in the New York Gazette of November 11. Huntington’s statement was typical:

The Committee of Huntington, being thoroughly convinced of the injurious and
inimical tendency of our former meetings and resolutions and willing to manifest
our hearty disapprobation of all such illegal measurs, do hereby dissolve this
committee, and as far as in us lies revoke and disannul all former orders and
resolutions of all committees and Congresses whatsoever, as being undutiful to
our lawful Sovereign, repugnant to the principles of the British Constitution &
ruinous in the extreme, to the happiness and prosperity of this country.77

Among the signers of the above declaration was Platt Conkling. Platt Conkling had been
one-third of the original committee of Huntington. He was named as appointed to Huntington’s
committee in Huntington’s elegant 1774 statement of the issues, the Declaration of Rights. The
other two named in the Declaration, John Sloss Hobart and Thomas Wickes, had escaped Long
Island. All who signed the recantations had been leading Patriots and had supported American
independence. It is highly unlikely that all of these leading Patriots had changed their minds.
There had been ample time between July 4 and the beginning of the occupation (or liberation)
of Long Island for those who thought independence was a step too far to resign. It is apparent
that their recantations were expedient, a response to the fact of British occupation.78
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As the war continued, General Howe made several offers of amnesty, and oaths of
allegiance to Britain were made by the people of the island. According to historian Frederic
Mather, the “general form” of the oath was thus:

I do swear upon the Evangelist of Almighty God, that I hold true and faithful
allegiance to his Majesty King George the Third of Great Britain, his heirs and
successors: and hold an utter abhorrence of congresses, rebellions, etc.; and do
promise never to be concerned in any manner with his Majesty’s rebellious
subjects in America. So help me God! 79

Several periods of oath-taking occurred during the war; a major signing occurred in the
fall of 1778. Even the most cursory comparison of the lists of those who signed these oaths and
of those who had put themselves on record as supporting the Patriot cause will show that many
names may be found on both lists. For example, John and Solomon Ketcham, as well as
Nathaniel Smith, Henry Titus, Zachariah Rogers, Silas Wickes, and Platt Conkling, among other
residents of Huntington signed both the Association on May 8, 1775, and the Oath of Loyalty
before Governor Tryon in 1778. It is evident that for many of the oath-takers, the oath was only
a matter of expediency, of protecting their homes, properties, families and persons. The oaths
were usually administered by commissioners. One commissioner, Abraham Gardiner, who had
ordered the homes of Col. Jonathan Hedges and Col. David Mulford surrounded in order to force
them to take the oath, later would become a refugee himself, and would serve the American
cause. Perhaps he had a change of heart, but it is more likely that his actions as a commissioner
were only a matter of expediency.80
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Many local Long Island historians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
were descendants of those who had taken the oaths. A sense of embarrassment, or a need to
justify their ancestor’s actions, can be detected in their writings. Local historian Justice Henry
P. Hedges, in his 1910 “Sag Harbor Address”, defended the oath-takers:

What should they do? Take the oath and live? Refuse and die? They took the
oath but in heart were as devoted to their country and as hostile to their
oppressors as before. This is a subject avoided by writers, but fidelity to historic
truth demands expression. When residents of Sag Harbor and the Hamptons
took this oath, as they in fact did, they reasoned thus: Refusing , I die with no
benefit or help to my family, friends or country’s cause; living, I may be a help to
all…To hold an oath procured by force, valid, is to hold force the law and above
the right.

He then proceeds to defend the actions of both Colonel Gardiner and Colonel
Jonathan Hedges. Allowing for perhaps some excesses in his rhetoric, Hedges was
probably right in his belief that the oaths did not reflect a change in heart. While no
doubt there were, particularly in Queens, many who were nonaligned, and those who
“trimmed” to the wind, it is likely that many of the oath takers were merely bending to
the military realities. Particularly suspicious were the recantations from the
revolutionary committees of Suffolk County that Governor Tryon received in October
and November of 1776. It is rather unlikely that leading Patriots had truly changed their
minds in two or three short months, and it is far more likely that they were bowing to
the military realities of Long Island. Charles Street, editor of the Huntington Town
Records, said of these recantations that they “were concessions forced from a
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conquered people.” The sincerity of the recantations of the committees was quite
questionable, as was the sincerity of many—perhaps most—of the oaths.81
Unfortunately for the British, too often they suspected everyone of disloyalty, including
people who were manifestly loyal. It is one of the fatal ironies of the American Revolution that
high policy makers tended to overestimate the amount of Loyalism in America, thinking that
the Patriots were a small faction, while at the level of policy implementation, the troops and
local commanders tended to act as if everyone was a rebel. This may have made some sense in
Suffolk, which was overwhelmingly Patriot, but it made no sense in Queens and Kings. From
virtually the end of the Battle of Long Island, the British acted in manners which not only failed
to win over the Patriots and neutrals, but actually disaffected many of the Loyalists. As historian
of Revolutionary Queens and New York Joseph S. Tiedemann put it, by the end of the
occupation, the Loyalists in Queens (and no doubt the rest of the island) had become “Patriots
by Default.”82 This work will return to these “Revolutionary Incidents” of Long Island and
elsewhere in an upcoming chapter.

VI

Having successfully extricated the forces stationed on Long Island forces from Brooklyn,
Washington faced the distinct possibility that his army would be trapped on Manhattan.
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Nathaniel Greene, recovering from his illness, urged that the city be abandoned and burned to
deny its resources to the British. Brigadier General John Morin Scott, an important New York
Patriot, who had a large estate and many assets on Manhattan, selflessly concurred. Congress
informed Washington that the city was not to be harmed. Rather than retreat off the island,
Washington tried to hold it. 83
With the British having won an impressive, though not-quite decisive, victory, Admiral
Howe decided to make one last attempt at peaceful negotiation before unleashing his brother’s
army. Howe paroled the captured General Sullivan, who was sent to Philadelphia to attempt to
set up a face-to-face meeting with members of Congress. John Adams was not pleased with
this; and told his fellow Congressman Benjamin Rush that he wished the first British shot at the
battle had gone through Sullivan’s head. Despite Adams’s opposition to meeting with the
British (or perhaps because of it) he was appointed, with Benjamin Franklin and Edward
Rutledge, as one of a committee of three to meet with the British.84
The three Americans met with Lord Howe at Billopp House on Staten Island. Even
though it belonged to the Loyalist Christopher Billopp, the Hessians who had been quartered
there had treated it so poorly that for the meeting the floor of the parlor was spread with moss
and green branches—to dampen the smell. Howe believed that the great majority of
Americans were loyal and that the Patriots were a minority. After discussing his affections for
America and Massachusetts, Howe observed that the Declaration of Independence had
“changed the ground”. If it was given up, pardons could be issued and re-union with Britain on
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terms advantageous to the colonies as well as Britain could be made. Howe added that he could
not confer with them as members of Congress, as he could not acknowledge that body, but
merely as “gentlemen of great ability and influence”, as private persons, and as British subjects.
Adams replied that he could be considered in any character except as a British subject.85
This was the sticking point. Independence truly had changed everything. Offers and
plans which a few months earlier might have diffused the crisis were now inadequate. Having
crossed the “Rubicon” of Independence, having symbolically executed the king, having had
their love and loyalty for the King and the Empire turn to hate and rejection, a voluntary return
to being subjects was impossible. Only crushing military defeat could possibly convince Patriot
Americans to accept the King as their ruler, and even then their acceptance would be grudging.
As events on Long Island showed, even the taking of solemn oaths signified for most only a
bowing to necessity, not a change of heart. Colonel Gardiner, for example, worked for the
British and forced people to take the loyalty oath, but when the opportunity arose fled Long
Island and again served the Patriot cause. Thus, negotiations which did not acknowledge
American independence were useless for the Americans. Negotiations which recognized
American independence were unacceptable to the British.
After three hours of discussion, Howe and the delegates departed. Negotiation was
impossible as long as the colonies did not give up independence. The Americans returned to
their lines. There was nothing left to do but fight.86
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One other thing should be noted here. The Howe brothers wore two hats: they were
high-ranking military officers trying to win a war and they were also Peace Commissioners. They
held the sword in one hand and the olive branch in another. It is difficult to both fight a war and
try to make peace. Efforts to win a war militarily might doom or poison the peace; conversely,
efforts to negotiate a peaceful end to a conflict could harm efforts to fight it. For example,
destroying cities and farms might hasten military victory, but poison relations between victors
and losers for years—or even harden resistance. And the pause to seek peace permitted
Washington to move much of his army north from the city, making the American evacuation of
Manhattan Island easier. 87
General Clinton had proposed seizing part of the modern Bronx to block Washington’s
retreat, but was overruled. With the prospect of peace gone after the Billopps Conference, the
invasion of Manhattan was ordered. On September 15, British troops landed at Kips Bay (near
where the United Nations is now located). The raw recruits guarding the bay broke;
Washington tried to rally the troops, but failed. In the confusion of the battle, Washington was
nearly captured or killed. A few days later, there was a major skirmish in a hilly part of
Manhattan where much of the American army was located. This skirmish became known as the
Battle of Harlem Heights; much of it was fought on or near the present-day site of Columbia
University. The British were pushed back here, giving the Americans a morale boost. Despite
this, Washington’s army soon retreated from Manhattan to the relative safety of the mainland.
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However, a large force was left in Fort Washington in North Manhattan, overlooking the
Hudson. Their intent was to block the Hudson, but the fort was eventually captured.88
On September 16, 1776 General James Robertson was made military commandant of
New York City. Robertson was an experienced staff officer who had lived in the city several
years earlier and had recommended that the invasion begin in Staten Island, not Gravesend.
The city he took over had been reduced by the flight of much of its populace to a population of
about 400 or 500 people, mostly Loyalists, but thousands of Loyalists would stream in during
the next few months and throughout the war. 89 As the historian Judith L. Van Buskirk
described it, the influx of Loyalist refugees would continue throughout the war, “with surges of
new Tories arriving whenever the British army withdrew its protection from an area: New
Jersey in 1777; Philadelphia in 1778; Rhode Island on 1779; Virginia in 1779, 1780, and 1781;
South Carolina in 1781.”90 But on that September day, those who remained in New York City
“behaved in all respects, women as well as men, like overjoyed Bedlamites.” At the Fort, a
woman pulled down the rebel flag and hoisted a British flag, “after trampling the other [the
rebel standard] under Foot with the most contemptuous indignation.”91 Manhattan was British
again. Five days after taking his position as commandant, Robertson was faced with a major
challenge: the Great Fire.
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While small by the standards of London, New York, with its excellent port and strategic
location, was clearly a great prize in a war. Its buildings could house many British officers,
soldiers, and refugees in relative comfort. Hence, the possibility of destroying New York had
long been discussed—by Americans. Nathaniel Greene, Joseph Reed, and even New Yorker
John Jay all urged that the city be demolished if it had to be abandoned. After all, as Greene
argued, with some justice, “Two Thirds of the Property of the City of New York and the
Subburbs belongs to Tories.” 92 British control of the city, with all the advantages it would give
them, could not be contemplated, so it was argued that the city should be destroyed before
they could occupy it. Beyond strategic necessity, the historian Philip Ranlet suggests a darker
motive for the destruction of New York City was possessed by some Americans. New York and
New England had long distrusted each other, and been rivals economically. Both had
encroached on and claimed each other’s territories during the colonial era. Even today, echoes
of this enmity can be seen in the intense rivalry between the fans of the Boston Red Sox and
the rather ironically named New York Yankees. The strong possibility exists that the Great Fire
was set by Americans, most likely New Englanders, acting either with or without orders. 93

Ambrose Serle, Lord Howe’s secretary, described the fire as follows:
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This Morning about 1 o’clock, we were alarmed with the Appearance of a Fire in
the Town: and presently after it burst out, at several Places, into a most
tremendous Blaze. The Wind was rather strong, which increased the Rapidity of
the Flames: & these extended in a Line for almost the Length of a mile,
consuming onward from the East River, for several hours together, to the North
River up to St. Paul’s Church, which wonderfully escaped, while Trinity
Church…was utterly destroyed.94

Serle blamed “Some Rebels, who lurked about the Town,” and stated that several of
them had been caught with matches and “Fire-balls” upon them. In addition, Serle reported
that one man was detected in the act and was “knocked down by a Grenadier & thrown into
the Flames for his Reward.” Another person was found cutting handles off of water-buckets to
prevent their use; he was reportedly hanged by sailors.One of the people arrested with
matches and £500 on his person was Captain Fellows, a New Englander. He became the chief
suspect. On the smoky morning of September 21, Serle recorded that “The New England People
are maintained to be at the Bottom of this Plot, which they have long since threatened to put
into Execution.”95 The Mercury commented that “the New-England Incendiaries…had long
threatened the Performance of this villainous Deed; and this is the best return that the People
of Property in this City, who have espoused their Cause, are to expect for their heedless
Credulity.”96
Smith reported that about one thousand houses, or one-quarter of the City had been
consumed. Robertson agreed that about a quarter of the city had been destroyed.97 Patriots
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blamed the British for the fire, or thought it was an accident. 98 Despite the illogic of blaming
the British, the Patriots successfully managed to pin the blame on the British in the public mind.
The cause of the New York fire has long been disputed by many historians. There was no
conclusive trial, and all suspects pled innocence. Amazingly, many of those arrested were soon
released. No investigation was launched until Commander-in-Chief Guy Carleton launched one
in October, 1783. This was only weeks before the final evacuation, and shows an amazing
slackness by the British authorities. The most recent historian to examine the question of
responsibility for the blaze, Benjamin Carp, suggest that Washington ordered the burning
surreptitiously, or that it was set by “rogue elements” from New England.99
While Robertson may have been slack in investigating the fire, no complaints can be
made about his fighting of the fire. Two regiments were sent into the city to act as guards on
the streets and to prevent looting. Public buildings were also guarded. As Smith mentioned,
Robertson saved several suspected incendiaries from being killed by a furious mob. The royal
warehouses and magazine was threatened by flames, and Robertson diverted fire engines to
save the valuable supplies. In the process, his own home was destroyed. Howe and Tryon both
informed the ministry that Robertson’s efforts had prevented the total destruction of the
city.100

Following the Battle of Harlem Heights and the fire, the two armies traveled by parallel
paths through Westchester. Washington’s army followed the Bronx River through western
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Westchester north, leaving Manhattan Island on October 16. The British had attempted to cut
off the American retreat by landing at Throg’s Neck in southeast Westchester Oct 12, thinking it
was a peninsula. Unfortunately for them, it turned out to be marshy, often an island, and the
Americans had destroyed the bridge to more solid ground. Regrouping, a few days later the
British landed troops at Pell’s Point a few miles north, then marched north, hugging the coast.
They marched through New Rochelle and Mamaroneck on the Sound, and then turned north to
White Plains, arriving on October 28. Washington’s troops were waiting for them, having
established themselves on a hill overlooking the town.101
The Convention in the meantime, was “a government in flight.” The Fourth Provincial
Congress had met in White Plains because of its relative safety from the British; the Asia and
other British warships had been a constant threat, and at the end of June, the British invasion
fleet had appeared. It was in White Plains that the Congress had declared New York
independent and then renamed itself the Convention of Representatives of New York. Now, the
British were marching on White Plains. The Convention moved about 25 miles north to Fishkill
(on the east bank of the Hudson in Dutchess County), and then later about another 25 miles
north to Kingston (on the west bank of the Hudson in Ulster County). It governed the state in
“abandoned churches and in private homes”, and its “members burdened the ablest among
them with staggering loads.” Somehow, despite all this, the Convention managed to produce a
Constitution. This constitution steered away from both democratic and conservative extremes.
It declared the people were the source of power, and enlarged the Assembly to over sixty, its
membership distributed among the counties in a manner roughly proportional to population.
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However, the legislature also had a second house which could delay or even halt popularly
desired legislation, and it excluded many of the lower classes—farm laborers, urban poor—
from the franchise. Kingston was the final location of the Convention—but it would not prove
to be the end of the travels of the government. The legislature of the state under the new
constitution would also have to flee.102
“Westchester County”, as historian Sung Bok Kim notes, “became a major theatre of
war, as it remained throughout the entire conflict, with devastating consequences for the lives
of its people.” Soldiers—from both sides—destroyed and trampled fields, cut down trees,
destroyed houses, and pulled down fences to use as firewood. Noncombatants and their goods
were attacked and stolen by roving bands of regulars and irregulars. Livestock and other goods
were “impressed” in return for certificates. The uncertainty of payment on these certificates
made the line between plundering and impressment hazy. And everyone, Patriots, Loyalists,
and non-aligned all suffered from these actions.103
As the British marched towards White Plains, the people along the march were
plundered and, as one correspondent reported, not even women’s and children’s clothing was
immune. While laying especial blame on the Hessians, British colonel Stephen Kemble noted
“No wonder if the country people refused to join us.”104 New Englanders, again showing the
enmity to New Yorkers noted above, plundered Westchester homes, refused protection to
distressed Westchester residents after the Battle of White Plains, and needlessly burned during
the battle the county courthouse and most of the homes. The generals of both sides issued
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orders against these actions, but they were difficult to enforce, especially for the Americans,
whose troops were new and lacked discipline. 105
On October 28, the British attacked the American forces on Chatterton’s Hill overlooking
White Plains. The British drove them from the hill, but suffered heavy casualties in what
became known as the Battle of White Plains. This may have discouraged Howe from pressing
the attack, for Washington’s army again slipped away. Howe lacked accurate maps, and
according to British historian Piers MacKesy “was convinced that Washington did not intend to
stand and fight.” 106 Seeing no point in chasing him north, Howe headed south and attacked
Fort Washington (on the isle of Manhattan) on November 16. The fort, which the Americans
had thought invulnerable, was taken with over 3000 men. Fort Lee, on the opposite side of the
Hudson in New Jersey, was quickly abandoned. Leaving a few thousand troops to guard the
Highlands (the area straddling the Hudson from approximately Stony Point to Newburgh),
Washington headed south through New Jersey, as the British followed.107
With the capture of Fort Washington, Manhattan was firmly in British hands. Long
Island, Staten Island and Manhattan would remain British for the duration of the war. The
modern Bronx and part of what is now southern Westchester were all in British hands, with a
no man’s land called the Neutral Ground between them. It seemed certain that much of New
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Jersey would soon follow. This would, at the very least, provide a large area of forests and
farms to feed and fuel the British, Hessians, and the people of southern New York. Within six
weeks of the fall of Fort Washington, these hopes were dashed. In a few months, the strategic
situation would alter immensely. This would lead to a new strategy which would lead to an
abortive British attempt to restore civilian government in New York.
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Chapter IV
The New Strategy
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In 1778, the French entered the war on the American side. The British loss at
Saratoga, the product of some questionable British decisions, was a major factor in
French entry. French entry would alter the entire nature of the war for Britain from a
colonial rebellion to a world war. The main front of the war shifted from the colonies to
the West Indies. Peace with the colonies was now a priority. Much of this chapter will
deal with the Carlisle Commission, which was sent to negotiate a peace. While their
mission was a failure, a new strategy would arise in part from this mission. This new
strategy would bring a new governor to New York, tasked with restoring civilian
government to the British-controlled portion of the province.

I

In late 1776, General Howe’s troops occupied much of New Jersey as a result of their
pursuit of Washington’s retreating army. Howe, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in
America, hoped to hold eastern New Jersey, and proposed that a large number of troops be
quartered there, “without which we should be under much difficulty to find Covering, Forage, &
Supplies of fresh Provisions for the Army.”1 Howe was quite correct in his assessment, as the
loss of eastern New Jersey after Trenton and Princeton resulted in an inability to use this area
to help provision the Army. The inability to freely forage in the area caused great difficulties on
Long Island and Staten Island, as their wood, hay, and other resources were taxed to the
1
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maximum.2 Philadelphia was not at the time Howe’s main strategic objective, nor had its
capture been a major goal of British policy. Indeed, the reason Howe’s army was deep in New
Jersey in late November 1776 was because the decisive defeat of the main rebel army was the
British commander’s goal, and Washington had rather unexpectedly retreated in the direction
of Philadelphia, rather than towards New England.3 The British had long considered New
England to be the heart of the rebellion, and crushing (or at least isolating) the region
economically and geographically was the main goal of British strategy. Controlling the Hudson
and cutting New England off from the rest of the colonies was an important element of British
policy.4 As a bonus, such a strategy would bring the bulk of the province of New York back
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under the rule of the Crown—and quite possibly would result in the destruction of
Washington’s army as well.
Howe’s November 30 letter to Germain was in accord with this strategy. Howe
proposed that in 1777, at least ten thousand men should move on Albany, while a defensive
army of eight thousand would cover New Jersey and keep Washington “in check, by giving a
Jealousy to Philadelphia”. An army of ten thousand based in Rhode Island was to advance on
Boston and if possible take it. An attack on Philadelphia was proposed for the autumn,
depending on the success of the above operations. These plans would require the provision of
additional troops.5 These plans also clearly indicate that New England was the main objective of
Howe’s plans—Philadelphia was a secondary objective, to be attacked only if the attempt to
isolate and attack New England had been a success.
In the weeks that followed the November 30 communication, much changed. Howe had
pursued the American army across New Jersey, and found himself at the gates of Philadelphia,
stymied only by the Delaware River and a lack of boats to cross it. New Jersey had been
restored to the Crown, and the people of New Jersey were formally declaring their loyalty to
the King, as were many Pennsylvanians. While lacking the strategic virtues of New York
(especially if one’s aim was to isolate and/or crush New England), Philadelphia was arguably the
most important city in the colonies, and the home of Congress. If the rebels could be said to
have a capital, Philadelphia was it. Howe had failed to gain a decisive defeat at Long Island and
the battles that followed—perhaps one could be gained here? The apparent change in attitude
of many Americans, evidenced by their desire to seek pardons, was decisive:
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…the Opinions of the People being much changed in Pennsylvania, and their
Minds in general, from the late Progress of the Army disposed to Peace, in which
sentiment they would be confirmed by our getting Possession of Philadelphia, I
am from this consideration fully persuaded the principal Army should act
offensively on that side where the Enemy’s chief strength will certainly be
collected.6

In short, Howe proposed to seize Philadelphia, with the hope that the capture of that
city would be the decisive blow, at the least ending resistance in the Middle Colonies. This was
a break with the main outline of prior British strategy.7 As discussed above, the British had
planned to isolate New England by sending one army up the Hudson while another descended
from Canada. As the plan developed, a third force was to attack from the West against Fort
Stanwix on the Mohawk (the present site of Rome, New York).
Nonetheless, had Howe been a more aggressive general, he might have found a way to
cross the Delaware and attack Philadelphia in late December or January. Indeed, he hoped to
cross the Delaware once it was completely frozen. Such an attack may very well have had the
demoralizing effects for the Americans Howe thought it would have. But before that could
happen, Washington attacked Trenton and Princeton. The reverses they suffered in these two
battles made the British pull back their forces. This pull-back resulted in the abandonment of
most of New Jersey except Brunswick and Amboy. Many who had taken the King’s pardon now
submitted to Congress. The Loyalist units that were forming dispersed.8
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Nonetheless, Howe did not abandon the idea of attacking Philadelphia, and hopefully
gaining the decisive victory and destruction of Washington’s army which he had missed so far.
Such a defeat could end the war, or at the least regain the Middle Colonies for the Crown. Of
course, it must be noted that Washington would no doubt have opposed a move up the
Hudson, providing Howe with plenty of opportunities to destroy Washington’s army in a
decisive battle. (Conversely, the geography of the area, discussed further below, might have
provided Washington with opportunities to defeat isolated portions of Howe’s army). A move
up the Hudson also would have fit in with prior strategy, and supported the planned invasion
from Canada. But Howe decided on the Philadelphia campaign for 1777.
Communications across the Atlantic were slow, and orders from London were often out
of date even before they were issued. Trans-Atlantic official correspondence was generally
numbered, and many a letter began with a recounting of what letters had been received—and
usually, one or two numbers are conspicuous by their absence. The vagaries of wind, storm,
and (especially after French entry) enemy action would result in delays, lost letters, and letters
arriving out of sequence. Travel times were often quite long, for the same reason (not
surprisingly, since communications could not move faster than the means of transportation). As
an example, Ambrose Serle, secretary to Lord Howe, left for America with Howe on board a
British man-of war on May 11, 1776. He arrived in Halifax on June 23, sailed out the same day
from Halifax, first sighted “the Eastern Part of Long Island” on July 6, and finally arrived at their
destination, Staten Island, on July 12. Here they were “saluted by all the Ships of War in the
Harbour, by the Cheers of the Sailors all along the Ships, and by those of the Soldiers on the
Shore.” The wind had been unfavorable during much of the journey, and they had been
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plagued by fog and rain. They had also seen some icebergs.9 This summer journey—a journey of
a warship carrying the chief Admiral for the war (and a Peace Commissioner, as well), took two
months. And summer was generally considered good sailing weather. These stories could be
multiplied many times.10 Travel and communication across the Atlantic was slow and often
dangerous, either because of nature or man.
Partially as a result of the difficulty and slowness of trans-Atlantic communications,
Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for the American Colonies and de facto secretary of
war for the American war (of whom more shortly), had limited control over the actions of his
generals. While Germain tried to give the war some direction, either through orders, or more
usually, suggestions, much of the conduct of the war was of necessity in the hands of the
commanders in America. Howe decided on the attack on Philadelphia without consulting
Germain, though he did inform Britain of his plan, and did receive Germain’s approval.11
Many believe that Germain should have exerted more control and direction over the
war. Indeed, many views of Germain have been extremely unfavorable. For example, the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century soldier and author General F.V Greene called Germain
“probably the most incompetent official that ever held an important post at a critical moment.”
Sir John Fortescue, editor of George III’s papers, called him a “deplorable Secretary of State.”12
Alan Valentine, his biographer, relates that “History has tended to accept the harsher verdicts
[of his contemporaries], since his critics were more eloquent than his defenders.” As for
himself, Valentine reports that he could not bring himself to like Germain (a failure to like one’s
9
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subject is usually disastrous for a biographer), and adds that “In the effort to avoid doing him
injustice, I have searched for every episode and interpretation that could be turned in his
favour, but though I have found enough to temper my distaste I have not found enough to
remove it”. 13
McKesy dismisses Greene’s judgment as based on ignorance, unfamiliarity with the
workings of eighteenth century government, and reading Lord Shelburne and other “malicious”
writings too credulously. He notes that, while impatient of delays and frustrations, Germain
was well-liked by his Under-Secretaries. He was considered a good administrator and
“incapable of despondency.” Optimism, good administrative skills, general agreement with the
government on war goals, and even impatience (if translated into speeding action) are all good
qualities in a war leader, as McKesy notes.14 Under the circumstances of the Revolutionary War,
a good administrator who agreed with the King on policy to the colonies and was incapable of
despair seems like a very good choice for a de facto war minister. Indeed, not even Yorktown
seems to have shaken Germain’s optimism, and his papers contain plans for limited offensive
actions in America in 1782.15 Much of the poor contemporary opinion of him probably is a
result of people seeking to lay blame for the loss of America—as well as resulting from older
enmities arising from events described below. However, in the planning for 1777, Germain did
not exercise his position and authority as forcibly as he should have. Orders to ensure that
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Howe would have enough troops on the lower Hudson to support Burgoyne (or to cancel the
Philadelphia expedition entirely) should have been issued. It is possible that events in his
earlier life may have made Germain reluctant to issue the necessary orders to the Howes.16
Lord Germain was born George Sackville on June 26, 1716, the third son of the seventh
Earl and first Duke of Dorset. His family was one of the oldest and most powerful in England.
Herbrand de Sackville had entered England with William the Conqueror. The family had
prospered as Barons of Buckhurst, and been granted an earldom (the third highest rank of the
English peerage) and family seat at Knole by Queen Elizabeth. The seat at Knole included six
quadrangles, known by names such as the Stone Court or Green Court, and 365 rooms. As a
young man, he seemed both talented and “steady”, and was the favorite of his father and the
Lady Betty Germain (née Lady Elizabeth Berkeley) a close friend of the family who had an
apartment at Knole. He had many useful family connections; he was related by blood to Tudors,
Howards, and other famous families, and he had important Scottish connections through his
mother. In a country where birth, family and connections were vital to obtaining high and
important positions (and for all intents and purposes a prerequisite for a high military
command), George Sackville was well-situated to have an outstanding career.17
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Sackville attended Trinity College in Dublin (his father had been made the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland), and began a military career, punctuated by accompanying his father on a
diplomatic assignment to Paris in the 1730s. He served in the War of the Austrian Succession,
known in America as King George’s War (1740-1748). In 1743, he accompanied George II, the
last ruling British monarch to go to battle, on an expedition against the French, where he is said
to have distinguished himself. He became George II’s aide-de-camp. In 1745, Sackville was
seriously wounded, shot in the breast at the Battle of Fontenoy. When he fell, he was carried
into the tent of the French king. Recovery from the wound took a long time. In his next
command, he helped oppose the Jacobite rebellion of 1745, pursuing the remnants of the
Scottish supporters of “Bonnie Prince Charlie” after the Battle of Culloden. In between his
military activities, he pursued a career in Parliament, as the member for Dover (his father was
Warden of the Cinque Ports, of which Dover was one). 18
His star was in the ascendant until August of 1759 and the Battle of Minden. The events
of this battle would haunt his career for many years, give him life-long enemies, and may very
well have had a negative impact on his management of the American Revolution. Minden was
one of the most important battles of the Seven Years War. It was a major defeat of the French
by British and allied forces. Minden is located in modern northwestern Germany. The French
had charged the allies several times, but been repulsed. The allied army then attacked and
threw the French into confusion. The allied cavalry, under the command of George Sackville,
had not yet been committed to battle. Prince Ferdinand, the allied commander, sent several
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messengers to Sackville, ordering an immediate attack. Such an attack could have turned the
French defeat into a total rout. But, for some mysterious reason, the cavalry attack did not
come. After a delay of over a half hour, the cavalry finally moved—but by then the French had
retreated behind the fortifications of Minden. Recriminations flew, and Sackville was told
bluntly by Ferdinand that he had disobeyed orders, and that the failure to win a great victory
was his fault. Sackville argued that he had received conflicting or confusing orders, that he had
done nothing wrong, and eventually insisted on a court martial to clear his name. By the time it
was held in 1760, public opinion had already convicted him of disobedience, and given the
reason as cowardice. The actual court-martial declared him guilty of disobeying orders. His
sentence was to be declared unfit to serve the King in any military capacity. George II forbid his
appearance at court and had the verdict read to every regiment.19
Sackville slowly recovered from his disgrace through minor posts and a new King,
George III. In 1770, Lady Betty Germain died and bequeathed her estates to Sackville—if he
would take her name. Perhaps hoping for a fresh start, he took the name and by an Act of
Parliament he became Lord George Germain.20
On American affairs, Germain held positions similar to the king’s: America should
acknowledge Parliament’s right to legislate in all cases; once that occurred, then the complaints
of the Americans could be dealt with.21 In November of 1775, Germain joined Lord North’s
government as Secretary of State for the Colonies (as the position was formally known—many
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referred to it as the Secretary for America or for the American Colonies).22 In this position, he
would function as a de facto Secretary of War until after Yorktown. His letters reveal optimism
about the war effort that at times seems to border on Pollyanism. This is historical hindsight—
much of the information he received concerning America came from questionable intelligence.
He would not be the last statesman to act on information that at the time seemed correct and
believable, but later turned out to be incorrect.
Germain seems a curious choice for a position which would require him to run a war—
many despised him, and thought that he was a coward—and he had been declared unfit to
serve the King in a military capacity. But he held views similar to George III, and was a “King’s
man.” Germain was part of the old Leicester House faction which had coalesced around the
future George III during the reign of George II. Such factions arising around the heir to the
throne were a common feature of the Hanoverian monarchy. It is possible that the Minden case
was pursued so vehemently against Germain because of his membership in the Leicester House
faction.23
George III, the new king, slowly helped the rehabilitation of his faction-member. In any
event, while Germain was a member of the King’s faction, Germain was not as well-connected
as the Howes, who were favorites of the King (and, as discussed above, probably relatives).
Historian Robert Middlekauff argues that Germain, who was still under suspicion of cowardice
by many, and had been prohibited by court-martial from further military service, was
uncomfortable in the new government and in issuing orders to the Howes. In any event, he did
22
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not order Howe to abandon his plans for Philadelphia, or to ensure that he could cooperate
with the invasion from Canada that Germain soon approved. Germain’s failure to more
forcefully insist on this (or to even cancel the Philadelphia expedition), combined with the
unavoidable necessity of giving commanders in the Atlantic much free rein (because of the
slowness and difficulty of communication), were a major cause of the British defeat at Saratoga.
The mysterious events of Minden appear to have cast a long shadow and affected the waging of
the Revolutionary War.24

At about the same time General Howe was planning an attack on Philadelphia, Germain
and the King approved a plan by General John Burgoyne to take Albany through an invasion
from Canada down the Lake Champlain route. It would be supported by an attack by Lt. Colonel
Barry St. Leger from Oswego down the Mohawk. The two “prongs” of the attack would meet at
Albany. Burgoyne’s plan did not include a northward march from New York, and Germain failed
to tell Howe of Burgoyne’s mission early enough for it to affect his planning. Burgoyne claimed
his plan would isolate New England, though it is difficult to see how possessing Albany alone
would be enough to do that. New York City was militarily “the only vital city in the colonies.”25
In addition to its magnificent harbor and its position at the mouth of the Hudson, it also
dominated land communications between New England and the rest of the colonies. The main
land transportation routes between New England and the other colonies ran in peacetime from
Trenton and Princeton through New York, Kingsbridge, New Rochelle, and Connecticut.
24
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Possession of New York City by the British had pushed the main transportation route back to a
hilly area known as the Highlands. These Highlands stretched along the Hudson between about
Stony Point and Newburgh. One route stretched through Stony Point, while another route
existed further north at Fishkill, north of Newburgh. The loss of New York City meant that
American land-based trade, troop movement, and communications went through the two
crossings in the Highlands. If a British army were to gain possession of the Highlands, and thus,
the vital crossings at Stony Point and Fishkill, New England would be effectively isolated by that
army’s presence and by British naval blockade, even if Albany remained in American hands. The
Americans would make many forts to guard the Highlands. Militarily, the Highlands were as
vital to the Americans as New York was to the British.26 Despite the many good reasons for a
major armed thrust up the Hudson, and the fact that a southwards attack was to occur, the
northward attack was not ordered. The southern prong that had long been part of British
strategy, the march up the Hudson by a sizable army out of New York, thus never occurred, as
these forces were diverted to the attack on Philadelphia. Failure—a failure which this author
believes was caused in part by Howe’s decision to head south, not north—followed.
The western prong of the attack, under St. Leger, was blunted at Oriskany in August,
1777. While unfortunate for the British, the failure of this attack was not fatal to their plans. St.
Leger’s expedition, whose objective was Fort Stanwix (located on the Mohawk in modern
Rome, NY), was mainly a diversion. The northern prong, under General Burgoyne, headed
south from Canada in June of 1777, and had some initial victories, taking the important fort of
Ticonderoga in early July. Then they ran into supply difficulties, as well as the difficulties of
26
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moving a large army through the woods of northern New York, as a large army of Continentals
and New York and New England militia gathered near Albany. The Americans wrecked bridges
and dropped trees across their path, and defeated a large British detachment seeking supplies
near Bennington, Vermont (the actual Battle of Bennington was fought in what is now New
York State). Burgoyne’s army was finally stymied in September by a strong defensive position in
the vicinity of Saratoga, about 20 miles north of Albany, prepared by the Polish engineer
Thaddeus Kosciusko.
To the south, Howe’s army had traveled via ship to the Philadelphia region (landing at
Head of Elk on the Chesapeake) and taken Philadelphia in late September—but by taking the
sea route, he had left much of New Jersey still in American hands. Washington’s army, while it
failed to keep the British from taking Philadelphia, was still intact. Hence, Howe’s main army
was unable to send detachments north or otherwise support Burgoyne’s army. If a sizable
British force could have traveled north up the Hudson, it would possibly have resulted in the
American army at Saratoga sending troops south to meet it, or units heading towards Saratoga
turning instead to face the northbound threat. Either result would have made things easier for
Burgoyne and given him more options.
With Howe in Pennsylvania, General Sir Henry Clinton was left in charge in New York
City. Finally receiving some long-expected reinforcements, he led a small force north to aid
Burgoyne in early October.27 He seized much of the Highlands (and high praise from Germain),28
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but his actions were unable to aid Burgoyne. Kingston, north of the Highlands on the Hudson,
was attacked by units under Clinton’s command on October 15. This resulted in the first session
of independent New York’s legislature under the new constitution swiftly ending after being in
session barely a month, as the representatives fled the approaching troops. Two thousand men
under Clinton’s command headed up the Hudson in transports, but the pilots refused to go
closer to Albany than about 45 miles away, halting at Livingston Manor on the seventeenth of
October. American forces (numbering about 5000) posted on the Hudson made any closer
approach dangerous. Further movement north would have been futile anyway, for Burgoyne
had surrendered on the seventeenth, though Clinton’s forces were unaware of this as they had
no communication with Burgoyne. Burgoyne had lost the Battle of Freeman’s Farm in
September. Another battle, the Battle of Bemis Heights, was fought in early October. It was at
this battle that Benedict Arnold (or his leg at least) won undying fame. This second battle
resulted in the over-running of important British positions, and Burgoyne, short on troops and
supplies, retreated north. His retreat failed, and Burgoyne was forced to surrender on Oct. 17,
1777.29

29

McKesy, 139-40, 144; Willcox 187-188; Countryman, 161-162. The disruption of the legislature’s meeting was
not planned but a fortuitous (for the British) byproduct of the military situation. This disruption had some
interesting consequences. For months, the state lacked a regular government. Some members of the legislature
met in what Countryman calls “an utterly irregular” Convention of the Members of the Senate and Assembly.
When the legislature finally reformed itself and met in early 1778, the question of the legitimacy of the measures
the Convention had passed became a matter of important debate. See Countryman, “Consolidating Power”, 645.
Arnold led many of the assaults at Bemis Heights, and was wounded in the leg. Since his later treason for all
intents disqualified him from having a monument at Saratoga, a monument to the wounded leg of an unnamed
American general who could only have been Arnold was eventually erected near the site where Arnold was
wounded. It may still be seen today.

198

Clinton was soon forced to abandon the Highlands as many of his units were ordered to
Philadelphia.30 The British thus abandoned without a fight the vital crossings which could have
effectively isolated New England. The positions, which they had gained at relatively little cost,
were sacrificed to the needs of the misguided Philadelphia expedition. Indeed, arguably
Burgoyne’s army had been sacrificed to the needs of the Philadelphia expedition. In later years,
the British would expend much blood, treasure, and effort to regain the control of the
Highlands that they had relinquished in 1777. In 1779, they would send a small expedition to
gain control, only to be rebuffed by Mad Anthony Wayne at the Battle of Stony Point. In 1780,
they would offer Benedict Arnold thousands of pounds for West Point, the key to the
Highlands. Major Andre, a well-liked young officer involved in the negotiations with Arnold,
died as a result of his involvement in these negotiations, captured and hanged by the
Americans as a spy. And as will be discussed below, Howe evacuated Philadelphia in June of
1778.
Saratoga is generally considered one of the most decisive battles (or campaigns) in
history,31 and rightly so. The Americans had destroyed an entire British army, and (with no
small help from the questionable decision by Howe to attack Philadelphia instead of the
Highlands) thwarted an attempt to split New England from the rest of the colonies. The victory
seemed proof that “the American country with its armed population might be beyond the
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power of Britain to reconquer with any force which she could raise and sustain in America.”32
The battle raised American morale, as Howe informed Germain in a private communication:

In consequence of the Misfortune that has fallen upon the troops under
Lieutenant General Burgoyne’s Command, a considerable Reinforcement from
General Gate’s Corps has joined General Washington. The Hopes of the People
at large, as well as of the Rebel army, are greatly raised from this Event, and I am
free to own I do not apprehend a successful terminate to the War from any
Advantages His Majesty’s Troops can gain while the Enemy is able to avoid, or
unwilling to hazard, a decisive Action, which might reduce the Leaders…to make
an overture for Peace…unless a respectable Addition to the Army is sent from
Europe… 33

Most importantly, the American victory assured France—and eventually other powers—
that the Americans had a chance to win their independence. The Americans had shown they
could not only defeat British troops (Trenton and Princeton had already demonstrated that),
but destroy British armies. The possibility that they could actually defeat the British and win
their independence seemed much greater after Saratoga. The victory helped convince the
French that entering the war on the American side would probably not be a waste of blood and
treasure. There was a good chance that France would be able to reduce British power by
helping the colonies leave the Empire—and the war offered a chance for France to gain parts of
Britain’s empire. France’s war aims were to at least partially to overturn the results of the Great
War for the Empire, and regain lost parts of her empire and markets—but out of deference to
her American allies, she would forego her claim on Canada, and seek gains in the West Indies,

32

McKesy, 141.
Howe to Germain, Philadelphia, Nov. 30, 1777. Sackville-Germain Papers, Vol. 6, Clement Library.
On Oct 22, Howe had requested that he be allowed to resign, as “…little attention given to my Recommendations
since the commencement of my Command.” Sackville-Germain Papers, Vol. 6, Clement Library.
33

200

Africa, and India. When war between France and Britain broke out in the spring of 1778, the
North American colonies became a secondary front—control of the sugar-rich islands of the
West Indies became the most important objective of the war for both the French and the
British, and both sides sent many soldiers and ships there.34
The news of Saratoga prompted a reappraisal of British strategy, in anticipation of
French entry into the war. The wealth the Caribbean islands produced was vast. The islands
accounted for perhaps a third of France’s overseas trade. As for Britain, annually 300 ships
loaded with sugar and rum entered into London from the West Indies; and, while an important
port, London was just one of several British ports where Caribbean goods arrived. There was a
general belief the British economy and finances depended on the West Indies; likewise, it was
believed that capturing the French islands would cripple the French economy.35 Capturing the
French West Indies and denying their trade to the rebelling colonies would also put an
economic vise on the Americans, possibly forcing them back into the British fold. And even if
that did not work, conquering the French West Indies would be good compensation for the loss
of America.36
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On March 13, 1778, France informed the British government of France’s Treaty of
Commerce with America, signed on February 6, 1778. Such a treaty was tantamount to
recognition of American independence. A treaty of alliance had also been signed on Feb. 6, but
the British were not formally informed of that treaty. The British ambassador was recalled. It
would be a few weeks before actual fighting began, and before that occurred a peace mission
to the Americans had begun, as will be discussed shortly.37
French entry into the war changed everything. The war was transformed from a colonial
rebellion into a world war. Britain had to defend its home islands, defend its Caribbean
possessions while trying to seize French ones, and defend possessions throughout the world. As
the war developed, Spain and the Netherlands joined the French as enemies of Britain, and the
entry of Russia as an enemy was a serious possibility. Fighting occurred not just in North
America and the Caribbean, but in India, Gibraltar, and other areas. The home islands had to be
protected against a serious threat of attack; in 1779, a joint Spanish-French “second armada”
attempted an invasion of England, but supply and other considerations ended it before any
landfall was made.38
With the concurrence of the King,39 a decision was made to make the West Indies the
main front of the war, and to assure that enough ships were available in home waters to guard
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against a possible French invasion. Ending the war with America in order to concentrate against
the French was considered desirable—so desirable that the King even contemplated
abandoning the rebellious colonies entirely. On March 21, Peace Commissioners were ordered
to be sent to New York at once—and if they determined that there was no prospect of success,
that city might have to be evacuated. The decision was made to abandon Philadelphia, and to
send the troops there to New York or Halifax. Under the circumstances, as the King put it, it was
“a joke to think of keeping Pensilvania” now that France was in the war. The abandonment of
Philadelphia would reduce British control in mainland North America to Canada, Florida, the
New York City region, and part of Rhode Island—mainly Newport on the island of Rhode Island.
Indeed, the possibility of abandoning all footholds in the rebelling colonies was seriously
mooted.40
Ships and men were now needed everywhere, from the Channel to the Philippines, from
Nicaragua to the Mediterranean. The number of men and ships available to Britain for the
North American front, now at best the secondary front of the war (the historians Milton Klein
and Ronald W. Howard even called it “in some respects, a sideshow”) was now limited. If
offensive operations were to be attempted at all in North America, they would have to be
operations that could prove successful under the new circumstances. Defeating the Americans
would have to be pursued at the least possible cost. Both conciliation and the supplementing of
Commerce with America] by the French Ambassador is certainly equivalent to a declaration [of war] …what occurs
now is to fix what numbers are necessary to defend New York, Rhode Island, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas, it is a
joke to think of keeping Pensilvania for we must form from the Army now in America a corps sufficient to attack
the French Islands and two or three thousand men ought to be employed with the Fleet to destroy the Ports and
Warfs of the Rebels.” GIII, 2243, King to Lord North, March 23 or 13, 1778.
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the British and Hessian troops with Loyalist troops began to be emphasized. There were still
presumed to be many Loyalists in the rebelling colonies, perhaps a majority of the populace,
and they would add new strength to the attempt to achieve peace. Loyalist troops would be
cheaper than British regulars.41
Before the 1777 Christmas recess, North promised Parliament that new peace proposals
would be introduced. North, Eden, and several other officers drafted the proposals, which were
passed by “a silent and gloomy House” in February. Except for trade regulation, Britain would
renounce the right to tax the colonies, and the Commissioners—including Eden—were soon
appointed with very broad powers. Only one thing was off the table--independence. 42
A new strategy for fighting the war was eventually decided upon. The main source of
this war-fighting strategy was rather ironic—the Carlisle Commission. The Carlisle Commission
was the Peace Commission sent to America in the wake of Saratoga, and the new strategy was
its one real concrete accomplishment. Let us now take a closer look at the Commission and
the strategy it inspired.

II

The Carlisle Commission is an often-overlooked aspect of the American Revolution; for
example, there are but two brief mentions in Robert Middlekauff’s The Glorious Cause, a nearly
700 page history of the Revolution.43 But the Commission was sent out with high hopes. Its
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main members were the 29 year-old nobleman, Frederick Howard, the Earl of Carlisle; William
Eden, Member of Parliament, undersecretary of state, member of the board of trade, and
George Johnstone, a former governor of West Florida. The Howe brothers were also Peace
Commissioners, but they were preparing to leave America when the Carlisle Peace
Commissioners arrived. Considering the importance of the mission, some of the membership
choices seem curious.
Carlisle was young and untested. He had become the fifth Earl of Carlisle at the age of
ten in 1758. He was educated at Eton, where he became friends with Charles James Fox, the
future Foreign Secretary. He spent one year at Cambridge. He went on the Grand Tour in the
late 1760s with Fox, and spent much of the tour drinking, carousing, and gambling. In 1770, he
entered the House of Lords, and also married Lady Margaret Caroline Leveson-Gower. This
marriage connected him to the politically influential Earl Gower, his father-in-law. Marriage did
not end his gaming, and he developed more of a reputation of a rake; he also had at least one
mistress.44
Carlisle turned over a new leaf as he neared his thirtieth birthday—he abandoned many
of his excesses, began taking an interest in politics, and developed an interest in a diplomatic
career. Perhaps age brought maturity; perhaps it was the debts and the embarrassment of
having had to wait in Castle Howard for his rents to arrive so he could pay his creditors; perhaps
his wife exercised a positive influence on him (his private correspondence with his wife, some
of it excerpted below, indicates that he was quite fond of her, if not in love—and felt
comfortable discussing important matters of state with her.) He became a privy councilor, but
44
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many thought he was young for the mission. Prior to this, he mainly had been known for “the
variety of his wardrobe and his losses at cards.” On February 22, 1778, he was named head of
the Peace Mission that bears his name. The general verdict, as the British historian G.M.
Trevelyan said, was that he was “a very fit Commissioner for making a treaty which would never
be made.”45
William Eden, while he had much knowledge of the American colonies, had been an
undersecretary of state for the Northern Department under Lord Suffolk—a department whose
main responsibility was not the colonies but northern Europe. Eden however had been one of
the main proponents of the mission, and hoped membership would advance his career. He is
generally considered the true leader of the Carlisle Commission; Carlisle however did take his
duties seriously. Eden was 34 in 1778, having attended Eton and Christchurch at Oxford. He
went to the Middle Temple and became a barrister, and had written in 1771 The Principles of
Penal Law, which argued for various reforms in British law, such as the reduction of the number
of capital offenses. 1776 proved to be a good year for Eden—he joined the Board of Trade, and
married Eleanor Elliot. In his positions as undersecretary and Lord of Trade he had a “vast
secret foreign correspondence”; the biographer Carl Van Doren calls him the manager of “the
British secret service on the Continent.” He was the confidential friend and intimate of Lord
North, and anxious for positions of advancement. In 1778, he helped draft the peace proposals
(see below), and joined the Commission led by his old Oxford friend, Carlisle.46
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Originally, Richard Jackson had been a member of the Commission. He had been a
correspondent with Benjamin Franklin since 1753, and had worked with him as an agent for
Pennsylvania. The essayist Charles Lamb later immortalized Jackson as the “Omniscient
Jackson” in his essay, Old Benchers of the Inner Temple. His knowledge of America and its
interests would have proved invaluable to the Commission, but he was not well-known. Eden
suggested him to Carlisle to fill out the Commission. Eden convinced Carlisle that Jackson’s
“accurate knowledge of the country to which we were to repair, and his long and familiar
acquaintance with her interests, would outbalance the insignificancy of his situation and the
obscurity of his name.” However, Jackson had many doubts about the success of the mission.
At a meeting with North on March 29, 1778, Carlisle records, “so many adverse arguments
were started by Mr. Jackson, so often surmounted, and again repeated with a fresh addition of
difficulties, as to make it absolutely necessary to take advantage of the moment in which he
seemed desirous to disunite himself from us…” The next day, a letter was sent which removed
Jackson from the Commission. Carlisle feared that, if he had not been removed, he would have
driven the other commissioners mad “before we had got to Portsmouth.”47
Eden was in despair, as the Commission was scheduled to leave by April 12. Fortunately,
a seemingly suitable substitute was found in George Johnstone, who proved eager to be on the
Commission. Johnstone was a former governor of a loyal colony (West Florida); not a bad
choice, especially under the circumstances, but there were many ex-governors and other
officials who probably had more intimate knowledge of the rebellious colonies than Johnstone.
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Johnstone was the fourth son of a Scottish baronet, and had chosen a career in the Royal Navy,
where he earned a reputation for bravery. Like Germain, he was court-martialed for
disobedience—but here the underlying cause was insubordination. Losing the court martial, he
was nonetheless ordered back to duty, where he gained more commendations for bravery. His
problem was that he seemed to lack respect for the naval hierarchy. Johnstone was also
friends with Lord Bute’s secretary, the dramatist John Home. Bute was appointed prime
minister in 1761 by George III. Bute was Scottish, and many Scots received plum assignments
during his premiership. Johnstone’s connection with Home earned him the position of
Governor of West Florida. His governorship ended in 1767, after three years, and he became a
Member of Parliament. While not a member of Rockingham’s faction, Johnstone worked with it
in opposing Lord North’s American policy, and called the Tea Act “criminally absurd”. These
views probably made him seem acceptable to Americans, and earned him a place on the
Commission. His elder brother, William Pulteney, about the same time as the Carlisle
Commission, met secretly (under the alias of Mr. Williams) with Benjamin Franklin in Paris to
discuss peace.48
Mention should also be made of the acting secretary of the Commission. In many ways,
he was the most distinguished of all those who would soon travel to America. He was Adam
Ferguson, a professor of moral philosophy at Edinburgh University. He was an eminent
philosopher and historian of the Scottish Enlightenment, and a member of the “Select Society”,
which was “the central forum of Edinburgh’s republic of letters” (its membership included such
48
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luminaries as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Lord Kames). His most famous work was his Essay
on the History of Civil Society (1768). He has been called “the father of modern sociology.” He
would later be formally appointed secretary.49
The Commissioners were given broad powers and detailed instructions by the King. They
were to attempt to communicate with Congress or Washington and to address the colonials “by
any style or title which may describe them”.50 Safe conduct to areas of negotiation was to be
offered, and a promise that once peace was established, the colonists would “thenceforth be
protected in trade and commerce by British power.” In times of peace, no standing army would
be kept in America. There would be no alteration in their “Antient governments or Con
stitutions without their consent.”51 While no doubt meant to be a major concession, the
problem with this instruction was that none of the colonies were being governed under their
“antient governments or Constitutions”—they were being governed under revolutionary
constitutions adopted in 1776 or 1777. Under this instruction, the bulk of the colonies would go
from a government where the people chose their own governors to a government where their
executive officer was chosen by the King, among many other changes.
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The King recognized the possibility that Congress would not wish to negotiate with the
Commissioners; in which case, the Commissioners were authorized to make the proposals and
offers public “in such manner as you shall see fit,” and to watch for the first desire of a province
to revert to Crown rule. The King also opined that “if an Assembly could be formed under your
Power of appointing a Governor, in the case in which you are at liberty to enter upon such
detached Treaty, the good Consequences and the extensive Effects in the operations of such
Assembly are obvious.” A closer look at the question of forming loyal assemblies will be taken
in a following chapter. For now, let us merely note that the King and those who advised him
now thought that the benefits of forming pro-British governments, complete with an assembly
of the people, in regions that had returned to Crown rule was “obvious”. The Commissioners
were also authorized to issue a proclamation of the King’s sincere desire to compose the
differences between the two sides, and to enter into a ceasefire, though when doing that,
consultation should be made with the military authorities.52
The King instructed that the basis of the treaty should be the conditions of 1763. The
King wanted the colonies to be reminded that they had promised to contribute freely to the
public charge, if it could be of their own free will—they were “called upon to exercise this Act of
Justice, as such Contribution would now be a mere act of free will.” The King thought the sum
could be moderate. Trade regulations could be relaxed. The King proposed a bank as a way to
fix the finances of the colonies, but made it clear that Britain would not pay American war
debts. In what seems to have been a common suggestion among Loyalists and Britons, the King
suggested that offices, including high ones like that of governor, be bestowed upon Americans
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when possible. He even consented that governors could be elected, subject to the king’s
authority.53
The King would accept a Congress similar to the one they now had, but in determining
the powers and functions of that Assembly, “the Sovereignty of the Mother Country shall not
be infringed”, nor any powers given it that was “capable of being construed into an
Impeachment of the Sovereign Rights of His Majesty, and the Constitutional Control of this
Country.” The existence and powers of Congress, as well as having colonial representation in
Parliament, were considered matters that should be considered by Parliament.54
Full pardons and amnesties were to be offered, and full restitution for violations of the
rights of private property was to be made, and the restoration of private property was to be
made. As there had been much confiscation of property by both the British and the Americans,
that would probably have been a very difficult provision of any treaty. The Declaration of
Independence need not be formally revoked, as well as other acts since the “Rupture”, as it and
the other acts were in the King’s opinion not legal acts, and would be effectively rescinded by
the conclusion of a treaty. Showing how vital ending the American war was considered now
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that war with France loomed, negotiations were not to be broken off if the Americans
absolutely insisted on a point that the instructions, or the commissioners’ discretion, disposed
them to not give up on. There was one exception to this instruction: independence. The
Commissioners could not conclude any treaty which made the colonies independent.55
This was a very moderate set of instructions. The terms were quite favorable to the
Americans, granting them most of their demands. Not only were taxes not to be imposed
without their consent, but even the Declaratory Act was negotiable.56 Representation in
Parliament, or a Congress with some say over British acts, were possible (as long as British
sovereignty was not impeached by this). The Navigation Acts were to be relaxed. Some of the
instructions were problematic. For example, restitution for property and property return would
probably have caused many problems. It is likely that the question would have been referred to
a commission. While the restoration of the “antient” governments might have been a problem,
it is likely that the point could have been negotiated, and the colonies could have kept their
new governments intact, with perhaps some changes to their constitutions to acknowledge the
rule of the King. But, in general, the proposed terms were quite favorable to the Americans.
Indeed, there is evidence that that the Cabinet considered the terms a surrender of British war
aims, but one that French intervention made unavoidable.57 About the only American demand
that was not granted was a relatively recent one—independence.
Had a similar set of proposals been made in 1770 or 1773 or 1774 it is likely that the
dispute between the colonies and Great Britain would have been settled peacefully and on
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terms quite favorable to the interests of the American colonies. Even after Lexington-Concord,
such a set of proposals would probably have been viewed favorably, as many Americans still
desired reconciliation with Britain. But under the conditions of 1778, the Peace Commission
was met with contempt.
What to the British seemed reasonable propositions were no longer acceptable to the
Americans, who had breached the psychological barrier of declaring independence, and had
fought the British for three years, two as an independent country. Independence marked a
turning point that made any solution that required the Americans to return to being subjects
unacceptable to many Americans, short of an overwhelming British military victory—and even
then, the acceptance may very well have been sullen.58 The Americans during the Revolution
had at the very least begun a transition from being subjects of a king to self-ruling citizens, and
some had completed it.
Making a return to subject-hood even more difficult was the sense of betrayal and even
hatred many now felt for the king. (See Chapter III) The King, guardian of their liberties, had
sided against them in their dispute with Parliament, and had declared them to be in rebellion.
He had sent his own soldiers and even foreign troops to crush what the Americans saw as their
rights, raided cities, and committed acts of pillage and plunder. The love and loyalty many had
felt for the King and the Empire, built up over generations, was gone, and it was likely that
nothing could be done to restore it. Common Sense had ridiculed and attacked the very concept
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of monarchy, saying God opposed it, and that the King was merely the descendant of a “rascal”.
Thomas Paine’s words and arguments had been read by many Americans, and many agreed
with at least part of his arguments concerning monarchy. Republicanism and even democracy
were taking hold of Americans. This was a slow process, and what historian Gordon Wood
called “monarchism”, and others have referred to as “The Age of Deference” would not really
be fully gone until the time of Jackson. But the process had begun, and it is difficult to see how
it could have been reversed. Even military victory by Britain, as Serle noted, might only “skin
over the Sore for a Time”; sooner or later, the Americans would desire to be free citizens ruling
themselves, and seek independence again. 59
Thus, the Americans were not prepared to return to being subjects once they had been
citizens. They were not prepared to be subsidiary to the interests of a distant kingdom, no
matter what ties of blood, trade, custom, law and history bound them together. And they
certainly were not willing to do this when it was clear that they had the upper hand over the
British. They had defeated a British army, and France was now on their side. Only a catastrophic
military loss or series of losses might induce the Americans to sue for peace on terms that
included their return to British rule. Even then, their “reconciliation” would be forced and
sullen, and a strong possibility existed that they would be willing and eager to revolt at the
earliest opportunity. The British did not aid their cause or the tasks of the Commissioners by
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presenting the Americans with the defeat of American arms. Instead, the British soon
evacuated Philadelphia.60

III

The Commission set sail for America in late 1778 on board a man-of-war known as the
Trident. Over six hundred were crowded into the ship, and Lord Cornwallis, who had been in
London, also returned to America on board the ship, making it even more crowded. Eden spent
much of the journey seasick, while Carlisle and Cornwallis spent much time playing whist. Eden
had brought his pregnant wife Eleanor with him, and she withstood the rigors of sea travel far
better than her husband, evoking much admiration for her. Carlisle, who thought their
destination was to be New York, wrote his wife that he had been told that New York was “very
hot, and the gnats extremely troublesome.” Carlisle was particularly bothered by gnats, and
however peace were to be established in America, he feared that with the gnats it would be
“perpetual war.” 61
60
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During the journey they also prepared for the important work before them. Governor
Johnstone had prepared a paper entitled “Heads of Accommodation”. This was based on
discussions his brother, William Pulteney, had had with Benjamin Franklin. Pulteney had
traveled to Paris under an alias to negotiate with Franklin, the United States Ambassador to
France. On May 6, the commissioners “perused” Johnstone’s proposal. Under Johnstone’s
proposal, Congress would “subsist”, and its powers were to be defined. The King would name a
President. Free trade from all places would exist, as long as it did not interfere with grants to
exclusive companies. Johnstone believed that representation in Parliament would be pleasing
to the rebels. Carlisle commented that “If they be content with their present Governments,
little objection occurs to this article…any union injurious to G.B. seems to threaten less by
leaving them their antient forms.” 62 Once again, it should be noted that the colonies were no
longer under their “antient” forms.
On June 1, Carlisle prepared a paper entitled “Hints of general reasoning from which to
form our letter to the Congress.” Carlisle here described the intent of the mission to be to
“Offer Peace to America upon terms honourable and beneficial for her to embrace.” He
promised that the methods to achieve the peace and reestablish the union with Great Britain
would be “sincerity, good-faith, and unreserved confidence.” As a post-script, Carlisle noted
that it remained “to show in what manner they quit the former ground on which they stood,
and by becoming the allies of the House of Bourbon, they become our most dangerous
enemies: must be treated as such: that they must lose every advocate who supported them in
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the rectitude of their resistance: and that the calamities of a most bloody war will [be] the
consequences of their treatment of our proposals.”63

This was a Peace Commission that

clearly held both an olive branch and a sword in its hands. Their offers of peace were to be
backed up by the threat of the British military. “Britain,” as General Clinton’s biographer argues,
“had only as much bargaining power as she had prestige, and both were already at low ebb; her
abandoning the capital of the rebellion would ensure rejection of her olive branch.”64 Yet when
the Commissioners arrived, they found that the military was preparing to abandon Philadelphia.
Their olive branch was useless without the sword to back it up.
Rather dejectedly, Carlisle informed Lady Carlisle that the evacuation of Philadelphia,
where they finally arrived in June:

…will not give us much assistance in our business. In case the Congress was not
inclined to come into measures, we wished to have desired them to consider
that so fine an army, so disciplined, so healthy, so everything, might possibly be
of some inconvenience to them if they rejected our proposals; but for some wise
purposes, which we are not acquainted with, this fine army is to be of no
inconvenience to them whatever…As I begin to think our business nearly over, I
don’t see what we have to do here.65

The Commissioners had not been informed of the impending evacuation. This may have merely
been the result of an innocent error; Lord North said that he thought that Eden knew, as did
Germain. McKesy suggests that full knowledge of the plans for the evacuation (and the hope
that it would free up troops to be used on an assault on the French West Indies island of St.
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Lucia) were “virtually confined” to the Cabinet, and that Germain had not been at liberty to
reveal the secret. Carlisle, it must be noted, was on a very important mission, and this was
information that he needed to know. However, Carlisle was also a “smart penurious young
man” who was friends with many “fashionable gossips.” Perhaps it was best not to let him
know while he was still in London. In any event, Carlisle was “astounded and extremely alarmed
for the fate of our Commission” on learning of the evacuation, and told Lord Gower, his fatherin-law, that “We here were informed that every measure relative to this campaign was
determined upon long before our departure from England, and that the evacuation of
Philadelphia was not to be delayed, because such a delay would materially affect other
objects…” Eden was angry, having been privy to the “deepest secrets” for years, as he told his
colleague Alexander Wedderburn. As the Commissioners informed Germain, they were
“naturally surprised” to learn that the army was leaving, under orders dated about three weeks
before they left Britain, and “at a Time most critical to the operation of” the Commission. 66
As Carlisle’s letter to his wife indicated, the Commission hoped to use the army in some
manner to persuade the Americans to accept their proposals. Carlisle told his former tutor, the
Reverend Dr. Jeffrey Ekins:

…the great instrument which was to secure us success, the active and offensive
course of Military operation, was no longer to support our proceedings. A
defensive war carries with it neither threats [n]or terror; and when the rejection
of everything we had to offer was to be followed by no distress to those who
consulted alone their private interests or ambition in the refusal, and the
66
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advantage of either country; and when it was most evident that nothing but the
menaces of war, or its real destructive consequences, could shake men of this
description in their power, and bring those who had conferred this power on
them to their senses: you will agree with me that our offers of peace wore too
much the appearances of supplications for mercy from a vanquished and
exhausted State.67

The Commission hoped to use the threat of destruction by the army—or the actuality of
destruction—as a bargaining tool. Now their instrument of persuasion was retreating and
unavailable. Would their carrot be useful without the stick to back it up?
Nonetheless, the Commissioners sought to carry out their mission. A letter from the
Commission was delivered under flag of truce by Lord Cathcart (soon to lead the British Legion
at the Battle of Monmouth, and later the Coldstream Guards) addressed to “His Excellency
Henry Laurens, the President and other members of the Congress.” This was in accordance with
the King’s instructions to address the Americans by any title they used. No circumlocutions such
as “leaders of forces presently in rebellion against the King” were used— as discussed above, in
the American Civil War, the Confederacy had resorted to a similar title in a letter from Jefferson
Davis to Lincoln.68 Laurens, President of the Congress, replied from “York Town” (present-day
York, Pennsylvania), which was the site of Congress, on June 14, 1778. He stated that he was
writing in a private capacity, but declared with “great assurance” that the only terms with
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which Congress would treat would be independence, which he considered would be in the best
interest of Great Britain. His official reply of the seventeenth reiterated this.69
Lord Howe, through Ambrose Serle, had on May 27th or 28th, sent letters to Washington
and Laurens enclosing acts of Parliament empowering the Commissioners to treat and
abrogating tax acts and other acts. Serle commented in his journal that the acts “ ’tis most
likely, will be treated with the Contempt given to former Overtures of Reconciliation.” Laurens’
replied to the letter that “Yr Lp may be assured, that when the King of G.B. shall be seriously
disposed to put an End to the unprovoked & cruel War, waged against these United States,
Congress will readily attend to such terms of Peace as may consist with the Honor of
Independent Nations, the Interest of their Constituents, and the sacred regard they mean to
pay to Treaties.” Serle had been correct in his assessment. 70
Howe had long desired reinforcements, and begun to believe that he was not being
adequately supported by the government. This belief was increased by the fact that many of
the troops that were sent over in 1777 were sent to Burgoyne. At the end of 1777, he
requested to be relieved of his command, and he was replaced by General Sir Henry Clinton.71
An elaborate fete (the so-called Mischianza) was given Howe before he left Philadelphia on
May 25th72, and Carlisle rather bemusedly (or disgustedly) described it to Lady Carlisle:
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I forgot to mention the, I don’t know what to call it, that was given to Sir W.
Howe. I fear that it was a very foolish business….I only know there were
triumphal arches, and that General Washinton was within twenty-four miles of
them, and that Lord Howe saluted Sir W. Howe, and Sir W. Howe saluted Lord
Howe, and that it cost above four thousand pounds, and everybody paid
whether they could afford it or not.73

The Commissioners soon returned to the Trident, which was anchored in the Delaware.
Carlisle was bothered by gnats “as large as sparrows”. He protected himself against them by
wearing trousers, which he noted was the “constant dress” of the country. He also noted to his
wife that people wore many feathers in their hats. Turning more serious, Carlisle told his wife
that their “business” looked desperate: “As long as we had the army to back us—we had hopes
of success, but this turning our backs upon Mr. Washinton [as he usually spelled the name] will
certainly make them reject offers that perhaps the fear of what that army could have done
would have made them listen to. We have by these measures explicitly told all our friends here,
‘We can protect you no longer, therefore make the best terms for yourselves with the
Congress.’” 74
There were also harbingers that one of the Commissioners might cause future trouble.
Serle recorded on June 14 that he was told by Galloway that Johnstone had brought over a
picture of Washington in the lid of a snuff box, which he presented to Elizabeth Ferguson, “a
Woman noted for her Virulence in the Cause of Rebellion.” Galloway also told Serle that
Johnstone was “very inquisitive” about land values and prices in America, and even spoke of
selling his property in England and settling down in America. This manner of speaking had
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resulted in “great Reproaches” from Loyalists in Philadelphia. Galloway, as time went by
became an increasingly desperate Loyalist, and his words must be taken with care.
Nonetheless, while Galloway’s assertions must be looked at with some caution, it is evident
that Serle believed Galloway’s words, and commented that “A man of this kind is not likely to
be solicitous for the Interest & Honor of my dear Country.”75 It would not be long before
Johnstone would seriously embarrass the Commission.

The Commission finally arrived in New York in early July, where they attempted to
continue their mission. New York was suffering a heat wave, and Lord Carlisle rarely stirred
from his home in the daytime while it continued. Despite the heat, he did seem to enjoy New
York City:

The views and the country about this town are beyond all description
beautiful; you will judge by the map how delightfully it must be situated when
you see those two large rivers run so close to it, which are at present filled with
vessels of every sort and size; the banks are covered with farms, villa, camps,
wood, corn, and several sorts of trees which are unknown to me, of singular
beauty. Long Island, Staten Island, and the Jersey shore bind the whole.76

The Commission decided to publish their correspondence with Congress in a
proclamation “to the people at large.” Carlisle was not sanguine in his expectations for the
proclamation, but he considered it “a step not to be dispensed with.” While the weather had
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improved somewhat, the military situation had worsened. The Trident had sailed into New York
just ahead of a sizable French fleet. The English fleet was drawn up in Rariton Bay, just west of
Sandy Hook, while the French were lined up to the east of Sandy Hook and south of Brooklyn.
As Carlisle described the situation: “Our prison is very narrow: Gen Washinton [sic] and Gates
are supposed to be near each other on the White Plains”. 77
Carlisle believed that the arrival of the French fleet made “every hope of success in our
business ridiculous.” While the proclamation had been tried, and ought to have been tried,
Carlisle believed that “in truth the compliance with our instructions in this particular is the mere
obedience to a form.” He continued to tell his wife:

The leaders on the enemy’s side are too powerful; the common people hate us
in their hearts, notwithstanding all that is said of their secret attachment to the
mother country. I cannot give you a better proof of their unanimity against us
than in our last march; in the whole country there was not found one single man
capable of bearing arms at home; they left their dwelling unprotected, and after
having cut all the ropes of the wells had fled to General Washinton. Formerly,
when things went better for us, there was an appearance of friendship by their
coming in for pardons, that might have deceived even those who have been the
most acquainted with them. But no sooner our situation was the least altered for
the worse, but these friends were the first to fire upon us, and many were taken
with the pardons in [their] pockets. Beat Gen. Washinton, drive away Monsr.
D’Estaign, and we should have friend enough in this country; but in our present
condition the only friends we have, or are likely to have, are those who are
absolutely ruined for us, and in such distress I leave you to judge what possible
use they can be to us.78
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“The common people hate us in their hearts.” This was the considered opinion of one of
His Majesty’s Peace Commissioners, though addressed privately to his wife and not publicly or
officially. The arguments of Loyalists and Britons as to the secret attachment to Britain of the
majority of Americans seemed incorrect (perhaps nonsensical would be a better word) to Lord
Carlisle. Rather than proof of friendship, as Howe had thought in December, 1776, the taking of
pardons was expediency only. Only decisive military victory, it seemed to Carlisle, would give
Britain the “friends” it needed, outside a few whose attachment to the British cause would
leave them refugees. Their mission was hopeless, it seemed to Carlisle, and Carlisle and the
Commission would just go through the motions, though, as he told Lady Carlisle, “as everybody
in the world will not be ruled perhaps by my opinions, we must stay till there is not a possibility
of doubt upon that subject.”79 Perhaps this realization that the British were hated by the
average American would lead Carlisle, with Eden as well, to argue for policies with the aim of
winning the “hearts and minds” of Americans. Unless something could change, “the common
people hate us in their hearts” could well prove to be the epitaph for the British Empire in the
thirteen colonies. Indeed, even overwhelming military victory without such a change of heart
would only result in giving Britain false friends. Such a victory was one to be avoided.
Carlisle was not the only British observer to be disillusioned with the prospects of peace
on terms acceptable to Britain in that summer of 1778. Ambrose Serle’s journal is a diary, not a
work of fiction, but if any diary can be said to follow a dramatic arc, then it is Serles’. Serle, Lord
Howe’s secretary from 1776 to 1778 (and formerly a secretary to Lord Dartmouth), had long
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been interested in the relationship between Britain and the colonies. He believed in 1770 that
an establishment of an Anglican episcopate was vital to uniting the Empire, and did not leave
that view. In a 1774 pamphlet, Americans against Liberty: or an Essay on the Nature and
Principles of True Freedom, Shewing that the Designs and Conduct of the Americans Tend only
to Tyranny and Slavery, he argued that “The King, Lords, and Commons…compose the
Constitution, and supreme Legislature of the British Empire” and that there could not be two
legislatures of equal authority in any properly arranged polity. Everyone within the Empire, he
believed, is under the control of the Constitution, and protected by it. The establishment of an
episcopacy and the supremacy of the British constitution in America were his beliefs when he
boarded HMS Eagle in May of 1776 for what would turn out to be a two year journey to
America.80
Serle soon grow to believe that the colonies had drained Britain of men and money, for
little recompense beyond disloyalty. Serle spoke much with Loyalists about conditions in
America and ways to solve the dispute. He spoke much with prisoners of war as well, and was
early on convinced that a few unprincipled men had misled many honest Americans. His
original confidence in rapid success began to dissipate as events went against the British. When
on May 21, 1778, the King’s order to evacuate Philadelphia was announced, Serle saw that the
war was lost and that the revolutionaries had won:

I now look upon the Contest as at an End. No man can be expected to declare for
us, when he cannot be assured of a Fortnight’s Protection. Every man, on the
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contrary, whatever might have been his primary Inclinations, will find it his
Interest to oppose & drive us out of the Country.81

Serle had grown to believe the war was unwinnable. Indeed, British policy, which seized
areas only to abandon them, seemed to him to be a major reason—even those who loved the
King would find it in his own interest to be an enemy—for he could not be assured the British
would stay and protect him from rebel retribution. Serle left Philadelphia in mid-June. He was
heading back to England82. One can trace in his journal a “dramatic arc” stretching from full
confidence in the sure success of the British cause, to despair and a belief that the war was lost.
In the summer of 1778, all seemed lost for the British. The hearts and minds, the love
and loyalty of many Americans seemed to many British observers to be lost, and even those
Americans who were still loyal in their hearts seemed likely to oppose the British out of selfinterest. But the belief remained that many Loyalists existed, and some persisted in the belief
that they were a majority of the population, at least in some areas. According to the historian
Paul H. Smith, one-fifth of the white population was Loyalist overall,83 and in some areas, that
number was higher. If a new strategy could be found, perhaps all was not lost.
The King himself seemed discouraged from the reports he received:

The Present accounts from America seem to put a final stop to all Negociation:
farther concession is a joke, all that can now be done is steadily to pursue the
plan…providing Nova Scotia, the Floridas and Canada with troops, and should
81
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that not leave enough for New York which may in the end be the case we must
then abandon that place….84

The King once again contemplated abandoning New York and merely “distressing” the
rebels, at least until the French could be defeated.85 The evacuation of Philadelphia seemed
to be a signal that the war was being lost, if not already lost. Carlisle’s and Serle’s
discouragement at the prospect of achieving reconciliation seemed to indicate that the
attempt to restore America to the Empire was hopeless—some wanted to return to the Empire,
but many hated the British. Yet the retreat was not a total abandonment, but part of a
consolidation of forces to meet the French threat. While the thirteen colonies were now a
secondary front in the war, the hopes of regaining America had not been abandoned by the
British. But a new strategy was clearly needed, one that would get the most out of the limited
resources Britain could devote to the front—and in addition, win back the hearts and minds of
the Americans.
The Commissioners continued as well they could their work in New York, while
requesting permission to return. They spoke with many Loyalists, and tried to get an
understanding of the situation. But, the mission took two more bad turns before the
Commissioners returned to Britain. Johnstone attempted to bribe Joseph Reed, an aide to
Washington, member of Congress, and President of Pennsylvania, with a position in a future
government and ten thousand pounds if he would help the Commissioners in their task of
reuniting America and Britain. Reed’s antipathy to Loyalists was well-known, making the offer
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not only foolish by futile. Reed contemptuously turned the offer down. Congress expressed its
extreme displeasure, and published Johnstone’s letter.86
As an indirect result of Johnstone’s actions, Carlisle was faced with a situation perhaps
even more farcical, if more potentially deadly: he was challenged to a duel by the Marquis de
Lafayette. In a letter to Congress by Carlisle, Clinton, and Eden, dated August 26, the trio denied
any knowledge of Johnstone’s actions, while stating that Johnstone in all his conversations with
them had only been concerned with reestablishing the bond with the colonies and thereby
securing “the permanent happiness of the inhabitants of this Continent.” Later in the letter, in
reference to the “French connection” they expressed astonishment at America’s continued
deference to “a Power that has ever shewn itself an enemy to all civil and religious liberty; and
whose offers…were made with a view to prevent our reconciliation, and to prolong this
destructive war.” Lafayette, as the first French officer in rank in the American army, and as a
person not unknown to the British, felt honor-bound to challenge Carlisle. Lafayette challenged
Carlisle, as head of the commission, to a duel because of the “insulting words about my country
that you have signed.” Carlisle demurred, claiming diplomatic prerogatives. Carlisle’s reply told
Lafayette that the Commission’s correspondence with the Congress was not of a “private
Nature,” and that he thought that “all national Disputes will be best decided by the Meeting of
Admiral Byron and the Comte D’Estaing.” There the matter rested.87
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American leaders had united against the peace effort long before the Commissioners
arrived. Patriot propagandists were enlisted to ensure that Americans would not forsake
independence. Some of their efforts were truly creative. Governor Livingston of New Jersey
pretended to be a woman named “Belinda”. “Belinda” reported that mothers in “her” district
had promised to disown their sons, and wives and maidens to refuse the caresses and advances
of husbands and suitors who showed “the least symptoms of being imposed upon by this flimsy
subterfuge, which I call the dying speech, and last groans of Great-Britain.”88 In addition to this
rather Lysistratan appeal, Congress called upon the American people to not be lulled by
“fallacious hope of peace”, but to gird for battle.89 The commissioners were made objects of
ridicule. Carlisle was reported to have brought with him “one dozen bottles essence of
roses…half a dozen opera glasses—forty boxes of pearl coloured powder for the teeth…ninety
wardrobe cases for cloaths…twelve dozen best tooth picks—an abridgement of the history of
America, for the use of children…two portable billiard tables…”90 to name but a few items.
Even if the report exaggerated (as it probably did), it is likely that Carlisle’s baggage was rather
excessive.
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Johnstone returned to Britain on September 23, and Carlisle and Eden returned on
November 27, 1778.91 Their mission had ended in failure and farce. Before looking at the
aftermath of the Commission, let us pause to examine why the Commission failed. First, the
Commissioners were dealing from weakness, not strength. The disastrous loss at Saratoga had
led to French intervention, and the need to consolidate British forces in North America. The
sole bright spot of 1777 for the British, the capture of the rebel “capital” of Philadelphia, was
being abandoned. The Commissioners had hoped to use the stick of the army as a threat to
induce the rebels to accept the carrot of reconciliation on highly favorable terms for the
Americans. Instead, they arrived in Philadelphia in time to see it evacuated. Their messages to
the Americans were met with contempt. After leaving Philadelphia, they arrived in New York in
time to see it virtually besieged. It is little wonder that their mission failed. British prestige was
at low ebb; if Britain could somehow achieve a major victory, if they could have, as Carlisle had
told his wife, beaten “Washinton” and driven away d’Estaing, then their mission might have had
some success. But the Americans seemed unlikely to come to the table unless they were in
extremis.
Secondly, the concessions offered, while generous, were “a day late and a dollar short”.
The Americans were independent, and wished to remain so. Laurens and the Congress insisted
on their independency. The Americans governed themselves as free men; many of them had no
desire to return to being subjects, no matter how free—even subjects of a King who
constitutionally had been ultimately chosen by the people acting through Parliament92 —
especially when they had no representation in that Parliament. Concessions that would have
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worked in 1775 or earlier were worthless after July 4, 1776. Of course, had the British decisively
defeated the Americans, perhaps they might have been willing to reluctantly return to being
subjects. After all, many Patriots—including members of revolutionary committees—had taken
loyalty oaths to the king on Long Island. But, as Carlisle pointed out, this was probably not a
change of heart, but “trimming” to the wind, as the expression of the time went.
Lastly, while the Commissioners tried their best, the Commission was undermined by
the foolish actions of one of its members. First, it is highly unlikely that any person, no matter
how highly placed, could have swung America to reconciliation with Britain under the terms the
Carlisle Commission could offer. So, any bribe would most probably have been futile even if a
useful official had been found who was willing to be bribed. Secondly, it is not inconceivable
that there were members of Congress or of the state governments who would have been
amenable to bribery. As Benedict Arnold would soon prove, there was at least one leading
military official who was so amenable. But such a bribe must be approached delicately, a likely
target determined, and the target’s willingness to be bought ascertained slowly and surely.
Johnstone targeted an extremely unlikely candidate in Joseph Reed, who predictably was
gravely offended. The attempt was revealed to Congress, who published the correspondence,
embarrassing the Commission and making an impossible task even more difficult. To make
matters worse, the Commission’s attempt to overcome the incident created another incident.
The Commission foolishly chose to include in their declaration that they were unaware of
Johnstone’s actions an attack on the “French connection”. Such an attack, if it was to be made
at all, should have waited for a later letter, and should have been expressed more mildly. As it
was, the attack on America’s alliance was coached in language which, while mild by today’s
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standards, was considered harsh enough by a leading French soldier in America, Lafayette, to
induce him to challenge Carlisle to a duel. Carlisle managed to avoid the duel, claiming in effect
diplomatic immunity and treating the whole matter with his characteristic humor—but none of
this was calculated to increase British prestige or bring America to negotiate peace. These last
events may be considered farcical, but they were also a sign of the utter failure of a mission
which had been invested with such high hopes.

IV

Despite their disappointment at the failure of the Commission, and Carlisle’s private
belief that the common American hated the British, in a series of letters the Commissioners
continued to express hope that reconciliation was possible—but force might be required to
effectuate it. They argued that the “defensive and offensive Alliance with France is disagreeable
to a great proportion of the People”, and that their terms were highly acceptable. But as long as
Washington’s army could stay in the field, and “awe the country”, there was no hope that any
province would declare for Britain.93 On July 7 and Sept 21, they argued that force might work
against a people they believed were beginning “to recollect the blessings of Peace” and
“sensible…that they are kept in Rebellion by their Leaders without either a Grievance or a just
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Object.”94 By October 15, they told Germain that there was good reason “to believe that the
spirit of the Revolt is much abated…and that the French connexion is generally disliked.”
Indeed, the crisis was favorable for an attempt to break the entire rebellion.95
As discussed above, the Commissioners were not adverse to the use of force in the
service of peace. Eden, it appears, was particularly “rankled” by the unsuccessful mission. On
returning to Britain, the Commissioners made several oral and written reports. Eden discussed
the colonial situation in an audience with the king. On January 9th, 1779, Eden and Johnstone
testified on American affairs before a cabinet council, and made a written report to Germain
dated March 8, 1779. In these reports, they argued that there was “widespread disaffection”
with the Continental Congress, and much loyalist strength among the American people. They
argued for an offensive to force Washington into a direct battle. If he could not be decisively
defeated, his army should be forced to retreat into the New York or New Jersey Highlands. In
the territory that he was forced to abandon, they assured their listeners, the people would
renounce Congress and return to their former and natural loyalty to the Crown. Then, a civilian
administration would be established for New York “to conciliate the affections of the
inhabitants…remove apprehensions” and to “extend the benefit of law and police as far as
practicable.” They were sure that a civil administration could be easily organized in New York.
The success of renewed civilian government in New York would showcase to the other colonies
British willingness to restore constitutional government to loyal subjects.96
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Germain argued for a new strategy based on the Commissioner’s reports:

The principal object of the Main Army [Clinton’s New York-based army] in the
Opinion of the Commissioners sh’d be the getting possession of the Ridge of
High Land wch runs across from the Hudson’s River to the Connecticut, and
therby cover all the fertile Country brtween that Ridge & the Sea the Inhabitants
of wch are said to desirous of returning to their allegiance and w.d gladly receive
a civil Gvt. from His Majesty. Shd such an Establishment take place there,
Massachusets Bay w.d be unable to draw any considerable supplies or Succour
from the Southwards & left to its own Resources might soon be brought to
submit to the Kings Authority….97

Perhaps the most important phrase in the above letter is “getting possession.” In the
early part of the war, the army had tried to destroy the rebellion by decisively defeating its
armies and gaining control of important cities—while at the same time, they tried to isolate
New England. In war, the question whether one’s main aim should be to seek to destroy the
enemy’s army or take territory is perhaps the most important question that has to be made.
The two aims are not mutually exclusive; if one seizes or attempts to seize enough territory, or
a vital position, such as a city or an important pass, the enemy army will often be forced to
offer battle. If an army focuses chiefly on destroying the other army, the danger is that it may
neglect to consolidate territorial gains. This question is often quite acute in civil wars or colonial
rebellions, where restoring the region to the nation or empire is the goal of one side, and
independence is the goal of the other.
In 1776 and 1777, the British had failed to consolidate their territorial gains much
beyond southern New York. They had sought to destroy Washington’s army and seize
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important cities. A broader design of isolating New England existed, but was basically
abandoned by Howe when he attacked Philadelphia. Consolidation of territory was an
afterthought.98 The result was the British army marching all across the American landscape,
then abandoning its control (and incidentally, leaving Loyalists in a very bad situation). Indeed,
Howe’s attack on Philadelphia was an attempt to cut off one, and hopefully both, of the two
heads of the rebel “beast”: the political head by taking the capital, and the military head by
destroying the main rebel army when it attempted to defend the political head.
The problem was that the rebellious colonies really did not have a political head; they
were decentralized, divided into thirteen colonies, loosely knit together into a confederacy for
the purposes of fighting the British. Indeed, the national government, such as it was, was still a
revolutionary organization in early 1779—the Articles of Confederation would not be ratified
for another two years.99 Rather than fighting one country, it could be argued that the British
were, in some ways, fighting thirteen wars against thirteen countries. While there was a
common army, supplemented by state militias, politically there was no head to chop off—there
were thirteen, and many colonies had few identifiable places whose capture would mean the
capture of the province. Perhaps the appropriate strategy would be to attempt to take the
colonies back county by county, colony by colony. And to do this, they must “reclaim to their
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duty” the inhabitants of these counties and colonies. A rudimentary version of the concept was
presented in a report on the southern colonies from 1778:

The great point to be wished for, is that the Inhabitants of some considerable
Colony, were so far reclaimed to their Duty, that the revival of the British
Constitution, and the free operation of the Laws, might without prejudice be
permitted amongst them, the superior Advantage and Security, they would then
enjoy, above those who lived under a different Dominion, could not fail, to
suggest comparison that would daily be productive, of the most important
consequences, and an earnest wish, to partake of these Benefits, and Blessing
which they saw their Neighbors in the enjoyment of…

By restoring the “blessings of British liberty”, restoring the operation of the British constitution,
in short, restoring civilian government (complete with a legislative assembly), an example
would be made of British willingness to end martial law and restore British liberties.100
Because of the worldwide nature of the war, and secondary status of the North
American theatre, Germain was under pressure to reduce military commitments in America,
and found the new idea “attractively simple.” The colonies would be reduced “piecemeal”,
separately. Such an effort might achieve what the attempt to destroy the political and military
centers might not. The main Continental army of Washington would be pushed back and
confined to the Highlands; smaller forces would clear areas of rebel militia, eventually gaining
back entire colonies. Loyalist militia units would hold and protect the pacified regions from the
rebels. Civil government would be restored in these areas, guarded by the loyal militias. This
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restoration and reintegration into the Empire would serve to demonstrate the advantages of
returning to the allegiance to the Crown.101
In short, the idea was to use a field army to seize areas, and then local militia to hold the
area while the field army continued into the next area. The pacified region would have civilian
government restored, and be reintegrated into the Empire. The Revolutionary War was a new
type of war, and demanded new types of strategy and war-fighting methods. The proposed
new strategy was quite innovative, and McKesy has described it as “a fledgling theory of
counterrevolutionary warfare.”102
The proposed strategy also depended on there being many Loyalists in the colonies,
willing and able to join and support the militias, and support, staff, and vote for the new
Royalist governments. Modern estimates of the amount of Loyalist put the number at one-fifth
of the population. (See above). This is still a sizable number, but probably less than the British
thought actually existed. Germain was assured by officials from the southern colonies, such as
Governor James Wright of Georgia, that there was a sizable body of loyalists in the South.
Joseph Galloway was in constant touch with Serle, Germain, and Lord Dartmouth, and assured
the British that Pennsylvania and the Middle Colonies were full of Loyalists, and war-weary as
well. There was also plenty of evidence, from places like Long Island and New Jersey, that the
Americans were willing to sign oaths of loyalty when the British controlled a region. While some
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of these were no doubt Loyalists, it is likely that many of them were “trimmers”—people who
“trimmed their sails” depending on which ways the political winds were blowing for purposes
of protecting themselves, their families, and their property. The British assumed the Patriots
were a small minority. In any event, listening mainly to questionable sources such as Galloway
whose statements fit their preconceived notions, the British and Germain were convinced that
there was enough Loyalist strength to make the plan work. They had more than the word of
Loyalists and refugees as to Loyalist strength—officials such as Governor Wright, General
Robertson (who was Commandant of New York City and who had much experience in America),
and the Peace Commissioners were all convinced that most Americans opposed the rebellion
(though Carlisle, at least, thought differently in private). Perhaps they misread war-weariness or
neutrality as Loyalism; but in any case, the decision was made to attempt to implement a new
strategy that depended on a sizable body of Loyalists.103
As will be discussed below, such a strategy was already being implemented in Georgia,
and would prove rather successful, all things considered. But Georgia was a small and distant
colony; if such a policy could be implemented successfully in New York, its demonstration
value—its propaganda value—would be immense. Germain set about implementing the new
policy. He instructed Clinton, headquartered In New York City, to contain Washington, and
allow thereby the loyal subjects of the King in “the open country” to renounce their allegiance
to Congress. Once this was accomplished, elections for an assembly were to be called. Germain
had come to the realization that the route to victory in this war was political, and only
incidentally military:
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Notwithstanding the great exertions this country has made and the prodigious
force sent out for subduing the rebellion, I am convinced our utmost efforts will
fail of their effect, if we cannot find means to engage the people of America in
support of a cause which is equally their own and ours, and when their enemies
are drawn away or subdued induce them to employ their own force to protect
themselves in the enjoyment of the blessings of that constitution to which they
shall have been restored.104

The war was to become what it had always been—a war for the hearts and minds of the
Americans.
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Chapter V

The Failed Attempt to Restore Civilian Government to New York

240

I

In October 1775, Governor Tryon of New York received information that he was to be
apprehended as “an enemy to America,” made a prisoner, and transported to Connecticut and
confined for the duration of the war. Tryon undoubtedly found the source credible, for he soon
boarded the British man-of-war Asia, which was at the time docked in the harbor. He soon
transferred to the Dutchess of Gordon. From here, he acted as governor, and met with his
Council. Council members such as William Smith would be rowed to and from the ship for the
meetings. The Provincial Congress slowly took over the management of the Province, while the
official government was literally “at sea”.1
Several other governors found themselves “governing” their provinces from warships
off the coast, or returned to Britain till they could be restored to office. No longer governing,
they still retained their posts, but in a “dormant” state. British authority had vanished across
the thirteen colonies, unless one wishes to include the rather pathetic ship-based governors.
While a brief period of “dual” rule existed in the colonies from about 1774 to as late as 1776 in
some colonies, by May 1776 British authority had vanished in the thirteen colonies. In New
York, elections were actually held for the Assembly in January, 1776, but that Assembly never
sat. Many colonies were under the rule of provincial congresses, though a few were still under
their old government. The court systems still functioned, though Patriots filled many positions
1
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abandoned by Loyalists. In May, 1776, Congress recommended that the colonies form new
governments that had no ties to the old colonial, British-approved government— in other
words, to form revolutionary governments. 2
The Howe brothers were made Peace Commissioners (as well as commanders of the
Army and Navy) in 1776, but their authority was not absolute. The Howes as Peace
Commissioners could only offer pardons to those who renounced the rebellion—hostilities
could thus not end until the Americans disbanded and dissolved their armed forces and
revolutionary governments. As for the restoration of civil government, this would only occur
once the rebels had been defeated—the Howe brothers were given authority to restore a
colony (or a portion of a colony) to its former government once the rebels had been defeated.
The possible advantages (as well as the difficulties) of restoring civil government were not
recognized in the early days of the war, and would not be until the aftermath of the Carlisle
Commission. The British historian K.G. Davies calls the plan of action the British contemplated
in 1775 to have been “in the nature of a large-scale police operation.” At its end, “the ancient
forms of civil government would be reestablished as a matter of course.” Some leaders of the
rebellion would probably have to be punished, but most Americans (at least outside of New
England) were thought to be either loyal or deluded by their leaders, so no major difficulty was
contemplated. Secretary of State Germain in late 1775 ordered Clinton, then preparing an
expedition against the Southern colonies, to attempt to restore legal government, because
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reports promised much support and many civilian officials were still in the area and ready to
restore British rule. Clinton was to proclaim pardon for those who laid down their arms,
dissolve Provincial Congresses and Committees, and reopen the civil courts. In other words,
once the rebellion had been suppressed, British government would restore itself. 3
Davies notes that “Nowhere in the proceedings of the Howe commission is there
recognition of the possibility of using restored civil government as a political weapon to
advance the British cause and discomfort the rebels. Confirmation of this negative attitude
comes from the refusal of the commissioners to contemplate restoring civil government in the
only place where in 1776 it was practicable to do so, the part of New York recovered by the
British army.” The Howe brothers and Germain agreed the area recovered was too small. In
addition, William Tryon, the British governor of New York, wanted a command in the war. This
desire reduced the pressure he might otherwise have exerted for the restoration of
government to southern New York. Tryon argued that New York was “in the present period too
much convulsed for the civil government to act with any good effect…I therefore have kept the
executive powers of civil government dormant, leaving everything to the direction of the
military.”4 In December 1777, Tryon informed Lord Germain that “his sphere in Civil Governt is
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not enlarged in this last Campaign.... I can now hardly be said to sit within the shade of my
Governt”. He told Germain he wished to resign, if he could be given command of a regiment.5
So, the possibility and benefits of restoring civil government in British-controlled New
York were overlooked or just not seen in the early phases of the war. Now, in the wake of the
Carlisle Commission, discussed in the preceding chapter, the possibilities of restoring civil
government, not as a follow-up to a military victory, but as a way of achieving a political victory,
of winning back hearts and minds and gaining new Loyalist recruits, began to be appreciated.
Some success was achieved in Georgia, as will be discussed at further length below. But,
Georgia was a tiny and distant colony. New York was another story. It was a major colony, much
of it was securely under British control, there was much loyalism, and it was both a commercial
center and located at a very strategic location—perhaps the most strategic location on the
continent. The new strategy, the “pacification program” as the historians Klein and Howard call
it, would be given great credibility if the New York experiment succeeded. 6
Much would depend on the Governor selected,7 and the response of the military
authorities to his position. The man selected was Major General James Robertson,
Commandant of New York City. Robertson, as Klein and Howard state, “is not one of the better
known figures of the American Revolution.” Over the years, Robertson, like Germain, was
viewed quite unfavorably by those few historians who did notice him. Like Germain, much of
our information comes from biased sources such as the Loyalists Smith and Jones, and General
5
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Clinton. Clinton, in his private correspondence, spoke unfavorably of Robertson. Jones despised
all Presbyterians and Scotsmen (he saw no difference between the two), and Robertson was a
Scot. Jones ascribed Robertson’s remarkable rise (described below) to being “a true Scot,
assiduous, flattering, and submissive.” He accused him of corruption, and said that in his role as
Governor, Robertson “was universally despised.” After becoming Governor, Jones alleges, “he
so often broke and forfeited his word, his honour, and his promises, that the people lost all
confidence in him.” He also states that Robertson was nearly eighty (not true—he was sixty two at the time of his appointment), in his dotage, and that he ran after young girls, some as
young as twelve. Smith, who was a strong proponent of restoring civil government, viewed
Robertson quite favorably in the early days of his governorship when it seemed that civil
government would soon be restored. However, by September of 1781, Smith was writing in his
journal that Robertson “…is a Dotard and abandoned to Frivolity. He has Parties of Girls in the
Fort Garden, in the midst of his own Fears, and the Anxieties of this Hour.” 8 This picture has
lingered, and often been accepted uncritically. The record shows, however, that Robertson was
a good officer, whatever his personal failings may have been. Under eighteenth-century
conditions, his rise to the rank of “general” is quite extraordinary. His opinions, especially on
America, were respected and sought after. He was a valued staff officer. As commandant of
New York City, he saved much of the city from burning in September, 1776. As governor, while
he was possibly corrupt, and a “lady’s man” (even according to more balanced sources than
Jones), his corruption seems to have been within acceptable parameters for the eighteenth
century, and his dalliances were probably not as depraved as Jones makes them. Despite the
8

K & H 2-4; Jones, I 162-4; William H. W. Sabine, ed., Historical Memoirs of William Smith, (New York: New York
Times & Arno Press), 1956, III, 441 (henceforth, “Smith”).

245

handicaps he labored under, he did try to exercise the duties of his office and bring civilian
government back to New York. This competent if flawed human being was entrusted by the
British government with the important task of making British-controlled New York a shining
example to the other colonies. He failed in this task, but not all the blame for that can be laid
on his shoulders. It is possible that a more favorable picture of Robertson will arise from a
review of his career and governorship.9
Robertson was a Scottish officer in the British army with much experience in the
Americas. Unlike many Scottish officers, he was not a wealthy landed proprietor or titled
nobleman, but came from a more “middling” background. Robertson’s family were freeholders.
They had a small estate called Newbigging in Fife, near Edinburgh. The family had many
community responsibilities and much local status; the family included doctors, lawyers, and
ministers. Robertson’s father was trained as a solicitor, and had the courtesy title of the “Laird
of Newbigging.” As freeholders in a society where most were tenants, the Robertsons had
considerable status in the community, and much responsibility for administering local
government.10
Born in 1717, by the 1730s James Robertson wished to be an officer. To obtain a
commission, one needed political connections and money. Officer’s commissions up to the level
of colonel were bought, not earned. Rising in the ranks was as often a result of wealth and
station than of skill in battle.. As for generals, they almost always sprang from the titled
aristocracy. Loyalty to the king was a “necessary prerequisite for military command.” The army
9
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was a force which the entire social order might have to depend upon, and the officers had to be
people whose loyalty to the king was “bred into the bone.” Robertson’s rise is a testament to
talent and may be considered extraordinary, and may be attributed to his intelligence,
“canniness”, and capacity for hard work. Indeed, only two other individuals of modest
background seem to have advanced to comparable heights during the eighteenth century.
Robertson was unable to afford a commission, and enlisted as a volunteer in 1739 in the hope
of securing an officer’s commission for merit. He began as a private, and became a sergeant on
merit. He was soon commissioned as a second lieutenant in a marine regiment during the War
of Jenkins’s Ear. He eventually gained an important patron, the Earl of Loudoun, who became
commander-in-chief of the British Army in North America in 1756.11
The Earl of Loudoun had a taste for high living, and Klein and Howard suggest he
transmitted this to Robertson. The Earl is reported to have in one week consumed over six
dozen bottles of claret, Madeira, and other wines and alcoholic beverages. Perhaps not all had
been consumed by the Earl himself; his junior officers (of whom Robertson was one) often
dined with him, and these meals were usually attended by women. Robertson apparently
picked up some of these habits. On an official trip to New London for the Earl, he is reported to
have brought along the wife of one of his fellow officers. To make matters worse, he played
cards with her, offending the provincial governor. In Puritan-founded Connecticut, card-playing
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was illegal. By 1775, Robertson was presiding at his own parties in Boston—which was under
siege by rebellious Americans for much of that period.12
Robertson served for better than two decades in America, accomplishing much, and
learning more than how to live the high life. He made his mark as a staff officer, serving much
of the time in the staff of Lord Amherst, the new commander-in-chief, who became his new
patron. He served as quartermaster-general and inspector-general. His recommendations
concerning quartering troops were very influential in the Quartering Act in 1765. One of his
recommendations was creation of the post of Barrackmaster-General to centralize the work of
the separate barrackmasters in America. The post was created by the Act and given to him. As
Barrackmaster-General, he was responsible for the care of the permanent barracks in America,
their furnishing and supply. He supervised the work of twenty-seven barrackmasters in posts
from St. Augustine in Florida to Louisbourg on Cape Breton, to Detroit on the frontier.
Robertson remained in this role until June 30, 1776. 13
Working mainly out of New York City, he gained much influence with the merchants of
Boston and New York, purchasing the supplies the barracks needed from them (this function
later was performed by the Treasury Board in England). As a leading Scotsman, he joined the St.
Andrew’s Society in 1757. Here, he became acquainted with many of New York’s movers and
shakers, people who would soon become leading Loyalists or Patriots: Colden, the Livingstons,
and John Morin Scott to name a few. He bought a residence in New York City, and acquired
lands in Cumberland and Charlotte Counties. It is quite possible that during this time period he
engaged in profiteering on the supplies he purchased. What is clear is that he gave himself a
12
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commission of one percent on cash transferred to local barrack-masters; the Treasury
eventually claimed that he owed them ten thousand pounds.14 These allegations of corruption
would haunt him as Governor and helped to diminish his stature among Loyalists—especially
those who were disappointed by what they saw as his failures.

In September, 1774, Robertson joined Gage in Boston, acting as a staff officer, licensing
dram shops in Boston, and observing (but not participating in) the battles of Lexington-Concord
and Bunker Hill. Robertson was appointed a colonel-commandant and battalion commander in
January 1776 and with other “old colonels” was soon promoted to major-general, after what
seems to have been a bureaucratic error which originally left him off the promotion list. He
offered to lead an assault on Dorchester Heights in early March 1776. The fortification of these
heights overlooking Boston by the Americans (with guns obtained from the capture of Fort
Ticonderoga) made Boston untenable to the British. An assault on Dorchester Heights would
probably have involved a frontal assault similar to Bunker Hill, which was a Pyrrhic British
victory. Wisely, Robertson summoned a lawyer and wrote a will. Fortunately for Robertson, bad
weather intervened, and Howe, who by this time was in command in Boston, reconsidered the
proposed assault and decided instead to withdraw from Boston.15
The evacuation presented a problem of both policy and logistics. As staff officer,
Robertson was in charge of supervising the movement of men and materiel during the
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evacuation. He urged Howe to remove everything that could possibly be of use to the
Americans, and destroy the rest. But Howe feared an attack by Washington during the
embarkation. He did have a hostage: Boston. Between Howe’s army and the naval vessels,
Boston could have been destroyed. A tacit understanding seems to have been reached between
Howe and Washington that the British could leave unmolested. While attacking the British
rearguard might have been gratifying, especially after a long, boring, but occasionally deadly
siege, the price—the destruction of Boston—was just not worth it. Robertson, despite his
recommendation for destruction, seems to have been one of the chief assurers of Bostonians
that the city would not be ravaged. Howe was later accused, unjustly in one historian’s view, of
dereliction of duty for leaving too many stores in Boston. Robertson, by contrast, was accused
of plundering Boston for his own use, though that also seems to have been unjust. In addition,
Robertson was not in Boston during the last days of the British occupation, so it would have
been difficult for him to engage in pillage. Plundering for his own personal gain would also have
been senseless, since it would have been difficult to find a place on the transports to put illgotten goods. Room was at a premium on the evacuation fleet, since in addition to Howe’s
men, the transports also had to accommodate the persons and goods of many Boston
Loyalists.16
Robertson set sail for Halifax shortly before the evacuation to prepare for the arrival of
the evacuating army. Thousands of men would have to be fed, billeted, clothed, and provided
with firewood and other necessities in Halifax. Robertson, as Barrack-Master General, was a
perfect choice for this mission. This was Robertson’s last important assignment as a staff officer
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for General Howe. Robertson was soon informed of a War Office directive which effectively
prohibited the office of Barrack-Master General from being held by a regimental commander.
To keep his regimental command, Robertson had to give up his position as Barrack-Master in
June of 1776. Having been relieved of these duties, Robertson was given his first field
command, leading a brigade of four regiments under General Sir Henry Clinton.17
Howe’s army finally left Halifax, and headed for New York harbor. Originally, they
planned to land on Long Island, but Robertson is credited with changing Howe’s mind.
According to a report by Justice Smith of a conversation Smith had with Governor Tryon, Howe
“was running into the most perilous Temerity, proposing when he arrived from
Hallifax to land his little Army at New Utrecht. The Men were in the Boats when
he got General Robertson to hold this Language to him: ‘If you beat the Rebels
before the Reinforcements arrive, you disgrace the Ministry for sending them. If
you are defeated, they will be of no Use when they arrive. Land therefore on
Staten Island.”18

As discussed earlier, the delay in attacking Long Island has been criticized by numerous
parties. If one holds with the critical view, then Robertson is partially responsible for the British
wasting much of the summer. Alternately, Robertson stopped the British from engaging, with
less than their full force, in possibly yet another deadly frontal assault against prepared
positions.
Robertson’s brigade landed on Staten Island on July 3, and spent much of the summer of
1776 on Staten Island. When Long Island was finally invaded in late August, his brigade landed
at Gravesend in Brooklyn, and was in the second wave of the Long Island campaign, holding
17
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territory for the most part. On August 30, Robertson’s brigade was ordered to Hell’s Gate to
oppose General Lee, who was reported to be landing there. Marching from Gravesend,
Robertson and his brigade marched through Bedford and Cripplebush, the town spot of
Newtown (in present day northwest Queens). From there, they continued to Hell’s Gate, but
found no enemy. Robertson took up residence in a local house, while his men billeted for about
two weeks at Hell’s Gate.19
Robertson, a long-time resident of New York City, was convinced, like many British
officers and officials, that the rebels were a small minority, and that the majority of Long
Island’s inhabitants would welcome the British. He therefore urged that the British troops avoid
pillage and other actions that could turn the population against them. Not all of Howe’s
generals agreed with him; they urged that the British and Hessian troops be allowed to “ravage
at will” as a lesson.20 While in Newtown, Robertson took swift action against his own troops
who he caught plundering. He even issued a public promise that in the future his troops would
“abstain from a crime which disgraces even victory, and defeats the King’s intention to protect
and reclaim his American subjects.”21 Robertson also offered to personally compensate pillaged
Americans, though no evidence exists that anyone took him up on his offer.22
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On September 15 Howe invaded Manhattan, and after some battles and skirmishes, he
was in control of the entire island with the exception of a fort which fell in November. The next
day, Robertson was made military commandant of New York City. The city he took over had
been reduced by the flight of much of its populace to a population of about 400 or 500 people,
mostly Loyalists,23 but thousands of Loyalists would stream in during the next few months and
throughout the war. The influx of Loyalist refugees would continue throughout the war. But on
that September day, those who remained in New York City were overjoyed, pulling down and
trampling on rebel flags as a few months earlier the rebels had destroyed the statue of the
King.24 Manhattan was British again, and Robertson was its military ruler.
Five days after taking his position as commandant, Robertson was faced with the major
challenge of the great fire, which has been described in greater detail in Chapter III. Its main
effects were to destroy a substantial portion of the buildings in the city, making the remaining
housing stock rather crowded as more people moved to the city. Robertson tirelessly fought
the fire, and even sacrificed his home to ensure that the royal magazine and warehouse were
unharmed. General Howe and Governor Tryon both informed the ministry that Robertson’s
efforts had prevented the total destruction of the city.25

Robertson erected barracks and confiscated the vacant homes of rebels to use as officer
housing. Many buildings were converted into warehouses, and many churches into temporary
hospitals. Fortifications were rebuilt. The city fire watch was reestablished. Ten companies of
23
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volunteer militia were organized. In addition to its military uses, the militia provided something
to do for many of the Loyalist refugees. Municipal services such as street lights and cleaning
were reestablished, and a vestry for the poor was established. A police department under
Andrew Eliot, former receiver-general of customs, was created. There were no taxes or civilian
courts, and prices were set and trade controlled by Robertson himself.26
Despite the reestablishment of street cleaning, the streets were often dirty, and the
sanitation problem was never solved. “Noisome vapours” arose from the mud and from the
crowding. With the housing-stock reduced by perhaps one third by the fire, Loyalists, residents,
soldiers and sailors were forced to live in close quarters, increasing friction among the groups.
And with no true civil courts, there was little opportunity In New York City, or elsewhere in the
British zone, to get redress for the looting and other depredations of the troops. These included
drunken rioting by sailors, and even murders by drunken soldiers.27
Firm in his belief that most New York City residents were loyal subjects of the King (and,
since most were Loyalist refugees during his tenure as Commandant, he was undoubtedly
correct), Robertson’s rule was mild. He believed that the purpose of the military was to support
“the good Subjects against the bad.” Troops were ordered to avoid taking rebel property
without authorization, and pillaging soldiers were dealt with severely—one was even executed.
Hoping that acting humanely would help the British among those pre-disposed to British rule,
he treated American prisoners mildly, unlike other officials such as Provost Marshal William
Cunningham, who treated American prisoners abominably.28
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Robertson retained his post as Commandant till 1778. His tenure was punctuated by
several trips to London. His advice and views were sought out on these journeys, and George III
was personally notified that Robertson was in Britain in 1777. On a journey to Britain in 1779,
Robertson testified at the Parliamentary inquiry of General Howe. This inquiry had been
demanded by the Howes to vindicate their conduct of the war, which had come into question.
This inquiry was in many respects a battle between Germain and Howe, and Robertson’s
testimony aided Germain. Robertson thought that Howe on several occasions had allowed
Washington to slip from his grasp. Robertson maintained that much additional manpower was
not needed in the colonies. He also argued that two-thirds of the Americans were loyal, and
that if the point of taxation by Parliament had been abandoned, that would probably have
ended the war. The great object of the war, he argued, was “to be the regaining the people,
and to do this by letting them see we were their friends.”29
Robertson’s views on the war were outlined in a memorandum he wrote at the behest
of Lord Amherst. Lord Amherst had been Commander in Chief in America for much of the Seven
Years War; in 1779 he was Commander in Chief of the Forces, which gave him command of the
entire British Army and a seat in the Cabinet. He was also one of Robertson’s patrons. Amherst
forwarded the memorandum to the King on or about January 1, 1779. In the “Memorandums
Relative to the Mode of Making War in America,” Robertson asserted that his belief was wellfounded that a majority of Americans wished to be subjects of the King and were adverse to the
revolutionary government, “and it is on this foundation, we should build our hopes of renewing
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all the advantages this nation can derive from its Colonys.” The rebellion’s authors were well
aware of this, and seduced the people by “artfully” taking “advantages of incidents, which I
need not mention in detail…to induce a general beleif, that no alternative was left the
inhabitants, but taking arms, or submitting to slavery.” 30
Robertson continued:

I have proofs in my hands from some of the best inform’d of the rebel councils,
and of the state of the peoples minds, dated two years ago—that if the two
foundations on which the rebellion stood, were taken away, by an explicit
declaration on our part, that the right of taxation by us, wou’d be given up and a
general pardon granted, that the congress would not be able to raise a thousand
men.31

However, Robertson continued that “Circumstances are now much alter’d, the address and
management necessary now to bring the people back to their duty… must now be much
greater.” What was before easy would now require great talent. One possible method
suggested itself; the ambitions of half the rebel leaders had been disappointed, and offices they
had sought had gone to rivals. No “very profound management or refined policy” was
necessary to induce them to prefer a position of consequence under the British to being
mortified by being subject to their rivals—though it would be necessary to understand the state
of each colony and the interests and resentments of their leading men.32
Here, Robertson is arguing that some appeal to the hunger for office and preferment
that existed in both Britain and America should be used to “bring…people back to their duty”.
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As the historian Gordon Wood notes, while not as developed in America as it was in Britain, a
hierarchical, “monarchical” society of patrons and preference did exist in the colonies, a milieu
of striving for honors (many of which could only be given by a patron). Indeed, Wood argues
that much of the “radicalism” of the American Revolution consisted of the ending of this
monarchical society, though this process would take decades. Even that most quintessential
American, Benjamin Franklin, had strived mightily as a young man so that he could retire in
middle age as a gentleman.33 A survey of the writings of many British generals shows a striving
after honor and an awareness of the slightest slights. This can also be seen on the American
side. For example, Nathaniel Greene bitterly resented becoming quartermaster of
Washington’s army because he thought it would deprive him of the glory he sought (to his
credit, he served in the post well and was eventually awarded with the Southern Command.)34
Benedict Arnold’s resentments at perceived slights and in not receiving the glory and posts and
recognition that he believed he was due (in most cases, quite rightly) led him to treason.
However, while there was at least some hunger for office and advancement on the rebel side, it
was difficult to find too many rebel leaders who could be turned, as Reed had shown a few
months earlier. Disappointed many of them may have been in not getting positions they had
hoped for, but personal advancement through obtaining government or military office was
probably not the only, or even the main, reason they had supported the rebellion. The vast
majority of rebel leaders probably truly believed in the ideals of the Revolution to one extent or
another, and could not be seduced back to the Crown by the mere offer of a position. Even
those who might have been susceptible to temptation were unlikely to be tempted under the
33
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relatively favorable circumstances of late 1778 (when the memorandum was most likely
written). It was possible, if not probable, that some rebel leaders would turn or “trim” under
conditions of invasion or conquest, as many Long Island patriots had trimmed, but not under
the relatively favorable conditions prevailing in late 1778.35
As discussed above, there had been much consensus among Americans on the broad
outlines of political philosophy and on the injustice and unconstitutional nature of Britain’s
policy. Even many who became leading Loyalists had been in general agreement on most of
these ideas and ideals. That so many British officers and officials thought an appeal to the
desire for office would be generally useful shows a profound misunderstanding of the
Revolution, the character of the Americans, and of the leadership of the Revolution. It should
also be noted that the Revolution, with its revolutionary committees and new governments and
fleeing British and Loyalist officials, had both freed-up and created many new positions for
leaders to fight for. For example, there were eleven (twelve if we include Vermont) new
governorships now available to Americans (as opposed to Britons, as had been the usual
practice), and thirteen or fourteen new state councils.36 Many “new men” arose through the
increase in political participation that occurred during the Revolution. Indeed, Robertson’s
soon-to-be- counterpart, Governor George Clinton of “free” New York, is generally considered
one of these.37
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In his testimony at the Howe Inquiry, Robertson had argued that few Americans had
returned to their allegiance because British troops had rarely stayed in any place for long.38
Loyalists were afraid that if they showed their loyalty, they would be punished once the British
left—so they kept quiet.39 In his Memorandum, Robertson told Amherst that the rebels were
trying to create a belief “that we are about to abandon our friends and that the country is to be
given up to them”. This belief had to be destroyed. He suggested that the government should
issue a declaration that “we will not abandon our friends, or quit the country,” and that this
declaration should be communicated to the people at large.40
Robertson suggested cutting off communications between New England and the other
colonies by seizing the Highlands. Possessing this area would not only starve out New England,
but result in about six thousand Loyalist troops—a substantial reinforcement. Since “the gros
[greater amount] of the respectable inhabitants of a Country are not to be expected to” act as
soldiers, the duties of the Loyalist troops would be mainly patrol and defense—and all without
costing the government a penny, since they would be local volunteers. With the lower Hudson
and northern Jersey in British hands, supplies, provisions, and forage would be greatly
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improved.41 Robertson’s thinking, we can see, was dove-tailing with the recommendations that
the Carlisle Commission had been making, and similar to Germain’s thinking of late 1778 and
early 1779.
Robertson suggested raids against New England, particularly Salem and Newbury. This
would destroy privateers and prevent reinforcements from being sent against the assault on
the Hudson. Robertson strongly urged that “The Army shou’d not wander to places that cant be
supported nor shou’d we call people into Arms who cant be sustain’d”. This would only result in
a defeat which would aid the rebels. Those people that could be properly supported by the
government should be “put under a civil government the offices shoul’d be fill’d by the most
respectable of the inhabitants, every priviledge and advantage even in trade shou’d be given,
their State shou’d be made the envy of the neighbours, this wou’d bring numbers under our
protection.”42 Again, his thinking was similar to ideas under discussion among the ministry.
Robertson believed that the government of a restored British Province of New York
would soon be self-supporting. The example of a restored Royalist New York, plus negotiations
and the progress of British arms, would disabuse the other provinces and the rebels of the idea
that Britain was abandoning the colonies. Indeed, with civil government restored, trade
restored, and leading New Yorkers in most major posts, and with the rebel colonies subject to
invasion and raid, they would “regret their condition, and wish for our protection.”43
Robertson’s and Germain’s views on America and the possibilities of civil government
meshed. Robertson’s testimony and his memorandum both asserted that a majority—two
41
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thirds—of Americans supported the King. The war could be won through persuasion
(supplemented by the sensible and effective use of military force). Robertson’s memorandum,
if not read by Germain, was surely discussed with him by Amherst or the King. The similarity of
views of Robertson and Germain in early 1779, plus Robertson’s long experience in America and
in New York, made him perhaps the perfect choice to restore civilian government to New York.
The fact that Robertson’s testimony aided Germain in his battle with Howe certainly did not
hurt, but the decision may have been made before the testimony. In any event, his royal
commission making him governor of New York was signed on May 11, 1779.44

II

In early July, 1779, Robertson was instructed by Germain that “Sir Henry Clinton
[Commander in Chief in America] is vested with the powers to restore to Peace the whole, or
any part of Province if he shall judge it fitting, in which case the Civil Constitution will revive.”
Once an area had been declared at peace, then civil government was restored, and Robertson’s
authority as civil governor of New York would become activated. Germain then informed
Robertson as to the “measures…it is wished you should adopt, as Opportunities may offer for
carrying them into Execution.” 45
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As Governor, Robertson would appoint a Council. Germain stressed that it was of the
utmost importance that the loyalties of council members be without a doubt. Germain spoke
much of the possibility of calling a new assembly, but acknowledged that it was a matter which
would require much consideration. While the King desired to “give Proof” to New Yorkers and
other Americans that it was “not His Majesty’s intention to govern America by Military Law,” it
was stressed to Robertson that “it would defeat that end, if an Assembly were convened before
such part of the Province was restored to Peace.” A loyal assembly was desired.46
A declaratory act would be issued annulling all laws and legal proceedings of the rebel
government. Robertson was to give free allotments of land to refugees desiring to settle in
New York, and to provide for the support of those refugees needing it. Deserted tenements
could be used for troops or rented out. Getting to the heart of the dispute between the
colonies and the mother country, Germain told Robertson that

The making a permanent Provision for the Provincial Expenses and fixing a ratio
for the Contribution of New York to the General Charge of the Empire would be
no more than suitable Returns for the Generousity of Parliament in relinquishing
all Purpose of imposing Taxes in the Colonies, except as Regulations of Trade,
and even in that case suffering the Revenue arising from them to be carried to
the Account of the Colonies.47

By taking the lead in enacting such a “dutiful and grateful Measure”, Germain stated, that New
York would be eligible for particular favor. To encourage this, Robertson could assure the
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Assembly that quitrent arrears would be remitted by his majesty and that future revenue would
be spent within the province.48
In summary, civilian government was to be restored in those parts of New York that had
been pacified. This had clearly been achieved in the three off-shore islands, and New Yorkers
such as William Smith had been clamoring for such an action for several years. Some difficulty
with Clinton was anticipated. The Howe brothers had feared civilian interference because it was
likely to restrain or divert military operations, 49 and Clinton would probably be similarly
reluctant. However, it was difficult to see how downstate New York could not be declared at
peace. Despite the occasional raid from Connecticut or New Jersey, the area was secured.
Outside of Halifax, it was probably the securest British possession on the continent.
Even though he was being sent as a civilian governor, Robertson retained his military
rank. To avoid too much friction with Clinton and the other military officers, Robertson was
directed not to actively command troops. 50

Despite the importance of the mission, Robertson did not leave London until September
16, 1779. One of the reasons for the delay was probably the failed Franco-Spanish “Other
Armada” that slipped into the Channel and threatened England with invasion in late July and
August of that year. The campaign against the Armada did not end until early September.51
Until then, sailing was hazardous. From London, Robertson sailed to Cork, Ireland. Here he
awaited the assembly of a supply fleet, with which he was to sail to North America. He waited
48

Ibid.
Davies, 113.
50
K & H 44, Germain to Clinton, Apr 1, 1779, DAR XVII, 94, in K & H, 44.
51
See GIII, Nos. 2716-2723, Vol IV, 395-401, which detail the reported operations of the French and Spanish fleets
and the British response, and Mckesy, 279-297 for more details, as well as Patterson, op.cit.
49

263

for an extremely long time. The dangers of attack by the French, Spanish, or the occasional
American privateer made trans-Atlantic travel a dangerous proposition requiring much
planning. While the Admiralty and Navy Boards did yeoman’s service in the immensely difficult
task of supplying an army 2000 miles (or two months travel time) away, there were often many
delays. Indeed, the British historian McKesy believes that the shipping bottleneck killed British
hopes for decisive victory in 1776.52 In any event, Robertson was delayed by the assembly of
the supply fleet he was to sail with. Further delay in reaching New York was occasioned by the
fact that the fleet that he sailed with was not headed to New York, but to Savannah, Georgia.53
Travelling on board the Raleigh, Robertson arrived in Savannah on February 16, 1780.
The British army was then involved in an early phase of the so-called “Southern Strategy,” and
Charleston (or “Charles Town”, as Robertson called it) was being besieged. Robertson was soon
transported to James Island, opposite Charleston, where the British army was headquartered.
General Sir Henry Clinton himself was overseeing operations. Since the Raleigh was in much
demand for operations against Charleston, and getting to New York would take some time,
Robertson offered his services in any capacity in the siege. This was not in violation of his
orders, as he was not yet in New York, and it is likely that the general wished one more chance
to serve in a military capacity before taking up his civilian duties. While he would probably
have been given a staff position, perhaps he hoped for a last chance for the martial glory that
had eluded him in an otherwise stellar career. Robertson laconically recorded that “Sir Henry
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after considering the Matter, next Morning told me that he thought I could be of most Service
at New York.” Robertson soon transferred to the Russel, which transported him to New York. 54
Robertson, a few months shy of his sixty-third birthday, arrived in New York City on
March 21, 1780.55 The weather was cold, and six inches of snow would fall on March 31 and
April 1.56 A small reception was held for him on the evening of his arrival, attended by a “large
company of Ladies and others,” including William Smith. Smith noted that Robertson was “thin
but sound in Health.” Smith and Robertson had known each other for twenty years, and had
worked with each other during the Drummond peace proposal.57 Smith, who was greatly
interested in seeing civil government restored, was quite pleased with Robertson’s arrival. He
stated in his journal that the “multitude” of Loyalists “sighed” for Robertson’s arrival. In
general, the sentiment among New Yorkers at Robertson’s arrival seems to have been
favorable. Andrew Elliot, then police chief of New York City and soon to be Lieutenant-
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Governor, considered him a sensible and intelligent man with a cheerful temper. However, not
all were pleased. It can be inferred from his History that the Scots-hating Thomas Jones was not
as pleased. Indeed, he described at some length how Robertson, in his old position of Barrack
Master, would clip coins called “half Joes” when paying contractors, which they had little choice
but to take; the coins, according to Jones, became known as “Robertsons”. Jones then argues
that Robertson “was universally despised and execrated by” New York’s inhabitants. Of course,
Jones was a man of strong opinions and heavily biased against Prebyterians and Scots.58 Still,
many seemed to view Robertson’s appointment favorably or at least hopefully—and a sizable
amount of New York City’s population, as refugees from elsewhere, probably had little memory
of Robertson’s alleged corruption. It would soon become apparent that Clinton did not view
Robertson’s arrival as favorably as many of the New Yorkers seemed to view it.
Robertson swiftly went to work. On March 22, he summoned the Council. 59 Except for
two additions occasioned by deaths, it was the same Council that had sailed to meet with Tryon
on board the Dutchess of Gordon four years earlier. Among its notable members was Andrew
Elliot, former receiver general of revenues and collectors of customs and during the occupation
superintendant of police (among other duties); Oliver DeLancey, who as brigadier general was
the highest ranking American Loyalist, Roger Morris, a Westchester loyalist who was connected
by marriage to the Phillipse family, and William Smith. Smith was made the Chief Justice; he
would prove to be the last Chief Justice of the Province of New York.
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Governor Tryon seemed to relish his military duties more than his civilian duties and had
put little pressure on the military authorities to restore civil government. So New York had
remained under martial law, while its nominal governor led several raids on Connecticut and
other places. A severe attack of gout afflicted Tryon about the time of Robertson’s arrival. As
Smith records Robertson’s inauguration:

We read the Commission with Tryon’s Consent in a Room opposite to his
Bedroom, fearing it would be too much for him to hear it and then administered
the Oaths in his Presence to the new Governor. On which he delivered the Great
Seals and a Number of Papers. We then returned and took the Oaths ourselves.
And afterwards proceeded to the Balcony of the City Hall from whence after
Proclamation to keep Silence it was read again. The Day concluded in a Dinner at
General Tryon’s which he could not attend.60

Robertson informed Smith that he had “no Authority to set up Civil Government till Sir.
H.C. [Clinton] has declared the Country at the King’s Peace. But Sr. H will do this on its being
asked.” Robertson seemed to think that Clinton’s declaration was only a mere formality, or at
least something that could be obtained fairly easily. Robertson soon asked Smith to draft an
“Instrument” declaring part of New York at the King’s Peace, plus a letter to Clinton urging the
declaration be made without delay. Smith hurried these to Robertson.61
In this Smith-prepared letter to Clinton, Robertson informed Clinton that he could “do
nothing very material, towards attaining the great Objects of my Civil Commission, until your
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Excellency shall have declared such Parts of this Colony, as are within our Lines, at the King’s
Peace.” Military force alone, he said, could not satisfy the Loyalists of downstate New York. In a
passage which perhaps reflected Smith’s views as much as Robertson, he stated that “I find
that they [the Loyalists] have been looking for my Arrival, as connected with the immediate
Revival of the Civil Authority, and the Restoration of the Blessings of the Constitution, which it
is the King’s Wish they should enjoy.”62
Citing intelligence gathered by Tryon “which seems daily to receive Confirmation,”
Robertson informed Clinton that there was a “great and favorable Change of Temper” among
the rebels. He strongly suspected that the “Usurpers”, as he called the rebel leadership, would
abandon their arms if they had “Hope of an Act of Oblivion” [a general pardon for political
offenses] to shield them from the “vindictive rage of their own Countrymen.” An assembly
would be required to pass such an act. If an assembly could be called, Robertson said that he
would consider the rebellion finished in New York, and sure to end soon in the other colonies.63
While Germain had stressed to Robertson the importance of an assembly,64 the
influence of Robertson’s “ghost-writer” Smith can be seen in these passages. Smith was a
strong supporter of restoring civil government, and clearly was taking the opportunity
Robertson had given him to push his own views on Clinton. This was not the first time Smith
had been presented with such an opportunity. In December of 1779 he had dined with Josiah
Martin II, formerly royal governor of North Carolina, and nephew of the Loyalist Josiah Martin
of Rock Hall on Long Island. Martin confidentially told him that he would be joining General
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Clinton’s upcoming Southern expedition and that he was to be the royal Governor of South
Carolina. Martin asked Smith what he would advise him to do. Smith advised Martin to convoke
an Assembly as quickly as possible for two reasons. The first reason would be to encourage and
support loyal militias, and the second would be to encourage the rebels to return to their
Allegiance. Smith also told Martin that the “Obstinancy of the Rebellion” was encouraged not
by “a Distrust of the King’s Clemency nor the Nation’s Liberality, but the Wrath of their own
Countrymen.” Only an Act of Oblivion could save the rebel leadership from private actions for
compensation, and only a colonial legislature would be likely to enact one. It seem that the
judicially-minded Smith feared civil actions mainly, not more violent forms of “compensation”
(or revenge) against the rebels. In the event, both Loyalists and Patriots, particularly in South
Carolina but also in the New York City region, often had to worry about violent forms of
“compensation.” The advice Smith gave in December to Martin was very similar to the wording
of the March letter Smith drafted for Robertson.65
Robertson told Clinton he was anxious to begin the “Experiment.” It would be, if it
worked, “productive of the greatest Benefits” and to the Crown’s advantage. Even if his
expectations were too high, it would still be helpful by “subdividing the Faction” and increasing
the number of the King’s Friends. He also added, probably aware of Howe’s problems with
restoring civil government and Clinton’s likely similar qualms, that “Civil Government
administered by a Friend to the Troops would conduce to their Interest and Accomodation.” In
other words, as Governor he would not let the civilian government get in the way of military
65
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operations. He even added his belief that civil government would make the soldiers better
soldiers.66
Robertson enclosed in his letter a form proclamation drafted by Smith whereby the
King’s Peace was declared in New York, Staten Island, and Nassau (or Long) Island.67 While
awaiting the positive reply which he expected Clinton to give, Robertson prepared, with the
assistance of Smith and others, a proclamation that promised civil government in the near
future. This proclamation was issued as a broadside on April 15, 1780, and soon printed in
newspapers. It was frequently reprinted, and was even printed in German (many tenants in
upstate New York were German-speaking). In this proclamation, Robertson informed New
Yorkers that His Majesty wished to revive civil government to prove to all that it was his desire
to govern America not by military law, but by civilian. He mentioned the steps he had already
taken, and stated that as soon as possible, he would reopen the Courts and convene an
Assembly. Robertson in the proclamation stated that he took “great Satisfaction in the
Anticipation of that happy Day,” when “Your Country with your antient privileges, will then
participate in an extensive Commerce and be exempted from all Taxations not imposed by
yourselves”. He stated that Patriot claims that Britain intended to impair American rights and
66

Robertson to Clinton, New York, 29 March 1780, Letterbook, 88-9. It is also possible that Robertson was hinting
that his civil government would, whenever possible, turn a blind eye to military transgressions against civilians,
such as the failure to pay for goods the army had taken.
67
Smith, Memoirs, III, 630. The British also controlled part of Westchester (including the modern Bronx), as well as
a small section of New Jersey. Much military action occurred in these regions, and these areas were clearly frontlines. In such circumstances, it made sense to not include British-controlled Westchester in the area where civil
government was to be restored, as it was a military region requiring military rule. “Nassau” is an old name for
Long Island, dating back to at least 1693, when Governor Fletcher proposed it to his Council and they accepted it.
His stated purpose was to honor the King, William III, by naming the island after the king’s family name. See Flint,
326. As William was of Dutch origin, it is possible that the name change had the additional purpose of pleasing the
island and province’s sizable Dutch population. The name “was neither popular, nor generally adopted.” The act
was never repealed, and thus in 1780 the official name of the island was Nassau. However, the act “was suffered
to become obsolete by disuse.” Thompson, 246-7. The name is preserved in the name of the county formed out of
eastern Queens after the western portion was incorporated into New York City in the late 1890s.

270

privileges were false and malicious, as were insinuations that she wanted to abandon the
provinces to anarchy or “the fraudulent and ambitious Views of foreign, Popish, and arbitrary
Powers.” Britain, happy under her Constitution which was the envy of her neighbors, wished
“to include in one comprehensive System of Felicity, all the Branches of a Stock, intimately
connected by the Ties of Language, Manners, Laws, Customs, Habits, Interests, Religion, and
Blood.” He warned “the Few who have found Means to acquire a Sway in the Management of
your Affairs” to desist, from any future Attempts to restrain and seduce the Loyalty of others.”
He promised protection and support to all those who accepted the proclamation of a general
pardon (to those who returned to their “duty”) issued in early March by Clinton, who had also
been made a peace commissioner. Robertson also promised that those “who shall most
distinguish themselves by their laudable Efforts for these good Purposes, will most assuredly
best recommend themselves to the Royal Approbation and Favour.”68
Again, the Proclamation indicated the common belief of many Britons that the rebellion
was by a small few, and that the majority wished to remain under British rule. New York would
be returned to its pre-Revolutionary state, and constitutional government under the king would
be restored. Pardons would be liberally granted, and commerce restored (this may have been
considered particularly appealing to a commercially-oriented state like New York.) And again,
the granting of signs of favor—such as positions and perhaps titles—by the King was implied for
those who distinguished themselves in “accomplishing the King’s most gracious Design of
restoring the Blessings of Peace and good Government.”69 Robertson would no doubt have
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agreed with Serle and others who wanted to make the colonies more like Britain by granting
titles and offices, and importing as much of Britain’s patronage system as possible.
The April 15 broadside was posted at several places, such as outside the offices of James
Rivington, the Loyalist publisher of the Royal Gazette. Smith reports that crowds were
“perusing” the Proclamation that had been affixed to Rivington’s Corner, and that he had been
told by Henry White (a wealthy merchant and a member of the Council) that it went down with
the resentful “like chopped Hay”. The merchant Will Bayard and the Loyalist Ashfield were
reported to have been livid at what they saw as the liberality of Clinton’s proclamation.
However, years after the event, Thomas Jones remembered things differently: “The Inhabitants
within the British lines, long oppressed by the imperious mandates and tyrannical sway of the
military, were charmed with the thoughts of being restored to the enjoyment of civil law.”
These hopes, he goes on to record, were soon dashed by the creation of the Police Courts,
which will be further discussed below. 70
A question has to be asked—why was this proclamation issued at all? It is doubtful that
Clinton, then in South Carolina, had even received Robertson’s March 29th letter, much less had
time to reply. It is possible that Robertson—or possibly Smith—was trying to put pressure on
Clinton by presenting him with a proclamation that it would have been most embarrassing to
reject. Perhaps he wished to remind Clinton that restoring civil government was not only the
Ministry’s wish, but that of His Majesty himself. Or perhaps he was eager to get on with the
“experiment”, and, unable to proceed officially without Clinton’s blessing, did what he could
legitimately do in early April, 1780: tell everyone that civil government would soon be restored.
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If so, he probably acted on the assumption that the proclamation that southern New York was
“at the King’s Peace” would surely be made by Clinton. It is dangerous to assume. Clinton never
certified that any part of New York was pacified—not in April, May, or June 1780, not on his
return to New York, not ever. Without that certification, British New York could not be returned
to civilian government under the King. Clinton, despite the manifest fact that the region was
pacified and acquiescent to British rule, never certified that it was. Civilian government did not
return to southern New York until George Washington entered New York City in late 1783.
Why did Clinton not certify southern New York was at peace? There is a strong
possibility that certain personality problems of Clinton may have had a major influence on his
failure to certify. To better understand his actions of 1780, actions that doomed Germain’s
hope to make New York a shining example to the other colonies, this work will now briefly
review Clinton’s life and career.

III

As his biographer William J. Willcox puts it, Henry Clinton, “like most men who rose to
be generals in eighteenth-century England, was born with a silver spoon in his mouth.” While
England was not an ancien regime in the French sense, and its thriving merchant and middle
classes did permit some social mobility, such developments barely touched the officer class.
The army was the particular sphere of royal influence, “for only men whose loyalty to the
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Crown was bred into the bone could be trusted to control the force on which the social order
depended.” One had to be a titled aristocrat or a member of the gentry to be an officer. Most
of the higher officers of the British army of the time were either members of the peerage,
future members of the peerage, or the younger brothers of those in or destined for the House
of Lords. Indeed, many British colonels and generals in the Seven Years War and American
Revolution were Members of Parliament. While there were rare exceptions, such as James
Robertson, they were the proverbial exceptions which proved the rule. To rise in the army,
proper ancestry and connections were more important than merit; patronage could be more
important than winning battles. Clinton came from a well-connected family that was titled in its
own right.71
Clinton’s family traced its earldom back to the time of Elizabeth, and another branch of
his family had been barons since the 1200s. More importantly, Clinton’s uncle, the Earl of
Lincoln, had married a sister of the Duke of Newcastle (who was one of George II’s first
ministers); in 1768 the Duke died sonless, making Henry Clinton’s cousin (the Duke’s nephew)
the new Duke of Newcastle. Henry Clinton was thus well-connected to a powerful family; in
addition, Clinton was in the line of succession for a dukedom as well. Henry’s father used his
many connections to gain positions, and had a career at sea. This meant that Henry rarely saw
his father. 72
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In such a system of patronage, it is necessary that one “put oneself forward,” and
indicate to one’s patrons one’s suitability and desire for a position. 73 While one must avoid
being over-aggressive and assertive, and must be ever mindful of the niceties of dealing with
one’s social “superiors”, one must avoid “bashfulness”. Bashfulness is a harmful personality
trait in such a social system. George Clinton, Henry’s father, was bashful, and thought that his
less-than- sterling early career had been due in part to “a diffidence, peculiar to my family and
self, of my own sufficiency.” He preferred to communicate with his patron, Newcastle, by letter,
because of a “family bashfulness”. George Clinton not only seemed to lack self-confidence and
be unassertive, but believed his unassertiveness was a family trait. His biographer, while
doubting that such a trait was genetic, believes that a belief in this unfortunate “family trait”
was transmitted to his son Henry. In short, Henry Clinton, while in many ways gifted, lacked the
needed self-confidence to fully use his gifts.74
George eventually became Governor of New York in 1743 (staying in that post until
1753), and Henry, who had been born in 1730, spent much of his adolescence in New York
province. He attended Reverend Samuel Seabury’s school at Hempstead on Long Island, where
he apparently made the acquaintance of Seabury’s son, also called Samuel. This younger
Seabury would later become the first bishop of the American Episcopal Church. In 1745, during
King George’s War, Henry served in Manhattan as lieutenant of fusiliers, and saw some action
on Prince Edward’s Island after the capture of Louisbourg. By 1751, he was commissioned in
the Coldstream Guards (then, as now, one of the elite regiments of the British Army) as a
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captain lieutenant. He appears to have been a man-about-town during his years in London, and
his father, appalled at his expenses, asked Lord Lincoln to obtain for him a “genteel post.”
Lincoln got him a position as aide-de-camp to Sir John Ligonier in 1756. Ligonier, of French
origin, was Britain’s top soldier, and in 1757 became Lord Ligonier, field marshal, and
commander in chief of the army in Britain. By becoming his aide-de-camp, Clinton was now in
the highest circles of the army.75
In 1760, his regiment was ordered to Germany, and he managed to secure service with
the future Duke of Brunswick, nephew of the Prussian king and soon to be one of Europe’s top
soldiers. He soon became the future Duke’s aide-de-camp. At the Battle of Friedberg in 1762,
Clinton and the future Duke were both wounded. Not realizing that Clinton was injured, the
Duke, who was being carried off the field on a cannon, ordered Clinton to bring a report to
Prince Ferdinand, the Commander in Chief. Clinton was unable to comply, and had to march
two leagues before he was eventually “hacked” by a German surgeon. He never fully recovered
from the “hacking”, but did gain a reputation for gallantry from the incident. 76
After the war, he married, probably from love, as his wife had no major connections.
Unfortunately, Harriet Clinton died in 1772, shortly after delivering her fifth child in five years.
By all accounts, Clinton was devastated. That same year, he was promoted to major general,
and elected as a Member of Parliament for a borough in Yorkshire. In 1774, he was again
elected a Member of Parliament for a different district, and in February, 1775, he was ordered
to America. In 1775, he was a good soldier, seemingly ready to take on an independent field
command, with a keen analytical mind, and good strategic planning skills. However, he was also
75
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sensitive and “prickly”. Eighteenth century British officers were often prickly; they were ever
alert to perceived slights to their honor, were often quarrelsome, angry at rebukes, and saw
nothing insubordinate about criticizing their superiors. However, Clinton seems to have been
perhaps excessively prickly. He was constantly quarreling and threatening to resign. He had
difficult working or getting along with his fellow officers, and this difficulty seemed to increase
in proportion to stress.77
In the war, Clinton’s plans were sound. In 1776, he urged more aggressive use of British
sea power to trap Washington on Manhattan, and the Southern Strategy he tried to implement
was in many ways sensible. Like Robertson, he did not agree with moving into an area only to
leave again; he believed this was a betrayal of trust. His Hudson campaign of 1777, while it
failed and was soon negated by Howe’s ordering of troops away from him, was masterful. Yet,
Clinton had difficulty working with his superiors and inferiors. There is evidence that his plans
were often rejected because he was the source—he had made himself so obnoxious that his
suggestions were rejected. His biographer, after looking at these and similar traits, believes that
he was at war with himself, had difficulty in sharing authority, and argues that he was
neurotic.78
In what was perhaps one of the earliest attempts at using psychology to understand the
actions of long-dead historical figures, Willcox in the 1950s conducted a “joint investigation” of
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Clinton’s writings with Frederick Wyatt, then head of the Psychological Clinic at the University
of Michigan. Wyatt and Willcox argued that Clinton

as an adult had a particularly intense craving for authority of his own, because at
some deep level he was still trying to free himself from that of his parents. In
the eyes of the world he succeeded, for at the peak of his career he had
authority in full measure and much of the time he used it with apparent selfassurance. But the assurance was precarious. Part of him insisted, at the same
deep level, that he was a usurper guilty of intruding on the parental domain…[At
times the insistence was so great that…] he was so torn between his craving and
his guilt that he could not exercise the authority he had.79

Psychoanalyzing a long-dead historical figure is a difficult proposition. Willcox and
Wyatt’s attempt, however, is impressive and worthy of serious consideration. Wyatt, after all,
was the head of a psychology clinic at a major university. Of course, Freudian analysis is not in
as much vogue as it used to be, and many schools of psychology compete with it. Still, whether
Clinton was neurotic or not (or whether neurosis is even a real or useful diagnosis), the
evidence is clear that he had difficulty sharing authority, and had little desire to share any
authority over New York with Robertson. On learning of Robertson’s appointment, he asked
“What do they mean by it?”80 So, a difficulty in sharing authority, perhaps a neurotic difficulty
in sharing authority, may have been one reason he failed to certify New York as pacified. But
there may have been other reasons for his puzzling failure.
Recall that the Howe brothers had become peace commissioners in May of 1776. As
commissioners, they had the power to declare colonies or parts of colonies “at the King’s
Peace” assuming several conditions (most noticeably the dissolution of revolutionary
79
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congresses and committees and the meeting of an Assembly which declared its allegiance to
the King) had been achieved. They too failed to create a civilian government in New York,
Rhode Island, New Jersey or Philadelphia. While the Philadelphia occupation was relatively
short, and the Jersey occupation was ephemeral and then minimal (a few port cities guarding
Manhattan and Staten Island), the Rhode Island occupation lasted two years, and the New York
occupation for the entire war. Yet during the Howe’s term as commissioner, they never
attempted to achieve civil government in New York or Rhode Island. The Rhode Island failure
seems even more puzzling in some ways than the New York failure. In December, 1776, the
island of Rhode Island had been captured by Clinton, bottling up the “Continental Fleet” in
Narragansett Bay81, sealing off the Long Island Sound, and providing a possible base for a move
on Boston. The main city of the island was Newport, then one of America’s five cities.82 The
province of Rhode Island had long been New England’s “Siberia”; a place of exile, either
voluntary or through expulsion, for those who disagreed with the Puritan establishments in
Massachusetts and Connecticut. In 1776, much of Rhode Island was Quaker. Newport and the
island of Rhode Island were mainly Quaker. Quakers were pacifists (those who took up arms
were often those who had fallen away from the Society of Friends, such as “the Fighting
Quaker”, Nathanael Greene). They also believed in obedience to established authority—and
many of them thought that meant the British. While mainly neutral during the war, because of
their acquiescence to British rule, they were often thought to be Loyalists. Many suffered for
81
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this; for example, in foraging expeditions during the winter of 1777 and 1778, American troops
from Valley Forge would often confiscate food from Quaker farms because they were thought
to have Loyalist sympathies.83 But Quaker acquiescence to authority meant that the British had
few problems governing Newport and the island. It seems that the island of Rhode Island would
have been a good candidate for an experiment in restoring government. But no such
experiment was attempted. The concept of creating alternative, loyal American governments
and then negotiating with them, as one historian notes, did not seem to occur to the Howes.84
With the exception of the Carlisle Commission in 1778, the power to restore civil
government was exclusively in the hands of the commanders-in-chief of the Army and Navy.
When William Howe left for Britain, the power transferred to Clinton as Peace Commissioner,
and after the Carlisle Commission, Admiral Arbuthnot became the Commander-in-Chief of the
Navy and a Peace Commissioner. Arbuthnot was an experienced naval commander, twenty
years Clinton’s elder, and had recently been given the high rank of Vice Admiral of the Blue. 85
Some believed that leaving the power of peace in the hands of the main general and admiral
was a problem, and that, as Germain argued in late 1781, “finishing the war should not so
absolutely depend upon the decision of those whose interest in continuing it may in some
degree influence their judgments.”86 Here Germain seems to imply that the Howes and Clinton
did not pursue peace as well as they could have, preferring military victory or glory (indeed, the
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statement follows a paragraph extolling the policy of establishing civil government). This is
unfair to Clinton and the Howes, but there is a kernel of truth here. A civilian power could
restrain military freedom of action; the Howes and Clinton “feared civilian interference, not
because it might put an end to the war and their own importance, but because it was likely to
restrain or divert their military operations.”87 Military men might reject a chance for peace
(such as, for argument’s sake, civilian government in New York) in exchange for an opportunity
for military victory—which in the long run might not prove as valuable as the peaceful path.
And military officers would tend to think that the best way to achieve peace was to beat the
enemy decisively, not negotiation. Sometimes, they would be quite correct in thinking this, but
in the situation of a colonial rebellion, it is at least arguable that victory is more likely to be
achieved through a combination of military victory and winning the people over. Germain
argued that “It is much to be wished that some one person should be invested with full power
to treat of and conclude peace” in order to avoid “future jealousies and misunderstandings.”88
So, an apprehension or worry by both the Howes and Clinton as to civilian interference in
military operations seems to be another possibility. Indeed, in Robertson’s letter of March 29th,
1780, discussed above, he tried to allay these fears.89
Thomas Jones had a darker explanation for the failure to establish civilian government
Jones, writing years after the events, was angry at many involved in the loss of New York to the
British Empire, British as well as rebels, and tended to believe many were activated by vile,
sinister, self-interested motives. The high ideals and expressions of belief in Constitutional
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principle of the revolutionaries, to Jones, merely were masks for their real reasons. Jones
believed that if civilian government had been restored, the result would be that the restored
civilian courts would order compensation for seizures by the military, and punish and prevent
much corruption by British military and government officials. He believed that the occupation
authorities had no desire to see that happen. Jones must be read with the proverbial grain of
salt, especially when he assigns a base motive for an action. Still, there may be more of a grain
of truth to his explanation for the British failure to establish civil government.90 As will be
discussed further below, Robertson created three “Police Courts” in lieu of restoring the civil
courts. With his usual tendency to see only the worst in people, Jones ascribed this to having
“no intention nor inclination” to carry out his orders to restore the courts (if he even had such
orders). This was confirmed, for Jones, by the creation of “three more arbitrary, illegal,
tyrannical, and unconstitutional Courts of Police.” When Loyalists asked why normal civil
government had not been restored, Jones records, they were “given to understand, that the
then situation of affairs would by no means admit of a restoration of the civil law.” The reasons
or circumstances were never explained to the Loyalists. Only the Governor, General Clinton,
and a few other officers and officials knew the reason. The Police Courts used different
procedures from civil courts, were limited in jurisdiction, and had no appeals. But the officers
and officials, Jones alleges, had

…particular purposes to serve, and the erection of such courts with such
abridged, limited, and restricted, powers, answered their designs. It prevented
the recovery of large debts justly due, and put it in the power of certain persons
to make large fortunes with the use of other people’s money. And it did (which
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perhaps was never intended) put it in the power of villains to defraud the poor,
the widow, and the fatherless. The abolition of the Courts of civil law, and the
establishment of these new ones, entirely answered the purposes of the military,
for being courts of a General’s or a Governor’s creation, the Judges, or
Superintendents, were solely in their power, were their tools, and could be
displaced at their pleasure. Their salaries were dependent upon them, they were
subservient to all their whims, did what they were ordered, behaved as
submissively as spaniels, and acted like so many ciphers. No prosecution could
be carried on, no trespass punished, nor a debt recovered, where an officer, a
commissary, a barrack-master, a soldier, a conductor, a wagon-driver, or any
other dependent upon the army, was concerned. Over the military these courts
claimed no power, took no cognizance, nor exercised any jurisdiction.91

As will be discussed in Chapter VI of this work, the occupying authorities and the troops
had committed many questionable acts. Property had been stolen or vandalized. Churches and
other buildings had been destroyed, allegedly from military necessity, or just wantonly.
Property had been taken in return for vouchers that were not honored. Many people had real
and legitimate grievances against the British. Military discipline under Howe had generally
been rather lax. If civil government was restored, then officers, barrack-masters,
quartermasters, commissaries would have been sued civilly and perhaps prosecuted
criminally.92 Jones alleges that a consultation was held among the main officials and officers of
British New York that civil law would not be restored, and that civil and criminal matters would
be heard only by military courts or courts of police. He also states that Superintendant George
Ludlow (of more below), the head of Long Island’s Police Court, had stated shortly after
receiving his office, “that [restoring the Courts of Law] would be inconvenient, prejudicial, and
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injurious to the king’s service, that the Governor did not intend to pursue.” He also mentioned
that the first action brought under the restored civil law in Georgia had been brought against a
quartermaster for an act done in his official capacity; this Ludlow held was sufficient reason
why civil law should not be restored in British-controlled New York.93
Whether or not the alleged meeting took place, the decision was ultimately Clinton’s.
But, the possibility of the army being hamstrung by constant suits, and the expense of paying
out judgments, was a real one, and certainly one that Clinton probably considered. It is likely
that the concern that civil government would mean a welter of civil suits and criminal
prosecutions was a factor in Clinton’s decision to withhold his certification of pacification.

This section has discussed in some detail the issues that most likely impacted Clinton’s
decision concerning the restoration of civilian government. To briefly recapitulate, the fear that
a civilian government might hamper the military’s freedom of action was probably the
dominant consideration, with Clinton’s reluctance (or inability) to share authority second and
the fear of civil and criminal actions against the military third. It must be remembered that the
King and the government wanted civil government to happen, if the military authorities—that
is, Clinton—believed New York at peace. Clinton’s failure to certify New York as at the King’s
Peace was going against the express wishes of the King and his ministers, though it was within
Clinton’s discretion. Military considerations, the fact that the area was often raided, the large
Patriot population in Suffolk, and the possibility, though remote, of a Franco-American attack,
93
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at least left cover for refusing to declare the area pacified. This decision was probably based
most on the desire to keep freedom of action for the military, combined with the desire to
avoid sharing power. The rather venal reasons Jones assigned for the failure to restore civil
government, and thus the ruination of Germain’s plans to create a showcase to the other
colonies of British intentions, were most likely minor factors, though avoiding suits and
prosecutions was most likely one of the factors that went into the decision. In summary, a
reluctance to share authority, a desire to preserve the military’s freedom of action which civil
government might have hampered, and a fear of civil and criminal actions hamstringing his
army were all probable factors in Clinton’s decision. Thus ended the possibility of restoring civil
government under the Crown to New York.

IV

By May 3, 1780, Robertson appears to have realized that the expected certification that
lower New York was at the King’s Peace would not be coming anytime soon from Clinton. In a
letter to Clinton sent on that date, he told Clinton that he thought that it was proper to hold
out the hope of civil government to the people of New York, but that “You [Clinton] are Judge
of the time, and probably will think with me, that this is not exactly the hour—If the power was
now lodged with me I would not exercise it, till I thought our Arms would thereby derive
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benefit.”94 It is likely that Robertson was adjusting to the realities of the situation, though
understandably some eventually thought he had never been for civil government in the first
place.95 This is unlikely; he had called for civil government in his Memorandum of January 1,
1779, and this call had been one of the things that had won him the position of Governor.
Germain had chosen him to move energetically in the direction of civil government.96 All of his
actions since arriving in New York, especially his April 15 Proclamation, had pointed towards
getting civilian government restored. Either Robertson had been lying for over a year or a half,
or he was adjusting to Clinton’s opposition. In addition to Clinton, many Loyalists and officials,
such as Tryon and Governor Franklin of New Jersey, considered civil government to be an
attempt to conciliate the rebels, and had little enthusiasm for it. Andrew Eliot, Robertson’s
lieutenant governor, also had doubts. Many had disliked the April 15 Proclamation.97 All
indications are that Robertson was adjusting to the opposition of Clinton and of many Loyalists
to the restoration of civil government.
Clinton was “utterly opposed” to civilian government according to his private
correspondence. Smith noted on June 18, 1780, that Clinton’s former “Expressions to Tryon
against Civil Authority shows that we can have little reason to suppose he will consent to it
here.”98 However, it is likely that Clinton, despite his opposition to the policy, realized that he
should try to comply with the King’s wishes as much as possible. “At his most rebellious,”
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argues his biographer, the King was one person that Clinton “never dared to question.”99 On
June 2, 1780, Clinton wrote Germain suggesting that he be authorized to restore civilian
government “partially and by decrees.” One way to do this would be to create criminal
courts.100 It should be noted that the authorization Clinton requested was to be for Clinton, not
Robertson, the civil governor.
Despite the appointment of a civil governor, civil government was not to be restored in
New York for the foreseeable future. New York remained under martial law. Which brings up
an interesting question: What do you do with a civilian governor in a province under martial
law?
Clinton returned to New York on June 18.101 The delicate negotiations between Clinton
and Robertson continued. Robertson met with Clinton on June 20th, and according to Justice
Smith, before the meeting perceived that “Sir H.C. has Jealousies of Inconveniences to the
Army.” Admiral Arbuthnot, the other Peace Commissioner, was for civil government as a
99
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necessary measure to “convince and convert the People,” and put an end to the war.102 The
next day, Robertson sent for Justice Smith. Describing the meeting of June 20th to Smith,
Robertson told him that Arbuthnot was “violent” for erecting a civil government, but Clinton so
much opposed him as to declare that he would go home if it was set up. As Robertson later told
Lord Amherst, “Sir Henry after much civil language and polite compliments to me, declared,
that if Civil government should take place in a province where military operations were carrying
on, he would give up the Command.” 103 Then Clinton made an intriguing suggestion to
Robertson.
Clinton was the Commander in Chief in America. He offered to promote Robertson to
Lieutenant General, and give him the military command of New York. Clinton told Robertson
that he would be authorized to “take the direction of the police of the province” and appoint
“the most respectable among the inhabitants to decide all differences”. In short, Robertson
would be the highest ranking officer in New York, outranked only by Clinton, with command of
the province. In his military capacity, he could set up courts, which would, in some cases,
probably be quicker than civil courts.104
These courts—the so-called “Police Courts”—while they substituted for civilian courts,
were not civilian courts but military courts. If not the “arbitrary, illegal, tyrannical, and
unconstitutional” courts that Jones called them105, neither were they a revival of the old civilian
court system. They were not civil courts; while they might act the part of a civilian court, their
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ultimate source of authority was the military. But Robertson believed that a military police was
a “judicious” step in the right direction. As Robertson told Clinton in a letter of June 25th, he
would “endeavor to adopt the spirit and give the Country all the real advantages of Civil
government, free from the loss of time, and the expense of law suits.”

He requested an order

or letter declaring his command of the troops in the province and his ability to regulate the
police. In this and a subsequent letter of the 27th, Robertson made it clear that he wished to
postpone or avoid “every question about the propriety of establishing Civil government.” On
the 27th, Clinton told Robertson that he could not consent to civil government, but would give
Robertson a “compleat Command”, and asked him draw up papers to that effect. As Robertson
told Smith, he would conceal the “Character” in which he acted. Thus, he would create
“civilian” courts in his military capacity, not his civil capacity. These “civilian” courts would thus
actually be military courts. In many respects, he was like the governors in 1775 and 1776 who
“governed” their provinces from warships; his powers as civilian governor were virtually
dormant, and what authority he exercised was for the most part in his military capacity. Clinton
would soon prepare a letter authorizing Robertson to perform some civil functions, but
declined to sign it.106
Thus Clinton thwarted the plan to restore civilian government to British-occupied New
York, substituting a pale imitation of civilian government for the real thing. This was hardly the
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shining example of the blessings of British liberty that the King and his ministers had desired.
However, Germain, when he was informed, agreed to the compromise.107

Having gained the right to establish military courts to mimic the actions of civilian
courts, Robertson soon set out to establish these military courts. The Police Courts, as these
courts were called, were established “to take care that the people of the province, may have all
the advantages free from the inconveniencys which at this moment would flow from a renewal
of Civil government.”108 A Police Court had been established in May of 1778 in New York City,
with Andrew Elliot as Superintendant of Police. The former mayor David Mathews was one of
the members of the court, which tried minor civil and criminal cases. Robertson desired to set
up a court on Long Island (a court would later be added on Staten Island) because he

…found that the distance from some parts of Long Island, and the expense of
living at New York, made most of the inhabitants of that Isle rather suffer wrong
than apply to the Courts at New York—for redress—and that the want of Courts
on Long Island—left every licentiousness and Crimes unpunished-- 109

Robertson approached Judge George Duncan Ludlow of Hempstead, a major town in
eastern Queens. According to Jones, Ludlow was “a gentleman of a liberal education, the
eldest son of an opulent merchant, with large family connections, of great abilities, and deeply
read in the law.” He was apparently friendly with Cadwallader Colden, who recommended him
to the Council to fill a vacancy in the New York Supreme Court in 1769. After September, 1773,
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he served with Jones on the Supreme Court. Ludlow, according to Jones, was vexed when Smith
became Chief Justice under Robertson, and resigned. Ludlow, it appears, had many important
friends, who were annoyed at Smith getting the position, especially as Smith was a Whig. Some
suspected Smith of being sympathetic to the rebels, since he still corresponded with some
rebels, and had been treated mildly when he was in their territory in the early part of the war
(as discussed in Chapter II). Robertson met with Ludlow, flattered and calmed him, and if Jones
(a long-time opponent of Smith) is to be believed, expressed his sorrow at Smith’s
appointment, stating it had been forced on him by powerful friends of Smith in England. It
should be noted that if Robertson did express sorrow at Smith’s appointment, he was probably
lying, as he seems to have had a good relationship with Smith, at least in 1780.
Robertson offered Ludlow the position of Master of the Rolls and Superintendant of the
Court of Police on Long Island at least in partial compensation for the failure to be made Chief
Justice. Ludlow was a Long Islander and clearly qualified for the positions, and his ruffled
feathers were soothed by the appointments. Smith noted that he perceived the appointment
to be the first act of Governor Robertson under the military powers of the “Letter of Service”
Robertson and Clinton had agreed to about a fortnight earlier.110
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The appointment, though it may have soothed some ruffled feathers, annoyed Clinton.
Clinton believed that appointing a Master of Rolls exceeded Robertson’s authority. Smith had
advised Robertson that he possessed the power as governor.111 Questions of leadership and of
the division of authority between the civilian and military leaders of New York were becoming
increasingly tangled and confused in New York under its military-civilian mixed government.
Robertson’s intentions in setting up the Police Court may have been the best, but the
establishment of the Police Court in many ways represented a step backwards for civil
government on Long Island. After martial law began with the British conquest of 1776, justices
of the peace remained on Long Island, but they were limited to cases of petty larceny. Under
martial law, they were forbidden from handling civil cases. Cases concerning vandalism and
other bad acts by the troops, the failure by British authorities to pay for provisions, questions of
ownership of abandoned property, as well as normal civil cases all needed to be handled by civil
courts, but all these cases had languished because of the lack of civil courts. However,
mortgage-recording offices remained functioning, as did the Boards of Supervisors of the
various Long Island counties. This all changed with the establishment of the Court of Police.
The justices of the peace lost their power to try petty larcenies. Trial by jury was not restored.
The Board of Supervisors in Queens ceased meeting. And, to repeat, the Court ultimately rested
on military, not civilian, authority. Superintendant Ludlow remained directly responsible to
military authorities. Since many of the cases he would oversee would deal with claims against
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the military, this meant that he and his court lacked, at least theoretically, the independence
one would expect a judge and court to have.112
Ludlow opened his office at Jamaica, in Queens County (to this day, there is a major
working courthouse in Jamaica). While closer to the East End of Long Island than Manhattan,
this location still was a hardship for the people of Southold, Southampton, and the rest of the
East End, who lived over fifty miles away—Jamaica is only a few miles east of Manhattan.
Having a court located in Jamaica was thus not much of an improvement; a more central
location like Huntington might have made more sense. Having opened his office, Ludlow
appointed an assistant, a treasurer, clerks, and other officers, most of whom were relations,
friends, or dependents. He then, according to Jones, proceeded to become “the little tyrant of
the Island.”113 Despite’s Robertson’s assertions that the men he chose as judges had executed
“Justice and equity and order,”114 Ludlow’s actions seem to have fallen short of that standard,
as will be discussed shortly.
After the British occupation began, a lucrative smuggling trade had been established
between Long Island and New England. Goods (usually from Britain) from the merchants of
New York would be carried to the East End of Long Island; from there they would be
transported to Patriot-held Connecticut, for “an amazing profit.” Howe issued a proclamation in
November 1776 by which no goods could leave New York City without a permit issued by the
Superintendant of Exports and Imports. After a short while, permits would only be issued to
those who could present a recommendation that they were loyal and honest, and that the
112
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goods that were leaving New York were for the use of Long Island. The permit power upon
Robertson’s arrival was held by the commander of the King’s soldiers on the island, General
Oliver Delancey.115
Trade between New York and New England was actually in many ways beneficial to the
British cause. New York received many provisions from New England, and the Patriots were
drained of hard currency (the merchants would only accept hard currency). As long as
gunpowder or other military items (including “coarse clothes”) were not included in the goods
exported to New England, there was little harm to the Empire by winking at this trade. So, trade
with New England continued with official connivance. Permits were issued for bringing goods to
Long Island, and the goods soon found their way to New England, while rebel coffers were
reduced of hard currency. One does not need to be a criminal mastermind to see that there
was a way for an enterprising official or two to make some money off this trade through
charging fees, under the table, for the issuance of these permits. Whether profiting from this
illicit but beneficial trade was the intent of Robertson or not (as Jones alleges), the power to
issue permits was soon transferred to the Court of Police, and “if what report said at the time
was true, it soon became a most lucrative branch of business, the profits of which were equally
divided between Robertson, Elliot, and Ludlow.”116
In addition to Robertson and Ludlow’s alleged involvement in the illicit trade with New
England, Ludlow may have found another way to supplement his income. About the same time
that the Long Island Police Courts had been proclaimed, Robertson, “in order to give relief to
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the many loyal subjects who had been driven from their possessions by the Rebels,” issued a
proclamation regarding rebel property. Rebel homes and property would be divided and small
lots assigned to distressed refugees (except for those needed for the “King’s service”). Philip J.
Livingston was put in charge of this program. Livingston was a former sheriff of Dutchess
County, and from the Livingston family which had mainly chosen the Patriot side in the
Revolution. Like many a family, the Livingston family had been split by the Revolution.
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Working with Phillip Livingston in his capacity as the Superintendent of Derelict
Properties on Long Island, Ludlow used the power of the court to confiscate rebel lands, and
then rented them. The fees were supposed to go to a fund to help refugee Loyalists, but the
land was rented at absurdly low values. Ludlow may have just been helping out friends, or was
perhaps pocketing a small fee for renting the land way below its worth. Much of the fees and
other moneys the Court collected went not to refugees but to salaries. 118
At a meeting in late 1782 with Robertson, Guy Carleton, and Smith, Ludlow told General
Robertson that the Police Courts cost the province nothing. Ludlow responded to a question by
Smith as to how court officers were paid, by saying that officers were paid by tavern licenses
and a duty on peddlers and hawkers. At the time of the meeting, these measures brought in
1000 pounds sterling, but the number had been as high as 1800 or 2000 pounds. The amount
had been reduced by breaking up lesser dram shops. It also “came out” at this meeting that
there was also a poor tax on Long Island. It was heaviest in the eastern parts of Long Island; in
Hempstead the tax was £1200. Ludlow remarked several times that he was “a King”, and Smith
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remarked that he appeared to have “acted as he pleased.” This tends to show that Jones’s
characterization of Ludlow as a “little tyrant” was, while an exaggeration, perhaps only a slight
exaggeration—he seems to have had much power, and few restraints seem to have been put
upon him.119
Even by the admittedly low standards of the eighteenth century, the actions of Ludlow
and the Court were questionable. If Ludlow was not “the little tyrant” of the island, he himself
thought that he had the powers of a king. In many ways, Robertson’s attempts to create
something resembling civilian government on Long Island had only added to the miseries the
islanders faced. And the Police Courts were but a pale imitation of civilian government. There
were no true civilian courts, and no assembly. The hoped-for shining example of restored
civilian government had been thwarted by General Clinton.
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Chapter VI

The Military Occupation of Southern New York
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Any military occupation will require large numbers of soldiers to coexist with the
inhabitants, many of whom are unhappy that they are there. The soldiers will need to be fed
and housed, and will need fuel to heat their fires. The occupation will put stress on the
resources of the occupied region. And soldiers will often get bored or homesick or even just
hungry. All of these may result in acts of vandalism, theft, or even worse. While it is virtually
inevitable that a military occupation will be unpleasant for the inhabitants, some occupations
may be worse than others. In a situation of a colonial rebellion, regaining the hearts and minds,
the love and loyalty, of the populace is vital. Therefore, it is extremely important that the
occupiers from the mother country try to minimize objectionable or appalling incidents with
the occupied population, and to protect the people from criminals or raids. A violent or even
ineffectual occupation could poison the effort to restore a colonial region to the empire.
The British occupation could have been much better. There were many mistakes by the
government and bad acts by the troops. These helped poison any chance for reconciliation. This
chapter will take a look at the occupation of Southern New York from the “ground level” of
soldiers and inhabitants during the seven year occupation. In the next chapter, the
chronological discussion will continue, as the final days of British rule in New York will be
examined.

298

I

In the fall of 1776, General Howe defeated Washington’s forces at White Plains.
Washington’s army retreated towards New Jersey, leaving much of Westchester in British
control. While not the decisive battle Howe needed, for southern Westchester at least, the
Battle of White Plains was quite decisive. The present-day Bronx and the southern part of
Westchester were now under British control. American forces stationed themselves
approximately 12 miles north of Tarrytown (the present location of the Tappan Zee Bridge) at
Peekskill in the northwest of the county, near the border with Revolutionary-era Dutchess
County (the southern part of the old Dutchess County is now Putnam County). Advance posts
extended from Mamaroneck on the Long Island Sound to Dobbs Ferry on the Hudson a few
miles south of Tarrytown. The British had posts from Kingsbridge (in the modern south Bronx
across from the northeast tip of Manhattan) to West Farm, near the Sound in the modern
Bronx. The area between the two armies became known as the “Neutral Ground.” A better
designation would have been “No Man’s Land”, as historian Jacob Judd notes. The area was a
battleground between the armies and bands of raiders. The Americans and British would fight
over this area, and it inevitably suffered the worst; however, areas outside the Neutral Ground
were also subject to raids.1
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So, unlike Long Island, which while subject to raids was fundamentally behind the lines
for the duration of the war, Westchester was a front-line in the war for the duration. As such, it
not only suffered from the movements of the armies, but from foraging, raids and the general
breakdown of law and order caused by the fact that neither side controlled a large portion of
the county. The Hudson River on the west and the Sound on the east provided easy highways
for raiders and armies to attack. The fact that the British, after the Battles of Trenton and
Princeton, held little of New Jersey beyond two bridgeheads, meant that they had to rely on the
limited resources of the area they controlled, especially Long Island and Staten Island, to feed,
house, and fuel their soldiers and the civilian population. This situation encouraged foraging
expeditions by the British to increase their resources in both New Jersey (using Staten Island as
a base) and into Westchester. This resulted in plunder, the disruption of agriculture, famine
and malnutrition, and possibly disease among the civilian population. The Americans as well
were not averse to seizing livestock and other items to deny their use to the British.2
The people of Westchester were also plagued by loosely-organized groups of raiders.
Those who supported the Loyalist cause were dubbed “Cowboys”; those who supported the
Patriot cause were “Skinners.” For the most part, whatever cause they espoused, the end
result was to steal property and terrorize people. The politics of those that were raided often
did not really matter. Among the most prominent of these groups were De Lancey’s Raiders, led
by James DeLancey. American militia units would indiscriminately plunder from Patriot families,
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and in July 1779, Banastre Tarleton destroyed two villages because the residents were
uncooperative with his attempt to seize supplies for his troops.3
Even the Battle of Yorktown, which led to the end of the war and British recognition of
American independence, resulted in suffering for the people of Westchester. Several American
units were removed from the area, making DeLancey’s raids easier. As late as 1782, when it was
common knowledge that peace negotiations were underway, warfare continued in
Westchester. The last British regulars were removed from the county on May 13, 1783; but
American militia and Loyalist militia, especially the Raiders, continued fighting each other.
Finally, in July of 1783, Washington sent some troops into the county to preserve the peace by
stopping the fighting between Loyalists and Patriots; eight companies guarded Westchester
until the British evacuation from New York City on November 25.4
While South Carolina is infamous for its backwoods fighting between Loyalists and
Patriots, the northeast also possessed its share of bloody civil war. The Patriots hated the
Loyalists, seeing them as representatives of the King who had betrayed them, or even as
traitors; to the Loyalists, the Patriots were traitors and even anarchists. Fighting, often low-level
but still deadly and frightening to those involved, continued, in Westchester and elsewhere in
the New York region. Especially as it became apparent that the Americans would win their
independence, an element of spite would enter into some Loyalist and British actions, as will be
described below.
The military historian John Shy argues that the Revolutionary War was a “social process”
of political education, or more colloquially, a “struggle for hearts and minds.” Shy argues that as
3
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British pillaging and plundering increased, and as more men served in the military, many
Americans who had been apathetic and averse to the war became patriotic citizens of the
United States. They were politicized and nationalized by the war itself.5 The historian Sung Bok
Kim respectfully disagrees. Kim had been a teenager in Korea during the Korean War. According
to Kim, “I and many other Koreans resented the war, cursed every ideology of public import as
a scourge, and escaped into privatism for the time being.” Kim argues that similar suffering
occurred in Westchester, and a similar response of privatism, not patriotic enthusiasm,
occurred. The war-weary people of Westchester, he argues, ceased to care about the broader
picture, and by late in the war, much of America was experiencing some of the misery which
Westchester had long endured.6
It seems that perhaps both occurred here; increased politicization by some in either a
Loyalist and Patriot direction, and political apathy and just trying to survive by many. The raids
and armed foraging, while they may have originated from military necessity or political
ideology, soon degenerated into naked plunder and pillage with politics providing only a fig-leaf
of justification. The lawlessness and the seeming inability of the British to protect people from
these raids were hardly examples of the blessings of good government the British had
promised. While Long Island was behind the lines, occupation and the occasional raid produced
results at least partially comparable to the result in Westchester. Long Island will be looked at
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later in this chapter. For now, let us note that the situation in Westchester was not too
conducive to winning hearts and minds for either side, and may have alienated many of
Westchester’s people from both Loyalism and Patriotism.

II

The situation in New York City was unusual. The pre-war population had virtually
vanished, though many of the Loyalists who had fled the city began to return after the British
conquest. There were few, if any Patriots living there. The city was populated by occupation
troops, officers, and an increasing number of Loyalist refugees who began flooding into the city;
by 1781, the civilian population of New York may have reached 25 to 26 thousand. The
population would swell with every British reverse, and it may have reached as high as 33
thousand just before the evacuation.7 Many of these were die-hard Loyalists, or those who
feared retribution from their Patriot neighbors now that the war was over. Many of these
would not remain in New York but would leave for Canada or other destinations when the
British evacuated.8 Thus, the capital and great city of colonial New York was populated during
the Revolutionary War by thousands of people who for the most part had little connection to
either the city or the province (or state) of New York.
The most urgent need, especially after the fire, was housing. Robertson, the
Commandant of the city, erected barracks and confiscated the vacant homes of rebels to use as
officer housing. Many buildings were converted into warehouses, and many churches into
7
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temporary hospitals. Fortifications were rebuilt. The city fire watch was reestablished. Ten
companies of volunteer militia were organized. In addition to its military uses, the formation of
a militia provided something to do for many of the Loyalist refugees. Municipal services such as
street lights and cleaning were reestablished. A police department under Andrew Eliot, former
receiver-general of customs, was created. There were no taxes or civilian courts, and prices
were set and trade controlled by Robertson himself.9
Many Loyalist refugees began living in confiscated Patriot homes, but were ordered out
of them by November 1, 1777 to provide more housing for troops. A city vestry was appointed
by Robertson in late December 1777 to care for the poor, and was given control of homes not
used by the military. Rents were collected by the vestry, and the money was used to help the
poor and pay for municipal services such as lighting lamps and cleaning the streets. As there
were no taxes, the city could not have paid for these services without these rents.10
Despite the reestablishment of street cleaning, the streets were often dirty, and the
sanitation problem was never solved. “Noisome vapours” arose from the mud and from “such a
number of people being crowded together in so small a compass almost like herrings in a
barrel, most of them very dirty.” The housing-stock had been reduced by perhaps one third by
the fire, forcing Loyalists, residents, and soldiers and sailors to live in close quarters, increasing
friction among the groups. The housing shortage was so great that soldiers and officers were
quartered in private homes, and they frequently ill-treated the inhabitants of these homes.
These mainly Loyalist inhabitants were not happy with the treatment they received. They
complained to the military authorities, but there was little action by these authorities. And with
9
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no true civil courts, there was little opportunity In New York City, or elsewhere in the British
zone, to get redress for the looting and other depredations of the troops. These included
drunken rioting by sailors, and even murders by drunken soldiers.11
Firm in his belief that most New York City residents were loyal subjects of the King (and,
since most were Loyalists during his tenure as Commandant, he was undoubtedly correct),
Robertson’s rule was mild. He believed that the purpose of the military was to support “the
good Subjects against the bad.” Troops were ordered to avoid taking rebel property without
authorization, and pillaging soldiers were dealt with severely—one was even executed. Hoping
that acting humanely would help the British among those pre-disposed to British rule, he
treated American prisoners mildly. This contrasts with the actions of officials such as Provost
Marshal William Cunningham, who treated American prisoners abominably.12
Churches were often used as barracks or hospitals. The British tried to spare Anglican
churches that were still standing, but Dutch, Presbyterian, French, Baptist, and Quaker places of
worship were all converted to prisons or hospitals. The interiors of these churches were usually
destroyed in the process. While the shortage of suitable large buildings was one reason for
these actions, the British do seem to have taken particular pleasure in damaging “Dissenter”
churches, especially Presbyterian. Many Britons and Loyalists considered the “Presbyterians”,
by which they meant both the members of the Presbyterian churches of New York and New
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England and the Congregationalists, to have been the fomenters of the rebellion. However, it
must be remembered that the overwhelming majority of the people of occupied New York City
were Loyalists. While most of them were Anglicans, a sizable minority was not. Some, like
William Smith Jr., were even Presbyterians. In November of 1779, it was rumored that St.
George’s, an Anglican church, was to be used as hospital, but the Anglican Parson Inglis
objected to that use. The Scottish Seceding Church was used for a Hessian hospital. The pews
were removed, and the Presbyterians and Lutherans who shared the building were “disgusted”.
The Old Dutch Church had been made hospital a few weeks earlier, and the Dutch had shared
St. George’s. Smith commented that “Neither of their measures yield to Prejudices friendly to
the Royal Interest.” In short, he believed that such actions would alienate non-Anglicans away
from the British cause.13
The hospitals were necessary; as has happened so many times throughout the millennia
when large populations have gathered together in tight quarters during a war, disease struck.
August, 1777, was a particularly bad month. The Moravian pastor Ewald Gustav Schaukirk
reported that “many people, especially children died. On many evenings 7 or 8 were buried,
and on one in particular seventeen.”14
The general overpopulation of the city even affected the holding of Anglican church
services. Several Anglican churches had been destroyed in the fire. Trinity Church, for example,
would not re-open until after the occupation ended, and its ruins were converted by the British
into a rather controversial entertainment center called “The Mall”. Here, lanterns were hung,
13
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benches placed, and bands played on summer evenings as soldiers would promenade with their
ladies. Obviously, it was not available for the holding of services. By 1782, St. George’s and St.
Paul’s could not accommodate their flocks, and Governor Robertson permitted worship in the
large courtroom of City Hall. Even here, extra seats were required. 15
Feeding the city and providing firewood was a constant problem. The region under
British control was just too small to provide for the thousands of soldiers and civilians needs,
despite constant requisitions. Food was transported from Great Britain and Ireland in convoys;
this exposed them to enemy attack, especially after French entry in 1778. Delays caused by
weather or enemy action often resulted in spoilage and great anxiety in the City as supplies
grew low. The arrival of the Cork Fleet—the supply convoy—was “one of the most eagerly
anticipated events in occupied New York”.16
Foraging was one method the British used to gain the needed supplies; this would result
in many small-scale military actions as American forces opposed the foraging parties. In the
early months of 1777, British and American troops fought what is called “the Forage War” in
New Jersey. Another method of obtaining food and fuel was by trading with the Americans. The
Americans had food and wood; the British had British manufactured goods and other trade
goods. Much of this activity was between old business associates who were on opposite
political sides, or had been neutral, or were family members.17 As discussed in Chapter V,
attempts to regulate this trade would eventually be instituted, making it less illicit—at least
from the British point of view.
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Some effort was made at achieving a favorable press. Some have called this control of
the press, though that may be going too far, at least at the beginning. As the population was
mainly Loyalist, the editorial slant of the papers was Loyalist as well. Ambrose Serle helped
revive the Weekly Mercury and the Gazette. He wrote from September, 1776 until July of 1777
news items, essays, and commentaries that espoused the British cause. He did try to keep the
news accurate. This contrasted with James Rivington, who filled his paper with baseless stories
such as Washington being declared “Lord Protector” (Cromwell’s title) or assassinated.18
Martial law remained in place for the entire war, despite efforts to alleviate it with
military-controlled courts (the “Police Courts”) or replace it with civilian rule. While better than
no courts, there was an obvious conflict of interest with the Police Courts. The reasons for
martial law remaining have been discussed elsewhere in this work, but the inability or difficulty
in adjudicating disputes—especially with the military—and the harshness of military decisions
did not have a positive effect on New Yorker’s views of the British. Indeed, there were signs of
disaffection, and by 1781, a fear that some had secretly become rebels. Rivington, perhaps the
last person one would think would become a spy for the Americans, became one. High-handed
attempts by British officials to control what he wrote or to keep newsworthy items out of his
paper seem to have driven him into American arms. The information he sent out was
apparently enclosed in the binding of books which he was allowed to send outside the British
zone. While rumored for decades, his role was not conclusively established until 1959.
Rivington, to the surprise of many, was allowed to stay in New York after the Americans
reoccupied. He received some gold from Washington for his services, but his paper soon went
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out of business—no one wanted to buy a paper written by the king’s former official printer, by
a man who had printed such scurrilous anti-American stories. 19

African-Americans, mostly slaves, had constituted a sizable portion of the pre-war
population of the region. Indeed, following the Declaration of Independence, one paper had
proudly printed the Declaration on its first page—when but a few days earlier it had ran
prominent advertisements offering ten dollars for the recovery of a run-away slave named
Jack, and another less prominent one offering twenty to forty shillings for the return of a
“negro man named TOM.”20 Slaves worked the fields in Staten Island and Kings, and often
worked as house slaves. One house slave, Jupiter Hammon of Lloyd Manor in Suffolk (northwest of Huntington), had several poems published. This possibly earned him a room with a
fireplace in the slave quarters of the mansion, but it did not earn him his freedom.21 As
previously noted, the presence of large numbers of slaves in regions like Staten Island and Kings
may have been a factor in the Loyalism of these regions.
New York City and its environs would thus seem an unpromising place for a Promised
Land, but it soon became a Mecca for slaves throughout America. Beginning with Dunmore’s
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Proclamation in Virginia of freedom for those who served in His Majesty’s forces (see above),
many African-Americans decided to cast their lot with the British, and many of these eventually
came to New York City. Not only were the British offering freedom, but to the horror of many
Americans, especially slave-owners, they were offering to arm the African-Americans. A black
man with a weapon was the greatest nightmare many a slave-owner could think of. In June of
1779, a new order was given by David Jones, Commandant of New York, that “All Negroes that
fly from the Enemy’s Country are Free—No person whatever can claim a Right to them-Whoever sells them shall be prosecuted with the utmost severity.” This order did not affect
slaves already living in New York or “belonging” to Loyalists. Thus, not all slaves were freed;
some were, some were not. If a slave’s “master” was a Loyalist, one was less likely to be freed—
and had to watch walking on the streets of New York freed blacks who had escaped from
unoccupied, “free”, America.22
Not all blacks joined the British; many African-Americans fought on the Patriot side, and
the black sexton of the John Street Methodist Church, Peter Williams Sr., was a Patriot. He
remained in the city and at his post at the church because he was a slave of a Loyalist tobacco
dealer. After Congress lifted its ban on enlisting blacks, many joined the Patriot forces. At war’s
end, many Loyalist blacks left for Canada and other places.23

Unlike Westchester and Staten Island (and increasingly, as the war continued, Long
Island’s North Shore), New York City was not on the frontline. An attempt to capture it, or even
raids, did not seem imminent for much of the war. Hence, the City became a relatively pleasant
22
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place, despite its overcrowding and dependence on a long supply line, with many social
activities to help pass the time. Perhaps because it lacked the Puritan background of New
England, the relatively cosmopolitan city had in the late colonial era boasted a fairly robust
theatre life. While plays were not held on a regular seasonal schedule, and sometimes months
would go by without plays, some of the finest productions of the time were staged in New York
City. In October, 1774, the Continental Congress forbade shows, plays, and other expensive
diversions. No doubt this was to show their seriousness, but perhaps the Puritan background of
many of the members of Congress helped create this decision. The Congress moved against
plays and the theatre again in 1778, since these were thought to divert people from the
Revolution. Such disapproval of entertainment has been seen in other revolutions, such as the
French.24
The British did not share either Puritan-influenced or revolutionary sentiments, and
reopened the John Street theatre in January 1777. The actors were members of the army or
navy. At a “gala occasion” on January 25, Tom Thumb was performed to good reviews from
Gaine’s Mercury. The plays continued throughout the occupation, with about eighteen plays a
year. The plays consisted of, comedies, tragedies and farces, with musical entertainment
between acts. The profits from each performance were given to the poor.25
As discussed above in Chapter II, one of the ways the British had created or reinforced
love and loyalty (or at least respect) for the royal family was through holidays. The various
British royal holidays, such as the King and Queens’ birthdays, became major events in occupied
New York. Fireworks, balls, and other entertainment would be used to celebrate these holidays.
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The celebrations, usually organized by the British, were far beyond anything the Americans
were used to in connection with these holidays, and some Loyalists began to be disturbed by
the expense of the entertainment in comparison with the suffering in the city of the
displaced.26 Perhaps the ultimate royal holiday occurred in 1781 when a member of the royal
family, the future King William IV, visited. This visit will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.
New York City, and to a lesser extent Long Island and Staten Island, became the scenes
of many balls and festivals. Celebrating the capture of the city, General Howe ordered
“Toujours de la gaieté!” in imitation of Frederick the Great. He attended many balls and feasts.
Twice a month, the City Tavern hosted the “Garrison Assembly”, where junior officers mingled
with young women. Howe himself had begun a “dalliance” with the Loyalist Elizabeth Loring.
Her husband Joshua Loring did not seem to mind; he had been appointed Commissary of
Prisoners by Howe, at least allegedly in “exchange” for permitting or not protesting Howe’s
dalliance. This provided Joshua Loring much opportunity for corruption, and supplies that
should have gone to the care of prisoners-of-war were often sold to others, leaving the
prisoners in a terrible state. Howe and Mrs. Loring were often seen publicly together at balls
and at the gambling tables. Some at the time and since have argued that Howe’s enjoyable lifestyle prevented him from being sufficiently aggressive in pursuing the war.

This view was

expressed at the time in a popular ballad written by Francis Hopkinson, musician and a signer of
the Declaration of Independence from New Jersey:
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Sir William he, snug as a flea,
Lay all this time a-snoring,
Nor dreamed of harm as he lay warm
In bed with Mrs. L-------g27

“Partying” by the British leaders, officers, and common men would continue throughout
the war. Governor Robertson was said to be “frolicking” with girls as young as twelve on the
eve of Yorktown (see chapter VII). Some entertainment was probably necessary for the morale
of both the soldiers and sailors and the civilian populace, but New York City was a city of
refugees, of people who had given their all out of loyalty to King and Empire. The actions of the
army of the Empire annoyed and shocked many of them. Many of the Loyalists were in many
ways more socially conservative and religious than the British seemed to be. The British army
did not seem to encourage church attendance, and most of the churches, Dissenter and
Anglican, were used as barracks, hospitals, and even stables. Trinity Church, as discussed above,
was used as a promenade; the walk was even widened at one point by removing some tombs,
perhaps to accommodate the size of women’s dresses. As one Quaker teenager, Hannah
Lawrence (aka Mathilda) wryly noted: “The female Size, by hoops increased/Demands a tomb
or two at least.” Disaffection and disenchantment grew; as the historian Van Buskirk notes,
many things that many Loyalists thought was right and proper were being violated by the
representatives of His Majesty. She notes that those like Smith and Jones and Mathilda, who
had thought themselves English before the war, when faced with large numbers of actual
Englishmen from England found that the English were a “different people” from New Yorkers:

27

Schecter, 273-274.

313

They seemed less respectful of sacred places, more concerned with the pursuit of pleasure, and
insensitive to how their pursuit of pleasure appeared to the suffering Loyalists. 28
As mentioned above, conditions for prisoners of war in New York were horrible. Many
lived—and died—in prison hulks. About 12,000 captive soldiers and sailors died in New York’s
prisons during the Revolution. Some prisoners were recruited into the British military. Many of
these probably joined to escape the terrible conditions, and some of the recruits deserted as
soon as they had the chance. It is doubtful that many of those who joined British military units
had truly had a change of heart. In many ways, this was a more extreme case of what we have
already observed on Long Island: Patriots, even committee men, being compelled by necessity
into taking oaths of loyalty. Historian Philip Ranlet cautions that “any use of enlistment totals
to estimate loyalism must be done with extreme caution.”29

Staten Island was much closer to the front lines than Manhattan. It was separated from
New Jersey by a narrow channel, the Arthur Kill, which at some points was less than 500 feet
wide. It was a staging area for attacks and raids into rebel-held territory, as well as foraging
expeditions; conversely, it was a tempting and fairly accessible target for rebel raids. The end
result was that its residents suffered from both the actions of warring armies and partisans, and
from marauding gangs. In addition, much of its wood and other agricultural resources were
used to feed the military and New York’s population, often without proper compensation.
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Historian Philip Papas argues that the experiences of Staten Islanders, “like those of the
residents of Westchester County in New York…were similar to those of the residents of the
southern backcountry. And by the end of the war, it was these experiences that led many
Staten Islanders to question their initial loyalties and to have a political change of heart.”30
After the defeats at Trenton and Princeton, the British pulled out of most of New Jersey,
retaining a small and thin bridgehead “anchored” at Perth Amboy and New Brunswick. The
British left several units on Staten Island, including a brigade of convalescents, a brigade from
the Fourteenth Regiment of Foot, the Staten Island militia; and the island served as the
headquarters for several Loyalist units. Some British and Hessian units were occasionally sent
there to guard against attack. British, Hessian, and Loyalist units made raids into New Jersey
from Staten Island. Despite the bridgehead in New Jersey, partisan units from New Jersey
would frequently cross the narrow Kill and raid farms, loot homes, and torture victims. They
also stole slaves—who were then sold for profit. Not all of the raiders were Jerseymen—some
of the raiders were Patriot refugees from Staten Island, seeking revenge for the indignities they
had suffered from Staten Island Loyalists.31
Because of the British presence, most of these raids on Staten Island were at night, to
elude the British. Two favorite targets were a store in Richmond owned by two prominent
Loyalist militiamen, and the Bentley Manor estate of Christopher Billopp. One Staten Islander,
Peter Houseman, was robbed by partisans who beat him and his son-in-law with clubs; he died,
but his son-in-law survived. Another Staten Islander was tortured with heated fire tongs by
30
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Whig partisans. There were also many kidnappings; Christopher Billopp himself was captured in
mid-1778 and languished in a New Jersey prison for nine months. He later had to endure
another capture, where he was chained to a jail floor for nine months and fed bread and
water.32
Periodically, large raids were launched by Continental forces, who also plundered farms
and homes. The largest Continental raid was in January, 1780, when 3000 soldiers under
William Alexander of New Jersey attacked across the frozen solid Kill. The British were alerted,
and met the invasion from prepared positions. The Continentals retreated, having
accomplished little. Alexander did try to control his troops, and threatened “Instant Death” to
any who plundered.33
The raids by partisans and Continentals were not the only thing Staten Islanders had to
worry about. The occupation soldiers tended to attack and pillage indiscriminately. To the
Hessians, all Americans were rebels, so Loyalists were often attacked. Soldiers also got drunk,
vandalized, and attacked people. Fences were destroyed for firewood or to help build
fortifications. Even Loyalist refugees would join in. And as the war continued, more rapes
occurred. And the fact that the island was under martial law meant there was little recourse to
the courts for those whose property—or worse—had been injured.34
The end result was that the Loyalists of Staten Island began to scorn their liberators as
occupiers. Many began to question their Loyalism, and some began to supply information to
the Americans, and even commit acts of sabotage. By war’s end, only the most dedicated
32
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Loyalists would leave in exile.35 The lack of respect for the persons and property of Staten
Islanders, and the British inability to protect the Island from raids, had turned “that ever loyal
island” into an island full of Patriots and of neutrals.
Thus, in both New York City and Staten Island, two very Loyalist locations, British actions
and insensitivity had soured much of the population on Britain. British frolicking in the midst of
refugees seemed insensitive to many Americans, and their treatment of churches and
graveyards seemed terrible to many. As discussed above, one young woman, the Quaker poet
Mathilda, even poetically called down Heaven’s wrath on the British. Matters were made even
worse in Richmond by its proximity to New Jersey. Staten Island and New Jersey suffered
horrors arguably comparable in many respects to the civil war in backwoods South Carolina, of
which a modern scholar argues that many “of the acts bordered on the barbaric, and the
conduct of those who perpetrated them verged on the sadistic.”36 In addition, the British
seemed incapable of protecting the Staten Islanders from American raids. The British, rather
than winning hearts and minds, were alienating their supporters and failing to win over neutrals
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and Patriots. Indeed, some in both New York City and Staten Island even went all the way from
Loyalism to active cooperation and support for the Patriots.

III

On August 27, 1776, British troops had defeated American troops at the Battle of Long
Island. They followed up that battle by rapidly gaining control of Long Island. Long Island
represented a source of raw material and food and a place to bivouac soldiers. Its eastern forks
provided a sheltered bay for the British fleet, and the sheer length of Long Island, stretching
from Manhattan to Rhode Island, provided an excellent base for raids of New England, and
even invasions. Protected by the British fleet and the British possession of Manhattan and
Staten Island, it was a near impervious sanctuary, safely in British hands. British occupation was
never seriously challenged, though at one point the British feared a Franco-American
invasion,37 and the island was subject to sea-borne raids for the length of the war. The island
did possess a sizable portion of Patriots, particularly in Suffolk County, but a fairly large
proportion of Loyalists as well, especially in Queens and Kings. It presented the British with a
golden opportunity to, by wise rule, win back the loyalties, or at least gain grudging acceptance
of British rule, of a large population of their rebellious colonists. They failed.
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After the Battle of Long Island, the army closed all civil courts and established martial
law. The army began to requisition needed property such as cattle, grain, and other items.
Because no good system for obtaining and paying for these items was ever established, many
abuses occurred. Property was often not paid for and was often seized without receipts.
Despite instructions from Howe and others to treat Loyalists better in obtaining and paying for
property, in actuality little distinction was often made between Loyalists and rebels. Enlisted
men and junior officers could not tell Patriots from Loyalists, and treated all of them as rebels.38
The army’s need for both supplies and labor was seemingly insatiable. The army
requisitioned all the cattle and sheep in Suffolk, and ordered the residents to help drive them to
Jamaica in western Queens. Grain, straw, and hay were requested, and grain, forage, and
livestock was seized, and boats, wagons, and horses were impressed. Timber for cooking fires
and building materials was in great demand, and much of Long Island’s forest and woodlands
was cut down, as well as many fences and buildings (especially Presbyterian churches). This
may be apocryphal, but it is said that at war’s end, “no tree on Long Island over six inches in
circumference was left standing except the Great Oak in Lloyd Neck.” This is unlikely. In early
1784, a few months after the war finally ended, “the Precursor of South American
Independence”, Francisco de Miranda, traveled across eastern Long Island and made no
mention of such devastation. Still, that much of Long Island’s woodland was cut down to feed
the needs of the refugees in New York City and the British soldiers and sailors cannot be
doubted, despite possible rhetorical exaggeration by the reporters. And it must be noted, the
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lack of a civilian justice system meant that it was virtually impossible for Long Islanders to seek
redress for their grievances in a court. Indeed, the lack of such a court permitted many British
officials to line their pockets.39
British, Hessian, and Loyalist officers and soldiers made many requisitions, purchases,
and outright seizures of property. They often did not pay. Many records of these were made at
war’s end, in the hope, often vain, of receiving compensation. On June 16, 1783 in Smithtown,
fifty-three residents formally swore under oath before Justice Gilbert Smith of Smithtown to
having provided goods and services to the British since the occupation began and to having
never been paid. For example, Obadiah Smith (as I mentioned before, the town was aptly
named) put in claims totaling 90 pounds for three horses taken and never returned, for almost
13 pounds of oats and hay, and five pounds for five blankets taken at the order of General
Delancey. The total claim was 112 pounds and 9 shillings, a sizable sum. Joseph Blydenburgh’s
farm was raided at one point, and he entered a claim for over 20 sheep, valued at 16 pounds,
and the loss of a bullock worth 15 pounds. The innkeeper Epenetus Smith entered a voluminous
set of claims, totaling about one-seventh of the total recorded in the “Blydenburgh
Manuscript”, as the record is now known. These included 8 shillings for 16 turkeys, 9 shillings
39
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for sugar cups and salt cellars, 18 pounds for board, 19 pounds for one horse, and 50 pounds
for cattle. On November 21, 1777, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton, who would soon gain
fame (or infamy) in South Carolina, and Major Cochran arrived in Smithtown with members of
the British Legion to forage. In four days, they raided the property of numerous Smiths, as well
as the property of Jeremiah Platt, Joseph and William Blydenburgh, and others. They carried
away nearly 6400 feet of boards from the Presbyterian Church. Their unpaid bill was 4 pounds,
17 shillings, and 6 pence for food and drink for the officers. Forty gallons of rum valued by
Epenectus Smith at 28 pounds was carried off. Tarleton also removed 4 sheets, as well as one
new petticoat and one silk handkerchief. The total sum recorded of claims for the town came
to over 3400 £. The above-listed claims are merely a sample from one town, one inn, and one
church. The examples could be multiplied many times for each town on Long Island. Benjamin
Thompson, a mid-nineteenth century historian, estimated that the loss of property to Long
Islanders from unpaid requisitions alone was over half a million dollars—in 1840s dollars.40
The more elaborate mansions of well-to-do Long Islanders became headquarters for
staff officers and their aides. Rock Hall in Hempstead, on the South Shore, was the country seat
of the loyalist Martin family, and became the center of much social life. “Graceful minuets and
quadrilles” were danced here, and there were perhaps twenty weddings as a result.41
Further east, the Queens Rangers, commanded by John Graves Simcoe (later the
Governor of Upper Canada), were quartered in Jericho and Oyster Bay. Simcoe and several
40
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other soldiers were quartered at the Townshend home in Oyster Bay, one of the finest houses
in the area, and now known as Raynham Hall. Its parlor was large enough that small balls or
fetes could be held in it, if the furniture was moved out of the way. Samuel Townshend, a
leading merchant, was one of the leading Patriots of the town, and was not happy with the
occupation of his house. For six months in 1778 to 1779, his home was the headquarters for
the Rangers. Simcoe was frequently visited by Major Andre, who would later be Benedict
Arnold’s contact. Samuel’s daughter Sarah, usually known as Sally, was about 19, and is
reputed to have been quite beautiful. Indeed, several soldiers were so enamored of her beauty
that they carved their initials and her name into panes of glass which are still on display at the
Hall. Simcoe himself was also quite taken with her, and sent her a valentine, reputed to be the
first valentine in America:

Fairest Maid, where all is fair
Beauty’s pride and Nature’s care;
To you my heart I must resign
O choose me for your valentine!

It continues in a similar vein for about twelve more verses. It was found among Sarah
Townshend’s effects when she died at the age of eighty-two, and made it into the hands of that
invaluable collector of “Revolutionary Incidents,” Henry Onderdonk. Despite her beauty, Sally
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never married, and this has raised speculation that Sally had found true, star-crossed love with
Simcoe.42
Sally’s older brother was Robert Townsend, a New York City-based merchant who would
often as part of his work walk along the docks, observing the goings-on and comings and goings
of ships. He gathered the gossip in the taverns of the city, and would no doubt on occasion
have gone home to Oyster Bay to see his father, and perhaps even had the chance to meet with
Simcoe and Andre. Townsend had another name: He was Culper Jr., George Washington’s chief
spy. He would send coded messages (or messages in invisible ink) through a courier, Austin Roe,
who maintained a tavern in East Setauket. From here, they would be delivered to Abraham
Woodhull (Culper Sr.), who again encoded them, then sent them to Connecticut via whaleboat.
There were several “drops” where the information could be picked up. According to the
historian Morton Pennypacker, a woman named Anna Strong would set out clothes on her
clotheslines, and the number of handkerchiefs on them would indicate which drop to go to.
(Unfortunately, the papers which would prove this tale seem to have gone missing). Once in
Connecticut, Caleb Brewster, the whaleboat man, would deliver them to Major Benjamin
Tallmadge who relayed it to Washington. The system worked for about five years, and about 70
messages were sent. 43
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There was much improper and even appalling behavior by British and Hessian troops.
In Southampton, British and Hessian troops committed many acts of vandalism, such that the
word “Hessian” became a local epithet. Indeed, one historian, writing about the time of World
War I, noted that young boys in Southampton “not yet in their teens would fling the word
[Hessian] at one another as an expression of opprobrium.” These acts of vandalism were
despite the fact that the local commander, Major Erskine, tried to restrain his troops.
Bridgehampton and Sag Harbor were overseen by the “notorious” Major Cochrane, who
according to historian J. T. Adams, “seemed to love cruelty for its own sake.” Throughout Long
Island, “meaningless atrocities accompanied by petty abuses of all kinds were visited upon a
helpless population” as Myron Luke put it.44
While some incidents, especially those relating to raids (see below), were reported in
the papers of the time or otherwise contemporaneously recorded, others were not, but passed
down as oral history. Most of these were not written down until the 1840s, 1850s, or even a
century after the events recorded. While some of these were no doubt embellished (especially
in the dialogue), and need to be taken with the proverbial “grain of salt”, they do provide a
clear and consistent account of troops and raiders abusing the population of Long Island, and
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are consistent with stories reported from Staten Island, Westchester, and other areas. As
Natalie Naylor, formerly of the Long Island Studies Institute, argues concerning one oral history
recorded about 1881, “Although these oral histories were not written down for more than a
century, they do have the mark of authenticity.” 45
The home of Francis Lewis, a prominent resident of Whitestone, Queens and a signatory
of the Declaration of Independence, was attacked shortly after the Battle of Long Island by
British soldiers who ransacked his home, destroying his extensive library and papers. He was
not there, but his wife was taken prisoner and held for months without a change of clothes or a
bed. She died shortly after her release was secured. One resident of Flushing in Queens,
Thomas Kelley, did not remove his hat when Captain Archibald Hamilton, aide de camp to
Governor Tryon (and after December, 1778, Commandant of the Militia of Queens County),
entered the house where Kelley was. Hamilton beat Kelley over the head several times. In Black
Stump near Flushing, several Tories entered the house of a Quaker named Willet Bowne. They
tied him to his bed, and tortured him with a lighted candle in order to get him to reveal where
he kept his wealth. Bowne refused to divulge the whereabouts of his wealth, and they finally
fled. Perhaps from mercy, perhaps from fear, Bowne never revealed the names of his attackers,
although he recognized them.46 In the winter of 1778-79, one poor woman in Amagansett (in
East Hampton) had to place her grandchildren in the brick oven of her house for safety when
British soldiers fired through the doors and windows of her house. 47
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Food was a major concern of many of the soldiers quartered on the island. Supply
difficulties and the relatively small area under British control made officially-sanctioned
foraging necessary (and officially-unsanctioned pilfering common). One incident in East
Hampton occurred during a foraging expedition by British soldiers quartered in Southampton.
Mrs. Joseph Osborn was making some Indian berry pudding for her lunch. The smell of the
boiling attracted the foragers, who went to seize it. What allegedly happened next was
recorded in verse by a woman named Fannie Elkins:

“Oh no you’re not,” she made reply
Then seized the boiling pot,
Ran with it through another door
And threw it, blazing hot,
Pudding and all, adown the hill
And left it in the sand,
Amid curses, loud and deep,
Of all the hungry band.

The hill is still known as Pudding Hill, and some Revolutionary era British uniform buttons have
been found there.48
Not even Anglican churches were immune from theft by hungry troops. The Loyalist
Anglican cleric James Lyons resumed services at Caroline Church in Setauket after British rule
was restored. One day, while he was giving a sermon to some British officers, he spied through
the window some Hessian soldiers stealing potatoes from his garden. In exasperation, he
ceased the sermon and is reputed to have said “Here I am preaching the blessed gospel and
there are your damned Redcoats in my garden stealing potatoes.” During the war, Caroline
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Church also suffered the loss of communion sets and silver linens. Setauket was also raided by
500 Patriots from Connecticut; bullet holes are still visible on the church, and (in the form of a
weather vane) the Union Jack still flies over the church. The Church after this raid was used as a
hospital, while the Presbyterian meeting house was fortified by Col. Hewitt.49
Femmetie Hegeman Leffert’s homestead in Flatbush was destroyed a few days before
the Battle of Long Island, probably by American forces, though her account (written decades
after the incident) accused the British of this action. She was about 16 at the time. The Dutch
Reformed Church she attended became a barracks, and the old school-house became a
hospital. An epidemic struck the British and Hessians stationed nearby in the fall of 1776, and
more homes became hospitals. Femmetie reports that pro-American papers managed to reach
them and were passed around to everyone, from neighbor to neighbor. Rivington’s Gazette
and other pro-British papers also reached Brooklyn, but, as she put it, “The last mentioned of
these papers left us in doubt about everything, except the loyalty due to the King of England.”50
The Hegeman family was Dutch-speaking, and Femmetie reports that her education was in
Dutch; she taught herself to read English. Like many Dutch families of Kings County, the family
had a few slaves. One of the family slaves, Caesar, had managed to hide a few cows in the
woods, and the milk and butter from the cows was sold to the British, providing the family with
much needed income. The family lived with friends as the house was rebuilt.51
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Caesar was rather enterprising, and he managed to provide the family with additional
income by arranging for cavalry officers to pasture their horses on some of the wood-lots the
family owned. One of these wood lots was known as, for some reason, “Nova Scotia”. One day,
an officer requested his horse from Caesar, and Caesar told him it was in Nova Scotia. The
officer, thinking Caesar meant the far-away province, asked him how he dared send his horse
there. The officer stormed to the house to protest, and Femmetie met him at the door. The
officer struggled between his anger and his desire to be a gentleman. While he was losing this
struggle, the horse was brought up, and the officer profusely apologized for his rudeness and
became a fast friend of the family, providing them with many acts of kindness. This did not
prevent Caesar from spreading the story, and the officer was teased for months by his fellow
officers. And it also did not prevent soldiers and prisoners being billeted with the family, or
soldiers from stealing their chickens or other food.52
Many of the above incidents have involved interactions between women on Long Island
and soldiers and officers loyal to the Crown. But one unfortunately relatively common
“interaction” between soldiers in war-time and civilian women is conspicuous by its absence. It
should be noted that, unlike Staten Island, there seems to be no reports of rapes on Long
Island. Perhaps this was a function of better discipline or restraint by the British on Long Island
than on Staten Island. But it must be noted that the troops on Long Island were for the most
52
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part the same troops that had reportedly committed rape on Staten Island. It is thus more likely
that some rapes did occur on Long Island, but were not reported. Many rape victims may have
felt shame, humiliation, horror or reluctance to report what had happened, and the dismissive
attitude of officers like Lord Rawdon may also have discouraged reporting. Many military men
of the time, both officers and soldiers, thought that rape was just an ordinary part of war, and
even a tactic or strategy of war. There is also a strong possibility that rapes were treated as
minor crimes, and tried by informal regimental courts. The proceedings of these courts were
often not recorded. Nonetheless, while there are many tales of vandalism and pillage and even
torture by soldiers on Long Island, there are no references to sexual attacks on Long Island
women. “Of course,” cautions local historian Edna Howell Yeager, “it must be remembered that
little was ever written of women’s lot anyway.”53
There were sporadic attempts to improve discipline by British, Loyalist, and Hessian
troops. On April 3, 1777, Delancey issued an order prohibiting the taking of horses or carriages
without his permission. He also issued an order in March of that year prohibiting civilians from
selling rum to soldiers, “As the Rum allowed by his Majesty to his Troops in these quarters is full
sufficient for them—It is Expected from the Inhabitants that they will not sell to a solder Rum
under any pretence whatever as the Certain Consequences are involving men into Scrapes &
Disgrace unfitting them for Duty & Leading them into acts of Disorder they otherwise would
avoid.” One suspects this order was more obeyed in the breach.54
Despite these efforts, the situation on Long Island was grim for many. There was little
recourse for the depredations of the troops and the army. The Loyalist Reverend Leonard
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Cutting of St. George’s Church in Hempstead described in a December 1781 letter how his
church and his personal property were used and abused by the army without permission or
restoration. His home was twice commandeered by the army. Cutting wrote that “Where the
army is, oppression (such as in England you have no conception of) universally prevails. We
have nothing we can all our own, and the door of redress is inaccessible. What a state must
people be in who can find relief neither from law, justice, nor humanity, where the military is
concerned! This is the case of the inhabitants within the King’s lines.” It should be stressed that
this was written by a Loyalist. Cutting left his parish, and most likely America, in 1783 or
1784.55

Some mention should be made of the German troops serving with His Majesty’s forces.
These were not mercenaries in the present-day sense of “soldiers-of-fortune”, but tough and
disciplined regulars serving in the militaries of their small German principalities. Their rulers
would sell their services to provide income for their tiny states (perhaps their rulers may be
considered mercenaries). Their officers were veterans who had been “trained in the school of
Frederick the Great and Ferdinand of Brunswick.” Without their aid, Britain would not have had
the manpower to attempt to reconquer America. Britain signed treaties for 18000 German
troops in January, 1776. Most of these (about 12500) came from Hesse-Cassel in the Rhineland,
and the term “Hessian” was used generically to refer to all German troops serving in America
during the Revolution. Nine hundred soldiers also came from nearby Hesse Hanau. In addition,
4000 came from Brunswick in northern Germany and 750 from Waldeck (near Hesse Cassel).
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More contracts were signed in 1777 with Ansbach-Bayreuth, (1285 men) and in 1778 with
Anhalt-Zerbst (1160 men). The total number of Germans sent to North America during the war
was a little over 29000.56
While fierce fighters, they were often more disciplined than the British Regulars or
Loyalist militias. While in some regions they became “a local epithet” (see above), in other
regions they were more liked. They were more popular in Oyster Bay than the Loyalist units, as
they were quieter, and their crimes were usually confined to pilfering, not to the violence and
bloodshed that was often attributable to the Loyalists. Long Island, especially the western
parts, was actually not a bad posting for the “Hessians”. Most of them came from the
Rhineland and were Calvinists. The German spoken in the Rhineland was close enough to Dutch
as to make the Hessians able to converse with Dutch-speaking inhabitants and understand
Dutch church services, and many of them would often attend Dutch Reformed Church services.
One Hessian unit, the Jaeger Corps, was stationed throughout eastern Queens. One area where
they were stationed was Westbury. They set a guard to protect the Quaker Meeting House
from damage, but the pacifist Quakers asked them to withdraw it. On occasion, the officers
would attend the Meeting, where it is said they “sat very commendable.” Several Hessians are
buried near the Westbury Meeting House.57
One Hessian chaplain, Chaplain Coester of the Hesse-Cassel von Donop Regiment,
was stationed at Brooklyn Ferry, across from New York City, shortly after the Battle of Long
Island. Here he baptized the five day old child of an English-speaking Long Islander on Sept 9,
1776. He was asked to do this because the local pastor had left to join “the rebels”. Coester did
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not want to do this, as his English was not very good, but he relented before the parents’
entreaties. Lacking anything to pay him with, the joyful parents shared a glass of wine with the
chaplain.58
Coester and other Hessian chaplains performed confirmations and marriages as well as
baptisms. In addition to soldiers, large numbers of women and even children seem to have
come over to America. For example, Coester notes that “On 20 October 1782, I confirmed
Elisabeth Lentz, from Volmarshausen, a legitimate daughter of Johannes Lentz, private soldier
in the D’Angelelli Regiment. According to the testimony, this Elisabeth was fifteen years old.”59
The mention of legitimacy underlines the fact that, as happens in all wars, some of the Hessian
soldiers entered into consensual non-marital sexual relations with the local women. Some of
these liaisons produced children. For example, Coester records that

Andreas—an illegitimate son, was born at New York on 17 April 1780 to Barbara
Rheider, born at Rhode Island and the daughter of an Anabaptist by the name of
Rheider. The mentioned Barbara said Lieutenant Dietzel of the Hessian Artillery
was the father and added that she had a child by him previously which was still
living. N.B.—She calls herself Mrs. Dietzel, because she says, her marriage was
made in Heaven…Therefore another pair of wretched boys and girls more in the
world! Therefore, take care and do not be fooled by a man who promises to
marry you!60

Hessian chaplains also perfomed marriages between Hessians and local New Yorkers.
For example, Coester married Casimir Theodor Goerke, lieutenant of artillery, to Elisabeth
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Roosewel of New York , in July of 1783. Coester also married soldiers to women who had come
over from Germany, such as Maria Elisabeth Wiederhold to a musketeer named Johannes
Sustmann in November 1776, and a grenadier from Hesse Cassel to a young woman from
Hesse-Hanau in December, 1777.61
In January, 1779, one Hessian officer named Feilitzche commented in his diary on the
pillage the Hessians engaged in:

The cost of living has increased sharply and for a lot of money, nothing is to be
had. It is especially true with bread. The common soldier has it the worst. His pay
is not sufficient to buy bread. Complaints are heard daily and it is necessary to
feel sorry for the men. The frequent crimes which occur create problems for the
officers. The jaegers steal and slaughter their landlords’ cattle at night. Such
complaints arise daily. We check them out every day but to no avail…62

This officer several times noted in his diary what can only be called war-weariness. In his
entry for July 11, 1778, he prayed to God that his unit be sent to Germany, and stated that the
entire army was dissatisfied. On the seventeenth of July, he stated that he would “always hate
this life.” On May 28, 1779, before the beginning of the campaign against Stony Point, he noted
in his diary “How happy I would be if this were our last campaign. However, I will have patience
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and give myself over to the higher will and to Him, who has protected me during two
campaigns and other great perils.”63

This work has noted the supply difficulties the British and their allies labored under. The
relatively small area they controlled limited the local resources that they could muster to feed,
clothe, house, and heat their troops and the refugees in New York City. This resulted in foraging
raids into American-controlled territory, and heavy requisitions of food and fuel from the areas
under British, as well as unauthorized supplementation by soldiers. By the middle of the war, as
Feilitzche’s diary indicated, war-fueled inflation was hitting the common soldier hard, driving
some to pillage and rob. The officers had difficulty controlling their troops.
Historian Myron Luke believes that the conduct of the troops depended on their
commanding officer. Some gave swift punishment to troops who stole or otherwise acted
criminally, others were lax. Some lay down strict rules, others did not. The historian Joseph
Tiedemann suggests that the ultimate responsibility for the soldier’s conduct lay with General
Sir William Howe, army commander in chief during the initial years of the war. He was quite
lenient, and often pardoned or commuted court-martial sentences involving crimes against
civilians. Luke notes that while robbery and the like by soldiers are to be expected in an
occupied area, the “enmity incurred by responsible officers who deliberately went out of their
way to incite the population is scarcely excusable.” 64 Fort Golgotha, perhaps the most
egregious of these incidents, will be discussed below.
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Luke makes an important point concerning robbery by soldiers. Occupations are
generally unpleasant, even the most model occupation. In some ways, the British occupation
was relatively insignificant. While towns and farms were burned in enemy-held regions, this
was generally not the case behind the British lines. Churches were damaged by conversion to
military purposes, sometimes maliciously so, and fence-rails were destroyed, and there was
petty vandalism, and grain and livestock were often fair game for plunder, but in comparison
with the brutality of some modern occupations, it could have been much worse.65
The poor behavior of the British and their officers on Long Island failed to win the hearts
and minds of patriots and neutrals, and disaffected, disheartened or just annoyed the loyal.
Loyalists were not immune to pillage by British or Allied troops, or other questionable acts.
Parson Lyon’s potatoes were stolen as he preached. Reverend Cuttings’ home was twice
confiscated. The people were subject to requisitions and were often not paid for the property
taken, even if they possessed a receipt. There was no means of legal redress for years. There
was no civil government outside town meetings. There were no civilian courts by which redress
could be found; only military courts or courts which seemed civilian but were ultimately
military. But one more factor beyond these truly made conditions on Long Island miserable:
the raids.
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IV

Staten Island, with its proximity to American- held territory, was particularly vulnerable
to raids. But Long Island also suffered from raids launched from American-held territory. The
raiders arrived on Long Island, mainly from Connecticut, on whaleboats:

The whaleboats were sharp at each end, the sheathing often not over half an
inch thick, and so light as to be easily carried on men’s shoulders, either to be hid
in the bushes or relaunched in the South Bay. Some were thirty-two feet long,
and impelled by from eight to twenty oars, and would shoot ahead of an
ordinary boat with great velocity, and leave their pursuers far behind. They were
always on the lookout, and in a calm would row out of their lurking places, and
board market boats, or even cut off the detached vessels of a convoy.66

The raids began in 1777 as fully-authorized (by the governors of New York or
Connecticut) military harassment of British installations on the North Shore and disruption of
British supplies and movement. The whaleboat men would attack cargoes of wood or other
products moving along the coast and either seize or destroy them. Both sides recognized this as
fully legitimate “hit-and-run” warfare under the rules of war of the time. While hardly typical,
the most famous of these raids was the Sag Harbor or Meigs Raid of May, 1777. This was in
retaliation for General Tryon’s April raid on Danbury Connecticut. Sag Harbor is located on
Peconic Bay (the bay between the two forks), on the northern shore of the South Fork, and was
a major regional port. Leaving Guilford Connecticut, Meigs and his 170 men landed at Southold
66
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on the North Fork, carried their whaleboats about five miles across the Fork to Peconic Bay, reembarked, and landed near Sag Harbor. They then captured the fort guarding Sag Harbor and
destroyed much of the supplies and shipping that could be found there. They then returned to
Connecticut, and Meigs was later voted a sword by Congress for his “enterprise and valor.”67
Authorized raids of this sort continued across the Sound for the duration. But, “the
whaleboat warfare at length degenerated into downright robbery.” 68 Lawless “brigands”,
claiming to be Patriots (or occasionally Loyalists) engaged in these raids. Men were murdered
and houses ransacked. Many in northern Queens, fairly close to Connecticut, abandoned their
houses at nightfall. Many of the raiders were refugees from Long Island, and would often try to
settle a few old scores during these raids.
In July, 1780, raiders from Connecticut landed in Setauket, and kidnapped two men,
Doctor Punderson and William Jayne, Jr. The raiders told Mrs. Punderson that they were taken
to exchange for two rebels who had been taken at Smithtown. In 1781, Simon Flint and
Gilbert Flint’s homes in Oyster Bay were plundered, and Gilbert was hung until he was nearly
dead. The same thing occurred to Richard Thorne and Esquire Coulne of Great Neck. The father
of Phillip Hewitt of South Huntington (modern Babylon) had his store robbed several times. He
finally pursued the robbers across the Sound to Norwalk Connecticut. Kings County was on
occasion raided from New Jersey; a rebel whaleboat landed near Flatlands and carried off,
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among other things, much specie and two slaves. These examples could be multiplied many
times.69
Even legitimate, authorized whaleboaters pillaged private property. Such pillage
actually had a military purpose: denying the enemy the use or potential use of the property.
American officers even promised a share of the plunder soldiers took from the enemy, though
attempts were made by Washington to stop this. However, there seems to have been much
public approval for these raids in the unoccupied regions of America. Kidnapping could even be
said to have a military purpose. As the example of Doctor Punderson shows, Loyalists were
often kidnapped to exchange for prisoners held by the British. But the Sound acted as a
lawless “No Man’s Sea” between the two sides, and many of the raids as time went on became
mere piracy, with the war and politics providing only a mere fig-leaf of an excuse for naked
free-booting. The situation was analogous in many ways to the situation in Westchester.
Political persuasion made little difference; the raiders were increasingly un-selective about who
was attacked. In September of 1781, the inhabitants of Southold and Shelter Island (two
Patriot towns) even made a formal protest to Governor Clinton of independent New York
against the raids.70
The British had hoped to re-establish not just legitimate, civilian government but good
government in America. According to most theories of government (including those common at
the time of the Revolution), one of the main functions of government is to protect the lives and
property of the people against attack. The British were doing a poor job at this. As in the
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“Neutral Ground”, as on the Arthur Kill, anarchy reigned. Three battalions of militia had been
raised by the British early in the war to defend Long Island. Rather than staying on Long Island
to protect the people from raiders, two of them were sent to Georgia in the fall of 1778,
angering many on Long Island who thought they should be defending the lives and property of
Long Islanders. Whaleboat raids increased after this. Long Islanders argued that warships
should patrol the coast to guard against the raiders. A few did, but not enough. In the early
1780s, General Sir Henry Clinton, now commander-in-chief of British forces, twice complained
that the Navy was not providing enough ships for this important service. The Navy was highly
pressed worldwide, and its ships were in demand everywhere. Still, one would think that
Southern New York should have been a priority, if one wished to regain the loyalties of the
population of a major region that the Crown wished to reincorporate into its empire. The
whaleboat warfare intensified at approximately the same time as the effort to restore civilian
government to southern New York The historian Joseph S. Tiedemann, speaking of Queens,
argues
It apparently did not dawn on the British that to win the minds and hearts of
county residents they needed to defend the local population from such attacks.
Failure to do so underscored Britain’s military weakness and undermined the
legitimacy of her continued rule over New York.71

There were some bright spots in the occupation: Hessian soldiers whittling toys for
children, “glittering” military balls and fetes, and some commanders tried to rule with restraint.
71
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Town meetings were allowed to continue and local officials continued to be elected (though
higher civil government functions and much of the court system existed in only martial forms).
But the wanton property destruction, either authorized or unauthorized, of the occupation left
an indelible impression on the people of southern New York beyond New York City. As late as
the 1960s, perhaps later, the term “Hessian” was a youthful epithet on Long Island. The shame
of submission still haunted descendants over a century later. And very importantly, the British
failed in what many consider the first duty of government, as it failed to protect Long Islanders
from freebooting and piracy.72
In addition to this failure to protect, the actions of some of the officers were most
egregious. Many viewed the colonists as social inferiors and as most likely Patriots, even in
areas where most were (at least initially) Loyalist. Some apparently sought to relieve boredom
by bullying defenseless citizens. Tiedemann argues that “It is impossible to state how many
acted this way, but the number was sufficiently large to alienate inhabitants, and the entire
officer corps shared responsibility by failing to punish offenders.”73 Loyalists like the Reverend
Cutting began to argue that they were living under a tyranny; Thomas Jones called George
Duncan Ludlow of the Police Court (see Chapter V) “the little tyrant of the island”.74 The
continuing misrule, the destruction of property, the vandalism of churches, the various
indignities of oaths and the like, the continuing inability to seek redress, the forced labor, and
the inability of the government to protect the people of Long Island and the other regions from
brigandage (whether naked or disguised as “military” action) failed to win the hearts and minds
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of Patriots and neutrals, and disaffected many Loyalists. Some Loyalists went as far as actively
aiding the Patriots; others were more passive, merely failing to evacuate in 1783, but remaining
behind and accepting the rule of the United States. As Tiedemann argued in regards to Queens,
many of the non-Patriot inhabitants, especially those who had been non-aligned before the
war, became “patriots, less by choice or conviction than by British default.”75
But this is probably not the whole story. As Kim notes from personal experience of war,
many of the people of Korea in the Korean War were depoliticized by the war, retreating into
“privatism”, a lack of concern with public issues; in short, they cared little for the great political
questions of their day and just wanted to be left alone. Kim argues quite persuasively that a
similar reaction to the horrors of war occurred in Westchester. Events in Staten Island and Long
Island may have had a similar effect—indeed, “patriotism by default” could in many ways be
merely another variety of privatism. What is evident is that the misrule, the abuse, and the
failure to protect doomed any chance to bring the region willingly back into the British Empire.
After the province had crossed the psychological “Rubicon” of declaring independence, the
chances that they could be persuaded to willingly return to the Empire were probably quite
slim, but perhaps better rule could have altered things; this question will be discussed further in
the concluding chapter. But it is clear that the British fumbled away even this small chance by
their occupation, which rather than engendering loyalty alienated the people of Southern New
York, even driving some Loyalists all the way into the arms of the Patriots.
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One final incident should be included as a coda to this chapter, for in many ways it
symbolizes many of the errors of the British occupation. This was the building of Fort
Golgotha.76

Churches and the like were often abused during the occupation. As discussed earlier,
churches were used as barracks, stables, and hospitals. Not even Church of England buildings
were immune; for example, St. George’s in Hempstead was seized by the military several times.
While some of this may have been the result of the grim necessities of war and occupation
(churches were often the largest buildings in town), some of it was not. Many Loyalists and
Britons associated Presbyterianism with republicanism and rebellion, and their churches seem
to have been singled out for special attention. They were habitually abused and desecrated;
Presbyterian churches as far away as Islip in southwest Suffolk were dismantled and sent to
Hempstead for the use of their lumber.77
To dismayed Americans of every political persuasion, literally nothing seemed sacred to
the British. Not even the graves of the dead seemed immune. In New York City, the ruins of the
Anglican Trinity Church had been turned into a promenade known as “The Mall”, and
gravestones had even been removed to widen the promenade (see above). British and Hessian
troops were sometimes quartered in the burial grounds of churches. Many felt rather uneasy
about that; as one Hessian told his brother, “We were also obliged to spend a night…among the
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tombstones, as we were unable to find another place for our equipage or any other shelter for
ourselves—if a night in a graveyard could be called by that term. This experience gave us our
first conception of what is meant by war in America!” Gravestones were used for fire bricks,
hearths, and oven bottoms. There are stories from both Huntington and Hempstead that the
“inscriptions [from the gravestones] had been baked onto the bottom of the bread.” One can
only imagine how uneasy that made the soldiers who had to eat the bread.78
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that a British or Loyalist officer would feel
little compunction about building a fort in the graveyard of Huntington’s Presbyterian Church.
In late 1782, such a fort was built by Benjamin Thompson, for reasons that may have had more
to do with spite than military necessity.

Benjamin Thompson79 was a Loyalist from New Hampshire, born in Massachusetts in
1753. In the autumn of 1775, he carried dispatches from Howe in Boston to the Secretary for
America, George Germain. He so impressed Germain that he was made his secretary. After
Germain and the North ministry fell from power, Thompson attained a commission as a colonel
of cavalry, and came to Huntington in 1782 as commander of a Loyalist unit known as the King’s
American Dragoons.80
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In November, 1782, Thompson ordered the local residents of Huntington to assist in
building a fort. The fort was to be built in the graveyard of the Presbyterian Church. A small
army of carpenters were ordered to assist in building the fort and dismantling the church.
These orders were dated November 5 and 26th, 1782. A further order on December 3 ordered
“all the Waggons in your District To appear at the Fort tomorrow morning by 7 O Clock to cart
provisions from the Vessels” to the fort. Thompson compelled forced labor to create this fort, a
fort made on the graves of the ancestors of many of those who were compelled to work on it,
out of at least in part the gravestones and the lumber of the church (other sources were also
used). It is likely that, as local historian Lois Meyer argues, “The location and manner of
obtaining the materials however struck all as inconceivable and they were horror stricken at
having to participate themselves in the act.”81
The fort soon became known as Fort Golgotha, after the site where Jesus is said to have
been crucified. It is likely that this name was given it by the Huntingtonians. The Huntington
Town Records contain a short description of the fort by a person known only as “D.M.”, most
likely an American spy:

On the 1st Dec., he was at Huntington passing for an inhabitant, and passed
within 4 rods of the front of the Fort which faces the north. It is about 5 rods in
front with a gate in the middle, it extends a considerable distance north and
south; the works were altogether of earth, about six foot high, no pickets or any
other obstruction to the works, except a sort of ditch, which was very
Clement Library. Lloyds Neck is located to the northwest of Huntington village. A Loyalist fort, Fort Franklin (named
after the Loyalist governor of New Jersey, Benjamin Franklin’s son) was built here, and it became a major base for
Loyalist privateers. Mather, 219.
81
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inconsiderable some brush like small trees fixed on the top of the works, in a
perpendicular form; he was told it encompassed near 2 acres of ground. It is
built on a rising ground, and takes in the burying-ground; the Meeting house
they have pulled down…some [of the troops] hutted along the sides of the Fort,
which makes one side of the fort. The inhabitants of Huntington do suffer
exceedingly from the treatment they receive from the troops, who say the
inhabitants of that Country are all Rebels, and therefore they care not how they
suffer.82

In Thompson’s defense, the graveyard was not a bad location for a fort. The graveyard
was on a hill, thus easy to defend, and a fairly good view of Huntington Harbor could be had
from it. Huntington was a major population center, and nearby Lloyd’s Neck had been subject
to attack by American forces. The graveyard and church were in the center of town, near the
“town spot”, Platt’s Tavern, the armory, and other important locations (it is currently about a
quarter-mile from the present Town Hall, and directly across from the Huntington Historical
Society). The area was a likely candidate for major raids or even invasions from across the
Sound, hence fortifying a major defendable hill made sense. And Thompson had to put his
troops somewhere. Had the fort been built several years earlier, such as 1776 or 1777, one
could at least argue that it was built out of military necessity.
But, it is often said that timing is everything. The orders for building the fort date back
to November or December 1782. The siege of Yorktown had ended with an American victory
over a year earlier. While there still was some small-scale fighting, in modern parlance, most
“major combat operations” had ended in the thirteen former colonies. The preliminary peace
treaty had already been signed, and the final peace treaty was only a few months away. This
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was arguably not the time for the British to be building forts, especially forts which desecrated
graveyards.83
Against this must be countered that small-scale fighting was still continuing in the
region, as it was in the South. Indeed, an attack on Huntington was planned by Major
Tallmadge of the Americans for early December, but cancelled after the Boat Fight on
December 7, where the raiders surprised and defeated some British ships.84 It should also be
noted that the preliminary treaty was signed November 30, 1782 in Europe, and it would be
months before that fact was known on this side of the Atlantic.
The nineteenth-century historian Benjamin Thompson argued that Colonel Thompson
had the fort built, “without any assignable purpose, except that of filling his own pockets, by
affording the ground of a claim on the British treasury for the expenses.” More recently,
historian John G. Staudt argues that it was possible that Thompson built the fort for military
reasons, to discourage raiders from Connecticut. And, had the raid planned on Huntington
actually occurred, the fort might have proved quite useful to Thompson’s troops. But it was
likely there was another explanation. Thompson, as he would soon show, was a rather
intelligent man, and could clearly see that the war was lost and coming to an end. Exile from
America was his probable fate. Like many, perhaps he blamed the Presbyterians for the revolt.
This explanation makes much more sense, especially when viewed against the pattern of abuse,
desecration, and destruction that had been “habitually” directed against Presbyterian churches
on Long Island. Indeed Staudt, while seeing a possible military purpose for building the fort, is
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inclined to a less innocent explanation. Thompson had gone out of his way to have the locals
participate in building the fort, ordering them to aid in destroying the church where many of
them worshipped, and the graveyard where many of their parents, grandparents, deceased
friends and loved ones were buried. Staudt argues that the sheer “ruthlessness of his
actions…suggests that he was seeking retribution against Huntington’s Presbyterian rebels for
Britain’s defeat in the war.” 85
In other words, Fort Golgotha was built from spite.

This chapter has spoken of an occupation. In Staten Island and other places, such as
New York City, the British were seen at first as liberators. But what could have potentially been
a liberation turned into an occupation—a very different thing. For seven years, the British ruled
southern New York. This gave them a golden opportunity to win over the unaffiliated and win
back the loyalty of the Patriots in not just the region, but throughout America. After
independence, this was probably a difficult if not impossible project, but one well-worth
pursuing if Britain had any hope of regaining its empire in North America. The effort to restore
civil government in British-controlled New York was abortive. Even if it been achieved,
whatever chance of success it might have had was doomed by seven years of misrule. Some of
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this was probably unavoidable; occupations are generally not pleasant, and some petty crime
by bored troops is probably expectable. But some of the crimes were not petty, and some of
the officers, such as Thompson, seem to have gone out of their way to make life miserable for
the New Yorkers. Even Loyalists were appalled by some British actions, and some even became
Patriots and even spies.
New York City was crowded and malodorous, but relatively safe and pleasant, and here
the people were mainly pro-British refugees—but even here British actions seemed highhanded and disaffected people. Things were worse in the rural regions. The people of the rural
regions of southern New York suffered seven years of bad government (as did the refugees of
New York City). Their persons were not safe and neither was their property. They were
compelled to labor against their will. They had little redress for their grievances, and were
subject to arbitrary military rule. They were subjected to petty abuses and the desecration and
destruction of sacred places. As for the British, the British ended the war with a useless fort
built from spite in a graveyard.
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The Waning of British Rule
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The attempt to restore civilian government in Southern New York was abortive.
The region, however, still had to be governed. The attention of the government turned
to the mundane but vital matters of providing firewood and ensuring the population
could be fed. While the war shifted to the south, New York was still intimately involved
in the war. Partisan activities continued, and occasionally there were events in the
North which led to the maneuvering of troops and fleets, and which could have led to
major fighting.
Despite the shift of the war, New York, with its harbor and geographic position,
was still the most important point in America for Britain. Much of the commerce
between Britain and the American colonies, and amongst the American colonies, passed
through it. There had even been proposals as early as the 1720s to build a canal to
connect it with the Great Lakes, which would have resulted in much of the trade of the
Great Lakes region passing through New York City (as eventually did occur with the
building of the Erie Canal). Thus, for both military and commercial reasons, the British
wished to hold onto New York. Thus, while the British pursued the “Southern
Strategy” of fighting in Georgia and the Carolinas, a region believed to have many
Loyalists and where American forces were generally weaker than in the North, they
maintained large ground and navy forces to protect New York City. Washington greatly
desired to seize the City if he could, but never was able to. After the post-Yorktown
consolidation of British forces, the British still retained their hold on southern New York.
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Some Britons, such as Germain, hoped to retain the City and its environs even if America
was granted independence.1 New York City was important to Britain, and they did not
want to lose control over it.
The war in America climaxed with the American victory at Yorktown. New York
and its military masters were greatly affected by the fallout of the Battle of Yorktown.
Surprisingly, one of these effects would be a final attempt to restore civilian government
to New York.

I

In the latter half of 1780, much of Robertson’s time and correspondence was taken up
with military matters; from late August to mid-September, 1780, Robertson was temporary
military commandant of the City.2 It is possible that he spent much time socializing: Smith
noted that “the Hurry and Dissipation of his over charged Hours has prevented his Attention” to
a matter Robertson had already approved (and added the comment “How detestable this
Military Government.”)3 In 1780, the main military front in America was located in South
Carolina, but some important military events occurred—or perhaps it would be better to say
“did not occur”—in the New York region which are worth a brief mention.
1
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Benedict Arnold, who had been passing information to Clinton through the soon-to-be
unfortunate Major John André (Clinton’s adjutant) for several months, had passed on some
information that French troops would be landing in Rhode Island (which had been evacuated by
the British in 1779). There was even a report that Long Island was to be invaded. Clinton hoped
to attack the French, and put together a 6000 man force. They embarked eastward through the
Sound in late July, 1780, arriving at Huntington Bay on July 28th. However, the French had
gotten to Rhode Island first, dug in, and Admiral Arbuthnot, sailing off Rhode Island, informed
Clinton that the French defenses, reinforced by American militia and artillery, were too strong
to be carried. There were also disturbing reports from the Highlands that Washington was
prepared to attack. Clinton convened a council of war (a rarity for him), which determined that
Huntington was too far from New York to respond rapidly to an invasion. They advised him
unanimously to fall back on Flushing in northern Queens (about ten miles from Manhattan) and
he agreed.4
Shortly after the failed attack on Rhode Island, Robertson felt it necessary to remind
New Yorkers of the importance of militia service in a set of militia regulations he published in
Rivington’s Royal Gazette in September. All were to enroll in the militia, except Quakers,
firemen, and those already in volunteer companies. After some early success in gaining Loyalist
military support, there had been some slippage in support. The difficulties would continue.
After receiving authorization to issue letters of marque against the Dutch (against whom Britain
had declared war on in December, 1780), Robertson found it difficult to get privateers fitted
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out. One reason was the forced impressment of 300 sailors (possibly including some American
prisoners) by Admiral Arbuthnot in May, 1781.5
The second important event of 1780 was the defection of Benedict Arnold in
September. While Arnold successfully defected to the British, his main contact, the popular and
well-liked Major André, was apprehended just north of Tarrytown and soon hanged as a spy.
His capture resulted in a furious exchange of messages between the British and American
camps. Robertson vigorously pled for André’s life, arguing (as did Clinton) that André had
traveled under a flag of truce and therefore “could not be considered as a Spy.” Robertson,
William Smith, and Elliot traveled to the American camp at Dobb’s Ferry, a few miles south of
Tarrytown, to plead for André’s life. The Americans would not permit Elliot and Smith to come
ashore; only Robertson was permitted to meet with Nathanael Greene. Greene, one of
Washington’s favorite generals, had presided at André’s court-martial. Greene met Robertson
“in civility as a Gentleman”, but could say nothing officially. Robertson “soothed and
threatened civilly and even begged” but to no avail. André was hanged on October 2, 1780.
Robertson forwarded to André before his execution various personal items, including a letter
from his mother. Robertson lamented André’s death as the loss of “a good son, a good officer,
and an amiable man,” and consoled himself that he had done his utmost.6
Despite the grief Robertson and many others felt at André’s death, the defection was
quite a coup, and even at this distance one can feel the excitement Robertson must have felt;
as Robertson wrote Lord Amherst, “Arnold the boldest and most enterprising of the rebel
5
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Generals, lives with me and sits by me while I write…”.7 The people of New York “exulted” at
the defection, and Smith opined that “This Desertion must have good Effects.”8 Arnold would
soon be deployed on raids in Virginia and elsewhere. But his defection was in many ways a
failure. While Arnold had successfully defected, a good man had died, and West Point, which
Arnold had promised to deliver into the hands of the British, was still in American hands. The
Highlands, perhaps the most strategic region in the independent states, the one spot
Washington could not afford to lose, remained in American hands. The chance to take it
without a shot had been lost.
Whether or not André was a spy, the Revolutionary War was tailor-made for
espionage; both sides spoke the same language, and there were many Loyalists behind
American lines, and many Patriots behind British lines. The British employed a large network of
spies to give them both military information, as well as a “feel” for the opinion of the
Americans. Many Loyalists would send information as well. One of the more famous British
spies was the Connecticut-based “Mr. Heron”. In September, 1780, he reported on the
difficulties the Americans had in filling their ranks; he had been told by a reliable source that
only 800 of 2500 drafted in Connecticut had been sent to Washington. He also reported that
Washington’s army had about ten thousand men, many of them ready to desert.9 An earlier
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report, furnished by a Loyalist, had reported that western Connecticut was ready to revolt
against the “Usurpers”.10
While there was clearly unrest and war-weariness in New England, especially in a region
on or near the front-lines of the war, this report most likely exaggerated the dissatisfaction of
Western Connecticut. Like all intelligence reports, the reports of spies were sometimes
accurate, sometimes partially accurate, and sometimes very, very wrong. Those that described
the tenor and opinions of Americans (especially as to their desire to return to British rule) seem
to modern eyes to have been suspect, or colored by the opinions of the reporters. But the fact
that so many spies reported dissatisfaction with the “usurpers” and even willingness to revolt
against them helps to explain why so many Loyalists and Britons truly believed the revolt was
the work of a small minority, and that reconciliation was a legitimate possibility. They received
so much information that fit this view (a view which jibed with their preconceptions) that it is
not surprising that they ignored or discounted conflicting information, or that many accepted
“trimmers” as truly loyal. If these Loyalists and Britons had known of Carlisle’s private belief
that “the common people hate us in their heart,” no doubt they would have disagreed with
him. The Americans also had their spies, and many of them were naturally centered in the New
York region (as it was military headquarters for the British). The most famous American spies of
the Revolution, Nathan Hale and the Culper Ring, were active in the New York region and have
been discussed in Chapter VI.
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II

Throughout 1781, the attention of New Yorkers and their military masters were focused
southward. Benedict Arnold in the spring led a highly successful raiding operation in Virginia,
which nearly captured Thomas Jefferson (his home was briefly captured, but Arnold ordered
that it be spared from destruction or pillage). At the same time, in the Carolinas, Cornwallis was
engaged in a series of battles with Nathanael Greene and many partisans. To a reader of
London newspapers, it would have appeared that Cornwallis was conquering South Carolina,
driving Greene’s small army backwards. Technically, Greene lost virtually every battle, but
Cornwallis’s supplies and army were slowly whittled down. Ignoring the advice of Robertson
and others, South Carolina was not secured—Cornwallis’ army travelled across the state,
marching north and south, east and west, but failed to establish a permanent presence. Many
Loyalists suffered for this.11
Robertson almost became intimately involved in the Southern campaign. In May, 1781,
Clinton ordered Robertson to take over the command of Virginia. Clinton had received word
that General Phillips, in command of the British Army in Virginia, was ill. Robertson was on
board a British frigate ready to sail south, but Clinton’s orders were countermanded when word
was received that Lord Cornwallis had reached Petersburg, Virginia, and joined Phillip’s army
(Phillips had died a few days earlier). Robertson returned to his duties as New York governor on
May 29th. The possibility of Robertson having a field command did not exactly worry the
Americans, or comfort the British. Upon hearing that Robertson was to be commander,
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Washington wrote Lafayette that “You may have something to apprehend from his age and
experience but not much from his Activity.” The letter was leaked, and one British officer
opined that it was “a just description”, that Robertson wanted “firmness and decision.” 12
While Robertson was at sea, Andrew Elliot was sworn in as acting governor, but
hesitated at the oath to see the laws of trade executed, as there was no civil government, and
the source of his authority was military. After some insistence by Judge Smith, Elliot took the
oath.13 The strange nature of New York’s pseudo-civilian government, neither fish nor fowl,
neither civilian nor military, had once again caused difficulty, as both military and civilian
personnel questioned their authority and powers.

To Robertson’s disappointment, a planned raid on Philadelphia for the summer of 1781
by Clinton did not occur. French armies appeared with Washington’s at White Plains (in
American-held Westchester County, and the site of a major battle in 1776). The appearance of
several French ships in the Sound in July drove all small craft into Huntington Bay, and two
frigates were ordered into the Sound to counter them, but the French ships had left by the time
the frigates arrived. Robertson assured William Knox (an undersecretary of state under
Germain) that the militia was ready to defend the city and thus free the King’s troops to attack
the enemy.14
New York and its British masters were not total bystanders to the climactic events of
Yorktown. Cornwallis established his ill-fated base at Yorktown in August, and on the
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nineteenth of that month French and American troops began their march from the Hudson to
the Chesapeake. Robertson reported that the French and rebels were at Paramus, New Jersey,
with the “declared Object” to attack Staten Island (no such attack occurred). Clinton in New
York also received news of major French fleet movements toward the Chesapeake, but
discounted the news. Soon, a sizable French fleet of about thirty six ships of the line were in the
region of the Chesapeake. Clinton, Robertson, the Hessian general Knyphausen, and others
decided to send 5 or 6 thousand men south to support Cornwallis. In early September, Arnold
sailed to raid New London, Connecticut. 15
Smith noted many troops embarking. While they were publicly stated to be headed to
Virginia (and that was their actual destination), Smith suspected that they were headed instead
for the Highlands; he had urged such an action to Robertson as a diversion to aid Cornwallis,
and later tried to suggest this second-hand to Clinton. Smith complained that “There is no Spirit
of Enterprize. The general Dullness kills the Spark that happens to rise in the Mind of any
Man…” Preparing the relief expedition would take till early October. Smith and others were
quite anxious as to the fate of Cornwallis’s army, as it was by now surrounded and under siege.
In mid-September, Clinton was reportedly more confident than Robertson, who was “in Terror”
at rebel accounts of 28 French ships of the line. Smith had slowly been losing faith in the
military leadership; he had long had a poor opinion of Clinton, and his former high opinion of
Robertson was in tatters. It was on September 13 that he wrote, “General Robertson talks in
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this pitiful Strain. He is a Dotard and abandoned to Frivolity. He has Parties of Girls in the Fort
Garden, in the midst of his own Fears, and the Anxieties of this Hour.”16
In the middle of this anxious time, and as preparations for the relief exhibition
continued, a welcome diversion occurred. Admiral Arbuthnot had been relieved of his duties
several months earlier, replaced temporarily by Admiral Graves, who was in the Chesapeake
region in September, 1781. Arbuthnot’s replacement, Admiral Robert Digby, arrived on Sept. 24
with three ships, and a rather important midshipman: Prince William-Henry, the third son of
King George III (and eventually, in 1830, King William IV). William was sixteen at the time of his
visit, and spent some time in New York. The Prince landed on the 26th, and was received by “Sir
H. Clinton, the Governor, and a Crowd behind Kennedy’s House on the North River”. The Prince
dined with the Admiral that evening (not a normal occurrence for a midshipman!), and lodged
at General Birch’s, who gave up the house he had been using. An address was prepared for the
prince by the Council. At noon of the next day, Prince William Henry walked with Clinton and
his officers from Headquarters to a fort called Bunker’s Hill. He returned by the Bowery, and
turned in at Queen Street. A great crowd of people, both old and young, watched. On Friday,
the 28th, the Prince held what can best be described as a court at Governor Robertson’s house.
For the first and last time, a prince of the blood held court in America as a representative of the
ruling monarch. Smith describes the scene:
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At 10 o’Clock we went with the Governor, and were called up and introduced at
the Head of the Stairs to Admiral Digby who brought us in to the Prince…The
Passage all thro’ was lined with General and other Officers of the Army and
Navy, waiting to be introduced. The Prince stood at the Right of the Fireplace
with a Paper in his Hand, and up at his Breast, and bowed as we entred. Digby
was at his right Hand, a little behind. General Robertson advanced and took out
the Address, but not having Spectacles got thro’ with great Difficulty. The Prince
then read his Answer. After which the Governor named us several as we stood
on his Right and down to the Bottom, ending with the Mayor and General De
Lancey. On this he bowed and retired, and so we did severally. 17

Many monarchs and members of royal families, British or otherwise, would visit New
York in the centuries to come. They would often be well-greeted by many otherwise republican
Americans eager to meet with a king or queen or prince. Many New Yorkers and Americans
have, at least figuratively, bowed before these royals since that September day in 1781. But
these royals were all visitors to an independent, republican country, one that had rejected
monarchy, and one where such fawning displays would be decried or mocked by many fellow
citizens. As John Adams had said, “the Idolatry” felt toward monarchy had rapidly dissipated in
the newly independent states. For many, the loyalty and even love that they had felt for the
king was gone, dissipated by what was seen as a betrayal, and by the actions of the soldiers
sent to enforce the king’s will. The monarchism that was displayed on the 28th of September
would soon be wiped away by a republican and democratic tide, except for the occasional,
almost atavistic, exceptions discussed above, or nostalgic remembrances of a “simpler” time
(such as Renaissance festivals or films about monarchs). The thought that one should bow to a
17
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sixteen year old merely because he outranked you in a societal hierarchy was dying rapidly in
America and would soon seem to many to be ridiculous, though it was not yet dead. For a short
while, just before the “world turned upside down”, the tiny enclave of British New York was
deeply integrated into the empire.
William’s visit was almost the last gasp of the British monarchy and the Empire in
America. Unknown to any of the “courtiers,” less than two weeks earlier, the French had driven
off Admiral Graves’s fleet at the Battle of the Chesapeake, preserving the encirclement of
Cornwallis’s army. Within three weeks, Cornwallis would surrender. In a little more than two
years, New York would be evacuated. But for now, Prince William would receive addresses and
walk in the streets so that the loyal subjects could see him.18 In a little more than two years
(and for some, a little less), many of these loyal subjects would be gone from America as well.
Before leaving for Virginia, the admirals, Sir Henry Clinton, and the prince attended
service at St. Paul’s. This visit by Clinton was rumored to be the first time he had been in a
church—this was highly unlikely, though perhaps he had rarely been to church in America
during the war. Certainly, the less-than-reverent attitude towards places of worship and
graveyards the British had shown over the course of the war may have contributed to this
rumor (see Chapter VI). The relief expedition was originally scheduled to leave on October 5; it
did not leave until October 12. Despite the urgency of the situation, it takes time to launch any
major expedition, but perhaps more speed could have been shown. Many were anxious at the
delay. In addition to time, relief expeditions also require men, preferably trained. Robertson
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asked for volunteers solely for the mission, promising them that they would be discharged and
able to return to their lives or their ships after the completion of the mission. They would
receive certain privileges for volunteering, including a certificate which would give them partial
protection from a future “press” for sailors. They would also be paid; the New York Chamber
of Commerce offered a bounty of three guineas per volunteer. 19
The expedition, led by Clinton with almost seven thousand men, sailed about the
twelfth of October towards Yorktown. Robertson, having been promised a place with the
expedition, was ordered to remain, to his evident disappointment. On October 24, much
gunfire was heard from New Jersey, which many believed to be sounds of rejoicing, making
many apprehensive that Cornwallis had been captured. That same day, New Yorkers were
shocked by a hand bill out of New Jersey which stated that Cornwallis had surrendered at
Yorktown on the seventeenth. Smith dismissed it as an “Artifice” to prevent a Loyalist
insurrection. Robertson, however, believed it. Definite word arrived on the 26th that Cornwallis
had surrendered. The relief expedition arrived at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay on Oct 24,
only to learn that Cornwallis had surrendered 5 days earlier. As in 1777, Clinton’s relief
expedition had arrived too late. The world had turned upside down, and Yorktown would lead
to the fall of ministers, ministries, and British rule. But many, such as Germain and Smith, did
not seem to realize that, as will be discussed further below. In Britain, former Peace
Commissioner Lord Carlisle could barely bring himself to comment, writing his friend George
Selwyn (a Member of Parliament and a member of the infamous Hellfire Club), “Everything that
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can be said upon this cursed event in America has been said by this time a thousand times, by
those who lament and by those who rejoice at our misfortunes. I shall therefore spare you my
melancholy reflexions. As for speculations, I have long since left off making any, seeing that
when I indulged any I very seldom was right.”20
The news of the surrender reached London on November 25, 1781. Germain went to
North with the news, which had arrived by packet. According to Germain, North took the news
“as he would have taken a ball in the breast.” North paced up and down the room, saying “Oh
God! It is all over.” This was a universal feeling; the news had arrived shortly after news of an
attack on British-held Minorca (in the Mediterranean) and of French and Spanish fleets again
threatening the channel. The London Gazette, “published by authority”, tried to bury the story
on the second page (or “below the fold,” in modern parlance) in its late December paper. The
first page dealt with a knighting ceremony and with news of a battle in India with Hyder Ali.
Cornwallis’ letter to Clinton, informing him of the surrender, followed.21

Clinton was soon relieved of his command, to be replaced by Sir Guy Carleton, the
former Governor of Quebec. It also seemed necessary to relieve Germain of his position.
Relieving Germain was more complicated. The policies of Germain and of the King were
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essentially the same, and Germain’s removal from his post would reflect badly on the King, who
had not yet abandoned all hope of retaining the colonies. The King, perhaps looking for a facesaving way to let Germain go, noted to Lord Stormont, the Secretary of State for the Northern
Department, that Carleton would “certainly not accept this Command if He is to correspond
with” Germain. Germain and Carleton had clashed over military policies in 1777, there had
been many intemperate remarks, and they were still feuding. Germain hoped for a peerage,
and the King, noting that Germain and Carleton were incompatible, thought that Germain
would surely retire if he obtained a peerage. Of course, such a peerage would distress those
who remembered Germain’s role at Minden without fondness.22
Germain still continued making plans for North America. In his 1782 Propositions
(probably prepared in December 1781), he argued for keeping what Britain still held, and
fighting for a settlement on a basis of uti possiditis (keeping what each side had).The continued
possession of New York, Charleston, and Savannah by Britain after a peace settlement with
America would help safeguard Britain’s extensive trade, and help with launching winter
operations in the West Indies.23 There was even a possibility, Germain thought, that suspicions
might arise among the rebels and “shake to pieces their ill formed constitution”, and if the
British were still in a position to “receive and protect them”, they might be inclined to return to
their former connection (at this late date, he still clung to that increasingly fantastical hope).
He suggested using some troops for raids, and even attempting to liberate the “Delmarva”
Peninsula. However, on this, he warned:
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The sending a force there, or into any other part where there are Loyalists, will
rather disserve than promote our cause, if better Order be not kept among the
troops, for the relaxation of Discipline which has prevailed throughout the
prosecution of this war, has been universally complained of, has disgraced the
Army and alienated the affections of the Inhabitants from the Royal Cause.
Plunder has been the common Object, and in the pursuit of it, no Distinction
have been made between the well-affected and the notorious rebels. This
grievance calls aloud for redress, and some officers much to their credit have
shewn that discipline may be restored by proper attention and firmness.24

This paper was for all intents and purposes his last official statement of the war, and
McKesy notes that it was “only the wearied repetition of a formula which he still believed to be
right.”25 His advice concerning discipline was quite good but also quite late; better treatment of
the civilian population in the earlier years of the war could only have helped the British cause.
Clinton was relieved of his position on December 23. The King still was in basic
agreement with Germain and opposed to independence; replacing Germain would be a change
of personnel, not policy. It was not until February 9, 1782 that Germain left, to be replaced by
Welbor Ellis. Germain would soon be awarded with a peerage, dying in 1785 as the Viscount
Sackville. The North Ministry itself fell on March 27th, 1782, replaced by the Rockingham
Ministry. They desired to end the war with America and transfer the troops to the Indies.26
Shortly after the battle, Robertson wrote Germain that there were 40 thousand men
stationed in America, and that if better use were made of them, all would be well. To Amherst,
he wrote that Clinton was saying that Clinton was “sorry for Lord Cornwallis because he loved
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him and had a great regard for his army—but the evil like any other great evils may be
productive of good. It will produce a new Minister…”, one who would listen to Clinton, and give
him the army he needed. Robertson told Amherst that “I hope it has not escaped You, that I
have tryed on every occasion to give Activity to the War, and to cease making war on the
treasury by reducing at least half our expence.” This letter was read to Smith, who believed that
Robertson was hoping to receive Clinton’s command in the shake-up that would probably
follow the disaster of Yorktown.27
While ministries tottered and positions were angled for, more mundane matters
exercised New Yorkers. The troops sent to aid Cornwallis returned to New York by early
November, 1781, and Robertson issued a proclamation on fire-wood, of which the Moravian
cleric Schaukirk hopefully wrote that it would “afford much relief, for the distress and extortion
has been great already.” Unfortunately, by December 11, Schaukirk would write that the
“Weather very cold; great distress for want of wood, the proclamations of no avail.” The winter
was very cold, and to add to the miseries of the city, rents went up to “extravagant figures.”28
Despite proclamations, there was a shortage of firewood. The soldiers in the barracks
got what fuel was available, but the city-dwellers suffered. Smith blamed a lack of ships in the
Sound to guard the shipments of fuel, which were mainly transferred by water, as well as an
order prohibiting any fuel leaving Staten Island until the garrison there was supplied. According
to Robertson, wood coming to town was seized and given to favorites. To make matters worse,
in mid-November, two New Jersey whale boats seized a victualler in New York harbor. The
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whale boats and victualler were pursued, and the rebels burnt the ship on the shore. The ship
contained 1000 barrels of pork and seven thousand pounds of wine.29
In late 1781 and early 1782, an important matter which had exercised much attention
among the leadership came to a head. The Green Mountain region had long been disputed
between New Hampshire and New York. The area was often called Hampshire Grants, as New
Hampshire had granted land to settlers there. Many claimed a freehold tenancy with only a
minimum quitrent (a quitrent was a payment made in lieu of performing feudal duties).
However, New York also claimed the area, and had granted land in it to speculators. If the area
was found to belong to New York, then the New Hampshire freeholders were New York tenants
with a high quitrent. Unsurprisingly, the Vermonters preferred to be part of New Hampshire. In
1764, a British court declared the area part of New York. New York organized the area into
counties, but many of the Vermonters refused to accept New York authority, and a small-scale
civil war broke out. Both the colonial and revolutionary governments of New York were unable
to maintain control of the region. Vermont in 1777 declared itself an independent republic;
New York did not acknowledge their secession and still claimed the area to be part of New
York.30
What had happened in Vermont was not an isolated incident. Although details differed,
similar situations had occurred in Vermont, the Hudson Valley, New Jersey, and other places. In
all these regions, there was a dispute between the allegedly “legal” owners of the land and the
actual possessors. Those who lived on the land, who worked and improved the land, were told
29
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that someone else, perhaps someone they had never seen and who had never seen the land,
was considered the owner—and that they had to pay him onerous quitrents, rents, or other
fees. In most cases, the law and the courts were on the side of the proprietors, landlords, and
absentee owners. The law—by which is mean the “black-letter law” of statutes, common law
and cases, not just the possibly biased judges and judicial systems—would usually consider the
proprietor or absentee owner or landlord to have the better claim. The actual inhabitants of the
land considered that they had made the land their own by the “Lockean” method of improving
the land, often supplemented by purchasing from Indians or by a donation or “patent” from a
governor. However, in places like New Jersey, there were often conflicting patents and grants.
Many settlers refused to follow court rulings, or suspected the courts of being biased against
them. These problems would not disappear with the Revolution. Large tracts of land would be
granted or purchased, only to have the legal owners find the lands occupied by “squatters” who
claimed ownership of the land by the Lockean means of improving the land. This was a
common occurrence in America throughout the colonial era and early nineteenth century. In
New York, landlord-tenant disputes would persist into the 1840s, until the great Hudson Valley
estates finally began to break up.31
New York, the other states and the Congress were reluctant to recognize Vermont as an
independent state. Ethan Allen and other Vermont leaders, including Governor Chittendon,
began to conduct tentative negotiations with Governor Haldimand of Quebec. While ostensibly
prisoner –exchange negotiations, the possibility of Vermont becoming a loyal province was a
major topic of discussion. If Vermont “returned to its former allegiance” in return for
31
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independence from New York, this would be a major victory for the British cause (especially
after Yorktown). It is possible that the Vermont leaders hoped to use the possibility of
returning to British control as a “bargaining chip” in their negotiations with New York and the
other states, as they continued to press their claim to independence from New York in
Congress. The negotiations with the British were secret, and Vermont’s legislature was kept in
the dark about them. In December 1781, Haldimand sent to Clinton an “express” containing
“proposals made by the inhabitants of Vermont for returning to their allegiance and putting
themselves under the protection of the Crown.” Clinton, unsure of the extent of his legal
powers in this matter (he was, after all, being asked to divide one of the King’s provinces in
two), sought legal advice from Smith who told him he had no authority, and should forward the
express to Britain. But in February, 1782, Governor George Clinton of independent New York
laid before the Assembly a series of documents concerning the negotiations. These included
affidavits proving the proposed treaty, and even included Smith’s advice. 32
The exposure of the negotiations to the light of day doomed them and any possibility of
Vermont becoming a loyal British province. Someone had provided the documents to Governor
Clinton. The most likely candidates were Vermonters who opposed the negotiations; in January,
they warned Clinton of an “intrigue with Canada.” Jones, who detested Smith, believed that
Smith had leaked them. Governor George Clinton had been the pupil of Smith, who had been
Clinton’s patron. Smith had been a youthful radical and was a Presbyterian, which in the mind
of Jones and many Anglicans made him seem more inclined to rebellion. Smith also had much
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land in Vermont, under New York grants, as did many of his friends. All of these claims would
have to be given up if Vermont became a separate province. 33
Any reader of Smith’s Memoirs would realize that Smith was a dedicated Loyalist, and
thus it is highly unlikely that he would deliberately do anything that would harm the British
cause, such as leaking the documents to Governor Clinton. If Smith, rather than Vermonters or
others who had access to the documents, did leak the proposal, it was to preserve Vermont for
New York—but a royal New York. Perhaps he did not see that his actions greatly harmed the
British cause, or that his loyalty to his province had to be outweighed by the greater good to
the Empire that Vermont’s return would bring. If he did leak the documents, perhaps he did
not think that his actions could be considered treasonous, though many would consider them
treasonous (a similar statement may be made about Ethan Allen and the other Vermonters
engaged in the Haldiman negotiations). In any event, whatever chance Britain had to retain
Vermont was lost by the leaking of the documents.

III

Thanks mainly to the opposition of Clinton and a substantial portion of the Loyalist
community, civil government had not been restored to British-controlled New York. Smith had
tirelessly pushed for it, but little had come of his efforts. New York’s government during the
occupation was neither fish nor fowl, being partly civilian and partly military. Civilian officials
were so unsure of the extent or source of their authority, that when Lt. Governor Eliot was
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sworn in as Acting Governor, he hesitated to say parts of the oath because he was not sure he
had the authority (see above). The absence of much normal taxation under martial law was
definitely a factor in the desire of many Loyalists to remain under military rule. 34 Despite this,
civilian government had some advantages, even for those inclined to prefer martial law. For
example, certain offices received fees based on taxes and duties that were not being collected
under military rule, and certain actions could only be performed by civilian governors. In July of
1781, Clinton “begged” Robertson to assume the powers of a civil governor so that some
vessels seized in Virginia by Arnold and brought to New York could be “libeled” as prizes to the
King. A libel is the formal declaration or statement of claim in an admiralty case. The vessels
here were being libeled as prizes to the Navy. A compromise was eventually reached with the
King’s intervention.35
Surprisingly, the most serious attempt to restore civil government to New York since the
failure to certify of 1780 was made shortly after Yorktown. The impetus for this new push for
civil government arose out of the surrender at Yorktown. The Tenth Article of Capitulation at
Yorktown provided that “Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country at present in
York or Gloucester, are not to be punished on account of having joined the British Army.” The
intent of the article was to protect Loyalist troops from being punished by the Americans as
traitors; they would be treated as prisoners instead. Washington refused to accept this
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provision, believing the status of these Loyalists to be determinable by civil authorities only.
Washington’s interpretation created a great uproar among the Loyalist community.36
The first intimations that civil government might be revived were made by Chief Justice
Smyth of New Jersey, who informed Smith in mid-December that the Council in a few days
would be consulted on it. Smith spoke at length with Clinton on the topic, but at that time to
little avail. Clinton on January 14, 1782, called a council to discuss the matter and see how to
“pacify” the outraged Loyalists. Here, he expressed a desire to reestablish civil government so
that rebel prisoners could be, “as Washington does,” left to “Civil Resort.” In other words, if civil
government was reestablished, then rebels could be tried as traitors in civil courts—just as the
British believed Washington wanted done. Clinton apparently hoped that the threat of such
civil courts would probably act as a deterrent on both sides to trying prisoners as traitors.37
Robertson proposed in response the issuance of a proclamation threatening retaliation
against American prisoners of war should Loyalists held by the Americans be treated as
anything other than prisoners. Such a proclamation was not issued; instead, Governor Franklin
of New Jersey suggested that Clinton send an order to all posts that no distinctions were to be
made between regular and provincial troops in any future surrender. Clinton’s correspondence
to this effect was published in Rivington’s Royal Gazette and Gaine’s New York Mercury in early
March. While Clinton had been relieved, he was still in command pending Carleton’s arrival,
which did not come until May 5, 1782.38
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At a February 20 headquarters meeting, the question of civil government came up again
when Smith noted that taxation would be useful. Clinton made a pointed observation to
Robertson that he had no objection to reviving civil government whenever Robertson thought it
fitting. This apparently prompted Robertson to review his instructions and consult Justice Smith
in Smith’s professional capacity. Robertson, in accordance with Smith’s views, found that civil
government could not be erected until Clinton had freed the port from the Restraining Act. In
short, the first action to civil government had to be with Sir Henry Clinton. Elliot disagreed,
believing that civil authority could be recreated while the port remained closed.39
Discussion continued on the topic. On March 14, Clinton wrote Robertson that he would
not oppose the restoration of civil government if Robertson thought it absolutely necessary.
Robertson called his Privy Council to discuss the matter on March 21, 1782. That civil
government was being discussed at all provoked astonishment. Everyone Robertson consulted,
he would soon report, were surprised “that, after a measure had been so long suppressed while
it might have been of service to the King…should be proposed under circumstances similar to
those which induce other governors to declare military law.” Robertson thought that now was
not the moment, and so did his Council. Most surprisingly, Smith, who had long been a tireless
advocate for restoring civil government in New York, agreed that now was not the time.40
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The March 21 meeting was held a few short months after the surrender of Yorktown;
indeed, it was partially in response to a problem created by that surrender. Many agreed with
Lord North that “it was all over” after that battle. Even the most optimistic recognized that the
loss at Yorktown, coming after six years of war, meant that British options were limited. At the
very least, news of a new ministry—perhaps a peace ministry—was expected, and the best that
could be hoped for was a peace based on uti possendis (possession). The Council surely
remembered the dark days of 1778, when Philadelphia was abandoned by the British, and there
was a real possibility in the spring of 1782 that New York would soon be abandoned. What
sense would it be to reestablish full civilian government, complete with an assembly, if the
British were planning to abandon New York? The Council argued that, in general, restoring civil
government under the king was the “direct Object of all Military Operations against the
Rebellion.” However, none of the good effects of calling an Assembly would occur if it was “his
Majesty’s Pleasure” to remove his forces now here. They thought it best to defer the measure
until there was better word as to the king’s intentions. Smith agreed, but also thought that the
Prohibitory Act needed to be repealed first.41 In short, the Council thought it senseless and
useless to restore civilian government in southern New York if the region was soon to be
abandoned.
In addition to there being general agreement that now was not the time to restore civil
government, there was also much concurrence on the procedure to be followed in restoring
civil government (if the time ever came). The entire Privy Council agreed that before civil
courts could be opened, an Assembly would need to be called. The Assembly in 1775 had been
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composed of 31 members, with sixteen making a quorum. The area under British control did
not reach 16 representatives; thus an Assembly drawn from only downstate New York would
not have a quorum. Several suggestions were made to correct this, generally involving
Robertson creating new boroughs or increasing the representation of the areas included so that
the numbers reached sixteen. Robertson sent a letter to Germain requesting advice as to the
legality and advisability of these proposals, should civil government be again contemplated.42
The proposal was again brought up briefly before the council on May 4, but the Council
rejected the proposition. Carleton, the new Commander-in-Chief, in mid-June argued that an
“assembly would render us ridiculous beyond the lines”. Smith continued to press for it, arguing
that restoring civil government was the only way to punish crimes not punishable under the
Articles of War.43 But it was clear that barring an unexpected change in fortunes, the last hope
of restoring civil government was ended, mainly because of its execrable timing. Thus ended
the attempt to restore civilian government in British-occupied New York.
Why had civilian rule not been restored in New York? Several factors must be looked at.
First, the virtually tax-free nature of the occupation undoubtedly made the Loyalists, many of
whom were in tight financial straits as refugees, desirous of keeping martial law. Many Loyalists
feared that restoring civilian government would result in the pardon of rebels, and they had no
stomach for that. Oliver Delancey, a member of the Council, declared that he would not pardon
any of the rebels.44 The possibility that the civilian government would cause obstacles to
military operations was one held by both Howe and Clinton, and Robertson had made a special
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effort to ensure Clinton that he would not interfere with Clinton’s military operations. This was
especially important, as the possibility always existed that the British zone would be subject to
a Franco-American assault, and cooperation between the military and the civilian government
in such circumstances would be vital.
The military concerns detailed above seem like legitimate concerns. However, less
legitimate concerns also seemed to be an important factor to both Howe and Clinton. The
British and Hessian soldiers had committed many crimes, ranging from petty theft and
vandalism to rape and murder. Officers had taken property without leaving a receipt, or had
left receipts and never paid. Petty corruption had governed the necessary trade with the rebels
that was conducted on Long Island. In short, many people in the British zone, Loyalist, neutral,
Patriot or trimmer had many legitimate claims against the British army and government which
the absence of a civilian court system prevented them from pursuing (the Police Courts
alleviated this somewhat, but not entirely). For many members of the British army and
government, it was very important that martial law continue so that the civilian court system
would not be revived. As long as martial law continued, they would probably not have to pay
for their questionable actions.
The British zone also consisted of five counties and part of a sixth. One county, New
York, was mainly occupied by refugees from many of the colonies. There were significant
constitutional questions that would have to be answered about how an assembly that only
included part of the state (albeit its richest and most populous part) would be constituted. As
Robertson noted, the area under British control did not produce a quorum of the old Assembly.
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Some alteration of the rules governing the Assembly would probably have been necessary.45
One other county, Suffolk, had had many Patriots (including a signer of the Declaration of
Independence). Could they even produce a loyal Assemblyman?
Despite all these reasons, perhaps the primary reason for civilian government not being
instituted was Clinton. While there were some arguably legitimate reasons (and illegitimate
reasons) for not instituting civilian government, the decision had been made at the highest
levels of the British government that British-controlled New York was to be restored to civilian
government. Communication problems made it difficult to know in London what was
happening in New York; information was often months out of date. Therefore, rather than
ordering that civilian government be automatically restored, some discretion had been given to
Clinton; Clinton had to declare the area under the King’s Peace before civilian government
could be restored. As discussed above, southern New York could reasonably be considered
pacified. Indeed, the area was pacified, and the certification that it was should have been given.
The conclusion must be made that the failure to certify by Clinton was an abuse of his
discretion.
As discussed above, Clinton was reluctant to—or incapable—of sharing authority. This
personality quirk may very well have been the main reason he did not give his certification. He
did not want to share authority, did not wish to, and found it difficult to cooperate and work
with Robertson. But, the restoration of civilian government to New York was the wish of His
Majesty’s government. Clinton would only have been justified in blocking this if the area had
45
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been suffering a major revolt or was under sustained attack by enemy forces. These
circumstances did not exist in 1780 or 1781. Clinton blocked a major policy initiative of his
government without a legitimate justification.
Some blame must be placed on Germain, and perhaps Robertson. The restoration of
civil government in New York was Germain’s policy, and Robertson was his main agent for
implementing it. Germain and Robertson should have vigorously pushed it, and pressured
Clinton to give his certification. This was a high-ranking military officer flouting the wishes of
the civilian government of his nation. While circumstances differ, this is a situation that has
occurred several times throughout history. One thinks of the problems Lincoln had with
McClellan, or Truman with MacArthur. McClellan and MacArthur were soon relieved of duty;
Clinton stayed on. Germain was thousands of miles away, and perhaps believed that he had no
choice but to accept the decision of the military commander on the spot. Or perhaps he was
reluctant to push Clinton. Germain, it must be remembered, was under a cloud because of his
questionable actions at Minden; giving orders or pushing his views on a general of
unquestioned courage (whatever his other flaws) may have been something he wished to
avoid. In that case, however, Germain was in the wrong position, because his role as de facto
Minister of War required him to do just that.
Of course, the question remains whether the restoration of civilian government in
British New York would have made any real difference in the Revolutionary War. This question
will be looked at further in the conclusion. For now, it is clear that what many thought was a
promising new strategy that had the potential to positively impact the British cause was not
attempted. Indeed, it was thrown away. The military master of New York refused to cooperate
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and work with the new civilian governor, and only requested civilian government at the worst
possible time. However, it must be noted that the experiment of restoring civilian government
was attempted in Georgia with some success. This work will now take a brief look at events in
Georgia, and contrast them with events in New York.

IV

Georgia was the youngest of the thirteen colonies, not having been founded until 1733.
The economy was similar to its neighbor South Carolina, with rice and indigo as its main
exports. It had a large servile population; in 1773, its population consisted of 18000 whites and
15000 slaves. The population was mainly found along the coast between the Savannah River
and the Altamaha rivers (about 50 miles from the Florida border), but colonists had moved
northwest along the Savannah River to the vicinity of Augusta. The frontier had recently begun
to be settled by second-generation Americans from the Carolinas and Virginia, many of ScotsIrish ancestry. Their rough manners often appalled the earlier settlers based at the capital of
Savannah. Many of these frontiersmen would become the leaders of Revolutionary Georgia.46
The colony long acted as a buffer between South Carolina and Spanish-held Florida, until
Florida became British at the end of the French and Indian War. In the 1770s Georgia still
desired British protection from Indians (as well as its own slave population). Begun as a
proprietary colony by idealistic Englishmen, by 1752 the colony had become a royal colony. Like
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New York, it was governed by a royally-appointed governor, an appointed Council which acted
as the upper house of the legislature and as an advisor for the Governor, and a popularlyelected assembly known as the Commons House of Assembly. Like New York’s Assembly, which
reached the grand total of 31 members in the 1770s, the Commons House of Assembly was also
small, never reaching more than thirty members (at least in Georgia, there was the excuse that
the colony was new and not too populous). These members were elected by all Georgians—if
they were free, white, male, and owned fifty or more acres of land. In 1765, the colony was
divided into 12 parishes for administrative purposes. 47
Georgia had been blessed with one of the King’s most conscientious and competent
public servants as governor. Appointed in 1760 by King George II, James Wright was to govern
Georgia until 1782 (with the exceptions caused by his exile during the Revolution). Wright was a
native of South Carolina, educated in law in England. Early in his administration, he achieved a
major settlement with the Indian nations of Georgia, ensuring peace as well as a large cession
of land from the Creeks. Wright was universally admired in Georgia in the early 1760s.48
As in the other colonies, there was much opposition to the Stamp Act. Thanks to
Governor Wright’s influence, Georgia sent no official delegates to the Stamp Act Congress, but
did send an official observer. Georgia’s agent in London was instructed to oppose the act, but
did not, finding nothing wrong with it. As in New York and other colonies, a group calling itself
the Sons of Liberty formed and opposed the act. Wright was perhaps the only governor to
succeed in enforcing the Stamp Act.49 The Liberty Party, a Patriot party, controlled the assembly
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from 1765. As in the other colonies, the Boston Tea Party resulted in the formation of
committees. However, the Georgians, perhaps because of the relative newness and small
population of the colony, were very reluctant to get too involved. No Georgian delegate
appeared at the First Continental Congress. By January, 1775, Georgia, upon learning of the
non-importation agreement passed by Congress, formed a Provincial Congress. The Congress
was mainly composed of delegates to the Assembly. The Congress ran the anti-British
movement and prepared the beginnings of a revolutionary government, while its membership
(in their capacity as members of the Assembly) continued running the official colonial
government.50 This was reminiscent of events in Massachusetts, where the Provincial Congress
was also largely formed of members of the legislature there. As in New York, as in 1917 Russia,
as in many revolutions, there was a period of dual or competing government between the
official government and a rising revolutionary government. In Georgia, the revolutionary
government and the official government were virtually the same for a time.

While Georgia initially failed to send delegates to the Second Continental Congress, it
began to take more and more revolutionary actions. In January 1776, the Provisional
Government arrested Governor Wright. On February 11, Wright escaped from house arrest. It is
possible that he was permitted to escape, as he had many friends and admirers who did not
want him to be harmed.51
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After independence, a turbulent period of self-government occurred. Two constitutions
were rapidly produced (a temporary constitution and one meant to be permanent), and the
state of Georgia’s first governor, Button Gwinnett (a signatory of the Declaration of
Independence) was killed in a duel with another patriot. In contrast, for the first few years, the
war was fairly quiet in Georgia. Every year, Georgia would launch an expedition against the
loyal British colony in East Florida, and every year, disease or other factors would force it to
return short of the St. Mary’s River, which is roughly the border between Georgia and Florida.
This all changed in December of 1778. Georgia’s exiled British governor, James Wright, along
with South Carolina’s governor Lord William Campbell, had agitated since their arrival in
England in 1776 for the recapture of their provinces. Both believed their colonies included a
substantial number of Loyalists. About 3000 British, German, and Loyalist troops under the
command of Colonel Archibald Campbell invaded and quickly seized Savannah, the main city of
colonial Georgia. Squabbling among the Patriot defenders was a major contributor to the
successful British attack. About one hundred eighty eight defenders of Savanna were captured.
Savannah would remain British for the duration of the occupation. 52
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At about the same time as the assault on Savannah, a small army from Florida under
William Prevost, a Swiss soldier serving in the British army, invaded Georgia from the South.
According to a memorandum in the Sackville-Germain papers:

The conduct of Wm Prevost in Georgia is much more obnoxious to the friends of
this Country [Britain] than to its Enemys and is likely to prove fatal to our
interest there…His progress from the Southward was attended with a wanton
destruction of Property which has never yet marked even the Retreat of any our
Armys and had more the appearance of a plundering Party, whose Stay in an
Enemy’s country was to be very short; than that of a Royal Army come to occupy
the Province for the defence and Protection of the kings Subjects.53

According to the memorandum, on his march Prevost destroyed thirty seven houses in
Georgia, plus grain and provisions of all kind. After this small-scale but Shermanesque “March
through Georgia”, he continued his plundering ways in South Carolina. The memorandum
writer blames his actions on the “ignorance natural to a foreigner of the ideas which British
subjects entertain of the right of private property, even in the midst of war as far as it can be
maintained.”54 In short, what Governor Wright no doubt considered “liberation” began as a
plundering invasion; the British repeated the same mistakes they had up north, making
themselves obnoxious to the people whose loyalties they needed to preserve or win over.
The British forces soon gained control of coastal Georgia, extending their control inland
as far west as Augusta, which changed hands several times during the occupation. By February,

particular “new man” from being a member in the new government. Constitution of Georgia, February 5, 1777,
Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ga02.asp#b1.
53
“Memorandum on Georgia, beginning The conduct of Wm. Prevost”, 1779, Sackville Germaine Papers Vol. XI,
Clement Library, Nov. 15, 1779-Feb. 15, 1780.
54
Ibid.

383

1779, only Wilkes County, a mainly frontier county, was in Patriot hands. The government
situation for independent Georgia was quite confused; at one point there were competing
Patriot governments. In the British-controlled zone, military officers ruled for four months,
until the Governor and other officers of the old colonial government returned. Campbell in
January proclaimed to the people of Savannah that he came to protect Savannah, not punish
those who had sided with the rebels. All who swore loyalty to the King and renounced the state
government would be fully pardoned if this was done within 3 months of the proclamation.
Many Georgians accepted; some may have been Loyalists, some trimmers, and others may
have been Patriots who thought the American cause was lost. A loyal militia was formed, but
some left to rejoin the Whigs when Whig military fortunes improved. General Prevost assumed
the role of Governor in March, and reestablished partial civilian rule. Loyalist Georgians were
appointed as provincial officers and all laws in effect when the British left in 1775 were
declared still in effect.55
Wright returned to Savannah on the fourteenth of July, and while he did not find the
province as secure as he had hoped it would be, he did believe that it had been restored to the
King’s Peace. However, he found it imprudent to issue election writs because he thought the
military hold on the province weakened by the expedition into South Carolina. He also found
that “several of the Leading Rebels are very busy in keeping up the Expiring Flame of Rebellion
& that there yet Many here who if they had an Opportunity would adhere to the Independent
Scheme.” By the end of July, 1779, he was again the governor.56
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Hoping that the province would become more secure, Wright delayed calling an
Assembly for almost a year. An Assembly was finally called and met from May to July of 1780.
At the opening of the Commons House of Assembly, Wright contrasted the “War,
Imprisonments, proscriptions, oppression, attainders, and confiscations” that he said the rebels
had brought, with the “Peace, happiness, true liberty and the enjoyment of property” which
had long been “banished from this land.” He added that “it will evidently appear that Great
Britain never meant to oppress or injure the Colonies, but that they should return to the mild,
just, and benign government, they formerly enjoyed.” 57
It is instructive to look at the actions of this Loyalist Assembly, to understand what a
Loyalist Assembly could have accomplished in New York. The Assembly worked hard to restore
Georgia to its pre-Revolutionary status. The acts of the Patriot state government were declared
illegal, and 151 prominent rebels were disqualified politically. The legislature attempted to
attaint (basically, permanently strip from them and their heirs their property) 112 rebels, and
eventually attainted 24 rebels (pending royal approval—though there is no evidence this was
ever received). The Royal Assembly in the spring of 1781 added new parishes and a court,
though the parishes probably never functioned as the region they were located in soon became
Whig again. The court definitely never functioned. Perhaps most importantly, the colony
granted the King a permanent revenue, as their share of imperial expenses (Parliament had
foresworn colonial taxation).58
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British forces in Georgia were soon greatly reduced as units were transferred to the
fighting in the Carolinas. Wright’s forces were reduced to 500 men in Savannah, 371 about 35
miles upriver, and four regiments of suspect Georgia militia. Wright lost his sense of security, as
rebel raids kept the capital in disorder, and Wright constantly harangued London for more
troops. His plantations on the Ogeechee River were unprotected and often raided. The laws the
Assembly passed could not be enforced, and inflation was pushing food prices to unheard of
levels. Warfare on the frontier was vicious. American military success in the South and British
lack of troops eventually forced the evacuation of the British and the end of Loyalist Georgia by
July of 1782.59

The contrast between Georgia and British New York is instructive. British rule over Long
Island and New York City was relatively secure (though it is not inconceivable that a French
expedition could have seized part of Long Island). Despite this relative security, the region
remained under martial law for the length of the war (though there was a civilian governor). In
Georgia, four months after the invasion, the civilian government was restored. About
seventeen months after the invasion, a loyal assembly met. All this occurred despite a fluid
military situation and a shortage of troops—the opposite of the situation in New York. The
Assembly created courts and parishes and passed laws. The Assembly voided Patriot laws and
attainted rebels—and would probably have attainted more if it had not squabbled. However, a
59
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true assembly will often squabble amongst itself as different viewpoints and interests clash. .
Perhaps most importantly, the Georgian Assembly passed laws to help solve the imperial
revenue problem which had been a central cause of the Revolution. All of this occurred in
Georgia, a small province at the fringe of American society. It is not difficult to imagine the
propaganda value such actions could have had had they been made by a Loyal Assembly freely
elected by the people of a sizable portion of a major province such as New York.
This is not to underestimate the dangers such an approach would have presented to the
British. Kings and Staten Island were notably Loyalist and Manhattan was filled with Loyalist
refugees, but Queens was mixed in its loyalties, and Suffolk was Patriot. A Royal Assembly in
British New York could at times have worked at cross-purposes to the British effort. It would
probably have contained one or two members whose sympathies were not wholly with the
British. It would have undoubtedly been “factious and contentious” even in the best of
circumstances. But even a difficult Assembly would have been evidence that the British—the
legitimate government, at least in British eyes—were in New York to stay, and that the British
respected the rights and liberties of the people of New York. This, it may be argued, was a risk
worth taking.
Why the differences in the approaches taken in the two provinces? The relative success
of the Georgian experiment is probably because Governor Wright was dedicated to
reestablishing civilian government in Georgia, and because he had the cooperation of the
military authorities (though he clearly needed more troops to protect his province). This
situation was clearly lacking in New York. Tryon, the governor for the first years of the
occupation, had not pushed for civilian government. When Robertson arrived, Clinton refused
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to certify Southern New York as pacified, as Germain’s orders required before civilian
government could be restored. Clinton had difficulty working with Governor Robertson. Had
the military authorities been more cooperative, a true civilian government could perhaps have
been created. Instead, Robertson was forced to institute half-measures like his Police Court.
One thing is clear—New York was a lost opportunity for the British to restore civilian
government in an area where the propaganda value, the opportunity to win over hearts and
minds, would have been great. Whether such an action would have helped change events will
be discussed in the concluding chapter. But the attempt should have been made.

V

Robertson remained Governor of New York until April, 1783, and carried on the
necessary duties of his office. Robertson was briefly Commander in Chief until he was relieved
of these duties by the arrival of General Guy Carleton. During Robertson’s brief turn in the top
position, he corresponded in May, 1782 with George Washington (doing him the courtesy of
referring to him as General Washington) concerning what the British considered “acts of
Barbarity” committed against Loyalists by Continental and militia troops.60 This was to be a
major problem of the last days of British rule: the violence unleashed against both the
British/Loyalist side and the Patriot side.

While paling besides that of South Carolina, they

were bad enough.
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As briefly mentioned above, at Yorktown the Tenth Article of Capitulation provided that
““Natives or inhabitants of different parts of this country at present in York or Gloucester, are
not to be punished on account of having joined the British Army.”61 This article, intended to
protect Loyalist troops from being treated as traitors by the Americans, was not accepted by
Washington, who believed the status of such Loyalists could only be determined by the civil
authorities.62 While the deference Washington showed to civilian authority is admirable and
one of his finest qualities, the result was outrage among the Loyalists.
The Associated Loyalists, a militant group of Loyalist irregulars who would often raid
Connecticut (some would argue that they were pirates and freebooters) were angered at the
Tenth Article and its interpretation. On April 12, 1782, one of them, Captain Richard Lippincott
of New Jersey, killed Captain Joshua Huddy, a Patriot prisoner, on the grounds he had killed the
Loyalist Philip White. Lippencott did not act on his own, but under the orders of the Board of
Directors of the Associated Loyalists. This created a major incident. Washington wrote Clinton
complaining of the killing, and demanded that Lippencott be surrendered to the Americans for
punishment. Robertson supported proceeding against Lippencott as a murderer. The Council
decided to court-martial Lippencott.

Robertson informed Washington of this, and urged

Washington to join with him in preventing or punishing breaches of the rule of war.
Washington replied on May 4, and agreed on the need to conducting the war in a civilized
manner, but again insisted that Lippencott be extradited. Of far more significance, Washington
threatened retaliation on a British officer in American custody. This was not an idle threat; an
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officer was actually selected by lot to be the victim of retaliation, one Captain Charles Asgill of
the First Regiment of Foot Guards. The British proceeded with the court martial, and
threatened to hang Henry Brockholst Livingston, then a prisoner, should Asgill be harmed.
Livingston was the son of William Livingston, the Revolutionary governor of New Jersey.
Lippencott was acquitted of murder by the court-martial, on the ground that he thought his
actions were under official orders from the Associated Loyalists, an organization authorized by
Clinton and Germain. Fortunately for Lippencott, Henry Livingston, Charles Asgill, and the
reputations of Washington and everyone involved, Washington backed off from his threat.63
Guy Carleton, the new Commander-in-Chief, arrived on Sunday, May 5, 1782, after a
surprisingly short passage of only 25 days. He got straight to work, and less than four hours
after his arrival, he was being briefed on the Lippencot matter.64 Carleton (Known as Sir Guy
after 1776, and as Lord Dorchester after 1786) had been governor and captain-general of
Quebec in 1775. He had been born in the County Down, Ireland, of Scots-Irish stock to a local
landowner in 1724. He had been commissioned an ensign in 1742, and had risen in the ranks.
Part of this rise was owed to the friendship of James Wolfe, who secured him a position as
quartermaster general of the army which captured Quebec in 1759. He served in Canada,
Europe, and against the Spanish at Havana, and was thrice-wounded. In 1766, he became the
Governor of Quebec. Carleton realized that the large French Catholic population of Quebec
made Canada a very different province than one which had been peopled by British
Protestants. He developed this realization into the policies included in the Quebec Act of 1774.
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This, as one biographer notes, developed into the conception of “a larger ‘British’ liberty of
non-English people to retain their own distinctive character” within the British Empire.65
The actual implementation of these policies proved difficult. The interests of Englishspeaking settlers, many of them merchants, often clashed with the French-speaking majority.
Carleton believed that because of these conflicting interests, it was best that there be no
assembly.66 Carleton, aided by a council, would govern Quebec as a benevolent despotism. In
the actuality, he was impatient with opposition, disliked the English merchants, eliminated from
the government many who opposed him and stifled free discussion of his decisions. After a four
year return to England, he returned with an eighteen-year old French-educated wife, the Lady
Maria Howard, daughter of the Earl of Effingham. Not only did this help him in the patronage
and connection society of Britain, but her enjoyment of things French was no doubt an aid to
his administration of the French-speaking province. On his return, he hoped to make Quebec a
bastion against the increasingly rebellious colonists. He was disappointed at the lukewarm
response of the populace to the American invasion of 1775. Few took up arms, and some even
joined with the invaders. While the American invasion ultimately failed, it did reach the gates of
Quebec City. In 1776, Carleton defeated on Lake Champlain a small flotilla commanded by
Benedict Arnold, but failed to take Fort Ticonderoga. 67

65

Paul H. Smith, “Sir Guy Carleton: Soldier-Statesman”, in George Athan Billias, ed., George Washington’s
Opponents: British Generals and Admirals in the American Revolution (New York: William Morrow and Company)
1969, 103-105.
66
Paul H. Smith, 106-7. One could argue that Carleton was mistaken, that an assembly would have been quite
useful as a place for peaceful conflict between the various groups (as it served in the ethnically and economically
diverse province of New York). However, Quebec’s French population had only recently been enemies, so
Carleton’s opinion was understandable and perhaps even wise.
67
Paul H. Smith, 104, 108-110 According to Paul H. Smith, Carleton “did not recognize, or refused to believe, that
the bulk of the habitants sullenly acquiesced in the recent restoration of ancient clerical and seigniorial privileges
directed against their liberties, and accepted British occupation with a measured loyalty that bordered on passive
resistance.” 109. Carleton’s misreading of the habitants resulted in over-optimistic hopes for Quebecois resistance

391

Carleton was criticized for his conduct of the campaign, especially his failure to take
Fort Ticonderoga. Germain questioned his actions, and Carleton replied intemperately. The king
criticized both men for their immoderate, angry correspondence, but noted that Carleton was
wrong to “convey such asperity to a Secretary of State.” Thus began a long-standing feud
between the two men. Carleton returned to England in 1778, and his name was oft-mentioned
as a possible successor to Clinton. He was finally appointed.68
Unfortunately for Carleton, the position of Commander-in-Chief offered little chance for
glory in 1782. As he left Britain, it was made clear to him by Rockingham’s peace ministry that
his task would be to arrange for the withdrawal of British troops from New York, the South, and
even St. Augustine in Florida. Carleton hoped to bring the southern troops to New York, and
would even divert some ships bound for Halifax to New York. He hoped to strengthen the New
York garrison so as to give the British more leverage to bring the Americans to the bargaining
table. It is doubtful that this would have succeeded, and the question was moot, as discussions
in Paris were headed in the way of recognizing American independence. Carleton would later
be the governor of Canada from 1786 to 1796, where he gained a reputation as one of Canada’s
founders.69
Carleton infused some energy into British rule. One of his first acts was to review the
Lippincott case, and he also quickly forwarded copies of Parliament’s resolution to suspend all
offensive military operations in America to Washington. He rose early and rode around
Manhattan, familiarizing himself with the city and its problems. Prisoners were released from
to the American invaders. Carleton thus joins the long list of Britons and Loyalists who overestimated the
willingness of North Americans to take up arms for the Empire.
68
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their ships during the summer onto Blackwell’s Island (now Roosevelt Island). He attacked
corruption and instituted reforms, and initiated a long overdue inquiry into the September,
1776 fire (See Chapter III). Clinton left New York a week after Carleton’s arrival. He spent much
of the following years trying to rehabilitate his reputation.70
With Carleton’s arrival, New York learned of the change of the Ministry which had
occurred on March 27. Among the changes was the elimination of Germain’s old position,
Secretary of State for the American Department. The Earl of Shelburne, William Fitzmaurice
Petty, was made Secretary of State for Home, Irish, and Colonial Affairs. This essentially gave
him Germain’s old duties (along with other responsibilities). Shelburne corresponded with
Robertson as to why civil government had been not instituted. Robertson politely blamed
Clinton, stating that he had “never failed to urge Sir Henry Clinton in whose power this lay,” and
laying out the reasons for the recent rejection (see above). Perhaps Germain and Robertson
should have pushed harder for civilian government; even Rockingham’s Ministry wanted to
know why it had not been tried. Having assured Shelburne of his zeal to serve with Carleton,
Robertson also requested to be relieved of his Governorship.71
Robertson’s relations with Carleton were problematic. As discussed above, Carleton and
Germain had a long-standing feud. Robertson was considered a confidant of Germain, who was
not only out-of-favor with Carleton but with the new government. Carleton also believed that
Robertson had obstructed plans for civil government despite the desire of Clinton for it (!). The
probable source of this highly erroneous belief was Clinton. Robertson protested that he had
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pushed for civil government only to meet a stone wall in Clinton. Carleton failed to believe him,
and Smith, by now disappointed with Robertson, reinforced his disbelief. 72
In a May 9, 1782 letter to the Earl of Shelburne, Robertson replied to a letter sent him
by Welbore Ellis, Germain’s replacement as Secretary of State for the American Department
(and the last to hold that position). Ellis wished to know why Robertson objected to civil
government. Robertson argued that

I came to America possest of a belief, that by restoring Civil government I might
have the honor of being instrumental in restoring His Majesty’s Authority—This
belief was confirmed by observation, and I never failed to urge Sir Henry Clinton
in whose power this lay—to make the people happy in their wishes by restoring
their Constitution—I pressed this so earnestly, that Sir Henry declared he would
Quit his Command if ever Civil government took place in a province where he
carried on War-—73

Robertson ended the letter by requesting leave to return home, for reasons of his health
and his family’s situation. In a letter to Lord Amherst, he told him that he wished to see the
“remains” of my family, and he told Lord Haldimand that his wife’s grief (over their daughter
who had died recently) made him anxious to return to support her.74
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It would be several months before Robertson’s request would be granted, and
Robertson would not actually leave New York until April, 1783. Robertson carried on his duties.
In June, 1782, he issued a proclamation requiring virtually all “persons” (presumably all men)
except for ministers and a few other exceptions to perform militia duty, or provide a substitute
if they were old or infirm. Proclamations concerning carts, horses, and wagons used for
supplying the wants of the city and military were issued in July. Robertson also pardoned a
pirate on condition that he served in the fleet, and issued a proclamation of public thanksgiving
on the occasion of the successful relief of Gibraltar.75
Robertson left New York for England on April 16th, 1783. He held a final Council meeting
on April 10.76 Before leaving, he wrote two letters, one to Carleton, the second to Lieutenant
Governor Elliot, which may be considered a “Valedictory”, or summation of his governorship.
In his letter to Carleton, Robertson discussed his establishment of Police Courts on Long Island.
Robertson seems to have been quite proud of his establishment of the Police Courts, and to
have considered them one of the major accomplishments of his administration. The picture
Robertson painted of the Court of Police of Long Island is greatly different from that painted by
Thomas Jones:

I found that the distance from some parts of Long Island, and the expence of
living at New York, made most of the inhabitants of that Isle rather suffer
wrongly than apply to the Courts at New York—for redress—and that the want
of Courts on Long Island—left every licentiousness and Crimes unpunished—
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These Considerations led me to institute a Court of Police on Long
Island…Happily the Gentlemen who were chose for Judges—have executed
whatever I could hope from them—Justice and equity and order have taken
place there—and a want of the rules which are instituted for guarding liberty—
have been little felt—while delay and expence have been entirely avoided--.77

This contrasted with the picture drawn by Jones, who considered the court to have been
“an arbitrary and despotic court.” Jones called Ludlow, the Superintendant of the Court, “The
little tyrant of the Island”. Robertson perhaps was aware of criticisms of the courts, and argued
to Carleton that the lack of juries and the other “rules which are instituted for guarding liberty”
had been little felt, while delays and costs had been avoided. Even if Ludlow did not act
tyrannically (and there is evidence that he was corrupt or at least arbitrary, as discussed above),
the court by its very nature was only a pale shadow of a true British court. The truth is probably
somewhere between these two pictures.78
His April 14 letter to Elliot seems to indicate some sadness and depression over his
Governorship, though perhaps that is reading too much into an official communication. As he
informed Elliot, his successor as governor and the last Royal Governor, he had “exercised few
Acts in the Character of a Civil Governor.” All of his authority had been derived from the
Commander of Chief—and under it he had tried as a general “to supply the want of Civil
Government.” This truly showed the oxymoronic nature of New York’s occupation government.
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Robertson advised Elliot that he would gain more “advantage” from his “private Character and
the regard people have for your person, than from your Office.”79
Robertson returned to relative obscurity in England. His friendship with Smith was
resumed in 1784, when the exiled Smith arrived in London. Robertson had a small circle of
friends, former officers who had served in America, who regularly met for conversation, cards,
and wine, including Lord Amherst, General Gage, and Frederick Haldimand. Smith joined this
group. Smith also aided him in certain land claims Robertson had in America, but to no avail.
Robertson was dunned for receipts and vouchers from his years in America. He became ill and
passed away on March 4, 1788.80 His obituary in the Gentleman’s Magazine was brief:

In Wimpole Street, Cavendish Square, Lieutenant-General James Robertson,
colonel of the 16th regiment of foot, and late governor of New York.81

VI

Robertson had left New York for the last time on April 16, 1783. By this time, provisional
articles for peace had been signed between Britain and the United States, and between Britain,
France and Spain. In February, George III had proclaimed a “Cessation of Arms”. This was read
in front of City Hall a few days before Robertson left, on April 9, 1783. The mainly Loyalist
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crowd “groaned and hissed”, and their faces were full of despair. In the next few days, some
would take their lives.82
Prisoners of war were released on April 6 and 9. Patriot Americans began to return to
British-occupied New York—at least 2000 by one estimate. In early May, George Washington,
George Clinton, the Governor of American-controlled New York, and the British commanders,
General Guy Carleton and Admiral Robert Digby, met at Tappan (just north of the border with
New Jersey) to discuss the arrangements for a British evacuation. William Smith, Chief Justice of
British New York, attended. He was no doubt a little pleased to meet with Governor Clinton,
who had once been his clerk, but he also stated that he felt some humiliation as well.
Washington was concerned that the British not destroy or steal American property, especially
slaves. Carleton would not return slaves who were leaving or had left for Nova Scotia, but
agreed to a registry for compensation. Many blacks would leave for Canada.83
Loyalist refugees from throughout the thirteen colonies flooded into the city, as Patriots
began to return. Daily auctions were held as wealthy loyalists liquidated their possessions. In
October, 1782, a fleet with 500 refugees had left; larger fleets left in April and September 1783.
About 29,000 left New York City, and about 70,000 left the entire United States. While some
were exiled to Britain or the West Indies, about 50,000 of them went to Nova Scotia or Quebec.
Many of them did not go to Halifax or the other relatively small towns in Nova Scotia, but to an
unsettled frontier: Saint John on the Bay of Fundy. One New York Loyalist, Sarah Frost,
described it as “The roughest land I ever saw… But this is to be the city, they say. We are all
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ordered to land tomorrow and not a shelter to go under.” The winter was harsh; many lived in
tents with the frozen ground as a floor—and many did not live through the winter. Not mixing
well with the older settlers, they petitioned for the Loyalist-settled regions to be made separate
colonies from Nova Scotia. This request was granted, and New Brunswick (where Saint John is
located), Prince Edward’s Island, and Cape Breton were all made separate colonies.84
On the Ontario peninsula (then part of Quebec), many Loyalists from disbanded
regiments were settled. Their descendants formed the bulk of the forces that stymied American
invasions of what is now Ontario during the War of 1812. Also settling in Quebec was New
York’s William Smith, who became the Chief Justice of Quebec. In 1789, the Loyalists of
modern Quebec and Ontario and their descendants were honored by being allowed to affix
“U.E.” after their name. This stood for “United Empire”, and was awarded for their adherence
to the principle of unity of empire. Their descendants refer to themselves as United Empire
Loyalists. 85
Rather ironically, while they had left America, they were still characteristically American.
As has been argued earlier in this work, there was much agreement between Loyalists and
Patriots as to many political issues; the difference was in what methods should be employed,
and eventually in the loyalty that should be given the king. Arguably, even the Loyalists could be
considered Whigs, and a bit more “left-wing” or “progressive” than many of the British. Harvard
historian Maya Jasanoff notes that Loyalists, wherever they went, promptly expressed an
“uncannily American desire for greater political representation.” The transplanted Loyalists
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agitated for freehold tenure to be instituted in Quebec, rather than the semi-medieval
seigneurial system used in Quebec. They also agitated for elected assemblies. This eventually
resulted in the 1791 Canada Act, by which Quebec and Ontario were separated into two
colonies, each with an elected assembly, and with freehold tenure in Ontario (then known as
Upper Canada).86
But their experiences and reactions to the American Revolution also marked them. They
had seen what they saw as “mob-rule” in their old homes. They had seen arms seized by
committees with no legitimate power to seize them (at least in the eyes of the Loyalists); they
had seen these weapons taken from those who disagreed with the committees. Their distrust
for republicanism and fear of mob rule helped influence the “gradual, ‘paper-strewn’ path to
nationhood” of Canada. And their ties to Britain and their antipathy to the United States helped
create a separate Canadian identity, and no doubt helped preserve British rule during the War
of 1812.87

Carleton in November gave the Americans precise dates for the withdrawal of British
troops from New York. Eastern Long Island and northern Manhattan would be evacuated on
November 21, and New York City and Brooklyn at noon on the twenty-fifth, weather
permitting. The weather was acceptable, and the evacuation occurred on the twenty-fifth. The
last piece of occupied soil in New York (indeed, in the United States—not counting some
frontier forts the British failed to evacuate for several years) was Fort George, at the very
southern tip of Manhattan. Here, British soldiers had “helpfully” greased the flag-pole. After a
86
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brief delay to overcome the greasing, the American flag flew over the city.88 While the
Revolution was in many ways not over, the war was definitely over.
After the Battle of Yorktown, the band at the surrender is said to have played “The
World turned Upside Down.” The reoccupation of New York, symbolizing the American victory
over Britain, was a truly momentous, earth-shattering occurrence. As if to accentuate this, a
few days after the British evacuated, the earth in New York literally shook, as the Moravian
Reverend Schaukirk recorded in his diary:

In the evening about 8 o’clock, we felt a slight shock of an earthquake; and about
eleven, there was a more violent one, which shook all the city in a surprising
manner. We felt it in bed—enough to arouse us from our first sleep.89

VII

The Anglican Church struggled to find its footing in the new republican world, but it
eventually reestablished itself as the Episcopal Church. Reverend Cutting recorded in 1783
that offending passages (most likely prayers for the king) in prayer books were pasted over with
strips of white paper writing invocations for the President of the United States. This is curious,
as no such officer existed in 1783; it is likely he meant the president of Congress. The
Presbyterians rebuilt their churches. The records of Oyster Bay show many manumissions of
slaves in the 1780s. This was probably the result of an intensification of economic trends that
88
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had been making slavery less common in the region; but it is possible that the ideology of
freedom and the incongruity of slavery may have been a factor. Quaker manumissions seem to
have had an influence on Long Island. 90
On Long Island, about one of every six inhabitants fled. The state legislature deprived
many Loyalists of civil rights, attainting some, depriving others of voting rights; a violation of
the spirit if not the letter of the peace treaty. The exile of many leading citizens, and the
republican and democratic ethos that had swept and were continuing to sweep the colonies,
finally reached the southern district of New York. New people, new names, and new families
began to be elected to local and state wide offices. The oligarchic control of a few families in
Long Island towns began to broken. The governor of the state was considered a “new man”,
who would probably not have reached such a height if there had not been a revolution. While
Loyalist estates such as those of Frederick Philipse were forfeited and broken up, other great
estates remained; the tenancy system would last until the 1840s.91
The district had suffered greatly during the war. Rather unfairly, shortly after the war, a
tax was imposed on the area by the state legislature, because they allegedly had not
90
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contributed to the war effort. The trees slowly recovered from their devastation, and the
returning refugees sought compensation from the British. They were generally unsuccessful,
but much of our information on the actions of the British and Hessian troops comes from the
documents and affidavits they prepared in connection with these attempts. The Blydenburgh
Manuscript, discussed in an earlier chapter, is one of these documents.92

The Earl of Carlisle became the viceroy of Ireland in 1780, and later became a strong
supporter of the war against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. He became the guardian of
the great Romantic poet, Lord Byron, who later satirized him in a poem. William Smith, Jr.
became the Chief Justice of Canada, while Thomas Jones spent a few years in exile in Britain
before penning his acerbic history. Robertson spent his final years quietly back in Britain.
Germain became the Viscount of Sackville, dying in 1785. General Howe after the inconclusive
Parliamentary inquiry saw some limited action in the French Revolutionary wars. Historians still
debate his actions during the Revolutionary War. His brother served with distinction in
European actions during the Revolution and in the French Revolutionary wars. General Sir
Henry Clinton served in Parliament and in several distinguished posts, and blamed Cornwallis
for the disaster at Yorktown.
The spies of the Revolution faded into obscurity until their secrets were uncovered in
the 1930s. John Graves Simcoe, who had penned what may have been America’s first valentine
to Sally Townsend, became the Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada in the 1790s, and is
considered one of the founders of Canada. Sally Townsend, unbeknownst to Simcoe, was the
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sister of America’s top spy, Robert Townsend, and probably a bit of a spy herself. She died
unmarried in the 1840s, despite the great beauty she is said to have possessed. The valentine
was found amongst her possessions after her death.
Banastre Tarleton, who had taken many items from the inn at Smithtown, and burned
down two villages in Westchester that refused to cooperate in their plunder, later served in
South Carolina. Here he gained a reputation for ruthlessness, such that the term “Tarleton’s
Quarter” became synonymous for “No Quarter.” He later served in Parliament, where he
became well-known for supporting the slave trade. Benedict Arnold went to Canada for a few
years, engaged in business dealings involving the West Indies, and eventually moved to Britain
where he died. His important role in the Battle of Saratoga was eventually honored by a statue;
because of his later treason, the statue was of a boot, and the person honored was not named
(Arnold had been wounded in the leg during the battle). Benjamin Thompson, the builder of
Fort Golgotha, gained a reputation as a scientist and gained the title Count Rumford. Fort
Golgotha was eventually dismantled, and the hill where it stood became once again a
graveyard, and remains so to this day.
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Conclusions
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I

Before concluding this work, let us briefly summarize it. The Imperial Crisis was triggered
in the mid-1760s by a dispute over the right of Parliament to tax Americans. Most Americans,
including many who eventually became Loyalists, believed that Parliament did not have the
right to do that. This was basically a constitutional question, and could probably have been
solved by giving the Americans some say in determining the taxes they had to pay.1 A broadbased protest against the Stamp Act and other British-imposed taxes began. Resistance took a
form ranging from formal motions by colonial assemblies respectfully outlining their differences
with British policy to violent street actions. New York was a fairly reluctant participant in these
activities.
Of New York’s two main political factions, the great merchants, who had many
commercial and other ties with Britain, tended to be cautious in their opposition to British
policy, while the great landlord faction strongly supported the anti-British movement, and
eventually independence. The rather conservative, elite-based political system of New York was
altered and destroyed by the Patriot movement. A new faction, the Sons of Liberty arose, that
represented a rising group of newly-rich merchants as well as the “mechanicks”, the working
class of New York. There was a general consensus among all three factions that the British
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Parliament did not have the right to impose taxes on the Americans. The factions differed
mainly on stridency and methods, with the Sons of Liberty the most strident and most likely to
prefer violent street actions or political vandalism.
British intransigence and provocative actions such as the various “Tea Parties” led to
actions by the British which appeared tyrannical, such as the Intolerable Acts. It did not help
that many of the Livingstons were Real Whigs, a political tendency which argued that those
with power are constantly seeking to enlarge it and for vigilance against tyrannical actions—the
Intolerable Acts only confirmed them in their beliefs. A system of committees, often chosen by
local governments, began to develop to coordinate the anti-British movement. These
committees began taking on governmental powers, and provincial and Continental congresses
arose from the committees. The Continental and provincial congresses began to move in the
direction of armed conflict with Great Britain. Many Patriots, opposed to this direction, left the
movement, becoming Loyalists. In New York and other colonies the provincial congresses began
to take control of the government, and in New York and other colonies the governor fled the
capital and tried to govern from onboard a British ship.
Even after fighting began, the movement was not necessarily a movement for
independence. There was a long Anglo-American tradition of violent action and even armed
rebellion whose purpose was not independence or the overthrow of the government, but to
force the government to do what the rebels saw as sensible or constitutional. But the British
and the King refused to listen, and the King declared the Americans to be rebels. The
Americans, who believed the King was the guarantor of their liberties, felt betrayed, and their
loyalty and love began to turn to hate. An influential pamphlet, Common Sense, ridiculed the

407

whole notion of monarchy, and argued for independence. Independence was eventually
declared by the Continental Congress, and the revolutionary government of New York, which
had been in virtual control of the province for months, reluctantly declared independence. This
news was greeted by symbolic acts of regicide, such as the destruction of King George’s
equestrian statue in New York City.
Southern New York was soon occupied by the British, who remained there until the very
end of the war in November, 1783. While in many ways a mild occupation, there were enough
appalling incidents and breakdowns of law and order as to alienate many Loyalists and make
the task of restoring loyalty difficult. Churches and graveyards were desecrated; while some of
this was military necessity, some may have been done from spite. The Carlisle Commission and
others believed that restoring civilian government in the British-controlled territory would have
many beneficial attempts, such as signaling that Britain desired not tyranny but liberty in its
colonies. An attempt to restore civilian rule in the British zone was thwarted by military
opposition (particularly that of General Clinton). It is arguable that this was a major lost
opportunity for the British; this will be discussed below.

II

The basic question of this work was stated in the introduction thusly:

Would the restoration by the British of full civilian government have had the
beneficial effects the British desired from it? Would it have returned large
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numbers of individuals, counties, colonies, or regions back to British allegiance, or
was the attempt too late to have any such effect? If the latter, at what point was
reconciliation not possible, and what factors made this failure to achieve
reconciliation more likely?

One way at looking at the idea of restoring civilian government is to look at it as
an attempt to restore loyalty. Restoring civilian government would, it was believed,
showcase the benefits of remaining in the empire, and highlight to the Americans that
it was not Britain’s desire to create a tyranny, but to create free provinces within the
British Empire, to restore the blessings of liberty and the British Constitution to the
rebellious provinces. This, it was hoped and believed, would bring many Americans
back to “their former allegiance.” If one wishes to evaluate the success or failure of an
attempt to restore loyalty, then one must understand how that loyalty was gained—and
how it was lost. One must also understand the factors that drove the actors, what their
interests and beliefs were. Hence, before discussing the question of restoring civilian
government, this work examined the history of colonial New York, the factions of New
York, and the break with Britain in New York.
Loyalty to a king is not “natural”—it must be taught and encouraged. This is
especially so in a colony such as New York, where many of the colonists were a
conquered people, and many of the rest come from a suspect religious minority. Many
methods, detailed above, were used to turn the inhabitants into loyal subjects. By the
mid-eighteenth century, these efforts had borne fruit, and many Americans and New
Yorkers were quite fond of the king. What is more, he was seen as the guarantor of the
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people’s liberties. His name and the word “Liberty” was sewn together on flags flown
from liberty poles.
He was more than a guarantor of liberty—he was the leader of a vast trans-Atlantic
(indeed, worldwide) trading empire from which many New Yorkers benefitted greatly. There
were those who benefitted directly from this, while there were others where the benefit
seemed more abstract—indeed who found the British connection constraining. The economic
and other interests of New Yorkers greatly influenced the path New York took towards
independence, and the positions individuals took. To help understand the loss of loyalty of
many New Yorkers, as well as its retention by others, this work examined the nature of its
factions, as well as the various divisions to be found in rural regions such as Long Island. This is
briefly summarized below.

Colonial New York at the end of the French and Indian War was dominated politically by
two factions, representing the interests of two great economic elites: the Livingstons, who
represented the landed interest, and the Delanceys who represented the interests of the great
merchants. Both factions would seek to gain the favor of other groups, and would constantly
jockey for power. Ideologically, both groups may be classified as Whigs, believers in what would
become known as liberalism, in the principles of 1688, and in constitutionalism.
Whigs believed that property and liberty were inextricably linked. Property gave one
independence and hence liberty. Indeed, the whole purpose of men “entering into Society” was
to create a government that would preserve property. A tax imposed without one’s consent
was a seizure of property, of one’s independence, of one’s liberty. Many Whigs would argue
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that such an action was tyrannical, though they might differ as to the appropriate response. The
Livingstons came from the more extreme branch of the Whig continuum. They were “Real
Whigs”, and they believed that those in power would constantly try to expand their power
beyond its lawful limits. Thus, one had to be constantly vigilant against those in power. A Real
Whig was thus sensitive—perhaps overly sensitive—to the actions of government. Even an
innocent-seeming action could, to a Real Whig, be the harbinger of tyranny. 2
The Delanceys for the most part were not Real Whigs, and while they opposed the
Stamp Act and similar taxes, resisted any characterization of British actions as tyrannical or of
the Empire as a tyranny.3 Much of their trade was with Britain, and they saw the Empire as a
vast trading network. Their personal fortunes would have been directly threatened by a break
between American and Britain and the disruption it would cause. They thus were a moderating
influence in the Imperial Crisis. In general, they worked for reconciliation and opposed
measures they thought would worsen the situation. In the various committees of 1774-76, they
played a major role, even dominating important revolutionary committees. 4

2

Maier, 28, 31-36; Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 222, 225, pp. 412, 415.
Perhaps they thought that such a characterization would merely inflame a situation that could be peacefully
settled through negotiations and the normal processes of government.
4
The landed interest was thus the more revolutionary or radical of the two traditional factions. While they had an
affinity for English lifestyles, their direct connections to England were often slight. The Livingstons were much less
likely to suffer direct harm from a break or even temporary breach with Britain than the great merchants. This of
course assumes that no full-scale social revolution occurred concurrent with a political revolution. Then, the
Livingstons would probably have been the targets of land-reform measures (at the very least) by their tenants. The
Delanceys, however were risking the entire trading system from which their wealth derived when they opposed
Britain, and they suffered real economic losses with the various boycotts. Despite this, they would often go along
with such boycotts. It should also be noted that, as discussed earlier in the text, that some of the Delancey leaders
would curry favor with the “common people” by mixing with them in the common people’s taverns. The
Livingstons rarely did that. Rather ironically, the more elitist-seeming of the two elite factions was the one that
tended to support independence when the time came
So, in New York, there was arguably a rather confounding situation. The great landlords, generally a
conservative group in many polities (in the sense of wanting to keep things the same as much as possible), were
actually rather radical and would be among those who led the province to independence. Merchants are also
often quite conservative, but for much of the next century, in many countries some often believed that revolution
3
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As discussed above, the two-faction system based on economic interests which had
dominated the province for decades was joined in the Stamp Act Crisis by a new faction which
represented not only a new economic interest but a determined opposition to British tax
policies. The Sons of Liberty (also known as the Liberty Boys) were lead by newly-rich
merchants many of whom had started out in the “working class”, gaining their fortunes in the
French and Indian War, and often engaged in a “North-South” with the West Indies or other
colonies, rather than with England. Their commercial activities thus differed from the “EastWest” trade with Britain that the Delanceys mainly engaged in, and they were thus much less
vulnerable to direct economic harm from boycotts or a break with England than the Delanceys.
Coming out of the working class, they understood its concerns and language, and often lead
mobs and groups composed of the “common” people. This gave them an advantage over both
elite factions in appealing to the common people. Despite their wealth, by virtue of their
plebian origins, the leaders of the Liberty Boys were not quite accepted into the elite.
Therefore, unlike the other factions, they were in many ways not an elite group. They desired a
more egalitarian, meritocratic society, one with more democracy. They differed thus from the
more classical republican ideas of the Livingstons and Delanceys. They were more strident in
(against the remnants of feudalism or a mother country) was in their best interests. Not so in New York. Here
revolution and rebellion was against their interests. Surprisingly, sometimes revolution or rebellion is actually the
best way to maintain the status quo—or seems to be. In a colonial revolt, the local elite leadership (or elements of
it) may revolt against the mother country to preserve their privileges and positions if they think they are
threatened by the mother country. Arguably, this happened in New York. Similarly, Robert A Gross argues that the
people of Concord, Massachusetts had “gone to war not to promote change but to stop it…They rose in fury
against the assault on their autonomy, and at the peak of the Revolutionary movement they were attached more
strongly than ever to the ideals and values of the past. They would restore order to their lives by clinging to
custom---and making revolution.” Gross, 190. He goes on to say, however, that “the strains of war deflated their
hopes.” The American Revolution, at least in New York, was a most conservative revolution. However, the elite of
New York split on this issue; unlike the landed elite, the merchant elite believed that staying with the mother
country would be the best way to preserve their positions. Hence, many of them chose not to rebel, and would
find themselves on the Loyalist side of the ledger.
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their opposition, and more inclined to direct action and symbolism, such as riots, liberty poles,
and acts of political vandalism such as the New York Tea Party.
The Livingstons in this political continuum seem almost to have been the moderates.
The Delanceys shied away from armed rebellion and independence, and the Liberty Boys
moved towards them. The Livingstons moved towards independence to preserve their
privileges and rights, which they saw as threatened by the British. But, they did not desire the
more egalitarian society the Liberty Boys desired. The Livingstons dominated the new state’s
government. Perhaps influenced by classical republicanism, they produced a constitution for
New York that limited the people’s power, with many checks and balances.
The maneuverings, actions, and ideologies of the various factions affected both the pace
and nature of both the movement towards independence, and the nature of the permanent
government that was formed after independence for decades (the Constitution of 1777 was in
effect until the 1820s). While the Imperial Crisis was at first merely another issue the elite
factions could use to jockey for power, it soon began to morph into something out of the
ordinary run of political disputes, out of the ordinary factional give and take. The Sons of Liberty
in New York and elsewhere constantly pushed the movement in a more radical, less
accomodationist direction. The factional dispute between merchants and the landed was
subsumed by the split between Loyalists and Patriots. Soon, the Patriots were running a war
with Britain, and eventually declared independence. Those who disagreed with the Patriot
position were under suspicion, had their arms confiscated, and were occasionally arrested. This
was far beyond ordinary politics; it was revolutionary. Indeed, many Loyalists thought it was
mob rule—or even tyranny.
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When discussing Loyalists and Patriots, one important point should be stressed, and
bears repeating. Both the Patriots and Loyalists were Whigs. Most Loyalists were distressed by
Britain’s policy of imposing taxes that most Americans considered unconstitutional, and with
Britain’s failure to understand what the Americans thought were legitimate complaints against
the policy. The difference between the two groups was stridency, protest methods, and how far
each side was willing to go. The Patriots found themselves willing to go as far as armed
rebellion to change the British government’s mind. When that failed, they found that they were
willing to take the final step and declare independence. Those who became Loyalists wanted to
change British policy through persuasion and the ordinary processes of colonial governance,
such as Assembly resolutions and lobbying through colonial agents. Many disliked the
committees even where they were appointed by town meetings, as they were “a thing
unknown to the constitution.”
While Loyalists had many interests tying them to Britain, it is also probable that they
could not break the emotional and other ties that bound them to the monarch. When push
came to shove, they chose the British Empire and the King. But, as the later actions of the
Loyalist refugees in Canada and elsewhere showed, at the same time, they believed in liberty,
and they pushed the regions where they settled towards that. Liberty was their desire, and this
they believed could best be accomplished within the Empire. Georgia, it may be argued,
showed that both were possible, and that liberty could be had within the Empire and under the
rule of the King. Had civilian government been restored in New York, it could also have shown
that.
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The reality and intenseness of the emotional bond many felt to the King and the Empire
is evidenced by the many who remained Loyalist, as well as by those who became rebels. The
attacks on symbolic targets such as statues and effigies of the king, as well as on those who
remained loyal, helps show the intensity of the feeling that had been overthrown by those who
chose the Patriot side. Love had turned to hate.
In the rural counties surrounding New York, local factors were quite important in
determining whether the area was mainly Loyalist or Patriot. Economic ties to New York City
seem to have influenced some counties to be basically Loyalist, as did a high degree of slave
ownership, or a desire to remain a distinct community (such as with the Dutch). Those areas
with fewer direct ties to New York City, or with a cultural affinity to New England (such as
Suffolk County) were more likely to be Patriot. Similar to events in New York City, after news of
the Intolerable Acts arrived, in most of the towns of the rural regions committees were formed
to coordinate the protests against British actions. Showing the rather conservative nature of
the Revolution, for the most part these committees were usually formed by legal town
meetings. Despite this seeming legal imprimatur, virtually each committee in each town was
faced with a written protest, usually published in a newspaper, signed by a sizable number of
citizens denouncing the committees as extra-constitutional, among other things. These
committees would form the revolutionary structure that would lead the way to independence
and the eventual establishment of more permanent governments. This is quite remarkable: the
revolutionary government, at least in New York, grew out of committees which in many places
were formed by elements of the officially recognized government.
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Two other groups should be mentioned: tenants and the workers. Tenants often
resented their lords, and if their lord was Patriot, they would often become Loyalists. The
“mechanicks” and other artisans (the working class of eighteenth century New York,
concentrated mainly in the City) tended to support the Patriot cause, accepting many of its
ideological arguments and accepting the leadership of the Sons of Liberty, many of whom had
risen from their ranks. They also had their own agenda; they wanted more political power in
New York, and the Revolutionary movement with its multiplicity of positions was one way to
get it. They hoped for a more democratic constitution than was actually produced, and their
pleas to submit it to the people were ignored.
Lastly, many made no choice, but remained unaffiliated. The number of unaffiliated, of
neutrals, may have actually increased as the war went on, as Kim suggests in regards to
Westchester. And there were those who either from a lack of conviction or from necessity,
“trimmed” as the winds blew, depending on who controlled their area. And for those who
chose Patriotism or Loyalism, while economic, philosophical, religious, ethnic, or other
considerations would in general indicate what choice an individual would make, it was an
individual choice. The choice was individual and idiosyncratic, depending on a myriad of
conditions. Many whose background would indicate that they would probably be Patriots
could not bring themselves to break with the Mother Country, and there were Patriots among
those one would assume would be Loyalists.
Having examined the development of New York’s political system, and the long
complicated process by which loyalty was lost, the work then turned to the attempt to restore
loyalty and to win the hearts and minds of Americans through the establishment of civilian
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government in New York. Let us briefly review this attempt and the reasons for its failure. We
shall also attempt to answer certain subsidiary questions, such as the question of the effects of
personality, mistaken assumptions, the effect of some appalling (if not atrocious) behavior by
occupation troops and officers, and perhaps most fundamentally, the question of timing.

III

As detailed above, French intervention totally changed the nature of the war for the
British. The colonies were now a secondary front, and the sugar-rich West Indies had priority
for troop deployment over them. Faced with a world war, Britain tried to achieve peace with
the Americans, dispatching a peace commission authorized to concede virtually everything
except independence. Arriving in Philadelphia in time to see it evacuated, it was met with
contempt. However, from the ashes of the failed mission arose at least in part a new “counterinsurgency” strategy. As part of this strategy, civilian government was to be restored to Britishcontrolled New York.
The man chosen for this position was General James Robertson, a staff officer with
much experience in New York. Robertson arrived in New York in 1780 and attempted to restore
civilian government. However, before Robertson could fully restore civilian government, the
commanding military officer General Sir Henry Clinton had to declare southern New York “at
the King’s Peace”. While the region was subject to raids, the region was overall peaceful and
secure. Despite this, Clinton failed to issue the required declaration. There were several reasons
for this, ranging from a legitimate military concern to preserve the army’s freedom of action, to
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a desire to avoid claims against the army for unpaid goods. But perhaps the most important
reason was the difficulty, if not inability, Clinton had in sharing authority; a difficulty that his
biographer believes was neurotic. In 1782, a few months after the disastrous British defeat at
Yorktown, there was one final attempt at restoring civilian government. The general consensus
was that the time was not right, and the attempt was abandoned. Robertson returned home in
the spring of 1783, and southern New York was evacuated by the British a few months later.
Only then was civilian government fully restored—by the Americans, not the British. 5
In many ways, restoring civilian government was an excellent idea. The British prided
themselves on their liberty, and had no desire to be tyrants; indeed in some ways the whole
colonial dispute could be boiled down to the question as to whether the British were acting as
tyrants or not. The British would strenuously argue that they were not tyrants, nor did they
have any desire to be tyrants. Restoring civilian government in a portion of a major province
could go a long way to proving that, and perhaps restore many Americans to allegiance to the
Crown.
What would have happened if Clinton had acquiesced in 1780 and allowed civilian
government to be restored? If there had been none of the impediments to restoring civilian
government that there actually were, if civilian government had been restored, if courts had
functioned in accordance with civilian rules and the ancient liberties and rights of Englishmen, if
an Assembly had been formed and granted the King a revenue as a free gift, and performed all
the other functions of a free assembly, would it have had the desired positive effects? Would
thousands, dazzled by the gleaming example of restored British liberty in one of the most
5
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important colonies, have flocked to join them? Would thousands of Loyalist volunteers have
arisen to garrison regions, thus freeing up the British and Hessian regular troops to “liberate”
more territory from the “Usurpers”? Would areas or counties or entire provinces have
clamored to return to British rule? Could this restoration have led to British victory over the
Americans, or at the very least to southern New York and perhaps other areas remaining within
the Empire when peace was declared?
It is highly probable that in 1780, such an outcome was extremely unlikely. Restoration
may very well have made southern New York’s occupation far pleasanter for southern New
Yorkers, but it is unlikely it would have had any of the beneficial effects the British wished it
would have had. The time was just too late.
Consider the following. Two years earlier, in 1778, the Carlisle Commission had
presented extremely generous peace terms to the Americans, granting virtually every American
demand except independence. In the summer of 1778, the Americans had a powerful new ally,
France, and the Carlisle Commission arrived just in time to see the British evacuate
Philadelphia. British fortunes were at perhaps their lowest point of the war. The peace
proposals of the Carlisle Commission were, under these circumstances, met with contempt. In
many respects, in 1778 the Americans held the upper hand, and under such circumstances they
would not give up independence for even the highly favorable terms offered by the British.
In 1780 and much of 1781, while the British situation was slightly improved from 1778,
not much had truly changed. The British, having consolidated their forces, had re-launched
offensive operations by seeking to “liberate” the South, and nearly succeeded in taking West
Point through Benedict Arnold’s treachery. For a few months in 1781, it seemed the British
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were on the verge of conquering the entire Deep South. A royal government operated in
Georgia, and had one also operated in New York, it may have had a strong effect on the warweary and waiverers. At the same time, however, bitter partisan warfare in both the north
and the south continued, showing the resolve of many to not return to British rule. If the British
had managed to hold onto the South and had crushed the American army, then perhaps
returning to the Empire may have seemed an option to some. But, the Americans in 1780 and
1781 were still allies of France. This reduced the size of the force Britain could devote to the
war in America, as they had to divert forces to other theatres, and also gave the Americans
naval support.

In short, while the American situation in 1780 and 1781 may not have been as

good as in 1778, it had not changed enough to alter the fundamental situation. Short of
crushing defeat, the Americans would not return to their former loyalties. A restored civilian
administration in New York may have had propaganda value, but probably not enough to have
materially changed things.
After Yorktown, of course, the possibility of military defeat of the Americans seemed
remote. While raids and bitter partisan actions continued, the war was winding down. The 1782
attempt to restore civilian government seemed senseless even to many who had earlier pushed
for civilian government. Had a civilian government been restored in 1782, it would only have
lasted a few months before the region was abandoned to American control. Had civilian
government been restored in 1782, it would not have changed anything; the restored
government would have been at best an historical curiosity.
It seems clear in hindsight that by the 1780s, the attempt to restore civilian government
was just too late. This is not to argue that it should not have been tried; it was an enlightened
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policy well-worth the effort. Not only would it have provided better government for those in
the British zone, but it would have had some propaganda value, and perhaps drawn a few
Americans to the British side. If the British had achieved military success, the example of New
York may have helped a sullen Patriot population reconcile themselves to their defeat. And
there are plausible scenarios where the United States achieved independence, but where lower
New York and possibly other areas (such as Georgia) remained British. In such a case, a
functioning civilian-run Royal New York, complete with an assembly, may have helped Britain
retain the area (perhaps even formally petitioning to remain). So, there were many upsides to
the effort, and the British were right to attempt it. If not a tragedy, it was still unfortunate from
the British point of view that the attempt was aborted.
If the 1780s were too late, would an earlier time have been better? The short answer is
no. In the American Revolution, as in many wars and revolutions, a point was reached where
proposals that might previously have been acceptable and have defused the crisis (or ended the
war) were no longer acceptable. Changing circumstances may foreclose options previously
acceptable. At a certain point, certain options, once reasonable, become out of the question.
This point for America was independence. Before that, proposals such as the British offered in
1778 might have been acceptable. After that, they were the proverbial “day late and a dollar
short.” After independence was declared, anything short of independence was unacceptable to
many Americans. Restored civilian government in a major province would have done nothing to
change that.
In brief review, in 1763, the overwhelming majority of Americans were satisfied with
British rule. The Stamp Act shook this satisfaction, but the desire to remain connected with
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Britain seems to have been strong. What was desired was some form of “taxation with
representation”. Rather than come to some kind of accommodation, such as American
representatives in Parliament or a Continental assembly, Britain insisted that its Parliament had
the right to tax Americans; some even insisted that the American colonies were “virtually
represented” in Parliament. Years of frustration with this impasse resulted in the Boston Tea
Party. The British reaction to this, the Intolerable Acts, was seen as tyrannical, and many joined
in the protests. By the spring of 1775, the situation had resulted in open fighting between
Americans and Britain. But even at this point, many longed for reconciliation, and pinned their
hopes on the king. In July—a month after the bloody Battle of Bunker Hill—the Olive Branch
petition was sent to the king in the hopes of negotiating a peaceful sentiment.
In late December 1775, many Americans still clung to their loyalty to the King, despite
the fact that American blood had been shed by the British in such battles as Lexington-Concord
and Bunker Hill. But reconciliation was still possible. Many longed for it. A hint of compromise,
any gesture of reconciliation, of a desire to find a compromise that gave America a place at the
table, might have averted full-scale war and independence. Instead, news arrived in January,
1776 that the king rejected their professions of loyalty and considered them rebels seeking
independence. He would crush them, and was willing to hire foreign troops to do so.
Americans felt betrayed. The king who was supposed to guarantee their liberty was
seeking instead to extinguish it, and was even hiring foreign troops to do so. The fig-leaf had
fallen; they were at war not with the King’s ministers but with the King himself. Love and bonds
of loyalty to the king began to turn to hate. At this moment, Tom Paine’s pamphlet Common
Sense was released, mocking and ridiculing the very notion of monarchy. Paine even argued
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that God Himself was opposed to monarchy. Many Americans began to cross the psychological
“Rubicon” of independence, as their love and loyalty for the king became hatred and ridicule. A
few months later, the country as a whole crossed the political Rubicon of independence. When
this happened, the King was symbolically decapitated, hung, burned in effigy, and otherwise
executed throughout the newly-independent states. And not just the king was attacked; for in
the months preceding independence, those who still clung to their loyalty, the Loyalists, were
harassed, arrested, and otherwise affronted and endangered. To Patriots, they were the king’s
proxies—and the hate they now held for the king was expressed against the Loyalists. As the
war continued, and even after, the hatred for the King, the hatred for the Loyalists, would
result in savage fighting and ill-treatment of Loyalists. 6
The final months of 1775, therefore, were probably the last chance for a peaceful
reconciliation between the two sides. Once the King’s rejection of the Americans became
known, once Tom Paine’s words fell upon the now receptive soil of American minds and
poisoned many Americans against the very concept of monarchy, reconciliation was almost
impossible, even if the British had been inclined to offer it. Love and loyalty for the king were
replaced by hatred and ridicule. And something else was happening. The Americans, as South
Carolina historian David Ramsey noted in 1789, were no longer subjects, but becoming citizens,
and

6

The Loyalists, for their part, saw the Patriots as traitors, as anarchists, and saw the colonies as falling under mob
rule, led by a small cabal of usurpers. The Patriots were seen as tyrants, seizing Loyalist arms and destroying
Loyalist presses. That savage warfare between the two groups broke out in many places is not surprising.
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…the difference is immense. Subject is derived from the latin words, sub and
jacio, and means one who is under the power of another: but a citizen is a unit of
a mass of free people, who, collectively, possess sovereignty. Subjects look up to
a master, but citizens are so far equal, that none have hereditary rights superior
to others.7

In short, a subject is subjected to the rule of another, while a citizen rules himself—
though this sovereignty is shared with the other free citizens of his polity. The Americans during
the Revolution had at the very least begun this internal transition from subjects to citizens, and
some had completed it. John Adams was astonished at the suddenness of the change, as
“Idolatry to Monarchs, and servility to Aristocratical Pride” was swiftly eliminated.8 Once an
American had become a citizen, could he willingly go back to being a subject? Once he had
been a free citizen, could he return to being subjected to the rule of another? The answer
became apparent that for many Americans, the answer was no. Even if they had to “trim”, even
if they signed loyalty oaths to the king, many switched back to the American side as soon as
possible. Hence, nothing short of crushing military victory could have induced free,
independent, self-ruling American citizens to become subjects to the rule of a king they felt had
betrayed their trust and love. Even then, such a rule would have been tentative at best. Many
Britons and Loyalists came to the conclusion that such rule would last only a few short years,
and that rebellion would re-occur at some point. Such a victory would have required many
soldiers and sailors to enforce, would have likely ended in another revolt, and the “peace”
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would perhaps have been punctuated by violent episodes. Such a victory would not have been
worth the cost. 9
Compromise solutions acceptable to both sides may have been possible. The Galloway
Plan and many other plans that would have preserved British rule and given the American
colonies a voice in their own affairs were proposed before and during the war. Britain
eventually developed a dominion system which accomplished the same thing for other
colonies. While the dominions are in the early twenty-first century functionally independent
(and have been for decades), this process was gradual and for the most part “paper-strewn”,
not violent. To this day the Queen is the ultimate head of state of the dominions, and Canadian
coins and stamps, for example, bear the Queen’s image. Such reconciliation could have
occurred in America. But timing is everything. Solutions acceptable in 1765 or 1770 or 1774 or
1775 would not have been acceptable after July 4, 1776—indeed, it is unlikely that the
Americans would have accepted such a plan in April or May, 1776. They hated the king, and
were becoming self-ruling citizens, not subjects. As John Adams said many years later, “The
Revolution was effected before the War commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and
hearts of the people…”10
Thus, it was unlikely—no, impossible—that the British after July 4, 1776 could have
devised any acceptable plan to peacefully re-unite the colonies with the Empire, or for that
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The possibility also existed that Americans unreconciled to British rule might have left the seaboard and formed
small republics in the interior beyond the reach of British arms. Such a scenario actually occurred in nineteenthcentury South Africa, where Dutch “Boers” dissatisfied with British rule, headed north from Cape Town Colony in
the 1830s and 1840s. They formed small Boer republics, which were eventually destroyed and incorporated into
the Union of South Africa after the Second Boer War.
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matter to turn large amounts of Patriots and non-aligned into Loyalists. Only crushing military
defeat might have brought the Americans to the table. Such a defeat of the Americans never
occurred. Instead, the British lost two armies, one at Saratoga and one at Yorktown, and the
war.

IV

British policy towards their rebellious colonists, including the restoration of civilian
government in New York, was in many ways based on mistaken assumptions. British
misassumptions made the restoration policy seem more promising than it was. If one’s
assumptions are wrong, actions based on those assumptions may very well turn out to be
wrong as well. The most important misassumption was their misassumption as to the loyalty of
the local population. The British received a constant stream of questionable information, all of
which reinforced their erroneous preconceptions concerning the loyalties of the people.
The British did not realize the extent of dissatisfaction with Britain. While there were
many Loyalists in America, they were not the majority. Indeed, one scholar put the number at
no more than 20 percent. In the mid-seventies, there was broad dissatisfaction with British
policies, even among those who would soon be known as Loyalists. As discussed above,
disputes between the Loyalists and Patriots groups were at first mainly over methods and tone.
Loyalists were opposed to the use of committees and meetings, and were appalled at the
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language that many resolutions contained, such as calling British actions tyrannical. In many
towns they issued their own documents, finding the meetings unconstitutional and the
congresses an insult to the lawful, Constitutional government. Many seemed to want to be on
record as opposing all of these actions. Perhaps fearful of a British crackdown, they registered
their protests, so that it would be clear that they had nothing to do with their neighbors’
actions, and had in fact opposed them. Oyster Bay even declared at one point that they
“wanted nothing to do with congresses and committees”. It is also probable that the Loyalists
feared that the disruption of dissent and revolution would threaten their property and destroy
civil order. But the Patriot movement began to move in a direction that could—and did—lead
to armed resistance. This expanded the Loyalist ranks, as some, appalled at this, left the Patriot
movement. It was from the Loyalists that the British got much of their information about
colonial attitudes. As the war continued, they received information from Loyalists such as
Galloway and others, British officials considered American experts such as Robertson, and the
reports of spies. All argued that most Americans were Loyalists. They may very well have
believed this, but it must be noted that such an argument was very much in their own selfinterest.
The information the British received reinforced their preconceptions. They expected
most Americans to be loyal, and the information they received from their sources all indicated
that most Americans were. Reports of war-weariness were misinterpreted to match these
preconceptions. The evident fact that a sizable number of Americans opposed them enough to
go to war was discounted by considering the rebellion to be by a small group of “Usurpers” who
had gained power in the colonies. Perhaps an expansion of their information sources, or a
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more skeptical attitude towards at least some of them, might have helped to give them a better
picture of the number of Loyalists and Patriots. But as it was, the British were in a vast echo
chamber, only hearing what they wanted and expected to hear.
Loyalists such as Galloway and Smith seemed incapable of realizing the extent of
hostility to the British. Confined for much of the war to British-controlled areas, they lost
whatever “feel” they might once have had for public opinion in the unoccupied areas. Spies like
Mr. Heron mistook war-weariness for Loyalism. And the British did not seem to understand the
phenomenon of “trimming”. In New Jersey, on Long Island, in Pennsylvania, and elsewhere,
many signed loyalty oaths. Many of these were no doubt trimmers, trying to protect their
families and property by declaring loyalty to the occupiers. Many of these would renounce
these oaths as soon as they felt safe to do so. Some Britons, such as Carlisle and Serle, began to
sense the truth. Carlisle saw how those who had recently signed oaths of loyalty to the king had
returned to fighting him as the tide turned in Pennsylvania. He realized that for many, declaring
loyalty to the Crown was merely expediency. Carlisle in private wrote that “the common people
hate us in their heart”. He kept this opinion private, and joined in arguments for a policy that
would help win hearts and minds. Whether he thought that would work is questionable, but
perhaps he thought the effort was worthwhile.
If the British assumptions as to the numbers of Loyalists were wrong, their estimates as
to the numbers of Patriots were also wrong. Many British believed small groups of “Usurpers”
were leading the colonists. Every colony had its “ins” and “outs”, groups of families and
individuals, who would fight for power in the colonial assemblies and governments. It was
believed that a “cabal” of some of the “out” factions had used the dispute to curry favor with

428

the common people and gain control of power in the colonies. They had disarmed their foes,
and declared independence. This belief explains some of the “reforms” of the colonies
suggested by Serle and Robertson among others. It was thought that by multiplying offices and
places of honor, by granting titles, by increasing patronage opportunities in the colonies, the
hunger for office, power, and distinction that had led to the armed conflict could be satisfied.
The Revolution was thus reduced to a coup by a cabal of disappointed office seekers. The
solution to this, it was argued, was to replicate the patronage-based system of Britain as much
as possible in the colonies.
Needless to say, this view of the causes of the Revolution ignores the many ideals and
beliefs in rights that helped animate the Revolutionaries. While the Revolutionaries were not
immune to the desire for honors and distinction, there was more to the Revolution than a
desire for office. And even on that level, the Revolution greatly increased offices and brought
new men into politics. For example, offices usually held by British officers, such as
governorships, were now held by Americans. People from lower down the economic or social
scale were in government. It is unlikely that George Clinton, while he may have achieved some
local distinction, would ever have become governor of a royal New York. Mordecai Sheftall and
the carpenters and other workers of Savannah would probably never have held the power they
did in a non-revolutionary situation.
The British believed there were more Loyalists than there actually were, and fewer
Patriots. They misunderstood the motives that animated the Patriots, reducing what the
Patriots believed was a struggle for freedom into a struggle for office and distinction. Thus
they proposed increasing offices and patronage as a partial solution for the Revolution. In their
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overestimation of the number of Loyalists and gross underestimation of the number of Patriots,
and of their motives, the British displayed an appalling misunderstanding of the Revolution and
what was animating the rebellious Americans.
There were more Patriots than Loyalists, but many in the colonies could be considered
non-aligned. The Quakers, for example, accepted the rule of the British as accepted authority
and acquiesced to their rule when Quaker-dominated regions such as the island of Rhode Island
were conquered, but they were in general non-aligned (with obvious exceptions such as “The
Fighting Quaker”, Nathaniel Greene). And in regions such as Westchester, many probably
escaped into what historian Sung Bok Kim calls “privatism”, a political apathy and non-concern
about the war and Revolution. But the Americans were able to put much larger armies and
militias in the field than the Loyalists, and that a sizable number of Americans supported the
Revolution cannot be doubted. This was not an uprising by a cabal of “Usurpers” overthrowing
their governments so that they could rule; the Revolution was a broad-based movement
supported by, if not a majority, a substantial part of the population.
Their misconceptions greatly harmed the British cause. The British were slow to
recognize the need to win back the loyalty and love, the hearts and minds, of the Americans;
the British thought they already had them, for the most part. Hence measures which could
arguably have brought more people back into the British fold, such as the restoration of civilian
government in a region, were not tried in the early part of the war. The counterinsurgency
strategy of the later war was also based in part on the idea that the conquest of part of the
Hudson Valley region and the restoration of civilian government in southern New York would
produce many Loyalist militiamen who could hold the area while the field army conquered new
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territory. In the event, neither the conquest nor the restoration occurred, but it is doubtful that
it would have produced enough Loyalist militiamen to fulfill the role intended for them. Hence,
the counterinsurgency strategy would have failed or been not as successful as hoped.
These misunderstandings of the number of Loyalists in the colony, and for that matter
of the very nature of the Revolution and the Revolutionaries, had a strong negative impact on
British actions. Their intelligence sources supported their false beliefs. Their misconceptions
made the new strategy of which restoration was part seem more promising than it actually was.
Those who saw things differently seem to have kept quiet about their opinions. The plans and
strategies of the British were based on false assumptions about the loyalties of the Americans
and the motivations of the American leadership. It is not surprising that the British failed.

The personnel and the personalities of the British helped influence the sad result for the
British. Had different persons been in charge, different decisions might have been made and
different results ensued. This begins at the very top: the King. Americans felt loyalty to the king;
it was Parliament’s right to tax them that they disputed. Had the King been willing to “bend” a
little, if he had given some indication that a compromise was possible, war and independence
could have been avoided. The “Olive Branch” Petition of July 1775 was a clear indication that
even after fighting had occurred between British and colonial troops, many Americans desired
reconciliation. Instead, the petition was rejected and the king soon declared the Americans to
be in rebellion. A king more willing to compromise might have resolved the Anglo-American
dispute.
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Lord Germain, Secretary of State for the Colonies and the de facto minister of war
during the American Revolution, had been under a cloud ever since the Battle of Minden in
1759, suspected of cowardice and even declared unfit to command British troops by George II.
He had been somewhat rehabilitated since then and even risen to a very high position in His
Majesty’s government, but suspicions remained. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies, he
had to coordinate the actions of generals such as Howe and Burgoyne, and lay down the
policies they would follow. Whatever their other faults, Howe, Burgoyne, Clinton, and the other
commanders had distinguished war records and were considered brave. It is not surprising that
Germain, a man suspected of cowardice, may have felt some compunction in trying to
command these men. Hence, the disastrous operations of 1777 were executed with Germain’s
blessing (or at least acquiescence). Thus, Howe sailed to Philadelphia and his forces were
unable to give aid to Burgoyne when his army got into trouble at Saratoga. Similarly, Germain
did not push Clinton to give his consent to civilian government, even though the British
government desired it. Germain, while he had many virtues, may not have been the best man
for his job.
Perhaps the most important personality for the question of New York was of course
Clinton. There is much evidence that Clinton had difficulty sharing authority and working well
with others. He had difficulty working with Arbuthnot, his fellow peace commissioner, with
Robertson, and there is evidence that sound plans he created were rejected because he was
the source. His biographer, with the assistance of a trained psychologist, believed that this was
more than just a personality defect; it was actually a neurosis.11 Whether one accepts this
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explanation or not, that Clinton had difficulty sharing authority is evident. Restoring civilian
government to New York would have forced him to share his authority and work with a civilian
government. A more affable general who had no difficulty with sharing authority would
probably have been more amenable to restoring civilian government.
There were reasons, legitimate or otherwise, for what seems like an abuse of Clinton’s
discretion, as restoring civilian government was the clear desire of the British government.
These have been discussed above. But the overriding factor seems to have been Clinton’s
difficulties with authority. This made him highly resistant to the desire of the British
government to restore civilian authority. Because of the limitations of eighteenth-century
communications technology, much discretion had to be left to the commanders on the spot by
the authorities in London. Thus, Clinton could reject the policy of the government for highly
questionable reasons and get away with it. Robertson, for his part, had spent his entire career
as a staff officer, and had no martial glory, while Clinton had shown bravery under fire and led
men into battle. Robertson could only push Clinton so much. It is possible that Robertson tried
to force Clinton’s hand with his proclamation of the imminence of civilian government, but this
may merely have been a sign of his eagerness to get to work. In the event, Robertson decided
to compromise and accept what Clinton offered rather than engage in a power struggle with
him.
Thus, “a perfect storm” of personality defects combined to doom civilian government
restoration. Clinton’s difficulties with authority combined with Germain’s reluctance to press
brave officers to do what they did not want to do. Robertson was unable to exert too much
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pressure on Clinton. The result was Clinton avoided sharing authority at the expense of
Germain’s policy. A more forceful war minister might have been able to compel his views on a
reluctant general. Germain, with the cloud of Minden over him, was unable or unwilling to
force the issue. Clinton made his decision and it was accepted. A promising British policy was
thereby doomed, and the personalities involved were a large part of the reason for this. Had
Germain’s position been held by another man, had Robertson been more forceful with a more
martial military record, had another general held Clinton’s position, it is possible the outcome
might have been different.

V

An occupation by its very nature is often a dreadful, miserable situation for the
occupied. Even the mildest occupation will have requisitions of needed supplies, martial law,
and often petty vandalism or theft—or worse—by the troops. Even where the occupying troops
are hailed as liberators, there can be tensions between the occupiers and the occupied. Where
the occupying power is seeking to win the loyalty (or win back the loyalty) of the region,
appalling or dreadful acts can have the additional effect of making this task harder, as it
increases tensions. As discussed above, there were numerous appalling actions by the British
and their allies, ranging from petty theft to home invasions to rape. Churches and burial
grounds were desecrated or disrespected. Staten Island, Long Island and Westchester were
particularly susceptible to raids by small parties of raiders, thieves, and kidnappers. While some
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of these raids were legitimate acts of war under the standards of the time, many of these
actions were basically piracy or brigandage, with politics providing but a bare fig leaf of
justification for crime. Many of these raiders, no matter their alleged side, attacked Loyalists or
Patriots indiscriminately. The British, stretched on all sides particularly after French intervention
in 1778, were unable to provide the needed ships or troops to stop the raiders. To make
matters worse, of the three regiments of militia raised on Long Island to protect the island, two
of them were sent to Georgia. The British were not protecting their subjects; indeed, their
troops were stealing from them, vandalizing them, and even raping them.
Being a known Loyalist was not a guarantee of better treatment. Loyalists were as likely
as Patriots to have property taken with the only payment a chit that might not be honored, or
to have property requisitioned. It was a fateful irony (or perhaps a fatal irony) of the Revolution
that at the level of policy planning, the British believed and acted as if the vast majority of
Americans were Loyalists, or at the least not actively with the rebels, while at the level of policy
implementation, the troops and local commanders acted as if everyone was a rebel.
There was often a lack of discipline, leading to numerous appalling acts. That these acts
put Britain in a bad light and were harmful to the British cause was recognized several times.
For example, in Germain’s plans for 1783, he suggested an invasion of the “Delmarva”
Peninsula, but urged that the troops be better disciplined. While some incidents, such as the
Pudding Hill incident, were rather amusing (at least in retrospect), some were most decidedly
not. It all added up to a picture of a region where life and property were not safe, even for
those who loyally supported the King.
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There were many opportunities for corruption, and many British officials and soldiers
found ways to make some money on the side. Even the Police Courts, set up to allow a means
by which claims could be processed, also provided opportunities for corruption. Rather than
the blessings of good government, the residents of the British zone received corruption. In
addition, as detailed in prior chapters, churches were often disrespected and dismantled,
especially Presbyterian churches. None of this was calculated to win hearts and minds.
High-handed or insensitive actions could alienate even Loyalists. The entertainment
center and promenade at the ruins of Trinity Church disquieted many, especially when
gravestones were removed to accommodate the wide dresses of the time. The newspaper
publisher Rivington was so annoyed by high-handed British treatment that he became a spy for
the Americans. In Westchester, many escaped into privatism, and many on Long Island seem to
have become Patriots, if not actively so, or at the very least neutral. Some Staten Islanders
followed Rivington into acts of espionage.
The occupation of southern New York gave the British a superb opportunity to win back
the hearts and minds of New Yorkers. But the numerous appalling, atrocious, or corrupt actions
of the British and their auxiliaries helped poison these chances.

VI

The British of the eighteenth century were basically a free and decent people. But they
made many mistakes in their occupation and their conduct of the war. Basically free and decent
countries to this day will sometimes find themselves having to conduct an occupation. They
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sometimes find themselves tasked with having to win “hearts and minds,”12 the loyalty and
even love of the occupied. While eighteenth century New York has many differences from the
world of the twenty first century, there are some broadly applicable lessons that can be learned
from the occupation and the war that it was part of. While not exhaustive, here are some
lessons that may be gleaned from the war, the occupation, and the peace effort.
The first lesson is the vital need for cooperation between civilian and military
authorities. Especially in a situation where the objective is to restore civilian government in a
war-zone or an area just behind a war zone, then the military and civilian authorities must
cooperate. In New York, Clinton refused to allow civilian government, even though it was the
clear desire of the British government to do this. By contrast, in Georgia the military and civilian
leaders worked closely together. Realizing that a major purpose of the invasion of Georgia was
the restoration of civilian government, the military handed control over Georgia’s government
of Governor Wright within four months of the invasion. Restoring or establishing civilian
government show that an occupying government and its army intend to restore or establish
liberty, and be liberators, not occupiers. So, a second lesson is that this should be done
whenever possible.
A third lesson is the need to understand one’s opponents, and the nature of the war.
For example, the British commonly believed that the Revolution was largely by a group of
conspirators or usurpers. This was manifestly wrong. This showed a terrible misunderstanding
12
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spoke of needing to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. The ultimate source of the phrase may be the
King James Bible: “And the peace of God, which surpasseth all understanding, shall keep your hearts and minds
through Christ Jesus.” Philippians 4:7.
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of the war and the motives of the opponents. The fourth and fifth lessons are closely related.
They are the need to gather information from a broad number of people, and the need to be
prepared to change one’s preconceptions concerning the loyalty or political views of the
people. British policy was based on the erroneous belief that there were many more Loyalists
than there actually were. The sources of information the British listened to for the most part
argued this, and it fit with their preconceived notions. The British needed to listen to a much
broader range or so than a few upper class Americans or British generals, and needed to base
their opinions and actions on how reality was, not how they wanted to be.
A sixth lesson is the need to negotiate from strength. The Carlisle Commission was sent
to negotiate peace at a time when Britain was in retreat, abandoning conquests in the face of
French entry into the war. They were met with contempt. If their proposals had come on the
heels of a major victory, then perhaps things would have been different. The seventh and
eighth lessons are that, in counterinsurgency operations, areas should be secured before one
attempts to expand the area under control, and that allies should not be abandoned. While
retreats are an inevitable part of war, a careful policy of expanding the area under one’s control
will minimize the possibility of retreat. Part of the occupier’s job is to win, or win back, hearts
and minds, and to reintegrate the region back into one’s empire (or for a modern power, to
integrate the country into a country that is friendly to yours). Retreat means abandoning those
who cast their lot with you—or turning them into refugees. In New Jersey and in Philadelphia
the retreat of the British swelled the refugee population of New York City. Cornwallis’s failure
to secure his Carolina gains caused great harm to Loyalist Carolinians.
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The ninth lesson seems rather obvious. You should have enough troops, supplemented
with local militias. However, generals rarely get enough soldiers. They must use them wisely in
a way that maximizes the ability of the limited amount of troops you have. The proposed use of
the British and Hessian forces as a field army attacking rebel armies and areas, while Loyalist
militias held the newly-seized areas, would have maximized the forces the British had. The
many atrocious incidents committed by the British and Hessian troops shows the need to keep
control of one’s forces (the tenth lesson). Occupiers should also leave receipts for what they
take, and pay for the items eventually. It is difficult to win loyalty from people who are angry
with you. Indeed, not only did these acts fail to win hearts and minds, but probably helped lose
the loyalty of some. Indeed, the eleventh lesson is the need to treat one’s friends well—they
should not be treated like enemies.
The twelfth lesson is the fact that a country may actually be several different entities
loosely connected—one may have to fight the equivalent of several wars. The revolting colonies
were highly decentralized, thinking of themselves as thirteen (or fourteen, if Vermont is
included) independent states united in a “firm league of friendship” as the Articles of
Confederation described it. Thirteen or fourteen separate but interconnected revolutions took
place in these colonies. There was no political “head” whose elimination would bring swift
victory at either the Continental or state levels. The British finally began to recognize the
decentralized nature of America and began to support a strategy based on taking the colonies
back county by county, state by state. Similarly, many areas where wars and occupations may
occur are groupings of different political entities that may be considered a country by courtesy
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only. If that is the case, then it must be factored into strategies for fighting the war and
occupying the region.

VII

Several specific contributions are made by this work to the study of the American
Revolution in general and in New York. First, this work has tried a more global approach which
integrates events in the counties that surrounded New York City with events there. This work
has tried to examine events in all the rural counties and integrate the story of the “suburbs”
with the story of the City. While New York City was the capital of the province and much of the
“action” occurred there, important events occurred in the rural regions. Declarations of rights,
denunciations of British actions as tyrannical, and statements of opposition to the committees
and their pronouncements all occurred in the rural counties surrounding New York City. Indeed,
despite some local differences, a clear pattern of similar actions can be seen when one looks at
all the surrounding counties. One thing that emerges is how, in Staten Island, in Queens, even
in Brookhaven (in Suffolk County), Loyalists were subjected to similar treatment by the Patriots:
suspicious observation and eventually an attempt to disarm. Loyalist Staten Island was
subjected to economic pressure. And in many areas, such as the towns of Queens and
Westchester, formal statements denouncing and rejecting Patriot statements and actions were
made by Loyalists.
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Secondly, this work highlights the effects of what I have called “The Evaporation of New
York”. New York City’s population disappeared as British invasion came closer. When the
British arrived, there were only a few hundred New Yorker’s left, virtually all of them Loyalists.
The Sons of Liberty, the mechanics, all were scattered. The state government was in a small
town on the Hudson, trying to run a war and write a constitution. The government was freed
from the pressure to write a democratic (as opposed to a republican) constitution that would
have been exerted by the Sons of Liberty, the mechanics, and others if New York City’s
population had never fled and New York City remained the capital. The constitution that was
produced, while it had some democratic elements, for the most part was a republican
document full of checks and balances, and was not submitted to the people for ratification as
the Committee of Mechanics had requested. This constitution was in effect from 1777 until the
1820s, when it was finally replaced. Had the population of New York City not “evaporated”, had
the mechanics, Sons of Liberty, and other democratic elements not been scattered throughout
New York and America, it is possible that the pressure exerted by the mechanics and other
democratic elements would have produced a more democratic constitution, and that it would
then have been submitted to the people for ratification. Hence the basically classical republican
John Jay and the other framers of New York’s constitution were able to work and ratify the
constitution they wrote without such pressure. Thus, the British attack and occupation of New
York City and the surrounding region had a long-lasting effect on the government of New York
State.
This work has examined from both the perspective of the British and Loyalist leadership
and the ordinary person the British occupation, with especial attention to the attempt to
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restore civilian government to New York. This is an important story for an understanding of the
Revolution, New York history, and indeed the entire question of military occupations. It traces
the genesis of the idea, and the failed attempt to restore civilian government, and the reasons
for that failure. It thus takes a good look at the Carlisle Commission, whose mission was one of
the catalysts for the policy of restoring civilian government. It highlights the rather fascinating
character of the Earl of Carlisle. His early wastrel days and obvious sense of humor concealed
an insightful mind. As did Ambrose Serle, Lord Howe’s secretary, he saw that the love and
loyalty of the average American was lost. Perhaps because of (or despite) this insight, he helped
push for a new strategy that would hopefully win back these loyalties. Besides the Commission
members, several were thinking in the same way, and the restoration strategy was adopted.
This work highlights an oft-neglected figure, General James Robertson, the man selected
to implement the restoration strategy. Despite the publication in the 1980s of Robertson’s
gubernatorial letterbook, little has been written about him since. His attempt to restore civilian
government, its failure (mainly because of the opposition of General Clinton), and Robertson’s
actions as governor, are a fascinating and important story that needs to be told but which has
been largely neglected. Robertson, if somewhat flawed, was an excellent staff officer and
suffered great personal loss fighting the 1776 fire. He was one of the few from his relatively low
social station to rise to general ranks in the British Army of the Georgian era. Arguably, he tried
to alleviate the miseries of southern New Yorkers with his Police Courts and other actions. He
may have prevented with his advice to General Howe a deadly frontal assault. Unfortunately for
the British, he was unable to persuade Clinton to permit the full restoration of civilian
government in New York. Robertson, his governorship, and his battles with Clinton, are all
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worth studying. This work at the very least begins the work of studying him, or of building on
the work of the 1980s.
The occupation of southern New York was compared and contrasted with events in
Georgia by this work. This is an instructive comparison, as it shows the differences in
approaches, and helps show what could have been. In Georgia, there was good cooperation
between the civilian government and the military. Civilian government was restored, complete
with an assembly. This assembly formed new parishes and courts, attainted rebels, and perhaps
most significantly, voted the King a revenue. All this was achieved despite a shortage of troops
and a fluid military situation. This contrasts with New York, where civilian government was not
restored despite a stable and relatively secure military situation, and helps highlight what could
have been achieved in New York—an achievement which would have been far more visible to
the other colonies and perhaps more fruitful.
But the most basic question of the work is whether the beneficial results the British
hoped for would have occurred if the “experiment” was tried and civilian government restored.
Could it have won over a significant number of colonials back to the British? Could it have
materially affected the war enough to have improved British chances, or even helped win the
war for the Crown? At the very least, could it have resulted in a substantial portion of a major
province desiring, perhaps even proclaiming through an Assembly resolution, their desire to
remain in the empire even after independence was acknowledged by Britain? The short answer
is most likely no.13 The love and loyalty for Britain and the king built up over generations had
been lost. A decade of protest had resulted in war and revolution. Even before independence,
13

Since this a counterfactual situation, what follows is speculation, but informed speculation, based on my
research and many years of thinking of the problem.
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many began, in their hearts and minds, to become self-governing citizens, not subjects. Having
taken this step, it was difficult to step back from it. By July 4, 1776, the nation as a whole took
this step.
Once the nation crossed these psychological and political Rubicons, nothing short of
crushing military defeat could have made them return to their old allegiance (and even then, it
would merely have been bowing to expediency, not heartfelt). In the summer of independence,
the King was symbolically executed numerous times. As the war continued, people under
British occupation took oaths of loyalty to the monarch only to drop their allegiance at the first
opportunity. The very generous offers of the Carlisle Commission (which gave in on virtually
everything except independence) were met with contempt.
While there were many Loyalists, there were not enough. The Patriots were a sizable
minority of the population, and seemed to gained more adherents from the non-aligned and
even Loyalists as the war dragged on, while the British seemed to lose adherents. Indeed, in
those areas occupied by the British, there is evidence that their presence actually turned
Loyalists into Patriots.
For numerous reasons, the experiment should have been tried. It was promising, it
would have at the very least made the occupation less onerous, and there are plausible
counterfactual scenarios where it would have eased the reintegration of the region into the
empire after a peace treaty or British military victory. But would it have brought the great
benefits the British hoped from it? Would the restoration of civilian government in New York
have helped the British win the war and ease the way to the willing return of many Americans
to their old allegiance? The short answer is No.
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VIII

As part of a new strategy following French intervention in 1778, the restoration of
civilian government in occupied New York was proposed, but was not instituted, mainly
because of the opposition of the military commander, General Sir Henry Clinton. It had been
hoped that there would have been great propaganda value to such a restoration, and that it
could have led many individuals, regions, and even states back into the British fold. While in
many ways not a bad policy, it would have not succeeded in its goals. After independence was
declared, little short of overwhelming victory by the British would have restored the colonies to
London.
So, therefore, was the British occupation of New York a failure? Could wiser occupation
policies, particularly the restoration of civilian government, have led to greater success—to
victory in the war, to retention of at least part of New York for the Empire, or at least a
pleasanter occupation for the denizens of down-state (and produced perhaps a few more
Loyalist troops)?
Wiser occupation policies, such as decreasing theft and plunder, protecting people from
rebel raids, paying for requisitions, and restoring civilian government so that a court system
could properly protect the people of the region from British and Hessian actions would all have
made the occupation a better experience. More Loyalist troops (though probably less than
desired), a pleasanter occupation for southern New Yorkers, and even (under some scenarios)
retention of the area might have followed. But the biggest problem for the Empire was that
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everything the British did in America after July 4, 1776, was too late. Once independence was
declared, the war was lost. Even crushing military victory by Britain would probably only have
delayed independence by a few decades.
Americans in general, and New Yorkers in particular, for a long time wanted to remain in
the Empire. While they rejected Parliament’s right to tax them, they respected the King as their
ruler and gave him their loyalty and even love, and considered him the protector of their
liberties, even putting his name on their liberty poles But their love turned to hatred when they
found he had (in their eyes, at least) betrayed them. They began to reject monarchy as a
concept and embrace republicanism and even democracy. From subjects, who, despite their
assemblies and town meetings, were ultimately subjected to the rule of another, they were
becoming and thinking of themselves as self-ruling citizens. Even if their armies had been
crushed, their surrender would merely have been bowing to military reality, and their oaths of
loyalty would not have been heart-felt. There were numerous incidents during the Revolution
where loyalty oaths were taken by Americans, only to be thrown off at the earliest opportunity.
The Revolutionary War was, in addition to a war of armies and generals, fleets and
admirals, a battle for the hearts and minds, the love and loyalty of the American people. There
were many instances before July 4, 1776, when the British could have offered a solution to the
Imperial Question that would have satisfied American aspirations for a place at the table and
retained their membership in the Empire. Even after the Battle of Lexington-Concord, there was
still a slim chance for reconciliation. But what the Americans saw as the King’s betrayal, and the
independence that followed, shut that door. By the time General Robertson arrived in New
York, it was far too late. Even if he had been permitted by Sir Henry Clinton to restore civilian
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government to New York, such an action would only have ameliorated life in the occupied area.
While it may have had many beneficial effects, it would not have changed the fundamental fact
that, outside of the Loyalists (more and more of whom were being gathered in New York), the
“common people”, as Lord Carlisle wrote, hated the British “in their hearts.”
Certainly, the British occupation could have been better. The property and persons of
southern New Yorkers could have been protected more. The rule of law and even an assembly
could have been created. So, in this respect, it was a failure. But even if the occupation had
been a model one, even if civil government had been restored, it would not have mattered.
Even the scenario discussed above, where the United States became independent but the New
York City region remained in the Empire, was unlikely, and if it had occurred, it may not have
lasted long. America was independent. Even New York’s reluctant revolutionaries had crossed
the Rubicon of independence. Nothing the British could have done, including military victory,
would have changed the fact that in their hearts and minds, the Americans had achieved
independence. Even military victory would only have delayed political independence for a time.
In conclusion, the occupation was a failure. It could have been much less harsh
for those in the occupied territory. Wiser policies, such as civilian government, could have been
instituted. Better cooperation between civilian and military leaders would have helped to
institute civilian government. But it would not have mattered. British New York, even under
civilian rule, would not have been a shining example to the other colonies that they should
return to British rule—at least, not an effective one. Few individuals, much less colonies or
regions, would have returned to British rule because of its example. Even restoring civilian
government would thus have been a failure, and not have helped the British win the war. The
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occupation was a failure—indeed it would not be too much to say that it failed before it even
began.
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